Since the sigOpCount calculation was copied from P2SH, and P2SH
restricts the use of CHECKMULTISIG with pushed integers the reference
implementation would not take into account the number of public keys for
17 to 20 keys (not representable with an OP_N) even for P2WSH.
Therefore it fallbacks to accounting for 20 sigops in this case, which
this sentence seemed to mismatch with.
Btcd and Libbitcoin use the same calculation as in Bitcoin Core.
Signed-off-by: Antoine Poinsot <darosior@protonmail.com>
e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2 BIP155: change when sendaddrv2 is to be sent (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
Mandate to send `sendaddrv2` to the peer before sending our `verack`
to them.
This way we know that the peer does not support `addrv2` if we did not
receive `sendaddrv2` from them before receiving their `verack`.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
harding:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
jnewbery:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
laanwj:
re-ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
jonatack:
ACK e549ed3
hebasto:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2, I believe that the establishing of connection invariants in a such manner--in response to the `version` and prior to sending the `verack`--is the right way both for new `addrv2` message and for other future features.
Tree-SHA512: ec8c40a7f857cc8b7df10812cb34d526299b6908b06049dfea24e25d830fc2d01bf4c052e9e4cd575ce4a1b93032cbe27323a390fe7fb90803a5975dd363d150
Mandate to send `sendaddrv2` to the peer before sending our `verack`
to them.
This way we know that the peer does not support `addrv2` if we did not
receive `sendaddrv2` from them before receiving their `verack`.
When lockinontimeout is true, we don't transition directly from STARTED
to LOCKED_IN, so don't imply that we do.
If startheight or timeoutheight are not on a retarget boundary, they
behave as if they had been rounded up to the next retarget boundary,
so to keep things simple, require them to be at a boundary.
If timeoutheight is less than two retarget periods later than startheight,
behaviour when lockinontimeout is true (one retarget period of STARTED,
one of MUST_SIGNAL, one of LOCKED_IN, then ACTIVE) will not match
behaviour when lockinontimeout is false (one retarget period of STARTED,
then either LOCKED_IN or FAILED), so disallow that as well.
This removes the FAILING state and adds compulsory signalling during a
new MUST_SIGNAL phase during the last retarget period prior to the
timeout height.
This ensures that if a deployment occurs using bip8 with
lockinontimeout=false and timeoutheight=N, that a later deployment using
bip8 with lockinontimeout=true and timeoutheight=K, where K<N that any
chain where LOCKED_IN is reached prior to height K, will be accepted as
valid by nodes using either set of deployment parameters.
It also ensures that the soft-fork's changed rules are only enforced
on chain a retarget period after signalling indicates enforcement is
expected (which was not previously the case if the FAILING to ACTIVE
transition took place).
6ef71b344c51aebe1dab5ac47f87d8f926462a65 BIP155: Small text improvements (Hennadii Stepanov)
562f1d71883d1daa0dd5f438d25986fb18465800 BIP155: Mention SHA3-256 explicitly (Hennadii Stepanov)
Pull request description:
It seems better to clarify that `CHECKSUM` in Tor onion v3 address uses SHA3-256 hash function.
ACKs for top commit:
vasild:
ACK 6ef71b344
laanwj:
ACK 6ef71b344c51aebe1dab5ac47f87d8f926462a65
Tree-SHA512: b88c7dfeeda2a99cfe1042c9f4e7cbeb6047882bf97ce9c1dd5e1f4a30203a9a03702638cc4b6c3b573f6c0a05b73a5ca43a77352a5ca24a32d19be129f8b317
The Bitcoin Core source code has `VARINT` type which is different than
the "variable integer" format used all over the P2P protocol and also
for the "services" field in this BIP. The latter is called `CompactSize`
in some BIPs and also in the Bitcoin Core source code, thus use the word
`CompactSize` to refer to it and link to its documentation.
