This moves the anti-pre-mine commitment back into `pszTimestamp` and
keeps it as ASCII text, rather than using it as a fake public key. The
genesis transaction's output is replaced by an `OP_RETURN` to avoid
confusion over spendability. Using the `OP_RETURN` output and `nVersion`
rolling for additional nonce bits are explicitly allowed.
BIP352 scanning assumes consensus-valid transactions. These fixtures
have a Taproot control parity mismatch and ECDSA encodings without
a sighash byte.
Correct both sending and receiving copies. The DER lengths and R/S
stay unchanged. Append SIGHASH_ALL outside DER as an encoding
correction. Complete transaction signature validity remains outside
these input-only fixtures.
The 29 vectors pass the official reference runner before and after.
Expected outputs, addresses and shared secrets are unchanged.
Now PSBT_OUT_SP_V0_INFO provides labeled-spend public key not the base-spend
public key.
Modify test vector with labeled-spend key to the same recipient from:
two sp outputs - output 0 uses label=3 / output 1 uses label=1
to:
three sp outputs (same scan key) - output 0 uses label=1, outputs 1 and 2 uses label=2 (same spend key)
This vector excercises the BIP375 sorting outputs with same scan key properly.
The next commit will fix the validation logic and address this failing test.
bump ChangeLog to 0.1.3
"The PSBT_OUT_SP_V0_INFO should be serialized as a zero byte for the
version, followed by the 33 bytes of the scan key and then 33 bytes for
the spend key" names the field, and the field is 66 bytes: its table
entry is "<33 byte scan key> <33 byte spend key>", the test vectors carry
66, and the validator refuses anything else.
The sentence is in the Unique Identification section and was added with
it, so what it describes is the output script that stands in for a silent
payment output when building the unsigned transaction that identifies the
psbt -- 67 bytes there, and nothing about the field. Read as the field's
own serialization it contradicts the table, which is how it first read
here.
Only the wording changes.
In the "PSBT with invalid output witnessScript typed key" case, the
value of the PSBT_OUT_WITNESS_SCRIPT record no longer hashes to the
P2WSH program in the output's redeemScript: 65f0b3dd trimmed it to its
last six bytes while fixing a short read.
Re-encode the record as `02 0100 25 <script>`: the key stays one byte
too long, which is what the case tests, and the value is the original
37-byte script again. Same total length, same layout as the "invalid
output redeemScript typed key" case.
All vectors were tested against libsecp256k1, and
all verification vectors were checked against OpenSSL.
A check was also added to the `verify` specification
to reject pubkeys with x or y coordinates greater than
or equal to `p`.
Add a vendored copy of the secp256k1lab library (master branch, commit
a265da139aea27386085a2a8760f8698e1bda64e) that the full-aggregation
reference implementation and test vector scripts depend on.