Commit Graph
950 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5b92b83869 chore: tooling, docs and a guard for the name (fork, Phase 6)
- rootProject.name is Giza. Res is pinned, so no import moves.
- Regtest: GIZA_REGTEST, GIZA_SPLICE_DELAYS and the gizaRegtest task input;
  node aliases giza-lsp and giza-payer.
- README describes Giza and says what it shares with Bennu: one network, one
  derivation, and a recovery phrase that must not run in both apps at once.
  The clone URL is the planned giza-kmp repository, which does not exist yet.
- docs/README.md is titled Giza docs and says how to read the documents
  written while the app was Bennu.
- CLAUDE.md gains the rule: name the app Giza, never name Bennu outside a
  comment, and never rename a mantra/ or bennu/ derivation tag.
- docs/scripts/brand-audit.sh --check, run by check (brandAudit) and by the CI
  budgets job, fails on Bennu anywhere in composeApp, iosApp, testing or the
  gradle scripts except in a comment or a "bennu/ tag. It catches the strings
  a merge from Bennu brings in, which giza-rename.sh cannot word.
- The plan gains the twelve bennu/ tags, missed when it was written.

jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid, m3Audit and
brandAudit pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:53:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4f3f0da3ca feat: Giza in everything a person reads and on the wire (fork, Phase 4)
- Strings: app_name and the giza key say Giza, as do the eight values that
  named Bennu. Two keys that contained the name are renamed. Two messages that
  meant "has no Marmot key package yet" now say so, since a Bennu user counts.
- Restore: when a recovery phrase is recognised, the sign-in screen says to stop
  using it anywhere else. A seed running in Bennu and Giza at once is two copies
  of one Lightning wallet, which can lose funds.
- Desktop: the window title and the unlock heading come from the catalogue.
  The installers are named Giza (giza on Linux), with a fixed Windows upgrade
  UUID of their own so a Giza MSI never upgrades a Bennu one.
- iOS: PRODUCT_NAME and the product reference are Giza.app.
- Wire: the client tags are Giza and giza. Nothing compares them.
- The twelve bennu/ derivation tags stay as they are. They are hash inputs like
  mantra/, and a Bennu peer and a Giza peer derive the same keys through them.
  Each now has a note saying so. The rebrand-history comments count four.

jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid passes.
m3-audit: all budgets met. It differs from the baseline only by the new restore
line (one more stringResource and one more bodyMedium).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:46:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 34e802ce6f refactor: packages, classes and Res under mobi.giza (fork, Phase 3b)
docs/scripts/giza-rename.sh, run over the moves of Phase 3a:

- com.machankura.bennu.{compose,android,desktop} -> mobi.giza.{...}, in
  package lines, imports, fully qualified references, the manifest, mainClass,
  the Android namespace (one value with applicationId again), the m3Audit
  source path, the six docs/scripts tools, and the source links in docs/;
- Res moves from bennu.composeapp.generated.resources to
  mobi.giza.compose.resources, now pinned with packageOfResClass so a later
  rename of the root project leaves the imports alone;
- BennuDatabase, BennuTheme and the other eleven Bennu identifiers are Giza*.

The script's search is now the same pattern as its sed expressions, so on a
renamed tree it finds nothing and changes nothing.

Checked against the Phase 0 baseline: jvmTest 1643 run (1642 + AppDirJvmTest),
0 failed, 2 skipped; compileDebugKotlinAndroid passes; m3-audit prints the
baseline report line for line. iOS is not compiled on this Linux host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:40:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 30d5feaf87 refactor: move the sources to mobi/giza, paths only (fork, Phase 3a)
docs/scripts/giza-rename.sh --moves-only: com/machankura/bennu becomes
mobi/giza in all six source sets, the nine files named Bennu* are named Giza*,
and the Room schema directory moves to mobi.giza.compose.database.GizaDatabase.
Every source file is a 100% rename, so log --follow and blame go straight
through.

This commit does not compile on purpose: the next one rewrites the contents.
The script, which does both, comes with it so a merge from Bennu can re-run it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:35:04 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 78d913aaf2 feat: Giza installs beside Bennu and never opens its data (fork, Phase 2)
The store identities move first, before any rename, because they are what keep
two installed apps apart:

- the desktop data directory is giza, not curated, which is Bennu's. A Giza
  build in curated would open Bennu's database, key store and wallet;
- the Android applicationId is mobi.giza.android (mobi.giza.android.debug on
  debug). The namespace follows with the sources in Phase 3;
- the iOS bundle id is exactly mobi.giza.ios, without the $(TEAM_ID) suffix
  the template appended to Bennu's;
- the regtest compose project is giza-regtest, so it does not replace Bennu's
  containers. The ports are shared, which the README now says.

AppDirJvmTest checks the directory name on all three OS branches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:34:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4f1b4a4384 feat(lightning): buying inbound liquidity is on, on mainnet
GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED is true, by decision, ahead of the plan's own Phase 0 check
on mainnet: ACINQ's LSP has not yet been seen to accept a splice whose funding key from us does not
change, so the first purchase there is that check. If it refuses, the splice aborts before anything is
signed into it and the purchase is reported failed. A purchase is bounded meanwhile by the mainnet
channel cap, the fee cap the group signs, and every co-signer's checks. The wallet screen now shows Add
liquidity, and the operator's node buys what the group authorises.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 13:09:42 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 94015fd3f8 test(lightning): the group buys liquidity on regtest, end to end (liquidity, Phase 8)
GroupLightningRegtestJvmTest now buys inbound liquidity between receiving and paying: a member prices
200,000 sats from the operator's snapshot, the group authorises it, the operator's node splices, and
every co-signer checks the first commitment on the new output and the shared input before the group
signs. The channel grows from 100,000 to 299,779 sats for 2,521 sats, what the member's device
estimated; a 50,000-sat payment then arrives without an on-the-fly splice; and the run's payment,
mutual close and sweep follow on the spliced channel. No device refuses, and the room gets one line
for the liquidity added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:47:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 db7d12b606 feat(lightning): a member asks the group to add inbound liquidity (liquidity, Phase 7)
GroupLightningLiquidityScreen asks as Phoenix asks its owner: Phoenix's amounts on a discrete slider,
less those the LSP does not sell and those past the channel cap; the miner fee, service fee, its year
and the total, priced on this device from the operator's report with lightning-kmp's own arithmetic
(LiquidityPrice, which matches what eclair charged on regtest to the sat); Phoenix's warning at a
quarter of the amount and its stop at the balance; a fee cap with room above the estimate; and a
review sheet with Phoenix's acknowledgement. Then a proposal, and the signing session it opens.

The wallet screen gains Add liquidity on its balance card, or the reason it is not there, a purchase's
state on its channel row, and Inbound liquidity added in its payment list (a nullable liquiditySat on
the payment row, in schema 35). The room gets a line when a purchase locks or fails.

All of it is behind GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED, off until the regtest run passes; the
operator's node buys nothing while it is off. m3Audit meets every budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:45:01 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 be90715dd3 feat(lightning): the operator's node buys the liquidity the group authorised (liquidity, Phase 6)
GroupLightningNode.buyAuthorised runs with the node's other actions, on the watch of kind 30363: for
each open buy-liquidity it has not taken on, it finds the LSP's rate for the amount, estimates at the
node's own feerate, and splices only if the estimate is within the authorisation's cap, buying at the
feerate the estimate raised to, as Phoenix does. Once per authorisation; not while the channel has a
splice that has not locked, which eclair would refuse; a failure is reported and not retried.

The snapshot now carries the LSP's rates and the node's feerate, for a member to price a purchase from,
each purchase's state (waiting, pending, locked, failed with its reason), how many funding outputs each
channel has live, and the purchase as a `liquidity` payment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:33:50 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b481c14cf9 feat(lightning): every co-signer checks a liquidity purchase before the group signs it (liquidity, Phase 5)
A co-signer keeps a ledger per funding output now (schema 35: IcebergChannelLedger keyed by output,
with its index, the parent it spent and the purchase that let it). A commitment on an output it has
no ledger for is the first commitment on a splice's new one: it must follow the newest output by one
index, rebuild from its context, and open from the parent's ledger at the same number with the same
HTLCs, the group's balance lower by no more than an open buy-liquidity authorisation's fee cap
(CoSignerPolicy.openSplice). The shared input is then held to that authorisation: it spends the pinned
output, makes one new output of the group's key with the LSP's under the cap, buys the amount the
group named, is paid from the channel balance alone, costs what the first commitment took to the
msat and no more than the cap, and the LSP puts in what it is paid for. An authorisation is bound to
the parent of the first splice it let, so however many attempts there are, one confirms.

While two outputs are live a payment settles on both at one commitment number; each ledger records
what its last commitment consumed, and a sibling spends only the difference. Before this the second
commitment was refused as under its floor.

GroupLightningSpliceCoSigningJvmTest, seven four-device tests on regtest and mainnet: a purchase the
group signs and the script interpreter accepts, payments over both live outputs, and each refusal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:30:10 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 28f2d5a72a feat(lightning): the group decides to buy inbound liquidity (liquidity, Phase 4)
A fourth action for kind 30363, `buy-liquidity`: one channel, an amount of inbound, a cap on the fee
(our share of the splice's mining fee and the purchase's own together), an expiry, and an id so two
purchases for one channel are two events. An older build reads it as no authorisation at all, and
refuses the splice that follows.

GroupLightningAuthorisations gains liquidityPurchases, prepareBuyLiquidity -- which refuses a purchase
of nothing, or one past the mainnet channel cap, with a LiquidityProblem of its own -- and
proposeBuyLiquidity. The proposal reads "Add 500,000 sats of inbound liquidity", with the fee cap and
the LSP's year, and the room gets a line once the group signs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:14:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 89504df765 feat(lightning): the co-signing wire carries a splice (liquidity, Phase 3)
A splice's shared input now reaches every co-signer with what it is: CoSigningWire.Context type
`splice`, with the parent funding output, the new one by index, the counterparty's new key, both
contributions, the liquidity purchase and the feerate. A commitment's context names its funding index,
and a request carries every other output the transaction spends.

messageOf computes the taproot sighash at the input that spends the funding output, over every spent
output, and is null when the request leaves one out; check 3 lets a splice spend the funding output
once beside the counterparty's inputs, and refuses a request with no hash to compute. A splice is
still refused, now by name, until the co-signer checks one (Phase 5). The context's spec is optional,
since a splice has none, and every check that reads one refuses a context without it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:14:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5bc3f126da test(lightning): a node that keeps its funding key buys liquidity from eclair (liquidity, Phase 0)
LiquidityPurchaseRegtestJvmTest runs on the regtest network: a stock lightning-kmp node whose channel
keys serve index 0's funding key at every index, as a group's node will, buys 200,000 sats of
inbound three times on one channel, each with its signatures delayed longer, then receives a payment
the channel had no room for before.

What it found, recorded in the plan: eclair v0.14.4 accepts a splice whose funding key from us does
not change, and rotates its own; a purchase needs exactly two group signatures, and eclair allows the
whole splice one minute from quiescence (channel.quiescence-timeout), so both have to fit in it
together; the estimate is our mining share plus the purchase's own fees; and a splice does not raise
the channel's in-flight maximum, which this LSP fixes at the capacity the channel opened with.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:13:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 dcde4a7330 feat(lightning): the fork tells a signer it is signing a splice (liquidity, Phase 2)
Advances lightning-kmp to the splice signing context: a splice's shared input is signed with a
SigningContext.Splice that names the parent and new funding outputs, both contributions and the
liquidity purchase, and every commitment's context names the funding output it is on. The app maps
the new context to nothing on the wire for now, so a co-signer still reads a splice as unsaid and
refuses it, as before; Phase 3 carries it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:13:14 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 84984ca887 feat(lightning): the key ceremony asks once, and ends itself when it stalls
Joining is now the only approval. Every check in the other two rounds --
a contribution against its commitment, everyone's transcript hash, the
public shares making one key -- is the device's, so after joining it sends
its contributions and confirms by itself. Asking a person to tap through
them only let a member who joined and never came back hold the ceremony
open for everybody.

A ceremony that has not finished 24 hours after its proposal is abandoned
by the first participant's device to notice, checked each minute beside
the group nodes, naming who had not taken their part. The deadline runs
from the proposal's own timestamp, so every device agrees on it, and a
proposal read after its deadline is not filed. Any participant can also
abandon a ceremony from its screen. Before this a ceremony nobody finished
blocked the room for good, since a room runs one at a time.

The group screen's Lightning row test now covers both sides of the row
waiting for an onchain wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 10:11:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 83289aa4d0 fix(lightning): the group page's Lightning row waits for an onchain wallet
The Lightning wallet's key is made by the onchain wallet's signers and its
channels close to that wallet, so until the group has opened one the row
has nothing behind it. It now stays on the page disabled, and says that
Lightning is only available once the group has an onchain wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:51:51 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c4d8561cb0 fix(lightning): the wallet's payment list says a close is a close, and a sent amount without its fee
The same two misreadings the regtest run found in the room's lines, on the
wallet screen: a channel's close, which lightning-kmp files as an outgoing
payment with no payment hash, was listed as sent, and a sent amount
included its fee. Both now read through GroupLightningReports.isChannelClose
and recipientMsat, which the room's lines use too. A close is listed as one,
or as closing until it confirms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:06:02 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 94385d2f4a fix(lightning): a channel's close is not a payment sent, and a sent amount leaves out its fee
Found by the regtest run, now that it checks the transcript. lightning-kmp
files a channel's close as an outgoing payment with no payment hash, which
wrote "sent" beside each closed line, and an outgoing payment's amount
includes its fee, so 20,000 sats with an 84-sat fee read as 20,084 sent.
GroupLightningRegtestJvmTest now asserts every device's lines: one per
channel opened and closed, one per payment, and no raw JSON, refusal or
alarm.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:01:18 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 a660fabd7e feat(lightning): a co-signer's refusal and the equivocation alarm, as lines (Phase 6)
The wallet's plan said a person sees a refusal as a transcript line, and
that two hashes echoed for one label raise the alarm in the transcript;
both were logger calls. A refusal is now said on the refusing device only,
once per request, with the check that failed; an operator asking for two
messages under one label is said on every device that sees it, once per
label, in the error tint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:21:21 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3ec79b95ad feat(lightning): what the operator's snapshots say happened, as lines (Phase 5)
A channel opening or closing, and a payment received, sent or failed, each
get one line however many snapshots repeat them. The snapshot restates the
whole wallet, so the line is keyed on the fact, not the message:
ChatMessage.lightningFactKey (v34, an AutoMigration) holds the channel's or
the payment's id. A payment's line sits where the payment happened, and a
channel a newer snapshot no longer holds is said to have closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:19:38 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 1b4ed09798 feat(lightning): what the operator and the members say to each other, as lines (Phase 4)
The node seed being handed out, an invoice asked for and made, and an
operator's node stopping now each write one line, through
GroupLightningLines: on the way out by the device that sends the message,
which never reads its own back, and on arrival by every other, keyed on the
inner event so a redelivery is not a second line. An invoice request and a
stop are filed on arrival for the first time, and a stop is believed only
from the operator of the term it names.

The operator election line names the operator, the Lightning wallet's
signed lines get icons of their own, and every Lightning line opens the
wallet's screen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:11:56 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3922c15d74 feat(lightning): the Lightning ceremony's lines read like the shared key's (Phase 3)
A ceremony stopped on another device was recorded as "Abandoned by" a key
prefix and the sender's exception message, and the screen showed it after
"Abandoned:". IcebergRitualManager.describe now says each fault as a
sentence naming the member at fault, sends that sentence in the failure
message, and the screen shows it in the error card the shared key ceremony
uses.

RitualNotice's chevron was described as opening the shared key ceremony on
every line; each family now says what it opens, the lines that lead nowhere
draw none, and only a request line can carry the approved tick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:06:20 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 03833a1c42 feat(lightning): the Lightning wallet's key ceremony asks from above the composer (Phase 2)
The standing notice under the newest message read only the shared key's
ceremonies, so a member owed the Lightning wallet's join, reveal or confirm
had to scroll to its request line. AwaitingCeremony now says which ceremony
and what it wants, the chat's view model observes the Lightning ceremonies
beside the shared key's, and a tap opens the screen that ceremony has.

The member who opened the Lightning ceremony is also asked, once its key is
made, to open the wallet -- the counterpart to ChillDKG's room awaiting
creation -- until a wallet statement for it is being signed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:03:01 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 638c5aab64 fix(lightning): the wallet's own messages leave no raw JSON in the chat (Phase 1)
Every kind the group Lightning wallet's devices send each other -- the
Iceberg ceremony, the co-signing, the operator's snapshots and invoices --
reached applyInnerEvent's last arm and was written as an unsupported line
holding the event's JSON, beside the lines the managers already write.
GroupLightningEvents.PROTOCOL now joins the ChillDKG and FROST families as
protocol, and MIGRATION_32_33 deletes the bubbles already in rooms, found by
the kind of the inner event behind them, as MIGRATION_26_27 did.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:58:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 515ddea2be feat(lightning): the group node acts as requests arrive, and the mainnet run is recorded
On the first mainnet run, most of the wait for an invoice (six seconds) and for an authorised
payment to leave (five) was the node's ten-second poll. The node now watches the room's
invoice requests (30364) and authorisations (30363, which carry channel actions too), and acts
the moment either changes. The poll stays, for expiries and snapshots. Answering, paying and
closing each take one lock, so a wakeup, the poll and a direct call never act twice on the
same request: payAuthorised checks hasPaid, which suspends, before it marks a payment in hand.

Advances lightning-kmp-app to the commit that keeps payment preimages out of a release build's
Logcat.

The plan doc records the run with ACINQ's mainnet LSP: an on-the-fly 25,000-sat taproot
channel, 8,558 sats received, and a 21-sat payment sent. Every co-signer approved every
commitment. The doc also notes that a payment larger than the channel's 16,442 sats of
inbound would need the splice the co-signers still refuse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:47:32 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 309a486de9 fix(lightning): set the group node up as Phoenix sets up its own
ACINQ's mainnet LSP hung up on the group's node seven milliseconds after init, every time. The
node required simple taproot channels (bit 564). The LSP's init lists neither 564 nor 565, and
BOLT 9 obliges a peer to hang up on a required feature it does not offer. Phoenix leaves the
feature optional and stays connected. Nothing is lost by matching it: lightning-kmp asks for the
taproot channel type in every channel it opens, and the co-signers rebuild every funding output
and commitment as taproot.

The node now takes Phoenix's setup wherever the group's terms allow:
- lightning-kmp's default features and peer storage
- connect and handshake timeouts that grow with each attempt, tripled over Tor
- the LSP's onion address while the identity has Tor on, and no clearnet dial over Tor
- the 50% relative cap on liquidity fees

The absolute fee cap stays the statement's, and the redial backoff stays: Phoenix's resets at
every handshake, which against an LSP that hangs up after init would redial every 0.1 s.

On the operator's emulator, the group's connection to ACINQ now holds. The regtest run still
opens a simple_taproot_channel and passes. Whether ACINQ opens a taproot channel to the group's
node is still unknown until one is opened on mainnet. The plan doc says so, and Phase 0's
instruction to require the feature is corrected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:03:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3e4de464fe feat(lightning): the group node redials the LSP, and says why it was dropped
lightning-kmp never reconnects by itself. The identity's own node has Phoenix's connection
daemon for that; the group's node connected once, so a single drop left it offline for the
rest of the term.

It now redials after every drop, waiting two seconds and doubling up to five minutes. A
connection that ends within a minute counts as a failure, so an LSP that hangs up on our
features isn't redialled every two seconds. Each drop is logged with its reason. When the
LSP's init doesn't offer a feature we require, the log names it. The node waits up to a
second for that init, because the socket can read as closed before the init's event arrives.

Run against ACINQ's mainnet LSP on an emulator, every drop reads: "Connection closed: the
LSP does not offer simple_taproot_channels, which this node requires". The plan doc now
records that against Phase 0's first step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 22:37:54 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 cf8ae0200e feat(lightning): the group Lightning wallet on mainnet only
The Lightning wallet now opens on the node's own network, mainnet,
where the group's onchain wallet already is, so the separate testnet3
onchain wallet and its row on the group's screen are gone.
GroupLightningRollout.allows takes mainnet and regtest, nothing else.

This lifts the plan's mainnet gate by decision, ahead of its condition:
an outside review of the Iceberg scheme and the DKG, and a month on
testnet3. The LSP's signing deadline was never measured either.
Meanwhile:

- Every co-signer refuses to sign for a mainnet channel over
  MAINNET_CHANNEL_CAP, 1,000,000 sats, so a bigger one never opens; none
  grows, since splices are refused.
- The opening screen says the scheme is unreviewed and names the cap.

Running the co-signing suite on mainnet (now a second test class) found a
bug that would have stopped everything there: every key manager was built
with a testnet swap-in tpub, which lightning-kmp rejects on mainnet. That
covers every co-signer and the operator's node. Mainnet now takes the
mainnet LSP's published xpub; nothing derives from it.

The full JVM suite (1,578 tests) and the regtest run pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 21:45:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5ff9380b03 feat(lightning): turn the group Lightning wallet on, on testnet3 (Phase 15)
GroupLightningRollout.ENABLED is now true. A Marmot group's screen offers
the Lightning wallet and the testnet3 onchain wallet it closes to, and
devices run the group nodes they are elected to. NIP-17 rooms still get
neither: they have no key to sign with. Mainnet is still refused by
GroupLightningRollout.allows, whatever a screen offers.

It was turned on before Phase 0's testnet3 measurement of how long the
LSP waits for a signature, so the 60-second signing deadline is a guess
until the first groups run there. The plan doc says so.

The wallet-row test now finds the onchain row by its title and status,
since the testnet3 row is also "Not opened yet". A new test checks that
the Lightning rows open the Lightning wallet and the testnet3 wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 21:25:37 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 0939bd4c55 Merge branch 'bennu' into claude/lightning-wallet-iceberg-f20da1
Brings in an Electrum client for a profile with no node: IdentityElectrum
gives an nsec or npub profile a StandaloneElectrum of its own, so every
profile can watch the chain.

For the group Lightning wallet:

- GroupChainClients now sits on IdentityElectrum's client for the node's
  network, so group wallets and the watcher work on profiles with no node
  too.
- Each other network (testnet3, for the Lightning wallet) now gets a
  StandaloneElectrum instead of this branch's own connection loop. The
  old loop picked a server with ElectrumServers and connected directly,
  ignoring the profile's Tor setting, so a profile with Tor on would have
  reached a testnet3 server in the clear. The new one uses onion servers
  while Tor is on. A test covers it.
- The group's Lightning node takes its context and logger from the app,
  not the identity's Phoenix business, so a profile with no node that
  holds a share can be elected and run it.
- The member wallet's follow() keeps its network parameter.

The full JVM suite (1,568 tests) and the regtest run pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 21:28:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 cb277d3269 Merge branch 'bennu' into claude/lightning-wallet-iceberg-f20da1
Brings in the guarded member wallets, guarded subgroup wallets, ceremony
creation, and the removal of the group's nostr profile, relays and posts.

Two clashes needed more than a textual resolution:

- Event kinds. The guarded-wallet family took 30333-30337, the numbers
  the Lightning family used for its ceremony. Nothing conflicted
  textually and nothing would have failed, since each side reads the
  other's events by kind. The Lightning family moves to a fresh run,
  30350-30366, which costs nothing: rumor kinds that never shipped.
  GroupLightningEventsTest now knows the guarded-wallet kinds and asserts
  the family starts past every kind the app uses.
- Schema versions. bennu used 27-31. This branch's four versions were
  never on an installed database, so they become one migration, 31 to 32,
  adding the 13 Lightning tables.

Also:

- bennu's new member-wallet calls (broadcast, confirmationsOf,
  guardianSpends, the fee suggestion) now take the network, because this
  branch made Electrum clients per network.
- bennu's watcher conflict check uses the transaction's own network.
- NEVER_BROADCAST is gone with the broadcast screen, and so is the test
  that checked the Lightning statements against it.

The full JVM suite (1,554 tests) and the regtest run pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:23:33 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3f5de5887c refactor(wallet): every profile can watch, so the cannot-watch branches go (Phase 3)
The wallets are non-null wherever a screen is reached with an identity, and
with them go GroupWalletAddressesUIState.CannotWatch, the CANNOT_WATCH refusal,
canWatch on both wallet states and the new-member-wallet view model, and the
two strings that explained it. An nsec profile can now ask for a member wallet.
The profile screen keeps a nullable wallets, for previews and tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:16:29 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 da48d7b06c feat(wallet): an nsec or npub profile watches the chain on a client of its own (Phase 2)
IdentityElectrum hands the nav host the node's client for a profile with a
node, and a StandaloneElectrum for one without, stopping the last before the
next is made. The group wallets and the transaction watcher are made from it,
so they now exist for every profile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:10:19 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 9899c57164 feat(wallet): an Electrum connection loop for a profile with no node (Phase 1)
StandaloneElectrum is the node daemon's Electrum branch without the business:
the identity's server, the same pauses and handshake timeouts, a fresh start
on any change to the network, Tor or the server, and no clearnet connection to
a server the user wants reached only over Tor. Not wired in yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:05:31 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 ceffda81f6 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/bennu' into claude/wallet-guardian-group-display-4e7e78
Brings in guarded-wallet forwarding (docs/guarded-wallet-forwarding.md),
which made telling the groups above automatic and touched the same
sharing code in GuardianManager.

Resolved by keeping both: its upwardOf, elected sender and catch-up,
and this branch's naming and certificate tag. Its automatic forward now
carries the guardian's birth certificate too (guardianCertificateFor),
and D5's re-tell rule moved into its told(), replacing alreadyTold. Its
wallet-level named() is dropped in favour of this branch's, which also
fills the guardian and branch names.

GuardedWalletForwardJvmTest's "the button offers only what goes up"
now shares with the certificate, as every share from this build does;
without it the wallet is rightly offered once more.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 12:18:38 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 abb2c550ab feat(wallet): a person's page lists each guarded wallet once, with the group that guards it (Phase 6)
Wallets your groups guard drew one row per holding group, so a wallet
held by a group and its parent appeared twice, each row calling its
holder the guardian. MemberWalletManager.byWallet gathers the rows into
one entry per wallet: headed by its label, "Guarded by #M" for the
group that signed its certificate, and under it each group here with a
leaf in it, nearest first -- "#P: after 144 blocks, about 1 day" --
with Spend where this device holds a share, described as "Spend from
Savings as #P".

GuardedHere.guardianName, which was the holder's room name, is now
holderName, so it is not mistaken for the direct guardian's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 12:09:26 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 a49c3c1639 feat(wallet): an ancestor's wallet screen gathers a member's wallets and names who guards each (Phase 5)
Members' guarded wallets move under a Members' wallets sub-heading, one
header per person -- @alice, "2 wallets, guarded by 2 groups" -- that
opens their profile, with a card per wallet beneath it. Each card says
which group below guards it: "Guarded by #N", "Guarded by #M, below
#P" where it is further down than this group's own child, "Guarded by
this group", or, with no name this device can check, "Guarded by a
group below #P". An unlabelled wallet is headed by that line.

Fund and Spend now name the wallet as well as the person, so a screen
reader tells one member's several wallets apart. The spend form's
title, the proposal a signer reads and the transcript line name a
labelled member wallet the same way: @alice's guarded wallet "Savings".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 12:04:08 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 695b3db84c feat(wallet): an ancestor's guarded wallets gathered by person (Phase 4)
byPerson() gathers the member wallets among an ancestor's guarded rows
into one PersonGuardedWallets per member: their rows nearest first,
then by the guarding group's name, and a count of the distinct groups
that directly guard them. Subgroups' wallets are left out. Pure, over
the rows the screen already holds, so nothing has to be kept in step
while the chain redraws them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:58:16 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5200c4c182 feat(wallet): a notice of a member's wallet carries its guardian's birth certificate (Phase 3)
A 30333 carrying a 30334 gains ["certificate", <30329>]: the birth
certificate of the group that signed the member's wallet, so a device
in a group above that was never in that room can name it. It is a tag,
so an older build still believes the wallet, and it is checked with
certifies before it names anything.

GuardedWallet carries the checked certificate, Shareable passes it on,
and share writes it, so each hop up the tree hands it further. A room
told before notices carried it is offered again, once, when this
device has one to add.

Tell the groups above now offers only guardians above the room it is
shown from. It offered every guardian but that room, so a device in P
and M was asked to tell M about M's own member's wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:56:59 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 a91bcfc269 feat(wallet): a member's wallet is named by the group that guards it, where this device can check (Phase 2)
GuardedSubject.Member gains guardianName and branchName, filled in
GuardianManager.named beside ownerName, so every caller of
guardedWalletsOf gets them without a lookup in a composable.

Each name is the room's founding name, read off a birth certificate its
parent signed and checked with SubgroupBirthCertificateEvent.certifies,
whoever handed it over: the certificates the parent signed, the room's
own key state, or one a subgroup's statement told to the holding room
carries. Without one, the room's name here; without that, null.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:51:42 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 449d80f8bf feat(wallet): a guarded wallet knows the group that directly guards it (Phase 1)
GuardedWallet gains three derived properties: directGuardianChatRoomId,
the nearest guardian, which for a member's wallet is the group that
signed its certificate; isGuardedHere; and branchChatRoomId, the
holding group's own child the wallet sits under. All are read off the
guardians and the line of descent a verified certificate already gives.

LineageExample is the note's R/P/M/N tree with Alice's two wallets in
it, for this phase's tests and the later ones.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:49:11 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 7b6ea16c3b feat(wallet): the wallet screen says sharing upward happens on its own (forwarding, Phase 6)
Tell the groups above stays, as the fallback for what the automatic
forwarding could not send, and now says so once under its heading:
this device tells the groups above on its own when it can, and Share
is for a group above that has not heard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:47:28 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 ea557306a5 feat(wallet): one line per guarded wallet shared into a group, and the forwarder sees it (forwarding, Phase 5)
With several devices able to forward, a group can be told about one
wallet more than once. A notice now writes its transcript line only
when it is the first the room holds for that statement, and none when
the room signed the statement itself; a duplicate is filed and silent.

share writes the forwarder's own line into each group it tells, since a
sender is never handed its own MLS message back -- for the automatic
forwarding and the button alike.

Two older tests described a notice under an id other than the one they
filed, which now reads as a second notice; they describe the filed one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:46:43 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 23b6f00496 feat(wallet): opening a group catches up on what the groups above were never told (forwarding, Phase 4)
GuardianManager.forwardAll forwards everything the button would list
from a room, on every network, without the election: what the elected
device never sent, what arrived while this one was offline, and every
certificate and statement filed before forwarding existed. It runs as
the group's chat opens and before its wallet screen reads what is left
to share, through ChatRepository.forwardGuardedWallets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:44:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 29979e6ba5 feat(wallet): a guarded wallet is told to the groups above as it arrives (forwarding, Phase 3)
Three arrivals now forward, on the device elected to send at once: a
member wallet certificate filed in the group that signed it, a guarded
wallet statement filed in a subgroup, and a notice arriving in a group
-- the statement inside goes on a generation further, from any device
that believes it, whether or not it holds that room's key. Each rides
on the arrival and never fails it.

GroupWalletRollout.FORWARDS_GUARDED_WALLETS is the switch; the button
does not read it. A member's wallet signed two generations down now
reaches the root with nobody calling share.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:43:00 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 7397ca46ed fix(wallet): a guarded wallet is told upward only, to a group that does not hold it (forwarding, Phase 2)
GuardianManager.forward tells every group above a room that this device
can tell about a statement it believes, as the profile in that room.
With whenElected it sends only where this device is the elected sender
among the members of both rooms; the catch-up will send the rest.

The button's targets move onto the same rules, which fixes two bugs in
it: it offered to tell guardian groups below the room as well as above
-- the root re-telling the middle group that told it -- and a guarding
group's own member certificate, held as a signed event, never counted
as told. A target belonging to another profile on the device is never
told either.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:41:12 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8c46ba8a1b feat(wallet): what a forwarder believes, and which groups are above (forwarding, Phase 1)
GuardianManager.verify splits into believable -- everything it checks
except the walk down from an ancestor's own guardian root, which only a
device holding that key can make -- and the walk. believable is what a
device checks before passing a statement on.

upwardOf is the groups a statement is told to from a room: those after
it in the guardian list, never those before. electedSender is who, of
the members in both rooms, sends at once. Nothing calls either yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:38:39 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b7baea701b fix(wallet): a direct chat is not a group that can guard a member's wallet
A direct chat is a Marmot room of exactly two people, and never has a key
-- a ceremony needs three -- so it passed the picker's only filter and sat
there asking for a key nobody can answer with. MemberWalletManager.couldGuard
leaves out a room of fewer than three members unless this device knows its
key, so a real group that shrank to two after its ceremony stays. The
picker (groupsOf) and the group page's members' wallet section and Ask
button use the same rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 11:09:45 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8871e47224 feat(wallet): the group picker lists only groups that guard members' wallets, or may
"Choose a group to guard it" no longer lists a group that never opened to
its members' wallets, or has closed: neither is a choice. A group whose
key -- and so whose policy -- this device has not been told stays, with
the button that asks, since the answer is how it learns the group is
open; so do the refusals about the profile itself. The empty list now
says how that changes: a group's signers can turn it on from its page.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 10:58:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 0e3110bff7 feat(wallet): a group opens, sets and closes its members' wallets (Phase 6)
The group's page shows, first in Members' guarded wallets, where the group
stands -- guarding them after a delay, never having said so, or having
stopped -- to everybody in a Marmot group, with Change or Guard members'
wallets for a device that can sign. It opens MemberWalletPolicyScreen:
the delay chooser, what a change reaches (only wallets asked for from now
on), the older-app caveat, Ask the group, and for an open group Stop
guarding new wallets behind a dialog saying closing releases nothing.
Each proposes a 30337 through the existing signing session.

GuardianDelayChooser and its state, GuardianDelayInput, move out of the
subgroup picker so both screens share them; the picker's behaviour is
unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 10:49:56 +02:00