Commit Graph
1067 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 851ff0c8c2 test: Giza derives what Bennu derives, every tag pinned (fork, Phase 8)
ForkCompatibilityTest pins each mantra/ and bennu/ derivation tag through the
function that hashes it: the ChillDKG host key, the Marmot shared-key tweak,
the group Lightning basepoints, the Iceberg pool label and the session,
contribution, commitment, seed and transcript hashes, the member wallet id and
possession message, and the group wallet address and guardian root. A sweep
that renames one of them now fails a test rather than moving a group's coins
and splitting Giza from Bennu.

The vectors come from this tree. A diff against 4e106fb5 shows that the files
holding the tags differ only in packages, imports, comments and the database's
type name, so the vectors are Bennu's too.

docs/giza-rebrand.md gains a table of where the build stands and what turned
out differently, the twelve bennu/ tags first.

jvmTest: 1651 run (1643 + 8), 0 failed, 2 skipped. m3Audit and brandAudit pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 11:00:44 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c0f1b3d5e3 build: Giza's version numbers and an upload key from outside the repo (fork, Phase 7)
versionCode 1 and versionName 0.1.0: a new applicationId has no store history
to stay above. The desktop packageVersion stays 1.0.0, since jpackage refuses
a DMG whose major version is 0.

Release builds are signed with an upload key named by gradle properties
(giza.upload.*) or the environment (GIZA_UPLOAD_*), and are unsigned without
them, as before. Key files are gitignored. It must never be Bennu's key.

The store records, provisioning and listings are outside this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 11:00:44 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5b92b83869 chore: tooling, docs and a guard for the name (fork, Phase 6)
- rootProject.name is Giza. Res is pinned, so no import moves.
- Regtest: GIZA_REGTEST, GIZA_SPLICE_DELAYS and the gizaRegtest task input;
  node aliases giza-lsp and giza-payer.
- README describes Giza and says what it shares with Bennu: one network, one
  derivation, and a recovery phrase that must not run in both apps at once.
  The clone URL is the planned giza-kmp repository, which does not exist yet.
- docs/README.md is titled Giza docs and says how to read the documents
  written while the app was Bennu.
- CLAUDE.md gains the rule: name the app Giza, never name Bennu outside a
  comment, and never rename a mantra/ or bennu/ derivation tag.
- docs/scripts/brand-audit.sh --check, run by check (brandAudit) and by the CI
  budgets job, fails on Bennu anywhere in composeApp, iosApp, testing or the
  gradle scripts except in a comment or a "bennu/ tag. It catches the strings
  a merge from Bennu brings in, which giza-rename.sh cannot word.
- The plan gains the twelve bennu/ tags, missed when it was written.

jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid, m3Audit and
brandAudit pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:53:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4f3f0da3ca feat: Giza in everything a person reads and on the wire (fork, Phase 4)
- Strings: app_name and the giza key say Giza, as do the eight values that
  named Bennu. Two keys that contained the name are renamed. Two messages that
  meant "has no Marmot key package yet" now say so, since a Bennu user counts.
- Restore: when a recovery phrase is recognised, the sign-in screen says to stop
  using it anywhere else. A seed running in Bennu and Giza at once is two copies
  of one Lightning wallet, which can lose funds.
- Desktop: the window title and the unlock heading come from the catalogue.
  The installers are named Giza (giza on Linux), with a fixed Windows upgrade
  UUID of their own so a Giza MSI never upgrades a Bennu one.
- iOS: PRODUCT_NAME and the product reference are Giza.app.
- Wire: the client tags are Giza and giza. Nothing compares them.
- The twelve bennu/ derivation tags stay as they are. They are hash inputs like
  mantra/, and a Bennu peer and a Giza peer derive the same keys through them.
  Each now has a note saying so. The rebrand-history comments count four.

jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid passes.
m3-audit: all budgets met. It differs from the baseline only by the new restore
line (one more stringResource and one more bodyMedium).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:46:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 34e802ce6f refactor: packages, classes and Res under mobi.giza (fork, Phase 3b)
docs/scripts/giza-rename.sh, run over the moves of Phase 3a:

- com.machankura.bennu.{compose,android,desktop} -> mobi.giza.{...}, in
  package lines, imports, fully qualified references, the manifest, mainClass,
  the Android namespace (one value with applicationId again), the m3Audit
  source path, the six docs/scripts tools, and the source links in docs/;
- Res moves from bennu.composeapp.generated.resources to
  mobi.giza.compose.resources, now pinned with packageOfResClass so a later
  rename of the root project leaves the imports alone;
- BennuDatabase, BennuTheme and the other eleven Bennu identifiers are Giza*.

The script's search is now the same pattern as its sed expressions, so on a
renamed tree it finds nothing and changes nothing.

Checked against the Phase 0 baseline: jvmTest 1643 run (1642 + AppDirJvmTest),
0 failed, 2 skipped; compileDebugKotlinAndroid passes; m3-audit prints the
baseline report line for line. iOS is not compiled on this Linux host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:40:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 30d5feaf87 refactor: move the sources to mobi/giza, paths only (fork, Phase 3a)
docs/scripts/giza-rename.sh --moves-only: com/machankura/bennu becomes
mobi/giza in all six source sets, the nine files named Bennu* are named Giza*,
and the Room schema directory moves to mobi.giza.compose.database.GizaDatabase.
Every source file is a 100% rename, so log --follow and blame go straight
through.

This commit does not compile on purpose: the next one rewrites the contents.
The script, which does both, comes with it so a merge from Bennu can re-run it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:35:04 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 78d913aaf2 feat: Giza installs beside Bennu and never opens its data (fork, Phase 2)
The store identities move first, before any rename, because they are what keep
two installed apps apart:

- the desktop data directory is giza, not curated, which is Bennu's. A Giza
  build in curated would open Bennu's database, key store and wallet;
- the Android applicationId is mobi.giza.android (mobi.giza.android.debug on
  debug). The namespace follows with the sources in Phase 3;
- the iOS bundle id is exactly mobi.giza.ios, without the $(TEAM_ID) suffix
  the template appended to Bennu's;
- the regtest compose project is giza-regtest, so it does not replace Bennu's
  containers. The ports are shared, which the README now says.

AppDirJvmTest checks the directory name on all three OS branches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:34:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 afd43434cc chore: Giza is a fork of Bennu; CI runs on giza (fork, Phase 1)
The workflow triggered on pushes to mantra, a branch two rebrands old, so on
Bennu it only ever ran for pull requests.

The remote steps of Phase 1 -- the new repository, its remotes and default
branch -- are outside this tree and left to the owner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:28:50 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 2a7fc7a08a docs: a plan to fork Bennu as Giza under mobi.giza
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:28:11 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4e106fb56d docs: a README that describes Bennu
Replaces the Kotlin Multiplatform template with what the app does, how
to build it with its nested submodules and their local.properties, how
to check a change, and where the design notes live.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-12 15:06:08 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8dd09aa083 chore: license the project under GPL-3.0-or-later
Adds the GPLv3 text as LICENSE and a License section with the notice to
the README. Version 3 because the Apache-2.0 dependencies, lightning-kmp
among them, are compatible with it and not with version 2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-10 20:33:16 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4f1b4a4384 feat(lightning): buying inbound liquidity is on, on mainnet
GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED is true, by decision, ahead of the plan's own Phase 0 check
on mainnet: ACINQ's LSP has not yet been seen to accept a splice whose funding key from us does not
change, so the first purchase there is that check. If it refuses, the splice aborts before anything is
signed into it and the purchase is reported failed. A purchase is bounded meanwhile by the mainnet
channel cap, the fee cap the group signs, and every co-signer's checks. The wallet screen now shows Add
liquidity, and the operator's node buys what the group authorises.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 13:09:42 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 67351eeaa5 docs: group Lightning liquidity is built, but for the LSP's own splices, and off (liquidity, Phase 10)
The plan's build table now says each phase's state. Phase 9, a splice the LSP starts to deliver a
payment, is left to the group as the plan left it. GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED stays
off: the regtest run passed, but the mainnet half of Phase 0 -- ACINQ's LSP accepting a splice whose
funding key from us does not change, and its rates -- needs a purchase with real money. The group
Lightning wallet note's check 8 points here, as do the docs index and the regtest README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:47:24 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 94015fd3f8 test(lightning): the group buys liquidity on regtest, end to end (liquidity, Phase 8)
GroupLightningRegtestJvmTest now buys inbound liquidity between receiving and paying: a member prices
200,000 sats from the operator's snapshot, the group authorises it, the operator's node splices, and
every co-signer checks the first commitment on the new output and the shared input before the group
signs. The channel grows from 100,000 to 299,779 sats for 2,521 sats, what the member's device
estimated; a 50,000-sat payment then arrives without an on-the-fly splice; and the run's payment,
mutual close and sweep follow on the spliced channel. No device refuses, and the room gets one line
for the liquidity added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:47:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 db7d12b606 feat(lightning): a member asks the group to add inbound liquidity (liquidity, Phase 7)
GroupLightningLiquidityScreen asks as Phoenix asks its owner: Phoenix's amounts on a discrete slider,
less those the LSP does not sell and those past the channel cap; the miner fee, service fee, its year
and the total, priced on this device from the operator's report with lightning-kmp's own arithmetic
(LiquidityPrice, which matches what eclair charged on regtest to the sat); Phoenix's warning at a
quarter of the amount and its stop at the balance; a fee cap with room above the estimate; and a
review sheet with Phoenix's acknowledgement. Then a proposal, and the signing session it opens.

The wallet screen gains Add liquidity on its balance card, or the reason it is not there, a purchase's
state on its channel row, and Inbound liquidity added in its payment list (a nullable liquiditySat on
the payment row, in schema 35). The room gets a line when a purchase locks or fails.

All of it is behind GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED, off until the regtest run passes; the
operator's node buys nothing while it is off. m3Audit meets every budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:45:01 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 be90715dd3 feat(lightning): the operator's node buys the liquidity the group authorised (liquidity, Phase 6)
GroupLightningNode.buyAuthorised runs with the node's other actions, on the watch of kind 30363: for
each open buy-liquidity it has not taken on, it finds the LSP's rate for the amount, estimates at the
node's own feerate, and splices only if the estimate is within the authorisation's cap, buying at the
feerate the estimate raised to, as Phoenix does. Once per authorisation; not while the channel has a
splice that has not locked, which eclair would refuse; a failure is reported and not retried.

The snapshot now carries the LSP's rates and the node's feerate, for a member to price a purchase from,
each purchase's state (waiting, pending, locked, failed with its reason), how many funding outputs each
channel has live, and the purchase as a `liquidity` payment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:33:50 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b481c14cf9 feat(lightning): every co-signer checks a liquidity purchase before the group signs it (liquidity, Phase 5)
A co-signer keeps a ledger per funding output now (schema 35: IcebergChannelLedger keyed by output,
with its index, the parent it spent and the purchase that let it). A commitment on an output it has
no ledger for is the first commitment on a splice's new one: it must follow the newest output by one
index, rebuild from its context, and open from the parent's ledger at the same number with the same
HTLCs, the group's balance lower by no more than an open buy-liquidity authorisation's fee cap
(CoSignerPolicy.openSplice). The shared input is then held to that authorisation: it spends the pinned
output, makes one new output of the group's key with the LSP's under the cap, buys the amount the
group named, is paid from the channel balance alone, costs what the first commitment took to the
msat and no more than the cap, and the LSP puts in what it is paid for. An authorisation is bound to
the parent of the first splice it let, so however many attempts there are, one confirms.

While two outputs are live a payment settles on both at one commitment number; each ledger records
what its last commitment consumed, and a sibling spends only the difference. Before this the second
commitment was refused as under its floor.

GroupLightningSpliceCoSigningJvmTest, seven four-device tests on regtest and mainnet: a purchase the
group signs and the script interpreter accepts, payments over both live outputs, and each refusal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:30:10 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 28f2d5a72a feat(lightning): the group decides to buy inbound liquidity (liquidity, Phase 4)
A fourth action for kind 30363, `buy-liquidity`: one channel, an amount of inbound, a cap on the fee
(our share of the splice's mining fee and the purchase's own together), an expiry, and an id so two
purchases for one channel are two events. An older build reads it as no authorisation at all, and
refuses the splice that follows.

GroupLightningAuthorisations gains liquidityPurchases, prepareBuyLiquidity -- which refuses a purchase
of nothing, or one past the mainnet channel cap, with a LiquidityProblem of its own -- and
proposeBuyLiquidity. The proposal reads "Add 500,000 sats of inbound liquidity", with the fee cap and
the LSP's year, and the room gets a line once the group signs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:14:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 89504df765 feat(lightning): the co-signing wire carries a splice (liquidity, Phase 3)
A splice's shared input now reaches every co-signer with what it is: CoSigningWire.Context type
`splice`, with the parent funding output, the new one by index, the counterparty's new key, both
contributions, the liquidity purchase and the feerate. A commitment's context names its funding index,
and a request carries every other output the transaction spends.

messageOf computes the taproot sighash at the input that spends the funding output, over every spent
output, and is null when the request leaves one out; check 3 lets a splice spend the funding output
once beside the counterparty's inputs, and refuses a request with no hash to compute. A splice is
still refused, now by name, until the co-signer checks one (Phase 5). The context's spec is optional,
since a splice has none, and every check that reads one refuses a context without it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:14:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5bc3f126da test(lightning): a node that keeps its funding key buys liquidity from eclair (liquidity, Phase 0)
LiquidityPurchaseRegtestJvmTest runs on the regtest network: a stock lightning-kmp node whose channel
keys serve index 0's funding key at every index, as a group's node will, buys 200,000 sats of
inbound three times on one channel, each with its signatures delayed longer, then receives a payment
the channel had no room for before.

What it found, recorded in the plan: eclair v0.14.4 accepts a splice whose funding key from us does
not change, and rotates its own; a purchase needs exactly two group signatures, and eclair allows the
whole splice one minute from quiescence (channel.quiescence-timeout), so both have to fit in it
together; the estimate is our mining share plus the purchase's own fees; and a splice does not raise
the channel's in-flight maximum, which this LSP fixes at the capacity the channel opened with.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:13:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 dcde4a7330 feat(lightning): the fork tells a signer it is signing a splice (liquidity, Phase 2)
Advances lightning-kmp to the splice signing context: a splice's shared input is signed with a
SigningContext.Splice that names the parent and new funding outputs, both contributions and the
liquidity purchase, and every commitment's context names the funding output it is on. The app maps
the new context to nothing on the wire for now, so a co-signer still reads a splice as unsaid and
refuses it, as before; Phase 3 carries it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:13:14 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c52a2df424 feat(lightning): the fork serves the group's funding key at every funding index (liquidity, Phase 1)
Advances lightning-kmp-app and lightning-kmp to branch claude/group-lightning-liquidity, where an
injected funding signer's key is served at every funding index (design B) and a group-backed channel
splices in, out and as the accepter. Nothing in the app changes yet: every co-signer still refuses a
splice, so a group channel cannot be spliced until Phase 5.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 11:38:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 815d8c3e72 docs: requesting inbound liquidity for the group Lightning wallet, planned
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 11:19:51 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 84984ca887 feat(lightning): the key ceremony asks once, and ends itself when it stalls
Joining is now the only approval. Every check in the other two rounds --
a contribution against its commitment, everyone's transcript hash, the
public shares making one key -- is the device's, so after joining it sends
its contributions and confirms by itself. Asking a person to tap through
them only let a member who joined and never came back hold the ceremony
open for everybody.

A ceremony that has not finished 24 hours after its proposal is abandoned
by the first participant's device to notice, checked each minute beside
the group nodes, naming who had not taken their part. The deadline runs
from the proposal's own timestamp, so every device agrees on it, and a
proposal read after its deadline is not filed. Any participant can also
abandon a ceremony from its screen. Before this a ceremony nobody finished
blocked the room for good, since a room runs one at a time.

The group screen's Lightning row test now covers both sides of the row
waiting for an onchain wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 10:11:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 83289aa4d0 fix(lightning): the group page's Lightning row waits for an onchain wallet
The Lightning wallet's key is made by the onchain wallet's signers and its
channels close to that wallet, so until the group has opened one the row
has nothing behind it. It now stays on the page disabled, and says that
Lightning is only available once the group has an onchain wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:51:51 +02:00
Kgothatso Ngako 1f9c9ef131 docs: the group Lightning wallet's review findings, as seven phased plans
The review asked whether the wallet's operator can spend lightning funds
without t-1 other share holders. The core claim holds; the seven exceptions
each get a phased plan under docs/lightning/, with an index giving the
severity table and the build order.
2026-10-27 09:21:36 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c4d8561cb0 fix(lightning): the wallet's payment list says a close is a close, and a sent amount without its fee
The same two misreadings the regtest run found in the room's lines, on the
wallet screen: a channel's close, which lightning-kmp files as an outgoing
payment with no payment hash, was listed as sent, and a sent amount
included its fee. Both now read through GroupLightningReports.isChannelClose
and recipientMsat, which the room's lines use too. A close is listed as one,
or as closing until it confirms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:06:02 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 94385d2f4a fix(lightning): a channel's close is not a payment sent, and a sent amount leaves out its fee
Found by the regtest run, now that it checks the transcript. lightning-kmp
files a channel's close as an outgoing payment with no payment hash, which
wrote "sent" beside each closed line, and an outgoing payment's amount
includes its fee, so 20,000 sats with an 84-sat fee read as 20,084 sent.
GroupLightningRegtestJvmTest now asserts every device's lines: one per
channel opened and closed, one per payment, and no raw JSON, refusal or
alarm.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:01:18 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 ca2a5b790d docs: the group Lightning wallet in the chat is built, and the notes it touched say so (Phase 7)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:21:43 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 a660fabd7e feat(lightning): a co-signer's refusal and the equivocation alarm, as lines (Phase 6)
The wallet's plan said a person sees a refusal as a transcript line, and
that two hashes echoed for one label raise the alarm in the transcript;
both were logger calls. A refusal is now said on the refusing device only,
once per request, with the check that failed; an operator asking for two
messages under one label is said on every device that sees it, once per
label, in the error tint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:21:21 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3ec79b95ad feat(lightning): what the operator's snapshots say happened, as lines (Phase 5)
A channel opening or closing, and a payment received, sent or failed, each
get one line however many snapshots repeat them. The snapshot restates the
whole wallet, so the line is keyed on the fact, not the message:
ChatMessage.lightningFactKey (v34, an AutoMigration) holds the channel's or
the payment's id. A payment's line sits where the payment happened, and a
channel a newer snapshot no longer holds is said to have closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:19:38 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 1b4ed09798 feat(lightning): what the operator and the members say to each other, as lines (Phase 4)
The node seed being handed out, an invoice asked for and made, and an
operator's node stopping now each write one line, through
GroupLightningLines: on the way out by the device that sends the message,
which never reads its own back, and on arrival by every other, keyed on the
inner event so a redelivery is not a second line. An invoice request and a
stop are filed on arrival for the first time, and a stop is believed only
from the operator of the term it names.

The operator election line names the operator, the Lightning wallet's
signed lines get icons of their own, and every Lightning line opens the
wallet's screen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:11:56 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3922c15d74 feat(lightning): the Lightning ceremony's lines read like the shared key's (Phase 3)
A ceremony stopped on another device was recorded as "Abandoned by" a key
prefix and the sender's exception message, and the screen showed it after
"Abandoned:". IcebergRitualManager.describe now says each fault as a
sentence naming the member at fault, sends that sentence in the failure
message, and the screen shows it in the error card the shared key ceremony
uses.

RitualNotice's chevron was described as opening the shared key ceremony on
every line; each family now says what it opens, the lines that lead nowhere
draw none, and only a request line can carry the approved tick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:06:20 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 03833a1c42 feat(lightning): the Lightning wallet's key ceremony asks from above the composer (Phase 2)
The standing notice under the newest message read only the shared key's
ceremonies, so a member owed the Lightning wallet's join, reveal or confirm
had to scroll to its request line. AwaitingCeremony now says which ceremony
and what it wants, the chat's view model observes the Lightning ceremonies
beside the shared key's, and a tap opens the screen that ceremony has.

The member who opened the Lightning ceremony is also asked, once its key is
made, to open the wallet -- the counterpart to ChillDKG's room awaiting
creation -- until a wallet statement for it is being signed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 00:03:01 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 638c5aab64 fix(lightning): the wallet's own messages leave no raw JSON in the chat (Phase 1)
Every kind the group Lightning wallet's devices send each other -- the
Iceberg ceremony, the co-signing, the operator's snapshots and invoices --
reached applyInnerEvent's last arm and was written as an unsupported line
holding the event's JSON, beside the lines the managers already write.
GroupLightningEvents.PROTOCOL now joins the ChillDKG and FROST families as
protocol, and MIGRATION_32_33 deletes the bubbles already in rooms, found by
the kind of the inner event behind them, as MIGRATION_26_27 did.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:58:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 e328720071 docs: the group Lightning wallet in the chat, planned
Every Lightning kind but the three the group signs reaches the transcript's
unsupported arm and leaves a raw-JSON bubble, and the Iceberg ceremony never
got the standing notice above the composer. Seven phases to put both right.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:55:54 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 515ddea2be feat(lightning): the group node acts as requests arrive, and the mainnet run is recorded
On the first mainnet run, most of the wait for an invoice (six seconds) and for an authorised
payment to leave (five) was the node's ten-second poll. The node now watches the room's
invoice requests (30364) and authorisations (30363, which carry channel actions too), and acts
the moment either changes. The poll stays, for expiries and snapshots. Answering, paying and
closing each take one lock, so a wakeup, the poll and a direct call never act twice on the
same request: payAuthorised checks hasPaid, which suspends, before it marks a payment in hand.

Advances lightning-kmp-app to the commit that keeps payment preimages out of a release build's
Logcat.

The plan doc records the run with ACINQ's mainnet LSP: an on-the-fly 25,000-sat taproot
channel, 8,558 sats received, and a 21-sat payment sent. Every co-signer approved every
commitment. The doc also notes that a payment larger than the channel's 16,442 sats of
inbound would need the splice the co-signers still refuse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:47:32 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 309a486de9 fix(lightning): set the group node up as Phoenix sets up its own
ACINQ's mainnet LSP hung up on the group's node seven milliseconds after init, every time. The
node required simple taproot channels (bit 564). The LSP's init lists neither 564 nor 565, and
BOLT 9 obliges a peer to hang up on a required feature it does not offer. Phoenix leaves the
feature optional and stays connected. Nothing is lost by matching it: lightning-kmp asks for the
taproot channel type in every channel it opens, and the co-signers rebuild every funding output
and commitment as taproot.

The node now takes Phoenix's setup wherever the group's terms allow:
- lightning-kmp's default features and peer storage
- connect and handshake timeouts that grow with each attempt, tripled over Tor
- the LSP's onion address while the identity has Tor on, and no clearnet dial over Tor
- the 50% relative cap on liquidity fees

The absolute fee cap stays the statement's, and the redial backoff stays: Phoenix's resets at
every handshake, which against an LSP that hangs up after init would redial every 0.1 s.

On the operator's emulator, the group's connection to ACINQ now holds. The regtest run still
opens a simple_taproot_channel and passes. Whether ACINQ opens a taproot channel to the group's
node is still unknown until one is opened on mainnet. The plan doc says so, and Phase 0's
instruction to require the feature is corrected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:03:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3e4de464fe feat(lightning): the group node redials the LSP, and says why it was dropped
lightning-kmp never reconnects by itself. The identity's own node has Phoenix's connection
daemon for that; the group's node connected once, so a single drop left it offline for the
rest of the term.

It now redials after every drop, waiting two seconds and doubling up to five minutes. A
connection that ends within a minute counts as a failure, so an LSP that hangs up on our
features isn't redialled every two seconds. Each drop is logged with its reason. When the
LSP's init doesn't offer a feature we require, the log names it. The node waits up to a
second for that init, because the socket can read as closed before the init's event arrives.

Run against ACINQ's mainnet LSP on an emulator, every drop reads: "Connection closed: the
LSP does not offer simple_taproot_channels, which this node requires". The plan doc now
records that against Phase 0's first step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 22:37:54 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3d891e7c13 chore(lightning): the group node's logs reach Logcat on Android
Advances lightning-kmp-app to the commit that writes to Logcat when no SLF4J provider is installed.
This app installs none, so lightning-kmp's lines, the group node's among them, were dropped on
Android; on desktop they already went to stdout and on iOS to the unified log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 22:20:35 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 cf8ae0200e feat(lightning): the group Lightning wallet on mainnet only
The Lightning wallet now opens on the node's own network, mainnet,
where the group's onchain wallet already is, so the separate testnet3
onchain wallet and its row on the group's screen are gone.
GroupLightningRollout.allows takes mainnet and regtest, nothing else.

This lifts the plan's mainnet gate by decision, ahead of its condition:
an outside review of the Iceberg scheme and the DKG, and a month on
testnet3. The LSP's signing deadline was never measured either.
Meanwhile:

- Every co-signer refuses to sign for a mainnet channel over
  MAINNET_CHANNEL_CAP, 1,000,000 sats, so a bigger one never opens; none
  grows, since splices are refused.
- The opening screen says the scheme is unreviewed and names the cap.

Running the co-signing suite on mainnet (now a second test class) found a
bug that would have stopped everything there: every key manager was built
with a testnet swap-in tpub, which lightning-kmp rejects on mainnet. That
covers every co-signer and the operator's node. Mainnet now takes the
mainnet LSP's published xpub; nothing derives from it.

The full JVM suite (1,578 tests) and the regtest run pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 21:45:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5ff9380b03 feat(lightning): turn the group Lightning wallet on, on testnet3 (Phase 15)
GroupLightningRollout.ENABLED is now true. A Marmot group's screen offers
the Lightning wallet and the testnet3 onchain wallet it closes to, and
devices run the group nodes they are elected to. NIP-17 rooms still get
neither: they have no key to sign with. Mainnet is still refused by
GroupLightningRollout.allows, whatever a screen offers.

It was turned on before Phase 0's testnet3 measurement of how long the
LSP waits for a signature, so the 60-second signing deadline is a guess
until the first groups run there. The plan doc says so.

The wallet-row test now finds the onchain row by its title and status,
since the testnet3 row is also "Not opened yet". A new test checks that
the Lightning rows open the Lightning wallet and the testnet3 wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 21:25:37 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 0939bd4c55 Merge branch 'bennu' into claude/lightning-wallet-iceberg-f20da1
Brings in an Electrum client for a profile with no node: IdentityElectrum
gives an nsec or npub profile a StandaloneElectrum of its own, so every
profile can watch the chain.

For the group Lightning wallet:

- GroupChainClients now sits on IdentityElectrum's client for the node's
  network, so group wallets and the watcher work on profiles with no node
  too.
- Each other network (testnet3, for the Lightning wallet) now gets a
  StandaloneElectrum instead of this branch's own connection loop. The
  old loop picked a server with ElectrumServers and connected directly,
  ignoring the profile's Tor setting, so a profile with Tor on would have
  reached a testnet3 server in the clear. The new one uses onion servers
  while Tor is on. A test covers it.
- The group's Lightning node takes its context and logger from the app,
  not the identity's Phoenix business, so a profile with no node that
  holds a share can be elected and run it.
- The member wallet's follow() keeps its network parameter.

The full JVM suite (1,568 tests) and the regtest run pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 21:28:17 +02:00
Kgothatso Ngako e5eafe2d2a Merge branch 'claude/wallet-nsec-signin-dbb2b4' into bennu 2026-10-24 21:15:06 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 cb277d3269 Merge branch 'bennu' into claude/lightning-wallet-iceberg-f20da1
Brings in the guarded member wallets, guarded subgroup wallets, ceremony
creation, and the removal of the group's nostr profile, relays and posts.

Two clashes needed more than a textual resolution:

- Event kinds. The guarded-wallet family took 30333-30337, the numbers
  the Lightning family used for its ceremony. Nothing conflicted
  textually and nothing would have failed, since each side reads the
  other's events by kind. The Lightning family moves to a fresh run,
  30350-30366, which costs nothing: rumor kinds that never shipped.
  GroupLightningEventsTest now knows the guarded-wallet kinds and asserts
  the family starts past every kind the app uses.
- Schema versions. bennu used 27-31. This branch's four versions were
  never on an installed database, so they become one migration, 31 to 32,
  adding the 13 Lightning tables.

Also:

- bennu's new member-wallet calls (broadcast, confirmationsOf,
  guardianSpends, the fee suggestion) now take the network, because this
  branch made Electrum clients per network.
- bennu's watcher conflict check uses the transaction's own network.
- NEVER_BROADCAST is gone with the broadcast screen, and so is the test
  that checked the Lightning statements against it.

The full JVM suite (1,554 tests) and the regtest run pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:23:33 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 31404c675f docs: an Electrum client for a profile with no node is built, and the notes it touched say so (Phase 4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:17:25 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 3f5de5887c refactor(wallet): every profile can watch, so the cannot-watch branches go (Phase 3)
The wallets are non-null wherever a screen is reached with an identity, and
with them go GroupWalletAddressesUIState.CannotWatch, the CANNOT_WATCH refusal,
canWatch on both wallet states and the new-member-wallet view model, and the
two strings that explained it. An nsec profile can now ask for a member wallet.
The profile screen keeps a nullable wallets, for previews and tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:16:29 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 da48d7b06c feat(wallet): an nsec or npub profile watches the chain on a client of its own (Phase 2)
IdentityElectrum hands the nav host the node's client for a profile with a
node, and a StandaloneElectrum for one without, stopping the last before the
next is made. The group wallets and the transaction watcher are made from it,
so they now exist for every profile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:10:19 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 9899c57164 feat(wallet): an Electrum connection loop for a profile with no node (Phase 1)
StandaloneElectrum is the node daemon's Electrum branch without the business:
the identity's server, the same pauses and handshake timeouts, a fresh start
on any change to the network, Tor or the server, and no clearnet connection to
a server the user wants reached only over Tor. Not wired in yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:05:31 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 dc36607eaa docs: a profile with no node gets an Electrum client of its own, planned
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:01:30 +02:00