426e53be9d86c54b5bf3898ae1ec9c0a0a06eb34
558 Commits
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Kgothatso Ngako
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426e53be9d |
feat(frost): offer batch signing through the repository
Phase 4 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md: the app-facing surface for what Phase 3 built, plus the two rules a caller has to know before reaching for it. FrostSigningRepository.proposeSigningBatch takes a List<EventTemplate<*>> and returns the one session that signs all of them. proposeSigning stays exactly as it was -- AddDialectViewModel, AddArtifactViewModel and GroupKeyStateManager need no edit, and none is made here. Both forms now share one `proposing` helper for the throw-to-null conversion. The reason it exists is unchanged and now covers two more cases: proposing throws when the group has no key, when this device was not in the ceremony, and now when a batch is empty or over MAX_BATCH_SIZE. All four are states the UI is supposed to have checked for, so they become a null the caller reports. ## The two rules, written where a caller will read them A batch is only as available as its worst item. It is all-or-nothing, so if any event cannot be aggregated the session fails and none of them are applied -- which means events that do not belong together should not travel together. A retry is a new batch, never the same one again. A failed batch looks like it has perfectly good nonces going spare; it does not. Every item's seed has already been published against an aggregate, and reusing one would produce two partial signatures over a single secret nonce. proposeSigningBatch mints fresh seeds, so proposing afresh is safe by construction and re-proposing is the only way to get it wrong. GroupKeyStateManager.propose records that it must never be batched: it is the statement every other session in the room is opened against, so bundling it with a dialect would make the room's ability to sign at all depend on that dialect's aggregation succeeding. Per-item partial success stays out of scope -- it would need mixed-state UI, a transcript that can say "3 of 5", and a complete() that applies a subset, for an outcome that indicates a bug or a dishonest coordinator rather than a normal ending. 356 jvmTest and 224 testDebugUnitTest pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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59c34263b3 |
feat(frost): let one signing session carry a batch of events
Phase 3 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md. A session can now be proposed over several events, and the whole batch is signed in one round of four group events with one approval. 356 jvmTest and 224 testDebugUnitTest pass. ## The wire, and the compatibility rule that shapes it FrostSigningEvents.encodeProposal serialises a batch of one as the bare event object it always was, and only a genuine batch as a JSON array. That is not tidiness. A build predating this reads an array with Event.fromJsonOrNull, gets null, and drops the proposal -- so an old device refuses a batch outright rather than signing part of one, while single signing keeps working right through a mixed-version rollout. Emitting an array unconditionally would break every one-event session for those devices and buy nothing. decodeProposal accepts both forms permanently: proposals in the old shape do not stop arriving because this build stopped writing them. It is all-or-nothing -- an array with one unreadable element is refused rather than silently shortened, because the batch's length is what every later payload is checked against, and a proposal that quietly lost an event would have every signer's contribution rejected for being the wrong size: a stall with nothing to blame. ## MAX_BATCH_SIZE, checked twice 64, enforced in proposeSigningBatch and again, independently, in acceptProposal. The second check is the one that matters. A proposal is the only place in this protocol where a remote party decides how much work everyone else does -- k native key generations, k signatures, and a group event carrying k payloads, from a single message -- and until batching that was bounded only by never being more than one. ## acceptProposal over a list Each element is rebuilt from its own fields under this device's own reading of the room's path and checked against the id it claims, exactly as before but per item, and the whole proposal is dropped if any one fails. The write-once rule widens from "the event this session signs" to "the ordered list of events this session signs": a second proposal under the same id whose list differs anywhere is logged and ignored. ## The API FrostSigningManager.proposeSigningBatch(events: List<EventTemplate<*>>) is public here rather than in Phase 4, because without it there is no way to produce a k>1 session and everything above would ship untested. proposeSigning keeps its signature as the one-event form, so no caller moves. Each template carries its own createdAt. ## Tests - FrostProposalCodecTest (new, commonTest): a batch of one is byte-for-byte the old JSON object -- the assertion that stands in for the old build nobody can run here -- plus order preservation, old-form decoding, and refusal of empty, malformed and partly-unreadable arrays. - SignedGroupKeyStateTest: a k=3 batch between two devices over two databases. Three signatures verifying against the room, three dialects applied on both devices in order, five messages from the coordinator and two from the other signer, and one approval line rather than three. - The negative test that matters: no two items of a batch share an aggregated nonce or a seed, and the two devices' seeds do not intersect. Every positive test still passes if two items share a nonce -- the signatures verify fine; what sharing costs is the secret share. - The cap is refused when proposed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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935a8fe37a |
refactor(frost): run a signing session as k FROST instances in lockstep
Phase 2 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md. Pure refactor: proposals still carry one event, the wire is byte-identical, and every test passes unchanged -- 344 jvmTest and 217 testDebugUnitTest, none of them edited in this commit. advance() now loops over FrostSigningItem rows rather than reading the first one. One nonce per item, one aggregate per item, one Session.create per item, one partial signature per item, one signature per item. The signer set, the public shares, the tweak cache and the approval stay shared, because they are the terms that do not enter e = H(R‖P‖m). The coordinator's aggregation is the place where that distinction bites: it builds one AggregatedNonce per item, each from that item's nonce from each chosen signer. Reusing one across two items would be reusing R across two messages. ## The payload codec, early joinPayload/splitPayload land here rather than with the wire change, because at a batch of one a comma join is the identity -- the payload is the bare value it has always been. That leaves Phase 3 to the proposal encoding alone. splitPayload is strict: a payload that is not exactly the batch's length is dropped rather than truncated or padded. It runs in orderedNonces, orderedPartialSignatures and splitForSession -- never in record(), which stores payloads without parsing them so that a nonce can arrive before the proposal that would give it a length to check against. ## Two short-circuits, and one trap in the first advance() runs on every arriving message, so at a batch of k it was k native key generations, k Session.creates and k signs each time, usually to discover there was nothing left to do. - Nonces are generated by `lazy`. The obvious version -- a guard computing `ownNonce == null || (isSigner() && ownPartial == null)` -- is wrong, and wrong in a way that reads fine and fails every signing test: the coordinator settles the signer set further down the same pass, so isSigner() at the top is false on exactly the pass where the coordinator goes on to sign, and the nonces are never generated. Reproduced as IndexOutOfBounds before switching to lazy, which has no prediction to make. - A device that is neither signing nor aggregating leaves before building any FROST session, rather than building k of them to do nothing with. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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dff41d417d |
feat(frost): move a signing session's per-event columns onto FrostSigningItem
Phase 1 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md, which is added here as the plan the next phases follow. Schema only: a session still signs exactly one event, the wire is byte-identical, and every existing test passes on the moved columns. ## What moved, and why it had to A batch of k events is k independent FROST instances sharing a signer set, not one signature over k messages. That is forced rather than chosen: a Schnorr partial signature is `s = k + e·x` with `e = H(R‖P‖m)`, so two messages under one nonce R give two equations in one unknown and the secret share falls out. So the five columns that enter that equation -- unsignedEventJson, eventId, nonceRandom, aggregatedNonce, signature -- move to a child table keyed (sessionId, itemIndex). What stays on FrostSigningSession is everything outside it: the ceremony, the threshold, the derivation path, the signer set, and the one approval. itemIndex is protocol rather than presentation -- nonces and partial signatures are joined positionally against it -- so getItems() orders by it and nothing re-sorts. Spelled itemIndex rather than index to keep hand-written queries free of backticks. No itemCount column. The count is a COUNT(*), for the same reason signerIds is derived from the ceremony's participant order rather than stored: a denormalised count is one more thing that can disagree with the rows. ## Migration 9 -> 10 Manual, not auto: Room can create the table and drop the columns but cannot copy between them, and the copy is the whole point. A session in flight at upgrade holds its nonce seed and the aggregate it is already signing against, and neither can be regenerated -- losing either makes the next pass derive a different nonce for the same message and publish a second partial signature over it, which is the extraction case. Both are copied verbatim into item 0, so an in-flight session resumes as though nothing happened. Removing the columns uses ALTER TABLE DROP COLUMN rather than the usual create-copy-drop-rename rebuild. FrostSignerMessage and FrostSigningItem both reference FrostSigningSession(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, and DROP TABLE fires cascades -- with foreign keys enforced the rebuild would delete every signer message and every item just written. Whether it does depends on Room disabling foreign keys around migrations, which is not worth depending on when DROP COLUMN cannot go wrong. It needs SQLite 3.35 and unindexed, unconstrained columns; these five qualify, and getRoomDatabase pins BundledSQLiteDriver on every platform. ## Invariants established here for the phases that follow - signerIds and every item's aggregatedNonce are one write-once unit, applied by applyAggregate() -- items first in one transaction, then the session, so "some items aggregated" is unreachable and signerIds != null stays the gate. - Signatures likewise, via applySignatures(); isSigned() counts rows instead of reading a flag. - complete() verifies every signature before applying any event, so a batch is all-or-nothing rather than half-filed. - itemsOver() gives each item its own 32 bytes of seed. Independent seeds mean an off-by-one in index handling produces a session that fails to aggregate rather than one that signs two messages under a single nonce. signedEvent() and isAwaitingApproval() now take the item(s) rather than the session, which propagates to the repository, the view model and the screen. advance() reads items.first() and Phase 2 turns that into a loop. ## Tests - FrostSigningSessionDaoJvmTest: index ordering, single-item read, upsert replacing rather than accumulating, signed-item counting, cascade delete. - FrostSigningItemMigrationJvmTest (new): the backfill against a real v9 database, asserting the seed and aggregate values survive -- not merely that a row appeared -- plus the exact column lists Room will check at open time. - 338 jvmTest and 217 testDebugUnitTest pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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a805455df8 | Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/groupkeystate-frost-proposal-206090 | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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44127cf514 |
test: exercise MarmotOutboundDao past the MLS guard
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Kgothatso Ngako
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ed7a866421 |
test: run a real signing session between two devices, over two databases
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5fa0d08dfd |
test: cover nip17 room derivation and its preconditions
A NIP-17 room has no MLS group, no key packages and no invites -- membership *is* the p-tag set on each message. Two things follow, and both are load-bearing. The room id is deriveChatRoomId over the member set, the same aggregate the inbound path derives from an arriving gift wrap. That is what makes creation idempotent, and idempotence here is not a nicety: two people starting the same conversation have to land on one room, or the thread exists twice with each side writing into its own copy and neither seeing the other. Covered from three angles -- the order members are named in does not change the id, creating the same conversation twice reuses the room as it stands rather than rewriting it, and a different member set derives a different room. The order-independence test is guarding `deriveChatRoomId`'s own `.sorted()`, not the DAO's `.toSet()`, and its comment now says so. That was established by mutation rather than assumed: rebuilding the member set as an order-preserving LinkedHashSet in the DAO changes nothing, because the derivation sorts anyway, while removing the sort fails the test. The distinction matters for anyone reading the DAO and concluding the set is what does the work. And `mlsGroupState = null` is what marks the room NIP-17. sendChatMessage reads exactly that field to choose between a kind:445 group event and per-recipient gift wraps, so a room that acquired MLS state would have its messages routed down a path no recipient is running. Covered alongside: the creator is a participant of their own conversation even when not listed among the participants -- sealGiftWrapPayload walks that list to decide who to wrap for, so omitting the creator would send messages every other member could read and the sender could not -- and naming the creator among the participants does not produce a second row for them. One test records a precondition and an asymmetry. Participant.participantPublicKey is a foreign key onto Profile, so createNip17ChatRoom raises a SQLite constraint failure for a member this device has no profile for, while getOrCreateChatRoom, one method down, answers the same "never seen this user" situation by returning null. A caller treating the two alike gets an unhandled exception out of the first. That was found by writing the tests -- seven of them failed with SQLite 787 before every member was seeded -- and is pinned rather than seeded around silently. The remaining getOrCreate coverage: it returns the room already stored rather than overwriting it with the defaults passed in, stands one up for a user it has a profile for, and writes nothing at all when it does not. Real secp256k1 keys throughout, because deriveChatRoomId does point arithmetic and treats an off-curve value differently from a valid one -- hex filler would exercise a path users never reach. 11 tests. composeApp jvmTest is 309 tests, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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8a6cb81bf9 |
test: cover the FROST signing session state
The signing counterpart to the DKG coverage, and it differs in the way the DAO's own comment gives: "unlike a DKG a group signs repeatedly, so there is no single current one to observe". Sessions accumulate rather than replacing each other, which makes room scoping and ordering load-bearing rather than incidental. The duplicate-suppression property is the same and matters for the same reason. The composite key (sessionId, signerPublicKey, kind) is what makes a redelivered nonce or partial signature replace its predecessor rather than add a row, and countMessagesByKind is what decides that enough signers have answered. A second row for one signer lets a session cross its threshold while short a real participant, and the aggregation then runs over a signer set that was never assembled. Covered by resending a nonce with a different payload, and separately by giving one signer both a nonce and a partial signature and asserting the second does not overwrite the first -- the kind in the key is the only thing keeping those apart. Also covered: a session reads back by id with its stage intact and a missing id gives null; a room's sessions accumulate newest first, with the latest reachable on its own; sessions are scoped to their room, which matters because signing happens in the #admins room and a device can be in more than one -- a session leaking across would have a signer answering a request its group never made; counts are per session and per round; and a completed session keeps its signature, which is what a resume reads to avoid signing the same event twice. One test records a difference rather than a guarantee. FROST orders a round's messages by createdAt where the DKG orders the same query by participant public key. Arrival order is per-device, so this ordering is not canonical across the group the way the DKG's is. It is pinned as it stands rather than asserted to be right: whether it is deliberate is not something this change can settle, and a caller that needs a canonical signer order has to impose one itself. Worth looking at separately. 8 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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168d16c933 |
test: cover the DKG ritual state a ceremony is resumed from
Two properties here decide whether a ceremony can finish, and the compiler sees neither. A participant gets one message per round, and that is enforced by the composite key (sessionId, participantPublicKey, kind) rather than by any code that writes to the table. Rounds advance on countMessagesByKind reaching the participant count, so a redelivered message that added a row instead of replacing one would let the count reach the threshold while a member had still never been heard from -- and the ritual would proceed on a participant set it never assembled. Covered by resending a participant's message with a different payload and asserting the count stays at one and the payload is the newer of the two, and separately by writing the same participant into two different rounds and asserting neither overwrites the other. A key-holding session needs both halves. thresholdPublicKey without secretShare is a ceremony that produced a group key this device cannot sign against; secretShare without thresholdPublicKey is a share with no key to sign for. Either alone is a failed ceremony, and offering it up as a signing key means attempting to sign with half a result. Covered with all four combinations present in the table at once, asserting only the complete one comes back. Also covered: the live ritual for a room is the newest, because a group may have abandoned earlier attempts and a resume that picked up an abandoned one would wait forever on participants who have moved to the newer; rituals belonging to another room are not offered as this room's; key-holding sessions come back newest first; and messages are counted per session and per round rather than across either. And the ordering, which is the one with a reason beyond tidiness: a round's messages come back ordered by participant public key, not by arrival. Every device has to assemble a round in the same order to compute the same thing, and arrival order is per-device. The test writes three participants in an order deliberately unlike the sorted one. Real secp256k1 keys throughout rather than hex filler, since these are the values a canonical ordering is defined over. Verified by mutation: relaxing the key-holding predicate to `OR` returns all three of the incomplete sessions and fails that test; reordering the round query by createdAt fails the canonical-order test. Both mutations were reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 8 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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a8f6638325 |
feat: sign a room's key state into being, at the room's own key
Two changes that turned out to be one. A room's key state stops being something its creator announces and becomes something the group signs, and every FROST signature moves from the group's root threshold key to the key derived at the room's own path -- which is the room's id. The second is what makes the first worth having: a key state is now signed by the very key it names. Supersedes the announcement introduced in |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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baecb76253 |
test: cover the query a marmot reindex decides its work from
getResolvedMarmotGroupEventIds is what a reindex sweep subtracts from a room's stored group events to decide what to replay, so its answer decides what work the sweep does -- and both ways of being wrong are silent. Report an event as resolved when it is not, and the replay skips the one event that needed it: the message stays missing from the feed with nothing left to trigger another attempt. Report it as unresolved when it is resolved, and every sweep re-decrypts it forever. The whole distinction rests on `messageType NOT IN (:unresolvedTypes)`, where those types are the two placeholder lines that stand in for a message still to come rather than reporting one. Covered: an event with a real line is resolved; an undecryptable outer layer and a pending commit each leave their event unresolved, which is right because those are precisely what a replay exists to retry. Then the subtraction itself, since that is how the caller uses it -- three events, one settled, one holding a placeholder, one with no line at all, and the sweep left with exactly the last two. Covered because the query says so and nothing else would: `marmotGroupEventId IS NOT NULL` keeps out lines that are not about a group event -- a NIP-17 direct message, a locally written line -- which would otherwise carry nulls into a set the sweep subtracts with. And the room scoping, since a sweep runs per room and another room's resolutions must not shorten its work. Covered last, and it is the transition the sweep exists to cause: a placeholder upserted in place into a real line resolves its event, visible through this same query. Two smaller ones alongside: the single-row lookups order newest first, which is what makes them "the line for this event" rather than whichever row sqlite reached first, and the per-sender count is scoped to its room. Verified by mutation: defeating the messageType exclusion so placeholders count as resolved fails five of these, including the subtraction test. The mutation was reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 8 tests. composeApp jvmTest is 282 tests, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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521a4f5690 |
test: pin the epoch secret retention window
A retained epoch secret is what lets a member read a message sent under an epoch the group has since moved past. Both ways of getting the policy wrong are quiet: keep too few and old messages become permanently unreadable, keep too many and secrets that should have been dropped stay on disk. The entire policy is one strict `<` in a query and an IGNORE on an insert. The cutoff is strict, and that matters more than an off-by-one usually does. This query feeds a delete, so an epoch wrongly reported as droppable is not a stale read -- it is the messages of that epoch becoming undecryptable, with nothing to recover them from. Covered with three epochs either side of the boundary: only strictly older ones are droppable, the epoch equal to the cutoff is still inside the window, and a cutoff at or below every retained epoch drops nothing. Room scoping, for the same reason. Rooms advance epochs independently, so a sweep driven by one room's cutoff must never reach another's -- a leak here costs the other room its history. Asserted from both ends: the sweep returns only the sweeping room's rows, and the other room's secret is still there afterwards. Insert is IGNORE over the composite key (chatRoomId, epoch), which is what makes re-processing a commit safe. A redelivery or a replay re-derives the secret, and overwriting the stored one with that re-derivation would replace the value that actually decrypts the messages already on disk. Covered by inserting a second, different secret for the same epoch and asserting the first survives -- and alongside it, that the same epoch number in two different rooms is two rows rather than a conflict, since the composite key is what separates them. Also covered: defenestrate removes exactly the rows the sweep selected and leaves the rest, and a room's retained epochs are all readable back, which is what a rejoin or a full replay reads before deciding what it can still decrypt. Verified by mutation: relaxing the cutoff to `epoch <= :epochCutOffPoint` fails three of these, including the boundary test. The mutation was reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 7 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d355b68355 |
test: cover the outbound broadcast queue and its stale sweep
Nothing else drains BroadcastNostrEventRequest, so a row this DAO fails to hand back is an event that never reaches any relay -- and the failure is silent, because a queue returning nothing is indistinguishable from an empty one. That already happened. The observer's predicate carried a `createdAt > :now` bound whose `now` was evaluated once, when the Flow was built. Instants persist at second resolution, so it hid every broadcast enqueued during the observer's own start second -- the entire profile-creation burst -- plus everything a previous session had left pending. There is a test here for exactly that shape: a row enqueued before the observer existed has to come back. The stale sweep, which is the other half of not losing events. A request is flipped to "processing" before a publish is attempted, and a timeout or a dropped socket leaves it there; nothing observes "processing" or "failed", so those rows are dead weight until the sweep requeues them. Covered: both stale statuses flip to "pending" and are counted; a row already pending is not touched, so the returned count is not inflated by work that was never stale. Covered separately, because it is the reason the sweep is bounded at all: a row newer than the cutoff is left alone. A publish running right now holds its row in "processing", and requeueing that would hand the same event to a second publish while the first is still in flight. The bound is `<=`, so a row stamped exactly on the cutoff second is swept -- asserted, since that is the boundary the second resolution of these timestamps makes common rather than rare. Also covered: the queue drains oldest first; a "processing" row is not handed out as pending work; and getFirstBroadcastNostrEventRequestByNostrEventId returns the oldest of an event's per-relay rows rather than the only one, since an event is queued once per target relay. One test is deliberately kept despite not being able to fail, and says so in its own comment. `requests sharing a timestamp drain in insertion order` pins the observable order of a same-second burst, which is what callers depend on -- but deleting the `, id ASC` tiebreak leaves it passing, because `id` is an autoGenerate primary key and therefore the rowid, so sqlite's unspecified ordering already coincides with it under this plan. That coincidence is the argument for keeping the explicit tiebreak rather than against it: it is not contractual, and an index or a different plan can change it. Recording the limit in the test seemed better than implying a guard that is not there. Verified by mutation: reversing the drain order fails the oldest-first test. Removing only the tiebreak fails nothing, which is how the limitation above was found rather than assumed. Both mutations were reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 9 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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02e70d992a |
test: cover the MarmotOutboundDao membership guards
Both entry points that change a group's membership start by restoring the MLS state off the ChatRoom row, and a room restored from an inbound gift wrap has none -- there is nothing to add a member to. The comment on inviteMemberToChatRoom says the throw exists to "say so instead of silently doing nothing and letting the caller report success", which is a claim about behaviour and therefore something a test can hold to. A guard that returned quietly would still compile, still look like it worked, and leave a room whose members believe someone was invited who was not. Covered: inviteMemberToChatRoom and addMembersToChatRoom each raise MarmotMissingChatGroupException against a room whose mlsGroupState is null, which is exactly the shape a gift-wrap-restored room has. Covered separately, because ordering is the substance of it: a refused invite leaves no Participant row behind. The guard has to run before that write, not after. sealGiftWrapPayload walks a room's participants to decide who to wrap a Welcome for, so a participant persisted by a failed invite would make the room look like it has a member no MLS group knows about -- and the next Welcome would be sealed for them. Covered last: the empty-batch guard returns before the MLS state is looked at, so addMembersToChatRoom with no peers must *not* throw on the same stateless room the other two tests reject. Adding nobody is not a failure to add somebody, and pinning that keeps the two guards from being collapsed into one. Deliberately not covered, and the test file says so rather than implying the DAO is done: everything past the guard -- the MLS commit, the Welcome, the epoch advance and persisting it back to the room -- needs a real peer key package, which means an MLS fixture this change does not build. That gap includes the batching rationale on addMembersToChatRoom, which is the more interesting property of the two: one commit and one Welcome so no member ever has to process a commit for an epoch they were not yet in, since MarmotInboundManager refuses future-epoch messages outright with no queue and no replay. Worth covering once there is a fixture to build a key package with. The MarmotKeyPackage these tests pass carries an empty byte array, which is honest: no test here reaches the MLS layer, so the bytes only have to exist. A test that got past the guard could not use it. 4 tests. composeApp jvmTest is 258 tests, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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ba0c60dd2e |
test: cover the NostrDao event funnel and the publish durability split
NostrDao is what every event passes through, inbound and outbound, so its two decisions carry everything downstream: which of two copies of an event wins, and what survives when the enrichment after a write fails. Both were described in comments and neither was asserted. Deduplication, at all four positions. A first sighting is stored. A strictly newer copy replaces the stored one. An older copy is ignored. And -- the case that actually distinguishes the implementations -- a redelivery carrying the *same* timestamp is a no-op, because the comparison is a strict `>`. That last one is not hypothetical: relays redeliver and negentropy re-syncs, so the common case is the same event arriving again unchanged, and a `>=` there would rewrite the row on every delivery. The publish durability split, which is where a bug shipped. `commitPublishedNostrEvent` is the durable half -- mark the unsigned row signed, store the event, queue a broadcast per relay -- and indexing is best-effort enrichment that runs in its own transaction. They used to share one, so any throw in indexing rolled back `signedAt` too. Because the notary drains one unsigned row at a time, that row was then re-selected forever and every event queued behind it went unsigned, including the MLS key package that is enqueued last. The test provokes the failure the way the code itself would fail: publishing with no target relays reaches `relayURLs.first()` inside the try and throws. It then asserts `signedAt` and the stored event both survived. The happy path is covered alongside it, asserting a broadcast request per target relay, so the durability test cannot pass by publishing nothing at all. Also covered: an event from an author with no profile leaves a "LOADING..." placeholder stamped GENESIS_AT rather than nothing, since that row is the only record that the pubkey was seen and needs fetching; and rescheduleBroadcastNostrEventRequests re-queueing a broadcast and re-linking it to the chat line when the event is a group message that has one, without inventing a relation when it does not. One test began as a wrong assumption and the schema corrected it. The "no chat line" case was first written against an event id that had never been stored, and failed with SQLite 787: BroadcastNostrEventRequest.nostrEventId is a foreign key onto NostrEvent. So the real invariant is that a broadcast cannot be scheduled for an event the caller has not saved; the test now stores the event and leaves only the chat line missing, and says so in a comment rather than quietly seeding around it. Verified by mutation: relaxing the dedup comparison to `>=` fails the same-timestamp test; removing the try/catch around indexing so the throw propagates fails the durability test. Both mutations were reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. Uses `runBlocking<Unit>` on the durability test because its last expression is an assertNotNull, and a test method that returns a value is rejected by the JUnit4 runner outright. 9 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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36a98c5928 |
test: pin the nip30303 store-and-submit invariant in MantraDao
Every `add*` on MantraDao does two things in one transaction: writes the entity and queues a SubmissionEvent carrying the same nip30303 event for the group. The part worth asserting is the one `rumorOf` exists for. An entity's id is computed by its `Mantra*.from*EventTemplate` factory. The payload's id is computed separately, in `rumorOf`, from the same template. The two are meant to produce the *same event* -- the row on disk and the payload on the wire, not two copies of one. Nothing enforces that: the factories live in different files, both compile independently, and both produce a plausible 64-character id. A divergence would surface only as a group that receives a submission whose payload matches nothing it can find, which is a long way from the two hash calls that disagreed. Covered, through the seam rather than by recomputing the hash: the submission records `payloadEventId`, and that value has to equal the id of the entity the same call returned. Asserted for a dialect and again for an artifact version, because store-and-submit is the convention every `add*` follows rather than something addDialect does on its own -- and the second one goes through the full foreign key chain, dialect then artifact then version. Also covered: The envelope is not the payload. A submission's own id is the SubmissionEvent's and must differ from the payload's, which is exactly why `deleteByPayloadEventId` exists -- a superseded nip30303 event cannot be un-queued by its own id, and if the two ever collapsed to one value that method would start deleting envelopes by accident. The submission is queued unprocessed, `marmotGroupEventId == null`. That null is what the outbound pipeline selects on to encrypt the row into a kind:445. Filed as processed it would be stored and never sent, and the group would simply never learn about the dialect while the local device showed it as added. A ChatMessage line is written, since the room's feed reads ChatMessage and an added entity that leaves no line is invisible to everyone including its author. Verified by mutation rather than assumed: making `rumorOf` hash a createdAt one second off the template's fails both invariant tests, with the ids compared in the failure output. The mutation was reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 6 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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20d2547a34 |
test: cover the hand-written NostrEventDao queries against sqlite
Two of these queries carry a comment describing a bug that already shipped, and neither bug was the kind anything catches by running: a wrong WHERE clause is still a valid query returning a plausible list. Both corrected predicates are now pinned, so the next edit has to argue with a failing test rather than with a comment. getMarmotGroupEvents. The predicate used to read `expiresAt < :now`, which kept exactly the expired events and dropped every live one -- for the whole group-chat sync path the set handed to negentropy was the complement of the relay's. Covered with four rows at once: no expiry at all (always served), an expiry in the future (still served), an expiry in the past (gone), and an expiry landing exactly on `now`, which the strict `>` excludes. Also covered: the inclusive since/until bounds using events stamped on each bound, room membership filtering across two rooms, and newest-first ordering with a limit keeping the newest window. getMarmotGroupNostrEventsByChatRoomId. Ascending order, because a replay has to apply commits in the order they were sent and this is the one query in the DAO that deliberately orders that way. The test that matters most here is that an event which never reached the MarmotGroupEvent table is still returned -- that is the whole reason the query reads NostrEvent instead of joining the index, since an event whose indexing failed part way is precisely what a replay exists to pick up, and a join would skip exactly those rows. Asserted from both sides: the un-indexed event comes back from the replay query and is genuinely absent from getMarmotGroupEvents. The same query's LIKE over-match is pinned deliberately rather than asserted away. The DAO's comment calls it a prefilter and puts the burden on callers to confirm the event's own `h` tag, so a room id sitting in an `e` tag is expected to come back. Recording it in both directions means anyone tightening the query knows a caller may rely on the loose behaviour, and anyone loosening a caller's check knows why it was there. Also covered: getNostrEventByPublicKeyAndKind returning the newest row, which is what makes it correct for replaceable events rather than a coin flip; and the difference between the two write paths, where `insert` with IGNORE keeps the stored event -- correct when re-receiving an immutable event from a second relay -- while `upsert` overwrites it. Last, the paged reads are pinned as treating `since` exclusively, which is what makes them safe to call in a loop with the previous page's last timestamp as the cursor. That sits one query away from the inclusive bound in getMarmotGroupEvents on purpose: the two conventions are genuinely different, and a reader who assumes either holds throughout gets a skipped row or a loop that never advances. The expiry test was checked by mutation rather than assumed: restoring `expiresAt < :now` fails it alone, with "an event expiring in the future is still live". The mutation was reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 11 tests. composeApp jvmTest is 239 tests, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5623df530c |
test: execute the nostr filter query against real sqlite
NostrEventFilterQueryTest pins the SQL string the builder produces. It never runs that string, and the gap between "the SQL reads correctly" and "sqlite returns the right rows" is where this query's expensive mistakes live. Four classes of bug survive a string assertion intact, and all four are covered here. SQL that is well-formed but not accepted. The clause emitted for a present-but-empty list is the bare literal `0`. Whether sqlite takes that as a false boolean expression rather than rejecting it is not something the builder test can answer; ids, authors, kinds and tags are each asserted to match nothing when handed an empty list. Binding indices. The limit is bound after every tag pattern, so its placeholder is the last in the statement. A drift in that order produces a byte-identical SQL string and different rows, so it is covered by a filter that carries authors, kinds, since, until, search, a tag and a limit at once. LIKE semantics against the column as actually written. The tag pattern is a fragment of the encoded tag -- `["p","<hex>"` -- and only real stored JSON can show that it anchors on the tag name (a pubkey in an `e` tag is not a `p` match, which is exactly the regression the substring scan `tags LIKE '%<pubkey>%'` caused), that it tolerates the relay hint and marker that follow a real tag value, and that escapeLike keeps a `%` in a tag value literal instead of widening the match. Timestamp units. This is a cross-file invariant nothing enforces: NostrEventFilterQuery binds since/until as epochSeconds, and MantraConverters.instantToTimestamp writes the createdAt column as epochSeconds. They agree today. Move either to milliseconds and both files still read correctly on their own while the filter silently selects nothing or everything, so the agreement is now asserted directly. Also covered: the NIP-01 inclusive bounds on both ends, using events stamped exactly on since and on until -- the case that tells an inclusive bound from the strict `createdAt > :since` this replaced; tags ORing values within a name and ANDing across names, against tagsAll which ANDs within a name too; newest-first ordering with the `id DESC` tiebreak, and a limit keeping the newest rather than the oldest window the per-shape queries used to return. Three of these were checked by mutation rather than assumed. Reverting the tag pattern to the naive `%value%` substring fails `a tag value is matched in its own position`; relaxing `createdAt >= ?` back to `>` fails both the inclusive bounds test and the units test. The mutations were reverted; no production source is touched by this commit. 14 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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af81933ab4 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/room-db-testing-setup-b053cd
Brings the branch up to date with the 40 commits mantra gained while the jvm target was being built, so that merging the other way is a fast-forward. One conflict, in docs/README.md, where both sides added rows to the index table. Kept both, and gave the jvm-target note a clause in the closing prose since it is the one document there that is not about the protocol. One thing the auto-merge could not have caught. `9250991` added NostrEventDao.getMarmotGroupNostrEventsByChatRoomId as a blocking query, which android accepts and which Room refuses to generate for any other target -- so the merged tree failed :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm with the same "Only suspend functions are allowed in DAOs declared in source sets targeting non-Android platforms" that phase 4 dealt with 58 times. Made suspend; its only caller, NostrDao.reindexMarmotGroupEvents, was already suspend, so again no cascade. That is now a standing cost of this branch rather than a one-off: any DAO method added on mantra while this is outstanding will break the jvm build on merge. It is a one-word fix each time, and the compiler names the line. Verified on the merged tree: :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm and :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid green, :composeApp:testDebugUnitTest 208 passing, :composeApp:jvmTest 214 passing -- both test tasks re-run from scratch rather than taken from the cache. The jvm figure is larger than the android one because jvmTest inherits commonTest, so declaring the target quietly gained the whole shared suite a second execution environment. That is worth knowing independently of whether desktop ever ships: the same tests now run on the host, without an emulator. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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607ef72bc3 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/marmot-group-reindex-events-96a0d0
# Conflicts: # composeApp/src/commonMain/kotlin/press/mantra/compose/database/dao/NostrDao.kt # composeApp/src/commonMain/kotlin/press/mantra/compose/database/model/ChatMessage.kt |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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925099125b |
feat: read a room's group events again when they arrived out of order
Relays impose no ordering, so a kind:445 can turn up before the group can read it: an application message encrypted under an epoch whose commit has not landed, or a commit for an epoch ahead of the local one. Both are stored and then dropped -- MarmotInboundManager refuses an out-of-epoch commit precisely so it does not half-mutate the group -- and nothing goes back for them once the missing event fills the gap. The message is on disk, readable, and never read. A "Reindex Events" button at the bottom of the group's detail screen is that second look. Only events with nothing to show for them are replayed: no chat line at all, or one of the two placeholder types. A room where nothing went wrong is left exactly as it was, which is what makes the button safe to press on a hunch. Passes repeat while a pass recovers something, because created_at order is not epoch order and a commit recovered by one pass is what lets the next read the messages that were waiting on it. **Replaying was not safe as it stood.** Every row the path writes is keyed on an event id and upserts in place -- MarmotGroupEvent, MarmotInnerEvent, and the nip30303 entities -- with one exception. ChatMessage's primary key is autogenerated, so writing a freshly built line always inserts, and a re-read would have left the room showing each recovered message twice, once as "Undecryptable Message" and once as itself. ChatMessage.reconcileMarmotLine matches on the group event id instead, so a re-read is an update, and refuses to let a placeholder overwrite a line that says something. That last rule is what protects the line this device wrote on the way out for a message it sent: our own kind:445 cannot be read back, since the sender ratchet has consumed the generation, and without the rule a replay would have replaced our words with "Undecryptable Message". The MLS group itself was already safe to replay against, which is worth saying because it is the part that looks dangerous: a commit behind the current epoch is rejected as a duplicate before it touches the group, one ahead is refused, and a consumed ratchet generation throws before mutating anything. The exception was quartz's EpochCommitTracker, which does not dedupe and only empties when a commit applies -- so replaying a held commit just grew the list and left it pending forever. forgetPendingCommits drops the room's entries first, and the sweep feeds the events back in the order CommitOrdering picks a winner in, so a contested epoch resolves the same way it would have on every other device. **What is testable, and what is not.** The DAO is not: testDebugUnitTest is plain JVM and Room's in-memory builder wants an Android Context. So the two pieces carrying decisions are lifted out where they can be run without one -- MarmotReindexSweep for the stopping rule, and reconcileMarmotLine for which of two lines wins -- and the DAO is left as query, sweep, write. The filter tests pin why the query's `tags LIKE` is a prefilter and not a test: an event belonging to another room can mention this one in a q tag, and its own h tag is what rejects it. **Not recovered by any of this.** A message whose key is gone -- one the ratchet has already advanced past, or one from an epoch predating this device's join. And events that never reached disk at all: storeNostrEvent is a single transaction, so a kind:445 arriving before its room exists rolls back its own insert along with the failed indexing, and only a re-sync brings it back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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6aff34c5c7 | Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/artifact-frost-signing-proposal-a414f6 | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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786c0602da |
feat: sign an artifact into the library instead of submitting one
Adding an artifact no longer creates one. It opens a signing session over an ArtifactEvent, and the artifact appears -- on every member's device at once, authored by the group's shared key rather than by whoever typed it -- when enough members have signed. The same trade the dialects made: a submission says "I am putting this in front of the group" and the group's only recourse afterwards is social, while a signature is the group saying it and it takes a quorum to say. A library is the group's. **The first version.** This is the part the dialect had no answer for. An artifact was creating an initial ArtifactVersion as a second submitted event, and that cannot survive the change: a chapter attaches to a version rather than to an artifact, so an artifact without one is inert, but a version cannot be submitted before the artifact it points at exists, cannot have its own quorum without costing a second signing session per form, and cannot be invented locally -- an invented id differs on every device, so members would silently disagree about which version a chapter hangs off while every screen showed the same artifact. So the label rides on the artifact as an `artifactVersion` tag and the row is derived from the signed artifact's own fields when it is applied. Same bytes in, same row out, everywhere. It is a rumor, because nobody signed it; what the group signed is the artifact that declares it. **What went away.** MantraDao.addArtifact and its way up through the repository. Nothing called it once the screen proposed instead, and leaving a path that authors an artifact under a member's key while the UI insists on a quorum would have double-created the version besides. **Tests.** Three files, and each was checked against a broken implementation rather than only against a working one: deriving the version from the clock, dropping the label from the proposal, authoring the derived row as its reader, and losing the signature on the way out of the session are all caught. SignedArtifactTest runs a real 2-of-3 quorum over an actual proposal, because the claim worth holding -- the row is the group's, and carries proof of it -- is invisible when it breaks. Not covered: applyInnerEvent's two upserts, which need a database no test here stands up, and AddArtifactViewModel, which is plumbing across two dispatchers over a template the tests already pin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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adf1f03817 |
feat: a desktop entry point, and the first code here that runs
Phase 5. `press.mantra.desktop.MainKt` has been named by the compose.desktop block since before this work started and did not exist; now it does, and `./gradlew :composeApp:run` opens a window. **The window opens onto a passphrase gate, not onto the app.** That is phase 3 landing here rather than there, and it was not in the plan. keyStoreEncryption(keyName, plainText) takes no secret, because on android the OS keystore serves keys without asking anybody anything -- so a passphrase scheme needs an unlock the expect signature cannot express. MainKt calls JvmKeyStore.unlock before MantraApp is composed, off the ui thread, because Argon2id at 64 MiB is deliberately slow enough to stop the window painting. The gate says on its face that this build is not for real funds. One application directory is handed to both the mantra and the phoenix context, so a single install keeps a single place on disk rather than two named after different projects. **MantraDatabaseJvmTest is the part worth keeping.** Running the app proves the window paints; it proves nothing about Room, because the gate stops before anything touches the database. Six tests now open it: the schema is created, a profile survives a write and a read, upsert replaces rather than duplicates, the @Transaction relation query behind findChatRoomById reads back, a soft-deleted room stops being found, and the on-disk builder writes under the context directory rather than java.io.tmpdir. This is the first time this database has been opened anywhere but android, and it covers exactly what the compiler cannot see -- that Room's ksp output for this target is usable, that the *host* SQLite native loads where the android artifact's would not, and that the 58 queries forced from blocking to suspend still return what they stored. Both of that test's first drafts were wrong in ways worth keeping the scars of. Every write failed with SQLite error 787 because Profile has a foreign key onto NostrEvent and the test never created the parent row -- which is evidence rather than an annoyance, since a schema whose constraints were quietly off would have let all of it pass. And Kind is a typealias for Int, not a constructor. Window sizing is 480x900: a starting size that does not immediately misrepresent layouts only ever exercised at phone widths, not a considered desktop layout. That, along with back handling and any ui offering an nfc affordance, is the shakeout this phase names and does not do. Verified, all five green: :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm, :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid, :composeApp:testDebugUnitTest (52), :composeApp:jvmTest (6), and the fork's :library:jvmTest (97). Not verified: nothing past the gate. No seed has been written, no business started, no relay contacted. A gradle `run` killed with SIGTERM reports BUILD FAILED with exit value 143 -- that is the signal, not the app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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024da99404 |
test: pin what a member who never took part needs to finish a session
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Kgothatso Ngako
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bf4041a5b2 |
feat: mantra compiles for the jvm
Phase 4. Declares jvm(), implements all 16 expects, and bumps the submodule to the fork branch carrying phases 1-3. :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm is green. **The actuals were the small half. Room was the blocker.** The first jvm compile failed with 58 copies of "Only suspend functions are allowed in DAOs declared in source sets targeting non-Android platforms". Room permits blocking query methods on android and nowhere else, so every @Dao function that was neither suspend nor Flow-returning had to change -- 58 of them across 24 files. KSP reports these in alphabetical batches, so the count shrinks in stages and looks bottomless; scanning the dao package directly for abstract funs with no suspend and no Flow return finds them all at once. It stops there, which is the only reason this is a 58-line change rather than a refactor. Every one of the 15 call sites outside the dao package was already inside a suspend function -- the repositories were written that way throughout -- so nothing needed rewriting. One private helper, DatabaseNostrRepository.matchNegentropicNostrEvents, had to become suspend, and its single caller was already suspend, so the cascade terminated immediately. Zero call-site edits. **The cost lands on android, not on the jvm.** A blocking DAO method runs on its caller's thread; a suspend one is dispatched to the query coroutine context, which getRoomDatabase sets to Dispatchers.IO. That is the better behaviour -- it is what stops a query running on the main thread -- but it is a real change to the shipping platform, made for a target that does not run yet. Hence the unit tests below rather than a compile alone. **BusinessManager was not an expect**, so nothing warned about it. It is now ported to the fork's jvmMain (05ce7eb); Phoenix.jvm.kt and NavigationViewModel.jvm.kt are otherwise the ios actuals with one changed import, since those files use no ios API. **schedulePlatformLogic schedules nothing, and logs that it does not.** Android starts two WorkManager jobs here, one of which is ChannelsWatcher -- it wakes periodically to notice a channel force-closed while the app was shut. A desktop application has no process once its window closes, so there is nothing to wake, and running the watcher in-process would be strictly worse than not running it: it would only fire while the app was already open and watching. The exposure is real and belongs in release notes rather than a comment -- a desktop wallet left closed past a force-close deadline does not notice. Smaller calls. PlatformContext carries an application directory, since there is no Context to read one from, and PlatformDatabaseBuilder puts aux.db under it rather than in java.io.tmpdir, which is what the abandoned Aux implementation did behind a TODO and which most systems clear on reboot. themeColorScheme ignores dynamicColor, which means Material You and has no desktop counterpart. AppVersion reads the jar manifest that compose.desktop writes, falling back when running from a class directory. Verified: :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm green, :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid green, and :composeApp:testDebugUnitTest 52 passing -- the one that matters, since this commit changes shared code every android query path goes through. Not verified: nothing has run. No jvm entry point exists yet, so the database has never been opened on this platform and no business has been started. That is phase 5, which also has to unlock JvmKeyStore before the wallet starts -- a passphrase prompt, not just a window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b87e6e4ed5 | Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/frost-proposal-review-visibility-8f6fab | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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e22a8ae4cd |
fix: stop asking a member to review a signature the group has settled
The transcript's "Review" affordance is a promise: tapping it leads to a
decision still there to be made. For a FROST signing proposal it was only
ever withdrawn one way -- and a proposal can be processed three.
**How a request was closed.** RitualNotice drops the tint and the call to
action when the request is answered, and a request counts as answered when
the step it asked for has since been published by this device:
FROST_REQUEST_FULFILMENTS = mapOf(TYPE_FROST_APPROVAL_NEEDED to TYPE_FROST_NONCE)
Approving publishes a nonce, so approving closes it. Nothing else does.
**Declining.** decline() fails the session and broadcasts a FAILURE. It
publishes nothing of the member's own, by design -- a refusal is a refusal.
So no fulfilment line is ever written, and the request went on asking, in
primary tint, for a decision the member had already made. Tapping it
reached a screen with no buttons on it, which was the screen being right.
**A quorum that did not need them.** A t-of-n key finishes without
everybody. The coordinator takes the first t nonces, and a member whose
phone was in a pocket is simply not among them -- but advance() returned at
the approval gate on their device, so the arriving SIGNATURE was stored and
nothing was done with it. Their session sat at COLLECTING_NONCES forever.
The request stayed lit, the screen still offered Sign and Don't sign, and
both answers were wrong: a nonce nobody was waiting for, or a refusal that
would flip a COMPLETE session to FAILED on every device and announce
"Nothing was signed" to a group holding the signature. fail() writes the
stage with update() rather than moveTo(), so that last one was reachable.
**The transcript.** A request is now closed by being *answered* or by being
*settled* -- a frostComplete or frostFailed line after it. The two are kept
apart deliberately. Answered keeps the tick; settled does not, because the
member never answered and crediting them with a signature they refused, or
were never asked for, is worse than the summons was. Both rules moved out
of the composable onto ChatMessage, where they are stated once and tested.
Settlement is signing-only: a ceremony step can only be taken or waited
for, so a DKG request has no equivalent and reading one from a signing
session's end would drop a summons the ritual is still stalled on.
**The session.** The transcript alone could not close the third case: the
device that never approved wrote no terminal line to read. advance() now
completes on a signature that has already arrived, ahead of the approval
gate rather than below it. That gate is there to keep this device's own
material off the wire, and finishing puts none there -- it verifies the
aggregate, applies the event and announces, all from what is already
stored. Everything it now skips on that path is work the signature made
pointless anyway: a late nonce, a partial signature nobody will aggregate.
Three things follow. isAwaitingApproval reports false, so FrostSigningScreen
hides the buttons -- it now asks the manager rather than re-deriving the
rule, which had drifted into a second copy of it. A late "Don't sign"
cannot abandon a signature that exists. And the signed event finally lands
locally for a member who never approved: applySignedEvent sat below the
gate and was being skipped, so a dialect the group signed without them
never reached their store.
Verified: :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid succeeds, and
:composeApp:testDebugUnitTest passes -- 165 tests, 16 of them new. Eight
cover the transcript rules against a hand-built row list; eight cover
isAwaitingApproval, including the settled-signature case. What stays
uncovered is advance() itself, which is Room-backed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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02117643c4 |
fix: send a group event because it was queued, not because the chat mentions it
No FROST signing message has ever reached another participant. The proposal
was built, MLS-encrypted, wrapped under the exporter secret, signed as a
kind:445, written to NostrEvent and MarmotGroupEvent, and its queue row
marked processed -- and then never handed to a relay, by a branch that was
never about delivery at all.
**The gate.** The tail of MarmotOutboundDao.encryptAndSendMarmotInnerEvent
looked up the transcript row for the queued rumor and did everything else
inside it:
val chatMessageOrNull = database.chatMessageDao()
.getChatMessagesByMarmotInnerEventId(marmotInnerEvent.id)
chatMessageOrNull?.let { chatMessage ->
... relation, marmotGroupEventId ...
val ids = database.broadcastNostrEventRequestDao().insert(...)
}
The BroadcastNostrEventRequest rows are the only thing that puts a kind:445
on a relay -- observeBroadcastNostrEventRequestsByStatus("pending") is what
the broadcaster watches, and nothing else inserts them for this path. So the
question "does the chat have a line for this?" was silently answering the
question "should the group receive this?".
**Why FROST always lost.** A signing message has no ChatMessage by design.
FrostSigningManager.broadcast queues the rumor alone, and announce() writes
its milestone lines with marmotInnerEventId = null on purpose: each device
writes its own transcript from the messages it has already received, so the
lines cost no traffic and cannot disagree with the session they describe.
The inbound half states the same intent from the other side --
ChatMessage.applyInnerEvent returns null for every FrostSigningEvents kind,
because a row there would be a second, worse account of what the manager
already narrates.
That is every kind in the family, not just the proposal: nonces, the signer
set, partial signatures, the finished signature and the failure notice all
go through the same broadcast(). A session could not have completed even if
a proposal had somehow arrived.
**GroupKeyStateManager.announce had it too.** Same shape, same silence: a
room's kind:30326 announcement of which key it signs with was queued,
encrypted and dropped.
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Kgothatso Ngako
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2aaa7b99a6 |
build: phase 0 of the jvm target -- clear the ground, correct the plan
First phase of docs/jvm-target.md. Nothing here turns the target on; it
removes what would break the moment it is turned on, and stages the two
catalog entries that cannot be derived automatically. Two of the four
steps as written in the doc turned out to be wrong, and implementing them
is how that surfaced -- both are corrected in the doc in this commit.
**Deleted the stale jvmMain tree.** Six files under
composeApp/src/jvmMain/kotlin/ac/cord/auxiliary/ survived from the Aux
project this codebase grew out of. They have gone unnoticed because
`jvmMain` is currently an orphan source set -- the accessor creates it,
no target compiles it -- so the wrong package, the Room 2 imports
(androidx.room, not androidx.room3), and the references to a long-gone
AuxDatabase and AuxGlobal have never had to resolve. They would all become
compile errors in phase 4.
They are not lost: they are the closest thing to a skeleton for five of
the six platform actuals phase 4 needs, and main.kt is a reasonable
starting shape for the phase 5 desktop entry point. `git show HEAD~1` has
them.
**Added two catalog entries, not four.** sqlite-bundled-jvm and
sqldelight-sqlite-driver. Both earn their place by being unreachable
otherwise: sqlite-bundled-jvm has to be named explicitly because
variant-aware resolution hands the *android* artifact to anything running
on the host, and sqldelight-sqlite-driver is the jvm counterpart to the
android-driver and native-driver entries already there.
The doc also listed room3-runtime-jvm and sqldelight-jdbc-driver. Neither
is right. Once jvm() exists, commonMain's existing androidx-room3-runtime
resolves to the -jvm variant on its own, so an explicit entry is
redundant and would drift. And the SQLDelight drivers phase 2 needs are
for DbFactory, which lives in lightning-kmp-app -- a separate gradle build
with its own version catalog, where an entry here is simply not visible.
**kspJvm cannot be wired yet, and the build file already said so.** The
doc's phase 0 told you to uncomment
composeApp/build.gradle.kts:194. It contradicted its own phase 4, which is
where jvm() gets turned on. The comment three lines above it states the
rule:
These configurations only exist when the ios targets are declared,
which the kotlin block above does only on a mac.
The same holds for kspJvm -- `dependencies { add("kspJvm", ...) }` throws
UnknownConfigurationException until a jvm() target creates the
configuration. So it moves into phase 4, into the same edit that declares
the target. composeApp/build.gradle.kts is deliberately untouched by this
commit.
**Also documented: gradle does not run in a worktree here at all** until
the submodule is checked out, which worktrees do not do automatically.
`lightning-kmp-app/` is empty and configuration fails with "Project with
path ':library' not found in build ':lightning-kmp-app'". Recorded in the
phase 0 verification section along with the caveat that a linked worktree
shares .git/modules/ with the main checkout, so both trees end up on one
submodule git dir.
**Not verified by a build.** For that reason. The deletion is an orphan
source set and the additions are unreferenced catalog lines, so neither
can change a build's outcome -- but that is an argument, not a green
check, and it is the second commit in a row on this branch that has not
compiled anything. Phase 4 is the first phase that genuinely cannot be
done without a working gradle invocation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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65e4a3acc0 |
fix: seal the Welcome, the one gift wrap an MLS room must publish
No invite to a Marmot room has been delivered since |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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39eac61838 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/long-running-chat-sync-8983dc
mantra had moved on ~30 commits, several of them in exactly this area — and it turns out both branches independently found the same bug and drew the same conclusion about the same filter. **The overlap.** |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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bcdfd2ec94 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/marmot-direct-message-type-7a0473
Twenty-two commits had landed on mantra since this branch left it, several of them in the same files. Merged this way round so mantra stayed untouched until the result compiled and its tests passed. The migration had to be renumbered, and this is the conflict that mattered. mantra is at database version 7 and already has its own 5.json -- for MarmotInnerEvent.payloadEventId, nothing to do with direct messages. This branch had also written a 5.json, for a different schema. Resolved by restoring mantra's 5.json untouched and moving the direct message columns to an AutoMigration(7, 8) with a regenerated 8.json. Taking either 5.json over the other would have left every device validating a migration chain against a schema it was never built from; keeping version = 5 would have made a v7 install refuse to open at all. The regenerated 8.json is two ADD COLUMNs and nothing else, same as before. fromGroupEventResult was restructured on mantra: the kind switch moved into applyInnerEvent, and a SubmissionEvent envelope now wraps nip30303 payloads. Took that structure and re-applied the direct message branch ahead of it rather than inside it -- a gift wrap is not a nip30303 payload to apply, and what happens to it depends only on whether this device's key opens it, so it does not belong in a function about applying submissions. The isUserMessage fix was re-applied to the eight call sites mantra's version has, up from the six it had here. ChatMessageListViewModel and ChatRoomMessagingScreen took mantra's versions with the composer state, the two renderings and the reply action layered back on. docs/README.md keeps both new rows and mantra's closing note about the skipped-keys document. 108 tests pass, up from 50 here and 83 on mantra. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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a909108300 |
feat: announce which key a room signs with, instead of rederiving it
A signer holds a different secret share under every ceremony it took part in, and signing with the wrong one produces a partial signature that cannot aggregate. Nothing said which was which: FrostSigningManager found a room's key by walking every ceremony this device holds a share for and rederiving each one's room id until one matched. That search can only find rooms derived at the one path the constant names. SharedKeyDerivation.parsePath was written to lift that limit and was never called, so a room derived anywhere else was invisible to signing. So the coordinator now says it. GroupKeyStateEvent (kind 30326) carries the threshold public key, the ceremony that made it and the path the room's id came from, posted into the room as its first application message and filed as a GroupKeyState row. completedKey reads that row first and follows it to the share. Nothing secret travels. Every member of the room can read the event, so a share on it would be each member holding everyone else's -- a 1-of-n key wearing a t-of-n's clothes. The event names the ceremony; the share stays in DkgSession.secretShare on the device that generated it. The coordinator is untrusted, as everywhere else in the ceremony, so a state is verified rather than believed: the room's id *is* the threshold key derived at the path, and one that does not rederive its own room is dropped. That is the same guarantee the rederivation gave, kept rather than traded for a lookup. The old scan stays behind it for rooms that predate the table. Announced after the members are added, which is the only order that works -- adding them commits a new epoch and MLS will not let a member read what was encrypted before the one they joined at. A member invited later still misses it and falls back to the scan, which is where every member was before this existed. Replacement is this app's job. These are rumors inside a Marmot group event, so no relay applies the 3xxxx rule, and the DAO keeps the newest announcement per room so a backfill cannot walk a room backwards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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f5eb744ca7 |
test: cover the long-running sync, and open the seams needed to do it
The six commits that built the live chat sync added no tests. Everything they
touch fails silently by nature — a filter that drops messages, a subscription
that stops being replayed, a group whose id never reaches the `#h` tag — so the
symptom is always "some messages didn't arrive", days later, on someone else's
phone. 46 tests, in four files.
**What is covered**
RelayPoolSubscriptionTest (13) — the pool's half of surviving a dropped socket.
A query is retained and replayed on reconnect; a closed one is forgotten and
stops the socket reconnecting for it; closing one of two leaves the other alone;
a negentropy exchange is never replayed (its rounds are stateful, so resuming
one reconciles against a conversation the relay is no longer having); an update
to a live subscription replaces what gets replayed, including when the send
itself fails; dropping a relay or closing the pool forgets what they carried;
replay is scoped to the relay that reconnected. Plus the semantic the whole
change rests on, asserted in both directions: a live subscription keeps
delivering after EOSE, a one-shot query still ends at it.
LiveSubscriptionReconcileTest (12) — the requirement this all exists for: the
group filter follows group membership with nobody calling a subscribe function.
Joining widens the filter *in place* rather than reopening (a reopen would drop
the live tail of every other group in that chunk); leaving drops one; leaving
everything closes the subscription; churn inside the debounce window collapses
to one update; a NIP-17 room never becomes a group subscription. Then the
collect loop: events stored against the relay they came from, an event after
EOSE still stored, a CLOSED reopened once the back-off elapses and not before,
and a rate-limited CLOSED waiting far longer — but still coming back.
Backgrounding closes and foregrounding rebuilds, reconnects, and queues the
catch-up.
LiveSubscriptionPlanTest (11) — the filter and planning rules, led by the one
most likely to be "tidied up" later: the gift wrap filter carries no `since`,
because NIP-59 randomizes created_at into the past and a `since` near the
present silently drops new messages.
RelayBackPressureTest (4) and ReconnectBackoffTest (6) — the two pure decisions.
Which CLOSED reasons mean "ease off", and the backoff arithmetic including the
exponent clamp: 2.0.pow(4000) is Infinity and Duration * Double throws on it, so
without it a socket failing long enough turned its reconnect loop into a crash
loop, at the point the network was least likely to recover unaided.
**Seams opened to get there**, each a readability win on its own terms:
- NostrSocketClientFactory becomes an interface with DefaultNostrSocketClientFactory
behind it, so the pool can be driven by a fake socket.
- RelayPool takes its CoroutineScope, so the replay a reconnect triggers can be
observed rather than raced.
- LiveSubscriptionManager depends on a new LiveSubscriptionTransport (4
methods) rather than RelaysSocketManager, which observes the active wallet in
its init and cannot be stood up in a test at all.
- Its pure planning helpers move to the companion as `internal`, and its
launches inherit the caller's dispatcher instead of pinning Dispatchers.IO.
SynchronizationViewModel already launches observe() on IO, so nothing moves —
but a coroutine that picks its own dispatcher cannot be driven by a test
scheduler.
- reconnectDelay is extracted to ReconnectBackoff.kt with jitter as a
parameter, so the arithmetic can be pinned without randomness.
- endsLiveSubscription names the live-subscription termination rule next to
isTerminalFor, which is the one-shot rule. Having both named makes the
difference between them reviewable rather than implicit.
kotlinx-coroutines-test is added to commonTest: the pool's bookkeeping is all
suspend functions and there is no runBlocking in a common source set.
The tests were checked by mutation, not just by passing — reintroducing a
`since`, making EOSE terminal, dropping the leftGroupAt filter and removing
retention from query() each produce failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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0319f1613b | Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/nostr-event-save-issue-6e9467 | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5321e4af72 | Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/distracted-franklin-e95ba4 | ||
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Kgothatso Ngako
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fb21678813 |
test: pin where a commit's bytes land when the row recording it is written
The mis-routed `framedCommitBytes` fixed in the previous commit was invisible for
one reason: nothing anywhere covered the persisted row. The bytes that reach a
relay come off the in-memory `CommitResult`, so the wire path stayed correct and
the stored path was wrong, and no test looked at the stored path.
## Why the mapping moved before it could be tested
A test that built `MarmotCommitResult` itself would have been writing its own copy
of the mapping and asserting against that. It would have passed against the buggy
code, because the bug was at the call site the test was not using.
So the mapping is now `MarmotCommitResult.from`, called by
`MarmotOutboundDao.inviteMember` and exercised directly by the test. That also
removes the shape that produced the bug rather than just the instance of it: the
old call site listed its named arguments in an order different from the
declaration, which is what put `preCommitExporterSecret` and `framedCommitBytes`
two lines apart. `from` lists the payload in declaration order, in one place, so
there is no second site to get wrong.
## What is covered
Four tests, each payload given a distinct self-identifying value so that a field
arriving in the wrong column names both halves of the mistake instead of comparing
equal by accident:
- every payload field lands in its own column.
- the framed commit column never holds the exporter secret -- the regression,
stated as an invariant rather than an equality so it keeps holding for a
`CommitResult` this test did not anticipate.
- a `CommitResult` that never framed its commit still stores a commit. quartz
defaults `framedCommitBytes` to `commitBytes` and the entity repeats that
default; the fallback must not quietly become the secret either.
- the bookkeeping `DatabaseNostrRepository` reads back on acknowledgement is
carried through. `id`, `chatRoomId`, `userPublicKey` and
`peerKeyPackageEventId` are all 64-char hex, so two of them swapped in `from`
would typecheck exactly as silently as the original bug.
Checked by reintroducing `framedCommitBytes = commitResult.preCommitExporterSecret`
into `from`: three of the four fail. A green suite that would stay green against
the bug it names is not coverage.
## What is not covered, and why
That the bytes published equal the bytes stored -- the property one level above
this one -- still is not. It needs the DAO, and the DAO needs Room: `commonTest`
carries only `kotlin.test`, the room3 KSP processor is registered for the android
and ios targets alone with `kspJvm` commented out, and `getInMemoryDatabaseBuilder`
wants a `PlatformContext` no unit test has. That is a Robolectric or instrumented
target, which is a larger change than this fix earns and is better decided on its
own merits than smuggled in here.
The ack-triggered rebroadcast that would have turned the bug into a live fault does
not exist yet, so there is nothing to test there either. When it is written, the
invariant it needs is already asserted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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ad3304a665 |
refactor: build the DM inbox filter once, where it can be asserted
The filter fix a commit ago changed a value inline in a ViewModel, which is
not a place a test can reach: ChatMessageListViewModel needs a repository and
a coroutine scope to construct, and NostrDao needs Room. So the filter that
had just been wrong in three call sites went back to having no coverage at
all.
Nip17Filters.inbox is that filter with one definition. ChatMessageListViewModel
and ChatRoomListViewModel now both call it — they had been building it
separately and identically, which is also what made their negentropy requests
collapse into one under computeId, a coincidence better expressed as shared
code than left to hold by luck.
Nip17FiltersTest asserts every clause that was got wrong in production:
- the p tag names us, not a peer
- there is no authors clause, because a wrap is signed by the throwaway key
GiftWrapEvent.create mints and discards, so authors=[anything knowable]
matches nothing on any relay
- there is no since cursor, because NIP-59 back-dates a wrap by up to two
days and a high-water mark taken from the newest wrap we hold skips mail
stamped behind it — the trap waiting for whoever acts on the TODO in
NegentropySynchronizeRequest.toSynchronizeNostrEventRequest
- the wire JSON is pinned, so an added default cannot quietly split the two
callers back into separate requests
- the SQL NostrEventFilterQuery builds from it bounds no author either,
since negentropy is only as good as the agreement between the set we build
locally and the set the relay builds from the same filter
Neither of the two failure modes this covers was visible from reading the
filter. The authors clause failed silently for as long as it existed, and the
peer p-tag failed loudly but somewhere else entirely — in a Room transaction,
three files away, as a MAC error out of Nip44.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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e1d35bbd6c |
test: pin who can open a gift wrap, and what happens to everyone else's
The Invalid Mac crash had no test standing between it and a repeat, so this adds one that reproduces it. GiftWrapMessageTest builds real NIP-59 wraps with real secp256k1 rather than recorded fixtures. The property under test is the key agreement itself — whether ECDH(ourPriv, ephemeralPub) can stand in for the conversation key the wrap was sealed under — and a fixture would only prove that the fixture still parses. Three cases carry the regression: - someone else's mail comes back null rather than throwing - not even the sender can reopen what they sent - isAddressedTo answers exactly what unsealing would Checked against the reverted fix, those three fail with the production exception verbatim (java.lang.IllegalStateException: Invalid Mac: Calculated bf2e6480…), while the two describing behaviour that never broke — the happy path, and isAddressedTo's reading of the p tag — stay green. A test that cannot fail against the bug it names is not worth the run time, so the split matters. The last of the three is the one guarding the fix's structure rather than its outcome. NostrDao decides whether to index on isAddressedTo, then throws GiftWrapUnsealException if decryptGiftWrapSeal returns null anyway; those two answers have to agree for either path to be correct. If they drift, the DAO either skips mail we can open or resumes rolling back transactions, and neither shows up as a failure anywhere near the change that caused it. commonTest gains kotlinx-coroutines-test for runTest. decryptGiftWrapSeal is suspending, runBlocking does not exist in common code, and every layer worth testing below the ViewModels — DAOs, repositories, the model's crypto — is suspending too, so the dependency pays for more than this file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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42dd38cfc4 |
test: pin the two invariants this session left unguarded
Both are silent when broken, which is why they are worth asserting rather than reasoning about. **The cache's reuse decision.** MlsGroupCache exists because quartz drops a secret tree's skipped-generation keys on save, so rebuilding a group between two messages loses any that arrives late. Its safety argument is one comparison: reuse while the stored state is still what the cache last wrote, rebuild when it is not. Get that wrong in either direction and nothing complains -- reuse too eagerly and a group carries on from a ratchet another writer already moved, which corrupts decryption rather than failing it; reuse too rarely and the cache does nothing and the original bug is back with no symptom. That decision is now a generic LiveInstanceCache with MlsGroupCache as a typed facade over it, so it can be tested without standing up an MLS group. Splitting it also made two behaviours explicit that were previously incidental: a failed build no longer leaves the old instance behind, and an instance whose use threw is deliberately not cached -- it is half-advanced and never persisted, so the next caller has to start from disk. **Rumor and row ids agreeing.** MantraDao writes an entity whose id comes from fromXEventTemplate and separately builds the rumor it submits with rumorOf, which hashes the template itself. Both are meant to produce one id and nothing checked it. Diverging would mean submissions naming an event nobody has, deleteByPayloadEventId silently un-queuing nothing so superseded translations go out anyway, and every receiver creating a second row instead of converging on the sender's -- all of it invisible, since the ids are opaque hex either way. Asserted per kind, plus the whole chain out through the submission envelope. Both suites were mutation-checked rather than trusted: inverting the staleness comparison fails one cache test, recording the pre-block state fails another, and hashing the rumor under a different author fails all six id tests. Still uncovered, and not cheaply fixable: FrostSigningManager's and MantraDao's state machines both need a Room harness, and commonTest has none. The FROST crypto path is covered by FrostSigningRoundTest; the message-driven parts around it are not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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a74a4b71cf |
test: cover the two decisions that decide who said what
The crypto was tested; the logic that acts on it was not. Both untested pieces were the security-critical ones, and neither fails loudly when it goes wrong -- one silently widens who may impersonate whom, the other silently destroys a message. Extracted MarmotDirectMessage.classify, which decides what an arriving wrap is to this device, from ChatMessage.directMessage, which turns that decision into rows. The decision is pure; only the filing needs a database, and Room-backed code cannot be unit-tested in this project. Same split, and for the same reason, as pulling the wrap/open crypto out of the DAO in the first place. Extracted MarmotInboundManager.mip03Rejection for the same reason. Its kind:1059 exemption is the most dangerous line in this feature: widened to another kind, or stripped of its kind guard, it hands every member of every group the ability to publish events as anybody, and nothing else in the pipeline would notice. There is now a test that walks seven kinds and asserts each is still held to MIP-03. Fifteen cases, the ones worth naming: `our own message is ours, even though we cannot open it` and `ours is decided before anything is opened`. A sender cannot decrypt their own wrap -- the key was discarded -- so by decryption alone this is indistinguishable from a bystander's view, and only the MLS identity separates them. Get it wrong and the inbound path files an empty placeholder over the row sendChatMessage wrote, which holds the only copy of those words. It is the one failure here that loses data rather than rendering something wrong. `words sealed by one member and sent by another are dropped`. The check that replaces MIP-03 for this kind, tested directly rather than described in a comment as it was before. One test asserts something I had wrong. I expected a seal relabelled with another member's pubkey to be caught by the signature check; it never reaches it. NIP-44 derives the conversation key from the pubkey being claimed, so relabelling a seal makes it undecryptable by the person it was encrypted for -- the label is bound to the key, not merely asserted alongside it. The outcome is Unreadable, which is the truth: the recipient genuinely cannot read it. `a seal tampered with after signing is dropped` covers what verify() does catch, using an alteration that survives decryption. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d110737f9a |
fix: keep a room's MlsGroup alive so a late message can still be read
Two events published in the same second reliably lose one of them. The receiver stores the kind:445 and produces nothing from it -- no inner event, no chat line, no error anybody sees, because MarmotGroupEvent is written before the message is decrypted and so survives while everything downstream silently does not. Observed as a FROST signing session that never started on the receiver: proposeSigning publishes the proposal and then the proposer's own nonce, the relay handed them back in the other order, and the proposal was dropped. The nonce is still sitting there filed against a session that will never exist. The same bug ate a dialect earlier, which then took out the artifact referencing it via a foreign key. MLS is specified to tolerate this. RFC 9420 says a receiver that gets generation N+1 before N keeps the intermediate keys so the older message can still be read, and quartz's SecretTree does exactly that, in a private skippedKeys map. What it does not do is persist it: exportSenderStates() returns the ratchet positions only, so saveState() drops the cache. NostrDao rebuilt the group from stored state for every inbound event, so the cache was empty every single time, and generation N arriving after N+1 failed `require(generation >= applicationGeneration)` and was swallowed. Terminal -- the key is derived from a ratchet that has moved past it, and nothing asks the sender to resend. This keeps the instance alive instead. MlsGroupCache holds one MlsGroup per room, and the inbound path goes through it, so skippedKeys survives from one message to the next. That covers the case that actually bites -- a burst arriving in one sync, decrypted one after another against the same tree -- which is what every bursty flow needs: proposeRitual sends two, addArtifact sends two, and addChapter sends one per paragraph plus one, of which only the ones arriving in ascending generation order survived. Reuse is conditional on the stored state still being exactly what the cache last wrote. Sending a message advances the sender ratchet and saves; so does adding a member. When that happens the cache rebuilds rather than carrying on from a group that has been overtaken -- which is what keeps this from being worse than no cache at all: the fallback is always the old behaviour, never a diverged ratchet. One lock per room, not one overall, because the group is mutable and decryption advances it: two events for the same room decrypted at once would corrupt the tree, and a busy room should not hold up a quiet one. **This is a mitigation, not the fix.** It does not survive a restart, and it does not survive another writer, so a long enough reorder still loses the message. The fix belongs in quartz -- carry skippedKeys through saveState/restore -- and quartz is a mavenCentral binary, not a fork, so it cannot be made here. docs/mls-skipped-keys.md has the analysis, the patch, the migration constraint on the persisted state format, and the three ways to actually land it. Not verified end to end: the proposal that exposed this cannot be recovered, since its generation is already past, so confirming the fix needs a fresh burst. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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f38a5f12f3 |
fix: ask relays for gift wraps addressed to us, not to our peers
Three kind:1059 sync filters named the wrong pubkey. ChatMessageListViewModel asked for `#p:[peer]` with no author constraint, which subscribes to every wrap anyone has ever sent that peer. None of it is decryptable by us, and it is the direct source of the Invalid Mac saves fixed in the previous commit. It now asks for `#p:[us]` on our own DM relays — the only shape of gift wrap filter that can return something we hold a key for. The peer's relays were the wrong place to look regardless: under NIP-17 a sender publishes to the *recipient's* DM relays, so our mail lands on ours. The two in NostrDao asked for `authors:[userPublicKey]` + `#p:[participant]`, commented "messages from this relay that were sent by us". A gift wrap is signed by the throwaway key from GiftWrapEvent.create, never by the sender's identity key, so no author value we could know will ever match one. These requests were queued once per participant and always reconciled to empty — failing silently rather than loudly, which is why they outlived the bug that made the third filter visible. Both `if (chatMessageRelayListEvent != null)` branches held nothing else, so each is inverted to the `== null` case that does the real work: warn, and queue a profile sync for the participant whose DM relay list we are missing. Nothing is lost; neither filter ever returned an event. Two things worth recording about what a filter can and cannot express here. A wrap discloses only its recipient, so "the messages in this conversation" is not askable — `#p:[us]` pulls the whole inbox and that is the narrowest correct request. That is the privacy property being paid for, not a limitation to work around. Sent-message recovery is likewise not a filter problem. It needs a second wrap addressed to ourselves at send time, which giftWrapAndBroadcast does not yet emit; the `#p:[us]` filters already in place would pick those up with no new subscription. purpose on the chat message request changes from "sent-messages" to "chat", matching the now-identical filter in ChatRoomListViewModel. Since computeId buckets by minute and NegentropySynchronizeRequestDao upserts, the two collapse into a single request rather than racing as separate rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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f57644aa1f |
fix: stop discarding gift wraps addressed to someone else
An inbound kind:1059 whose `p` tag is not our pubkey took down the entire
save transaction:
java.lang.IllegalStateException: Invalid Mac: Calculated f1db537e…, decoded: 45c8c86a…
at com.vitorpamplona.quartz.nip44Encryption.crypto.Hkdf.fastExpand
at com.vitorpamplona.quartz.nip44Encryption.Nip44v2.checkMessageKeys
…
at press.mantra.compose.database.model.GiftWrapMessage.decryptGiftWrapSeal
at press.mantra.compose.database.dao.NostrDao.indexNostrEvent
at press.mantra.compose.database.dao.NostrDao.storeNostrEvent
Two separate things were wrong.
The first is that decryptGiftWrapSeal attempted the decryption at all. When
the recipient did not match our key it logged "We are unwrapping a message we
may have sent" and called
Nip44.decrypt(content, privateKey = ourPrivKey, pubKey = giftWrapEvent.pubKey)
giftWrapEvent.pubKey is the wrap's ephemeral author. NIP-59 encrypts the wrap
under ECDH(ephemeralPriv, recipientPub), and GiftWrapEvent.create mints that
ephemeral key with NostrSignerSync(KeyPair()) and discards it on return.
ECDH(ourPriv, ephemeralPub) is a third, unrelated key, so the MAC check could
never pass. A sender genuinely cannot unwrap their own gift wrap; that is the
point of the construction, not a gap in it. The call threw its result away
anyway (keyPair.privKey?.let { …; null }) and fell through to the trailing
`return null`, so it was a probe whose only possible outcome was an exception.
The second is that a null seal was treated as a failure. indexNostrEvent
throws GiftWrapUnsealException on null, which unwinds out of the Room
transaction in storeNostrEvent and rolls back everything written for the
event: the NostrEvent row, its NostrEventRelay row, and the GiftWrapMessage
upserted moments earlier. The only catch sits in DatabaseNostrRepository,
which logs and continues — and that catch also swallows the
`status = "processed"` upsert on the SynchronizeNostrEventRequest, so the
event was re-fetched and re-failed on every later sync pass.
isAddressedTo now answers the question with no crypto at all, and the indexer
returns early for wraps that are not ours: the event and the wrap row survive,
the remainder of indexNostrEvent still runs, the transaction commits, and the
sync request is marked processed. GiftWrapUnsealException goes back to meaning
what it says — addressed to us, but unsealing failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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3e4166f13d |
feat: sign a dialect into existence instead of submitting one
Adding a dialect no longer creates one. It opens a signing session over a DialectEvent, and the dialect appears -- on every member's device at once, authored by the group's shared key rather than by whoever typed it -- when enough members have signed. That is the difference between the two envelopes. A submission says "I am putting this in front of the group"; the group's only recourse afterwards is social, and the row records the submitter as its author. A signature is the group saying it, it takes a quorum to say, and the author on the row is the group's key. For something as load-bearing as the set of dialects a group translates into, the second is the honest one. **Where the signed event becomes a row.** Every device has the event and the signature once the session completes, so each applies the result itself rather than waiting to be sent something it can already build -- the same reasoning the transcript lines are written on. Nothing goes on the wire for it, and nothing could: the outbound pipeline re-authors rumors as their sender, so a group-signed event pushed through it would come out stripped of the signature and attributed to whoever sent it. Applying reuses the inbound path's dispatch rather than repeating it. applyInnerEvent takes plain ids now instead of a GroupEvent, and both are null here, because there is no group event and no inner event behind a row a device derived for itself. A failure there is logged and the session still completes: the signature is made and valid, and failing the session would tell the group to abandon something that succeeded. **The screen.** One, not three. A ceremony asks three different questions so it gets three approval screens; signing asks one -- sign this or do not -- so a single screen has to carry the whole case: what is being signed, who else has agreed, and what the group is still waiting on. The event is shown as the thing it is, a dialect with its name and country and language, because a member deciding whether to sign is deciding about a dialect and "kind 30304" answers a question nobody asked. Anything unrecognised falls back to the raw kind, which is better than describing it wrongly. The member ladder names people rather than counting them, for the same reason the ceremony's does: "1 of 2" does not tell anyone whose door to knock on. It stays useful after the decision, since a member who has already signed is exactly who needs to see who has not. **Getting there.** Signing lines render in the transcript as system notices like ritual lines -- nobody said them either -- but they lead to the session rather than to the key. A chat row carries no session id and adding a column to the table every message uses would be a poor trade for a lookup, so FrostSigningRoute takes a nullable id and the screen resolves the room's live session. Approving is recorded as answered by the nonce line rather than the partial signature: agreeing is agreeing to take part, and the coordinator may then pick a quorum without you, which should not leave you looking like you never replied. **Proposing needs a key.** The FAB is disabled, and says why, when the room has none -- proposeSigning throws there, and it is not reachable outside the #admins room in the first place. AddDialectViewModel drops MantraRepository, which it no longer uses for anything. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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63c1879ace |
refactor: carry signing on marmot inner events, not gift wraps
A signing message is now an ordinary Marmot inner event: queued with a
null marmotGroupEventId, picked up by the outbound pipeline, MLS-encrypted
and broadcast as one kind:445 for the room. Inbound it arrives through
ChatMessage.fromGroupEventResult like every other inner event, and is
dispatched from NostrDao rather than from the gift-wrap branch.
The ceremony keeps NIP-17 because it has no choice: its participants are
not yet a Marmot group, and its purpose is to produce the key one would
be keyed on. Signing has that solved for it, so it was paying for
addressing it does not need -- a gift wrap is sealed once per recipient,
so every message cost one wrap per member, and every message had to name
the whole group in p-tags. A group event is encrypted to the group once.
That also removes a small dishonesty. The signer set is supposed to come
from the ceremony; carrying p-tags meant each message also asserted a
membership list, and two sources for one fact is one too many. Now who
can read a message is the MLS tree's business and who may sign is the
ceremony's.
Which room follows from the transport. A ceremony runs in a NIP-17 room
-- every member an equal admin, no MLS tree to be outside of -- and a
group event needs an MLS one, so signing cannot happen where the ceremony
did. It happens in the #admins room, which is the right venue anyway: it
already exists after a ceremony, its membership is exactly the share
holders, and its id *is* the key, derived by
SharedKeyDerivation.marmotGroupId.
So completedKey rederives rather than reading a column: a room cannot be
pointed at a key it was not derived from. Receivers were already
independent of this, naming their key in the proposal's frost_key tag and
looking it up locally.
Mechanical consequences:
- processSigningPayload, acceptProposal, record and isFromCoordinator
take the decrypted Event instead of a GiftWrapPayload.
- replayStoredMessages reads MarmotInnerEvent rows, via a new
getByChatRoomAndKinds, and rebuilds the rumor from the row's own
columns.
- applyInnerEvent returns null for the signing kinds. They are the
manager's, and it writes transcript lines naming who did what, so an
"unsupported" row would be a second and worse account of the same
thing.
- DkgSessionDao gains getKeyHoldingSessions for the derivation match.
The kind comment is rewritten rather than kept. 3032x was chosen to clear
the DKG, which now shares no transport with signing and cannot clash with
it; what it actually has to clear is the nip30303 document kinds, which
run 30300-30312 and are dispatched by the same inbound path. It still
does. The DKG's own overlap with those numbers is noted there as the
routing accident it is, so nothing added later leans on it.
No schema change: both tables and the columns landed in v6 with the
previous commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b4ac65f5c9 |
feat: sign a nostr event with the group's shared key
A ceremony leaves every member holding a share of a t-of-n key and no way
to use it. This is the other half: a session that turns an unsigned nostr
event into one signed by the group.
The shape is ChillDkgRitualManager's, deliberately. The member who
proposes coordinates, protocol messages travel as gift-wrapped rumors on
the same NIP-17 pipeline chat messages use, each inbound message is
persisted and then the session is asked whether it can move, and every
step is recomputed from stored inputs so a device killed mid-round
resumes on the next message. Anyone who has read that manager can read
this one.
proposer --[ 30320 proposal ]-> everyone the unsigned event
signer --[ 30321 nonce ]-> everyone this device's public nonce
proposer --[ 30322 signer set ]-> everyone who signs, and their aggregated nonce
signer --[ 30323 partial ]-> everyone this device's partial signature
proposer --[ 30324 signature ]-> everyone the finished 64-byte signature
anyone --[ 30325 failure ]-> everyone abandon + blame
Three things are genuinely different, and each is why this is a separate
manager rather than another branch of that one.
**It does not need everybody.** A DKG cannot finish until every member
takes part; that is what makes the key. Signing needs t, and waiting for
n would throw away the property the group ran a ceremony to get. So the
coordinator waits for the threshold to be reachable, picks a set and says
who is in it. Members left out do nothing and stall nothing.
**Restart-safety is forced rather than chosen.** SecretNonce cannot be
serialised and refuses to be used twice, so storing the randomness it
derives from and regenerating on demand is the only way a session
survives the app closing. That is safe for exactly one reason: a session
signs one message and cannot be made to sign another. Two rules hold it
in place and both are load-bearing rather than tidy:
- the event id is written at creation, and a proposal that disagrees
with it is refused rather than applied;
- the aggregated nonce and signer set are write-once. A coordinator
that sends a second, different set is ignored. Obeying it would mean
two partial signatures over one secret nonce against two challenges,
which is precisely how a secret share is extracted. The session
stalls; the share does not.
**One approval, not three.** A DKG asks three times because each step
publishes something different and commits the member to something
different. Here every step serves one decision -- sign this event or do
not -- and the event is fixed before the member is asked, so a second
prompt would be the same question twice. Declining is broadcast rather
than silent: a t-of-n group can sign without you, but only if it knows.
Two things are checked rather than trusted, both because the coordinator
is untrusted by construction: the event id is recomputed from the
proposal's own fields, so a proposer cannot have the group sign one thing
while showing them another; and the finished signature is verified before
the session is called complete, so a bad aggregate is a failure here
rather than a rejection at every relay it reaches.
Signer ids are derived, not stored: a member's FROST id is their index in
the bytewise sort of the ceremony's host keys, the same ordering ChillDKG
hashed into the session identity and the same one the public shares are
in. Deriving means signing cannot disagree with the ceremony that made
the key.
DkgSession gains publicShares, kept because FROST validates each signer's
secret share against its public one. A ceremony finished before this
column reads back null and signing runs without that check rather than
refusing.
The tests run the same calls in the same order against real FROST and
assert the aggregate verifies as a nostr signature. That path was written
from reading the library rather than from a working example, so it is the
part most likely to be subtly wrong -- and wired up wrong it fails
silently, on every device.
Kinds start at 30320 with a gap. The DKG runs 30310-30316 and the
nip30303 document kinds run 30300 up; those two already collide at 30310
and 30311, and SubmissionEvent sits on 30312, which is also the DKG's
round-1 kind. They are kept apart today only by riding different
transports, which is luck. Signing shares a transport and rooms with the
DKG, so it starts clear of both.
No UI yet: this is the session logic, reachable through proposeSigning,
approve and decline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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fcc28de931 |
Revert "fix: hold a payload whose parent has not arrived instead of losing the event"
This reverts commit
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