Kgothatso Ngako 670f87a609 docs: record what phase 3 turned out to require
Phase 3 is implemented in the fork on claude/jvm-target-actuals (ce49657).
The security analysis in the plan held up; three practical constraints
around it did not appear until the code was written.

**A passphrase-derived KEK is not a drop-in.** The plan treated the choice
between a passphrase, an OS keychain and a key file as the whole decision.
But keyStoreEncryption(keyName, plainText) takes no context and no secret
-- on android the OS holds the key, so none is needed -- which means any
passphrase scheme needs an out-of-band unlock the expect cannot express.
That is a change to application startup, not just to the actual, so it is
now called out against phase 5: the desktop entry point has to prompt and
unlock before the wallet starts.

**The iv must be 16 bytes.** EncryptedSeed.V2.serialize in commonMain
throws on anything else, which rules out a conventional 96-bit GCM nonce
-- worth knowing before designing around one. It turns out to help: with
randomly generated nonces the risk is a repeat under one key, and 128 bits
makes that vanishingly unlikely where 96 merely makes it unlikely.

**Argon2id costs a dependency.** The jdk has PBKDF2 and no memory-hard
KDF at all, so it means bouncycastle. Recorded with the reason to pay it:
if the build is dev-only because it lacks hardware backing, weakening the
KDF too gets the trade backwards.

Also recorded: wrap a per-name data key under the KEK rather than
encrypting the seed with it directly, so a passphrase change rewraps 32
bytes; throw java.security.KeyStoreException when locked, since the
graceful* wrappers already map it to
DecryptSeedResult.Failure.KeyStoreFailure; and a verification section
naming the properties that fail quietly, plus the two limits worth writing
down rather than fixing -- the first unlock on a new store accepts any
passphrase, and zeroing the key is best effort.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:13:07 +02:00
2026-07-05 23:21:02 +02:00
2026-07-28 09:10:20 +02:00
2026-03-24 04:47:19 +02:00
2026-03-23 01:41:39 +02:00
2026-03-23 01:41:39 +02:00
2026-03-23 01:41:39 +02:00

This is a Kotlin Multiplatform project targeting Android, iOS, Desktop (JVM).

  • /composeApp is for code that will be shared across your Compose Multiplatform applications. It contains several subfolders:

    • commonMain is for code thats common for all targets.
    • Other folders are for Kotlin code that will be compiled for only the platform indicated in the folder name. For example, if you want to use Apples CoreCrypto for the iOS part of your Kotlin app, the iosMain folder would be the right place for such calls. Similarly, if you want to edit the Desktop (JVM) specific part, the jvmMain folder is the appropriate location.
  • /iosApp contains iOS applications. Even if youre sharing your UI with Compose Multiplatform, you need this entry point for your iOS app. This is also where you should add SwiftUI code for your project.

Build and Run Android Application

To build and run the development version of the Android app, use the run configuration from the run widget in your IDEs toolbar or build it directly from the terminal:

  • on macOS/Linux
    ./gradlew :composeApp:assembleDebug
    
  • on Windows
    .\gradlew.bat :composeApp:assembleDebug
    

Build and Run Desktop (JVM) Application

To build and run the development version of the desktop app, use the run configuration from the run widget in your IDEs toolbar or run it directly from the terminal:

  • on macOS/Linux
    ./gradlew :composeApp:run
    
  • on Windows
    .\gradlew.bat :composeApp:run
    

Build and Run iOS Application

To build and run the development version of the iOS app, use the run configuration from the run widget in your IDEs toolbar or open the /iosApp directory in Xcode and run it from there.


Learn more about Kotlin Multiplatform

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Mantra as a kotlin multiplatform project
https://mantra.press
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