Kgothatso Ngako 65e4a3acc0 fix: seal the Welcome, the one gift wrap an MLS room must publish
No invite to a Marmot room has been delivered since 1700e6d. The Welcome
was built, hashed, queued and logged exactly as before -- and then refused
one step short of the relay, by a guard that had no idea it was looking at
one.

**The guard.** 1700e6d ("send a direct message into the group, wrapped for
one member") added a backstop at the top of sealGiftWrapPayload:

    val chatRoom = database.chatRoomDao().findChatRoomById(giftWrapPayload.chatRoomId)
    if (chatRoom?.chatRoom?.mlsGroupState != null) { log; return }

Its reasoning is sound and still is: a Marmot direct message is a genuine,
correctly signed NIP-59 gift wrap, indistinguishable from one this path
would be right to publish, and the only thing keeping it off a relay is
that it never becomes a GiftWrapPayload row. Refusing at the seal as well
means a future caller cannot walk one onto a relay by accident.

**Why it caught the Welcome.** MarmotOutboundDao.deliveryWelcome writes a
GiftWrapPayload with chatRoomId = nostrGroupId -- the MLS room's own id,
which by construction has mlsGroupState set. Every Welcome therefore
matched a refusal keyed on mlsGroupState alone. There is no Welcome that
does not: the tag identifying the room is the whole point of the event.

The kind:444 arm further down -- the one that wraps only for the
participant who published the referenced key package -- became
unreachable, which is why nothing in the logs said "welcome" at all.

**Why it went unnoticed.** The room reaches the correct state on the
inviter's side whether or not the Welcome goes out: addMember advances the
epoch, the group state is persisted, the Participant row exists, and
"Invited X to chat" is written to the transcript. From the coordinator's
side an invitee who never heard anything is indistinguishable from one who
joined -- recorded as a known gap in docs/shared-key-ceremony.md, and this
is what was behind it.

**The second-order damage.** observeUnsealedGiftWrapPayloads is

    SELECT * FROM GiftWrapPayload WHERE publicKey = :p AND giftWrapSealId IS NULL

collected as a Flow<GiftWrapPayload?> -- one row at a time. giftWrapSealId
is only ever set inside persistAndBroadcastGiftWrap, which the guard
returns before reaching, so a refused payload stays unsealed forever and
sits at the head of that queue. The first Welcome a user queued blocked
every gift wrap behind it, in every room, for the life of the install.

**The fix.** Kind first, room second. MIP-02 addresses kind:444 to someone
who is not yet in the group and holds no key to read a kind:445 -- a
relay-borne gift wrap is the only way to reach them, and deliveryWelcome
queues one on purpose. Every other kind is refused exactly as before.
sendChatMessage already branches on mlsGroupState before writing a
payload, so an MLS room's messages never arrive here anyway; the guard
stays as the backstop it was meant to be.

docs/marmot-direct-messages.md claimed "An MLS room should never produce a
NIP-17 gift wrap for any reason". That premise is what made the guard look
complete, so it is corrected rather than merely amended, with the test to
apply when adding a kind to the exemption: can its recipient read a
kind:445? If so, it does not belong on this path.

**Not fixed, deliberately.** A refusal still leaves the payload unsealed
and head-blocking. That is now unreachable -- nothing else can queue a
payload against an MLS room -- but it remains a trap for whatever gets
refused next. Marking a payload refused needs a state the schema does not
have, so it is left for its own change rather than smuggled in here.

Verified: :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid succeeds. No test covers
this -- DatabaseChatRepository is Room-backed, and Room-backed code has no
unit test harness in this project.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 00:40:31 +02:00
2026-07-05 23:21:02 +02:00
2026-07-28 09:10:20 +02:00
2026-03-24 04:47:19 +02:00
2026-03-23 01:41:39 +02:00
2026-03-23 01:41:39 +02:00
2026-03-23 01:41:39 +02:00

This is a Kotlin Multiplatform project targeting Android, iOS, Desktop (JVM).

  • /composeApp is for code that will be shared across your Compose Multiplatform applications. It contains several subfolders:

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