Commit Graph
1125 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 d95412ffda feat: an admin makes a member an admin, or not, in a convenient room (member-admin-promotion, Phase 6)
MarmotOutboundDao.promote and demote commit the room's admin list through
the publish gate, built from the list the group holds when the commit is
staged. AdminGovernance holds the rules once: the library's permissions,
plus that a promoted account holds a leaf, and that a keyed room's admins
are changed by none of this -- they need the group's signature and a
share of its key, which are not built.

Removing an admin now takes them off the admin list first and removes
them when that commit is confirmed, chained by MarmotEngine.afterConfirmed.
A bare Remove left their key on the list, so inviting them back made them
an admin again with nobody having said so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 01:19:34 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 19f0fc0f1e feat: the room says who became an admin, and who stopped (member-admin-promotion, Phase 2)
TYPE_ADMIN_ADDED and TYPE_ADMIN_REMOVED, derived like the membership
lines: processGroupMembershipChanges compares the group's admin set before
the commit with the one after, on every device that applies it. The prior
set comes from the group's state -- captured before the engine moves the
group on the inbound paths, and from the obligation's prior state on a
confirmed own commit -- never from the adminAt flags. An account that
left the tree gets its departure line and no admin line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 01:13:37 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 53acae68a4 feat: a member's admin flag is true from the room's first moment (member-admin-promotion, Phase 1)
Participant.adminAt was written only when a commit arrived, so on the
device that created a convenient room or a direct message nobody was an
admin until somebody else committed. MarmotInboundManager.reconcileAdmins
brings the flags into line with the group's admin set without a caption.
It runs where every Marmot room is made -- replacing stampAdmins, which
only the keyed rooms had -- and when a room's detail screen opens, which
catches up rooms made before this build.

processGroupMembershipChanges shares the same flag rule, adminFlagChanges.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 01:09:56 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 2ed83c55ab fix: an admin's refused leave is shown, not thrown out of the view model (member-admin-promotion, Phase 10a)
leaveGroup called the repository inside viewModelScope.launch and caught
nothing, so "An admin cannot leave; hand over admin first" escaped the
coroutine: never shown, and on Android a crash. It now goes to an onFailed
callback the screen reports through the notifier, as disbandGroup does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 01:07:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8088efd732 docs: making a member an admin and back, a phased plan
Three rules: every admin holds a share, every commit in a keyed room is a
proposal until the group's threshold signature is on it (a member's own
leave and key update excepted), and a robust group keeps at least three
admins. Phase 0 is upstream work in mls-kmp and marmot-kmp.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 01:05:30 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 fc437d0511 fix: a device does not vouch for a rotation's key state on its own
Material Design conformance / budgets (push) Canceled after 0s
Material Design conformance / tests (push) Canceled after 0s
The automatic ceremony lets a device sign, without asking its owner, the
one key state that can be true for a ceremony it finished
(GroupKeyStateManager.vouchesFor). Its seventh condition -- no state for
the room already signed here -- was what kept a share rotation's key
state out, and only in rooms that already had one. An eighth makes it
explicit: a state naming a share generation or a member binding says
more than the ceremony did, and its owner is asked.

Found by ShareRefreshRitualJvmTest after the merge: its devices hold no
first state, and the generation-1 state signed itself. jvmTest
1229/1229, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 00:08:21 +02:00
Kgothatso Ngako f88c70bee4 Merge branch 'claude/frost-reenrollment-plan-055ba8' into giza-refresh 2026-11-20 00:03:13 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 08b5c56f7e docs: the share refresh chain is pushed
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:55:50 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8278ffd5df docs: share refresh is built, phase by phase, and what is left
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:53:13 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4949f0fefe feat: the recovery walk, from the host key to the live share (frost-share-refresh, Phase 12)
ShareGenerations.recover rebuilds a device's share of every generation
from its host secret key alone: ChillDKG's recovery data gives generation
0, and each refresh's recovery data, applied to the generation before,
gives the next. It stops at a generation the host key was withheld from,
since a repaired share leaves no recovery data. Nothing calls it yet.

Tested three refreshes on, against every device's live share and each
generation's table. With the release-build test, jvmTest 1200/1200,
compileDebugKotlinAndroid and the audits pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:53:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 992290903b feat: a Shares section, behind a flag that is off in release (frost-share-refresh, Phases 11 and 13)
The room detail screen shows a key share by share: the generation the
group signs with, who holds a share, who waits to be brought back and who
was removed for good; what this device is being asked (take part in a
rotation, store the new share, help bring a member back), with approve
and abandon; and the two things it may start -- rotate the shares, or ask
to be brought back. The copy says what a rotation does not do.

ExperimentalFeatures.shareRefresh gates all of it (D4): on in debug and
development builds, off in release until the zkp modules are reviewed.
Off, nothing is offered, and a rotation this device is asked into is
declined out loud. The desktop build can opt in with
-Dgiza.experimental=true. The iOS actual was not built.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:53:06 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 1c3e0e934e feat: re-enrollment, a stale member repaired into the generation the group signs with (frost-share-refresh, Phase 10)
ShareRepairManager brings back a participant id a refresh left stale, with
FrostReducedEnrollment in repair mode, on kinds 30346-30349. t live helpers
approve and run it; their round-1.1 shares and round-1.2 sums are raw
additive shares, so each goes NIP-44-encrypted between the two parties'
ChillDKG host keys. The target checks the result against the public share
the group signed -- never one the helpers supply -- stores it, and proves
it with a Schnorr signature by the share, which every device checks before
marking the id live. The share is a point of the new polynomial that the
old device never had.

10b: a new identity at an id -- a lost device, a compromised account -- is
bound by a group-signed key state first (frost_member, GroupKeyState
.memberBindings, schema 40), applied only to an id that is not live. Until
then its request waits, with nothing sent. A key state amending one at the
same generation is stamped a second later, so a binding can never tie with
the state it adds to.

jvmTest 1198/1198, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:46:38 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 bb39a82cc7 Merge branch 'claude/automate-key-ceremony-803bb9' into giza
Joining is the only approval a key ceremony asks for: rounds 1 and 2,
the coordinator's follow-up steps and the ceremony's own key state run
without a tap. docs/automatic-key-ceremony.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:37:19 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c4fe4c9c26 feat: rotating a group's shares without a member it removed (frost-share-refresh, Phase 9)
A removal takes a member out of the room, not out of the key: their share
still helps sign. After an admin removes a member who holds a live share,
the room screen offers to rotate without them -- a second act, never
folded into the removal, since it needs every remaining holder.
ShareRefreshManager.proposeWithout withholds them for good (RETIRED); the
refusals say when that would leave fewer than t holders (the group could
not sign at all) or not a majority (remove fewer at a time).

Tested in the ritual harness: in a 2-of-3, the other two sign at
generation 1 and the removed member's old share signs nothing with a new
one. jvmTest 1195/1195, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:36:48 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 51615992ee feat: the group signs its new generation, and every device deletes the old share (frost-share-refresh, Phase 8)
When a refresh completes the coordinator asks the group to sign the key
state at the new generation -- the same room, key, path and parentage, plus
frost_generation, a hash of the public-share table, the refresh and any
retired ids. It is the new shares' first signature, and what D6 waits on:
a device that files that state, holds the generation active and agrees
with the group's table fails every signing session left at an older
generation, out loud, and deletes the older shares, the ceremony's
randomness that rebuilds generation 0's, and the WAL's page images of them.

A key state at a higher generation wins whatever its timestamp, in the
DAO and among signed events. A proposal at a generation this device has
confirmed and is still waiting on the certificate for waits instead of
declining, and resumes when the generation activates.

jvmTest 1193/1193, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:32:14 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 6491d2aa13 docs: joining is the only approval, as built (automatic ceremony, Phase 8)
The ceremony note's approval section becomes 'Joining is the only
approval'; the subgroup note says which of its four steps anybody is
asked about; the plan records where the build chose differently and
that its device session has not been run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:29:28 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 0a60da6e47 feat: a ceremony's own key state signs itself (automatic ceremony, Phase 7)
For a ceremony a device finished there is one true statement of what
its room signs with: its key, at the admin path, naming the room that
derives, with the parent's certificate for a subgroup. A signing
proposal that is exactly that statement is approved on arrival.
GroupKeyStateManager.vouchesFor checks it with the rules stateFrom
applies to a signed state, minus the signature; anything else, a key
state included, is asked about as before.

SignedGroupKeyStateTest's two approval-gate tests now assert the new
rule. CeremonyNetwork relays signing messages, so a ceremony runs from
the joins to a signed key state with nobody asked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:28:25 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 f8974aec81 feat: a group rotates its shares, end to end between devices (frost-share-refresh, Phase 7)
ShareRefreshManager runs a FROST share refresh in the Marmot room the key
derives, on kinds 30340-30345, in the image of ChillDkgRitualManager:
every inbound message stored, every step recomputed from stored inputs,
nothing of a member's own published before they approve, at two gates
(DEAL, CONFIRM). Recipients are at least t and a majority of the ids not
retired, and a device confirms one refresh per base generation --
ShareRefreshConfirmation, written in the same transaction as the pending
generation it confirms -- so two refreshes from one generation cannot both
complete. The certificate activates the new generation; a withheld device
learns its table from the recovery data and files it with no share.

Schema 39 (AutoMigration): ShareRefreshSession, ShareRefreshMessage,
ShareRefreshConfirmation. Transcript lines as system lines; dispatch in
the Marmot inbound path.

ShareRefreshRitualJvmTest: three devices with real host keys refresh
through bitcoin-kmp's FrostRefresh and then sign at generation 1 as the
same room. jvmTest 1190/1190, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:25:45 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c8a529a178 build: lightning-kmp-app with FROST share refresh down the chain (frost-share-refresh, Phase 4)
e4779ff..3794eb8, every level on a local claude/frost-share-refresh branch:

  lightning-kmp-app  3794eb8   (e4779ff + this bump)
  lightning-kmp      2043f254  (df778bc4 + bump)
  bitcoin-kmp        3cd82d1   (1982eba + bump + FrostRefresh)
  secp256k1-kmp      0f5a710   (ce05021 + bump + frostRefresh* bindings + tests)
  secp256k1-zkp      31ea015c  (a04dc1ed + the frost_refresh module)

None of it is pushed; the pins are to local commits until it is. Giza
does not call the refresh yet (Phase 7).

compileDebugKotlinAndroid, jvmTest 1183/1183 and the M3, brand and wallet
audits pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:15:46 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 73fcfff0da feat: the coordinator's device takes a finished ceremony to its room (automatic ceremony, Phase 6)
CeremonyFollowThrough asks a subgroup's parent to certify it, asks the
group to sign the key state, and creates the room, from stored rows and
one step at a time. It runs beside the live subscription, outside the
inbound lock, since creating a room waits on key packages the inbound
path delivers. It looks again when a ceremony finishes, a certificate
or key state is signed, or a key package arrives.

Only the coordinator's device acts on its own, and never again after a
signing session failed; the ladder keeps the buttons for both. Once the
room exists the ladder's last rung opens it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:10:56 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4c75ca1b03 feat: a stalled key ceremony says on whom, and offers abandon there (automatic ceremony, Phase 5)
Once everyone has joined nothing is asked, so a ceremony that sits still
is waiting on a device that is not answering. After a day without a new
message, the ritual screen names who it is waiting on and since when,
with the abandon action beside it. Nothing abandons on its own.

A ceremony message is now stored once, on first arrival, so its time is
when it first came and a relay's redelivery does not restart the clock.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:02:46 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 d71cf0c093 feat: one approval screen for a key ceremony (automatic ceremony, Phase 4)
The join screen carries what the round-one screen showed, the members
in particular, and says the device takes it from there. The round-one
and round-two screens, their routes and their strings are gone; the
ritual screen offers only the join, and the ladder describes each round
as something the device does.

Old request lines still read as answered: the automatic round writes
the same line a tapped one did.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:55:44 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 9278ccd54e feat: running key ceremonies resume when the app starts (automatic ceremony, Phase 3)
A ritual moved on an arriving message or a member's tap. Without the
tap, a ceremony holding every message it needs -- one an older build
left waiting to be told to contribute, or one interrupted between
storing a message and acting on it -- would never move.

resumeRunning advances every ceremony this user has joined. Sync runs
it once per activation, after reopening the inbox.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:51:09 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 ca5cda81db feat: joining is the only approval a key ceremony asks for (automatic ceremony, Phase 2)
advance no longer stops at rounds 1 and 2. Contributing follows from
having joined, and confirming is ChillDKG's own check, which refuses a
substituted result whether or not anybody is looking. pendingApproval
returns the join or nothing, and approving a round is a no-op.

ROUND_1 and ROUND_2 stay in the enum, and their timestamps in the
schema, so rows written by older builds keep decoding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:49:12 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 fce51e20f6 feat: a key's shares have generations, and signing reads the one it names (frost-share-refresh, Phase 6)
Schema 38 (AutoMigration): KeyShareGeneration and KeyShareMember for every
generation a refresh makes, FrostSigningSession.generation, and
GroupKeyState.generation and publicSharesHash. Generation 0 has no row: it
stays where ChillDKG wrote it, with ids derived from the host keys as
before.

ShareGenerations is the one door signing reads a share through.
FrostSigningManager fixes a session to the generation the group signs with
when it is proposed, carries it as frost_generation from generation 1 (a
generation-0 proposal is byte for byte what it was), and a device holding
no share of the named generation declines out loud with
GENERATION_REFUSAL instead of waiting or signing with the wrong share.

ShareGenerationsJvmTest refreshes a 2-of-3 group's shares by hand with a
zero-constant polynomial; the new shares sign and the signature verifies
as the unchanged room. jvmTest 1183/1183, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, and
the M3, brand and wallet audits pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:48:42 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 e9c413ac66 test: a key ceremony run across devices with real ChillDKG (automatic ceremony, Phase 1)
CeremonyNetwork gives each member a database of their own and relays
what each queues to the others, stored first the way the inbound path
stores it. No test ran the rounds before: the others stop at the host
key or take a dealer's key.

Pins today's gates: members who have only joined stop at round 1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:45:20 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 ebe240a43e docs: joining is the only approval in a key ceremony (plan)
Phased plan to make a key ceremony run by itself once a member has
joined: rounds 1 and 2 automatic, a resume sweep in place of the tap,
the coordinator's follow-up steps and the key state's signatures
automatic, and abandon kept for a member who goes quiet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:44:34 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4040ae7424 fix: a deleted share is gone from aux.db, and aux.db leaves the phone in no backup (frost-share-refresh, Phase 5)
Every connection opens with PRAGMA secure_delete = ON (SecureDeleteDriver),
and GizaDatabase.scrubFreedPages truncates the write-ahead log, which keeps
whole page images of a share after its row is gone. Android backups and
device-to-device transfers carry none of the app's data: aux.db holds FROST
shares in plaintext, and a share copied somewhere the app cannot reach
cannot be rotated away from.

SecureDeleteJvmTest reads the database's files byte by byte; its two
controls find the share with secure_delete off and before the scrub.
jvmTest 1176/1176.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:40:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8dd710a156 docs: rotating a group's shares without moving its key (plan)
Enrollment evaluates the same polynomial, so it cannot rotate a share; a
zero-sum refresh can. Thirteen phases from a frost_refresh module in
secp256k1-zkp to the cutover, removal, repair and UI in Giza. D1-D8 are
decided as recommended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:32:48 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 d4dd87f2a2 docs: the submodule refresh is pushed, and what is left
Material Design conformance / budgets (push) Canceled after 0s
Material Design conformance / tests (push) Canceled after 0s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:00:32 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 70a38d0636 docs: the submodule refresh is built, and what is left to push and check
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 21:55:10 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 051b339a8c build: lightning-kmp-app with reduced FROST enrollment down the chain
67a0376..e4779ff. Every level now pins the tip of the branch it tracks:

  lightning-kmp-app  e4779ff  (master 949bfcb + this bump)
  lightning-kmp      df778bc4 (threshold 065dcf89 + this bump)
  bitcoin-kmp        1982eba  (threshold 9e3c4f8 + bump + FrostReducedEnrollment)
  secp256k1-kmp      ce05021  (threshold tip, reduced enrollment bindings)
  secp256k1-zkp      a04dc1ed (main tip)

Also arriving, from lightning-kmp-app master, three lightning-kmp bumps Giza
calls none of: a node may decline / answers again requests for its offers,
and a swap-in's user key held by a signer. The wallet audit is unaffected.

Giza does not call enrollment yet; see docs/submodule-refresh.md, Phase 6.

compileDebugKotlinAndroid, jvmTest (1171 tests) and check pass on Linux.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 21:54:58 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 33492cfff0 docs: carrying reduced FROST enrollment up the submodule chain (plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 21:37:05 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 3aef54b549 Merge branch 'claude/marmot-kmp-migration-ab8940' into giza
Material Design conformance / budgets (push) Canceled after 0s
Material Design conformance / tests (push) Canceled after 0s
The Marmot group layer moves off quartz's engine, which quartz 2.3.0 took out,
and onto marmot-kmp over mls-kmp over crypto-kmp. Nine phases: the rule table as
a reversible script, the swap itself in one commit with the policy finding inside
it, the names quartz 2.x gave the kinds, a stand-in on the library's own client,
C1 measured against a real state blob from the engine the app shipped, the
skipped-keys gap closed, the authored fork probed and still open, a build guard so
the engine cannot come back from quartz, the sender ratchet as its own row with
the receive-side write beside it, and a v36 database opened at v37 to show an
existing install survives the schema change that followed. docs/marmot-kmp.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 18:59:23 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 1321962b3f test: the version the app ships, opened by the version it builds (marmot-kmp, Phase 9)
Phase 4 settled the blob and left the database alone, because there was nothing
to settle: the state is opaque to Room and its version is inside it. Phase 8 added
a table, and that turns "does an existing install still open?" from a question
about MLS into a question about Room. They fail differently. A blob the engine
cannot read costs one room; a migration Room cannot find costs the app, on every
device that has ever had it, on the first launch after the update.

That second one is also the easiest here to ship by accident, because a fresh
install never migrates anything. Measured rather than assumed: with
`AutoMigration(from = 36, to = 37)` commented out, 32 database tests ran and 4
failed -- all four of them the new ones.

ShippedProfileUpgradeJvmTest builds a v36 database on disk from the exported v36
schema, down to its indices, its room_master_table identity hash and its
user_version, puts a profile and two rooms in it with the Phase 4 blob in one, and
opens it with the app's own getRoomDatabase. Four claims: it reaches v37 with
Room's own identity hash stamped and every table's columns and indices equal to
37.json's; the legacy room's bytes come back unchanged and MarmotEngine.groupFor
restores a group with its 0xF2EE metadata and a 32-byte kind:445 key; opening the
profile rewrites nothing, which is asserted only after checking the restore held
the room; and the new table takes a row keyed to a ChatRoom that predates it.

Room opens lazily, so a test that builds a database and closes it migrates
nothing. The first version of this did that and failed on user_version still
reading 36.

The blob itself moves to OldEngineBlob in commonTest, read by both tests. The
only thing those bytes are worth is that they are old ones, and a blob living in
two files can be regenerated in one of them.

1171 tests across 157 classes, 0 failures; the four audits unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 18:57:12 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 e07bb68014 feat: the sender ratchet as its own row, and the receive side beside it (marmot-kmp, Phase 8)
The piece Phase 7 deferred, in both directions, because they are one question:
a group's state is a few kilobytes of ratchet tree, group context and epoch
secrets, and the app was rewriting all of it to record things that moved a
counter.

Sending an application message advances exactly one thing -- this leaf's entry
in the secret tree (RFC 9420 §9) -- so the library carries the position as its
own record, `MlsGroupStateStore.saveSenderRatchet`, in the spirit of OpenMLS
keeping `message_secrets` apart from `group_state`. Giza defaulted that to
false, which sent the manager back to a full save per message. It is now a
`MarmotSenderRatchet` row, one per room, schema 36 -> 37 with an AutoMigration.
The bytes are stored as the library wrote them -- the `MarmotPublishObligation`
precedent, not the retained-epoch one -- because a record whose whole job is to
never go backwards is safest when nothing here re-encodes it; the epoch, leaf
and generation sit beside it, read off those same bytes, so they cannot drift.

The hazard this introduces is an ordering, and it is in the app's code, not the
library's. `MlsGroupManager.restoreAll` applies the record itself. A room joined
after the engine restored is loaded from its row by `MarmotEngine.groupFor`
instead, and that has to apply the record BEFORE `adoptGroup`, because adopting
persists and persisting rewrites the row from the group being adopted. The other
way round, the next restart re-emits generations already published, under AEAD
keys and nonces already used.

Finding the test that could tell the two orders apart took two goes. The first
asserted the row after a lazy load and passed with the order inverted: a state
saved before this leaf ever sent has no ratchet entry, `exportOwnSenderRatchet`
returns null, and the adopt writes nothing. The order cannot matter until the
stored state holds a position of its own behind the record's, and a received
message is what puts one there. With one receive in the middle the inverted
order fails with expected:<2> but was:<1>.

The receive side is a full save, from `MarmotEngine.processGroupEvent`, which
`NostrDao` now reads inbound events through so a second caller cannot forget it.
And a correction to Phase 5, which said an unwritten row still lost the late
message. It does not: mls-kmp writes the skipped keys beside the positions they
belong to, so an unwritten row is an older COHERENT state, and a position that
has not passed the late generation derives it forward. quartz's engine saved the
positions and dropped the keys -- that pair is what lost messages. The cost of
an unwritten row is the re-deriving, against SecretTree's thousand-step cap. The
reason the write lands now is the send side: until this change every send wrote
the whole state, so the row could not fall far behind inside an epoch.

1167 tests across 156 classes, 0 failures; Android and JVM compile clean; the
four audits unchanged. docs/mls-skipped-keys.md loses its mitigation claim and
gains the correction; docs/marmot-kmp.md gains Phase 8.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 09:55:31 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 7fb56b8f8f docs: the move is built, and what it does not claim (marmot-kmp)
Phases 0 to 7, one commit each but for 5 and 6, which share one because the fork probe
produced no code. 1161 tests, 0 failures; compileDebugKotlinAndroid and compileKotlinJvm
clean; four audits green, the new one among them.

Three things it does not claim, said at the top rather than left to be discovered at the
end of a phase. No manual upgrade of a profile with real rooms has been done, and that is
the last check before a release -- a fixture is one member at epoch 0. The sender ratchet
record and the receive-side write are deferred together, because they are one decision
about how often this app persists a group and they want a schema change. And the authored
fork is still not settled; Phase 6 probed it and the gap is the library's, unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:17:24 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 f0f1c179df build: the engine cannot come back from quartz (marmot-kmp, Phase 7)
marmotAudit runs docs/scripts/marmot-kmp-imports.sh --check from `check`, beside the M3,
brand and wallet audits. Verified both ways: silent on a clean tree, and on a tree with
one import put back it names the file and the line and fails with a pointer to the note.
That is C2 made enforceable -- a cherry-pick from a Bennu still on quartz 1.15.2 brings
the old spelling back, and "re-run the rule" is advice until a build failure makes it a
step.

The other three items of this phase are named in the note rather than done, each for a
reason:

- The app's own copies: nothing to delete. CommitOrdering is still live in NostrDao's
  reindex sweep and MarmotInboundManager's epoch tracker, and marmot-kmp has no
  CommitOrdering at all -- the convergence engine replaced the idea, not the class. Under
  D4 the legacy pipeline keeps its behaviour, so the comparator retires with the profile.
- The sender ratchet record wants a new table, so schema 36 -> 37 and an AutoMigration,
  and the interface says the write MUST be durable before it returns or a lost position
  reuses an AEAD key and nonce pair. A per-message write path with a correctness hazard
  does not belong in the tail of a migration whose discipline was D5. It is the obvious
  next task, and it is the same shape as the receive-side write Phase 5 pinned: one piece
  of work that decides how often this app persists a group, in both directions.
- Durable ingest dedup is taken by MarmotManager, not by MarmotInboundProcessor, so it
  needs the client D1 deferred. Phase 3 is where that stopped being hypothetical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:16:21 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 3b2b5e3614 test: the skipped keys, half closed and half pinned (marmot-kmp, Phases 5 and 6)
Phase 6 is a probe with no code of its own, so it rides along: both fork tests pass
unchanged, which means marmot-kmp 2.2.1 still scores a fork this device is half of the way
quartz 1.15.2 did. The assertion whose message is "the two sides agree -- the library has
been fixed" did not fire. What changed is that the fix docs/marmot-v2.md predicts is now a
first-class thing on the library's side -- MlsGroup.stageCommit, with the staged commit in
MlsGroupState from its STATE_VERSION 9 -- so it is a choice in MlsCandidateStateEngine
between replaying a branch and taking the state that was kept. Both notes say so.

Phase 5 is the skipped keys, and it is half closed. mls-kmp's state carries them:
skippedApplicationSecrets and skippedHandshakeSecrets, exported by saveState and imported
by restore, arriving at STATE_VERSION 5 so a version-4 blob reads them as an empty map.
That is steps 1 to 3 of the fix docs/mls-skipped-keys.md proposed. Step 4 is not done:
consumedGenerations, the replay guard, is still one SecretTree's field.

The app does not benefit yet, and the first draft of this test claimed it did.
MlsGroupManager.decrypt persists only when the message was a commit that advanced the
epoch, so the secret reaches the live group and never the row. The draft delivered
generation 1, rebuilt the engine, delivered generation 0 and asserted it decrypted -- and
it did, for the wrong reason: a rebuilt engine restores a blob whose sender ratchet never
moved, so generation 0 is simply the next one it expects. A green test proving nothing,
caught by the assertion beside it that looked redundant.

So the three tests say what is true: the secret is in the state the engine would save, a
group rebuilt from those bytes reads the late message, and the stored state does not carry
it. The last one is pinned in the style of the authored fork, with its KDoc saying what to
invert when the receive path starts persisting -- deliberately not done here, because it
is a write per inbound message that re-encodes the ratchet tree, the group context and
every epoch secret. saveSenderRatchet is the library's answer to that cost on the send
side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:15:28 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 b2539773ce test: the state on every device still opens (marmot-kmp, Phase 4)
C1 is the constraint the whole move hangs on: ChatRoom.mlsGroupState is a
MlsGroupState.encodeTls() blob written by quartz 1.15.2 on every device that has ever been
in a group, and a blob the new engine cannot read costs a user every room they are in --
there is no in-place migration from a legacy group.

The argument was checkable before a test was written. quartz 1.15.2's own sources, in the
sources jar beside the artifact in the gradle cache, declare STATE_VERSION = 4; mls-kmp
1.3.0 declares 10 and accepts 1..10, appending only. So every blob in the wild is version
4 and the window covers it six times over.

The measurement is docs/tools/old-state-blob, whose only dependency is
com.vitorpamplona.quartz:quartz:1.15.2 -- it prints a real 1033-byte blob for a legacy
MIP-01 group at epoch 0, which is the shape every room in the wild started as. It is
checked in because once it is gone nothing in the hex says whether the fixture came from
the old engine or the new one, and a fixture written by the new engine would pass while
testing nothing.

MlsGroupStateCompatibilityTest pins it six ways: the fixture is still version 4 (asserted
alone, so a fixture that drifted to 10 cannot make the rest pass vacuously); mls-kmp
decodes it; the group rebuilds from it with 0xF2EE, its nostr_group_id and its name
intact, still reading as legacy; the kind:445 outer key off a restored old group is 32
bytes, which is Phase 1's policy finding pinned against real pre-migration bytes; a
re-save lands on version 10 and still decodes, same group id and epoch; and
RetainedEpochSecrets still round-trips the five fields RoomMlsGroupStateStore stores it as.

No schema change: the blob is opaque to Room and the version is inside it, so 36 stands.

Not done, and not automatable here: one manual upgrade of a profile with real rooms in it.
A fixture is one member at epoch 0; the rooms that matter have epochs, members and a
retained window behind them. That is the last thing between this and a release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:08:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 763edcde9f test: the app's orchestration against the library's own client (marmot-kmp, Phase 3)
`MarmotStandIn` moved to marmot-kmp's managers in Phase 1 with nothing but its imports
changing, and it stays as it is: the convergence and lifecycle tests need a processor they
can reach into -- `recordLocalCommit` with a state snapshot of their own, `buildAppEvent`
with a payload they wrote -- which a `MarmotManager` would take away.

So the second stand-in is additive. `MarmotClientStandIn` is a `MarmotManager` over an
`InMemoryMlsGroupStateStore` and a publisher that says yes, with no message store and no
KeyPackage store because both are nullable and a client that persists nothing is all a
test wants from one. It is what Amethyst, its desktop app and the `amy` CLI drive.

The two are not redundant, and the difference is the difference between the two questions
this migration has to answer. In CurrentProfileInteropJvmTest the test's own code decides
how the Welcome is sealed and what an application payload looks like, and asks whether two
engines agree. Here the library decides -- `addMemberInvites` picks the commit's shape,
`MarmotWelcomeSender` wraps the Welcome -- and the question is whether the app's own
orchestration, `MarmotEngine` and the DAOs and the outbound queue, reaches the same group
as the orchestration the library ships. It does, on the first run: the app joins a group
the client made and invited it to, under the routing id the client minted; it files and
attributes a `buildTextMessage` from it; and the client decrypts what the app's outbound
path sends and decodes it as a canonical payload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:05:11 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 9bc05c112d refactor: the names quartz 2.x gave the kinds (marmot-kmp, Phase 2)
Most of this phase was answered by Phase 1 rather than built. `GroupEventResult` still has
exactly nine variants -- `MarmotEngine.inRoom` is an exhaustive `when` used as an
expression, so the compiler says so rather than a reading of the source. The convergence
and lifecycle surface takes and returns what `settleLater` and `awaitSettled` already
expected, `allowsOutboundWork` included. `stageAddMember` -> `StagedCommit` ->
`gate.prepare` -> `installState` needed no edit. And no test's assertions moved: seven
fixtures now build their group with `MarmotGroupPolicy` as the app does, which is a
construction-site change, not a weakened expectation.

What was left is the six classes quartz 2.x renamed to match what the NIPs call the kinds,
and kept deprecated typealiases for: SealedRumorEvent -> SealEvent, ChatMessageRelayListEvent
-> DmRelayListEvent, RelayFeedsListEvent -> FavoriteRelayListEvent, LnZapEvent ->
ZapReceiptEvent, LongTextNoteEvent -> LongFormContentEvent, ChannelListEvent ->
PublicChatListEvent. 104 references in 25 files; same packages, so each is an identifier
rename. None reaches a string the app persists -- no Room column, no string resource, no
kind number -- and after it the build has no quartz deprecation warnings left.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 23:59:35 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 fc80a089aa build: the Marmot engine comes from marmot-kmp (marmot-kmp, Phase 1)
quartz 1.15.2 -> 2.7.3, and the engine it used to carry from marmot 2.2.1 over mls 1.3.0
over crypto 2.1.0. docs/scripts/marmot-kmp-imports.sh --apply moved 187 lines by the rule;
42 `quartz.marmot` imports stay, which are the event classes quartz kept.

The 854 non-Marmot quartz imports came through the major bump without an edit. All 45
compile errors were in the engine seam, and 44 were one thing: five accessors that were
members of `MlsGroup` in quartz's engine are extension functions in marmot-kmp
(`currentGroupState`, `currentMarmotData`, `currentNostrGroupId`, `currentAdminIdentities`,
`isLocalAdmin`), so 14 files import one now. The 45th, `buildCurrentProfileFrom`, likewise.
No constructor the app drives changed shape, and `GroupEventResult` still has exactly nine
variants -- `MarmotEngine`'s exhaustive `when` compiling is the proof there is no tenth to
drop on the floor.

One change here is not a rename. `MlsGroupPolicy` is new in mls-kmp: quartz's engine
hardcoded Marmot's rules, mls-kmp made them an argument, and every factory defaults it to
`Permissive` -- so the eleven places this app builds a group itself were building a
non-Marmot group. The loud half is that `commitExporter` is then null, `preCommitExporterSecret`
comes back empty and `GroupEventEncryption.encrypt` refuses it ("Group key must be 32
bytes"), which is the one test that failed. The silent half matters more: `Permissive`
greases the leaf's capabilities, which MDK has never been tested against; it knows neither
`0xF2EE` nor the app-data dictionary, so RFC 9420 13.4 refuses a GroupContextExtensions
proposal in a group we are a member of; and it authorizes every commit, proposal and
SelfRemove without a check. So `MarmotGroupPolicy` goes in at all eleven. The
current-profile paths needed none -- `CurrentProfileGroupFactory` and every
`MlsGroupManager` entry point pass it themselves.

1149 tests, 0 failures; compileDebugKotlinAndroid clean; the three audits unchanged.
Import blocks were re-sorted in the touched files only: 253 further files in composeApp
have blocks that were already out of order, and C2 is the reason to leave them be.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 23:56:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 1775ae7d4c build: the rule that says where a Marmot class comes from (marmot-kmp, Phase 0)
docs/scripts/marmot-kmp-imports.sh, with --apply, --revert and --check. The destinations
in it are not derived from the packages' names but from listing what quartz 2.15.1 still
has under `marmot/` against what marmot-kmp 2.2.1 and mls-kmp 1.3.0 declare, which is how
the split inside `mip00KeyPackages`, `mip02Welcome`, `mip03GroupMessages` and
`mip05PushNotifications` came out: the events and tags stay, the five stores and managers
beside them move. marmot-kmp imports the quartz half itself.

Applied and reverted on a clean tree it moves 187 lines and puts all 187 back -- 79 onto
marmot-kmp, 80 onto mls-kmp, 27 onto crypto-kmp, one KDoc line -- and leaves the 42
`quartz.marmot` event imports standing, which is the count the plan's table predicts.

Reversible because the fork still cherry-picks from upstream, upstream is on quartz 1.15.2
with the engine inside it, and every line this touches is one a cherry-pick will conflict
in. The resolution is to re-run the rule, not to read the diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 23:43:46 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 f2059eb1b5 docs: the Marmot engine left quartz, and a plan to follow it (marmot-kmp, the plan)
quartz 2.3.0 dropped the Marmot engine. Everything this app imports from
`com.vitorpamplona.quartz.marmot` but the event classes -- the MLS engine, the three
processors, convergence, the publish gate, the app components, the KeyPackage managers --
is in marmot-kmp over mls-kmp over crypto-kmp now, and quartz 1.15.2 is the last version
that still has it inside. So the app is not behind on a version; it is on a branch of the
engine that ended.

The note is the move: where each of the 228 import lines goes and the one rule that places
all but two of them, the two constraints (the group state already on devices, and that the
fork still cherry-picks from a Bennu that is on 1.15.2), the six decisions -- keep
`MarmotEngine`, pin quartz to the 2.7.3 marmot 2.2.1 was built against, declare crypto-kmp
rather than inherit it -- and eight phases that put the swap in one commit with the
evidence around it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 23:43:46 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8b06679584 docs: follow Bennu by cherry-picking, and record what is left (wallet removal, Phase 9)
Material Design conformance / budgets (push) Canceled after 0s
Material Design conformance / tests (push) Canceled after 0s
The rebrand's Phase 9 now takes fixes from Bennu one commit at a time
(W1): a merge would bring every wallet change back as a conflict, and
Giza's schema has its own version 36. The wallet-removal plan records
itself as built but for Phase 7b and Phase 9's device checks, which need
an iOS build, devices and a Bennu build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:15:37 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b27ed2a05f docs: retire the wallet notes, and guard against a wallet coming back (wallet removal, Phase 8)
The 23 wallet notes move to docs/retired/ with a banner; every link between
notes is rewritten for the move and checked. The index lists them as one
Retired paragraph, and seven kept notes carry a line on what changed. The
README and CLAUDE.md describe a Giza with no wallet.

brand-audit.sh loses its "bennu/ exception: every such tag was a wallet's,
so one now is a wallet coming back. wallet-audit.sh --check, in check and
in CI, fails on a retired kind in the app's code, a lightning-kmp import,
a file named for a wallet's pieces, or sats in a string.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:15:13 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 005cbc2f23 refactor: composeApp stops importing lightning-kmp (wallet removal, Phase 7a)
W3: a Lightning invoice in a note is a card that opens a lightning: link
in the device's own wallet app, undecoded -- decoding was lightning-kmp's,
and paying from the card was never wired. The dead pay and zap hooks go.

Lightning.randomBytes becomes quartz's RandomInstance; the tests'
LocalKeyManager becomes PhraseKeys; NodeParamsManager.chain becomes
PROFILE_CHAIN, the mainnet constant every profile's preference files are
named under.

What is left of the library is storage (keystore, credentials, seed file,
preferences). Moving it into the app and off the composite build is
Phase 7b, which needs an iOS build and a device to check, and is left for
its own branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:08:52 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 84be1c5beb refactor: no node behind a recovery phrase (wallet removal, Phase 6)
PhraseKeys derives a phrase's nostr key (NIP-06, m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0) and
its profile id (hash160 of m/50'/0', the old node key) with bitcoin-kmp's
DeterministicWallet. ForkCompatibilityTest's Phase 0 pins pass unchanged
through it, so the same phrase is the same person with the same
preference files.

No profile starts a node: Identity.business, startupNode and its state
machine, the platform start/schedule/stop actuals, LightningApplication,
BusinessManager.initialize, the NFC hooks and POST_NOTIFICATIONS go. A
switch is clearing the identity and nothing else. Copy that promised funds
or a wallet is reworded, and the switcher's badge says Recovery phrase.

Forgetting a phrase profile is still refused (now PhraseAttached): the
phrase would derive the key again, and offering it is new UI.

iosMain was edited without an iOS build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:03:47 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 9c2cbf0295 feat: schema 35 -> 36, the wallets' tables and rows dropped (wallet removal, Phase 5)
MIGRATION_35_36, by hand: the wallets' chat lines; GroupTransaction; every
signing session over a transaction or a sweep, with its items and its
members' messages; the other fifteen wallet tables, children first; and
FrostSigningItem.inputIndex, DkgSession.guardianDelay and
ChatMessage.lightningFactKey. DkgSession.walletPolicy stays: the join
screen reads a Bennu ceremony's tag from it. The 36 schema is committed.

The wallet line-type constants and the transcript's arms for them go with
the rows they named.

jvmTest: 1,150 run, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 15:54:21 +02:00