fix: seal the Welcome, the one gift wrap an MLS room must publish
No invite to a Marmot room has been delivered since1700e6d. The Welcome was built, hashed, queued and logged exactly as before -- and then refused one step short of the relay, by a guard that had no idea it was looking at one. **The guard.**1700e6d("send a direct message into the group, wrapped for one member") added a backstop at the top of sealGiftWrapPayload: val chatRoom = database.chatRoomDao().findChatRoomById(giftWrapPayload.chatRoomId) if (chatRoom?.chatRoom?.mlsGroupState != null) { log; return } Its reasoning is sound and still is: a Marmot direct message is a genuine, correctly signed NIP-59 gift wrap, indistinguishable from one this path would be right to publish, and the only thing keeping it off a relay is that it never becomes a GiftWrapPayload row. Refusing at the seal as well means a future caller cannot walk one onto a relay by accident. **Why it caught the Welcome.** MarmotOutboundDao.deliveryWelcome writes a GiftWrapPayload with chatRoomId = nostrGroupId -- the MLS room's own id, which by construction has mlsGroupState set. Every Welcome therefore matched a refusal keyed on mlsGroupState alone. There is no Welcome that does not: the tag identifying the room is the whole point of the event. The kind:444 arm further down -- the one that wraps only for the participant who published the referenced key package -- became unreachable, which is why nothing in the logs said "welcome" at all. **Why it went unnoticed.** The room reaches the correct state on the inviter's side whether or not the Welcome goes out: addMember advances the epoch, the group state is persisted, the Participant row exists, and "Invited X to chat" is written to the transcript. From the coordinator's side an invitee who never heard anything is indistinguishable from one who joined -- recorded as a known gap in docs/shared-key-ceremony.md, and this is what was behind it. **The second-order damage.** observeUnsealedGiftWrapPayloads is SELECT * FROM GiftWrapPayload WHERE publicKey = :p AND giftWrapSealId IS NULL collected as a Flow<GiftWrapPayload?> -- one row at a time. giftWrapSealId is only ever set inside persistAndBroadcastGiftWrap, which the guard returns before reaching, so a refused payload stays unsealed forever and sits at the head of that queue. The first Welcome a user queued blocked every gift wrap behind it, in every room, for the life of the install. **The fix.** Kind first, room second. MIP-02 addresses kind:444 to someone who is not yet in the group and holds no key to read a kind:445 -- a relay-borne gift wrap is the only way to reach them, and deliveryWelcome queues one on purpose. Every other kind is refused exactly as before. sendChatMessage already branches on mlsGroupState before writing a payload, so an MLS room's messages never arrive here anyway; the guard stays as the backstop it was meant to be. docs/marmot-direct-messages.md claimed "An MLS room should never produce a NIP-17 gift wrap for any reason". That premise is what made the guard look complete, so it is corrected rather than merely amended, with the test to apply when adding a kind to the exemption: can its recipient read a kind:445? If so, it does not belong on this path. **Not fixed, deliberately.** A refusal still leaves the payload unsealed and head-blocking. That is now unreachable -- nothing else can queue a payload against an MLS room -- but it remains a trap for whatever gets refused next. Marking a payload refused needs a state the schema does not have, so it is left for its own change rather than smuggled in here. Verified: :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid succeeds. No test covers this -- DatabaseChatRepository is Room-backed, and Room-backed code has no unit test harness in this project. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -159,9 +159,20 @@ but the tables it is kept out of stops it going to a relay.
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`GiftWrapMessage` could not be written anyway without a `NostrEvent` row — its
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foreign key — and `NostrEvent` is the broadcast join target. The rule is also
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enforced at the other end: `sealGiftWrapPayload` refuses any payload whose room has
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a non-null `mlsGroupState`, and logs. An MLS room should never produce a NIP-17 gift
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wrap for any reason, and an invariant in code is what stops a later refactor from
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walking a direct message onto a relay without reading this page first.
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a non-null `mlsGroupState`, and logs. An invariant in code is what stops a later
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refactor from walking a direct message onto a relay without reading this page first.
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**The Welcome is exempt, and the exemption is not optional.** MIP-02 addresses
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kind:444 to someone who is not yet in the group and holds no key to read a
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kind:445 — a relay-borne gift wrap is the only way to reach them, and
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`MarmotOutboundDao.deliveryWelcome` writes exactly such a `GiftWrapPayload` row on
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purpose. Every Welcome carries its own room's `nostrGroupId`, so a refusal keyed on
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`mlsGroupState` alone matches all of them: while it did, no invite to any Marmot
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room was ever delivered, and — since the unsealed queue is a single-row flow — the
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first refused Welcome sat at its head and blocked every payload queued behind it.
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The check is therefore on kind first, room second. When adding a kind to that
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exemption, the question to answer is whether its recipient can read a kind:445; if
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they can, it does not belong on this path.
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## Attribution comes from MLS, not from the payload
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@@ -301,7 +312,7 @@ sender, `senderIdentity` is the only source of attribution there is.
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| `managers/MarmotInboundManager.kt` | the kind:1059 carve-out; requires the sender identity |
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| `database/model/ChatMessage.kt` | `TYPE_DIRECT_MESSAGE`; the kind:1059 arm and its three outcomes |
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| `database/dao/NostrDao.kt` | resolves `senderIdentity` and passes it in |
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| `database/repository/DatabaseChatRepository.kt` | queues the rumor; refuses to seal an MLS room's payload |
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| `database/repository/DatabaseChatRepository.kt` | queues the rumor; refuses to seal an MLS room's payload, except a Welcome |
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| `database/dao/MarmotOutboundDao.kt` | wraps on the way out; scrubs the plaintext |
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| `database/model/MarmotInnerEvent.kt` | `directMessageRecipientPublicKey`, the outbound signal |
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| `ui/view/model/ChatMessageListViewModel.kt` | armed state; the two renderings |
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