On the first mainnet run, most of the wait for an invoice (six seconds) and for an authorised
payment to leave (five) was the node's ten-second poll. The node now watches the room's
invoice requests (30364) and authorisations (30363, which carry channel actions too), and acts
the moment either changes. The poll stays, for expiries and snapshots. Answering, paying and
closing each take one lock, so a wakeup, the poll and a direct call never act twice on the
same request: payAuthorised checks hasPaid, which suspends, before it marks a payment in hand.
Advances lightning-kmp-app to the commit that keeps payment preimages out of a release build's
Logcat.
The plan doc records the run with ACINQ's mainnet LSP: an on-the-fly 25,000-sat taproot
channel, 8,558 sats received, and a 21-sat payment sent. Every co-signer approved every
commitment. The doc also notes that a payment larger than the channel's 16,442 sats of
inbound would need the splice the co-signers still refuse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ACINQ's mainnet LSP hung up on the group's node seven milliseconds after init, every time. The
node required simple taproot channels (bit 564). The LSP's init lists neither 564 nor 565, and
BOLT 9 obliges a peer to hang up on a required feature it does not offer. Phoenix leaves the
feature optional and stays connected. Nothing is lost by matching it: lightning-kmp asks for the
taproot channel type in every channel it opens, and the co-signers rebuild every funding output
and commitment as taproot.
The node now takes Phoenix's setup wherever the group's terms allow:
- lightning-kmp's default features and peer storage
- connect and handshake timeouts that grow with each attempt, tripled over Tor
- the LSP's onion address while the identity has Tor on, and no clearnet dial over Tor
- the 50% relative cap on liquidity fees
The absolute fee cap stays the statement's, and the redial backoff stays: Phoenix's resets at
every handshake, which against an LSP that hangs up after init would redial every 0.1 s.
On the operator's emulator, the group's connection to ACINQ now holds. The regtest run still
opens a simple_taproot_channel and passes. Whether ACINQ opens a taproot channel to the group's
node is still unknown until one is opened on mainnet. The plan doc says so, and Phase 0's
instruction to require the feature is corrected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
lightning-kmp never reconnects by itself. The identity's own node has Phoenix's connection
daemon for that; the group's node connected once, so a single drop left it offline for the
rest of the term.
It now redials after every drop, waiting two seconds and doubling up to five minutes. A
connection that ends within a minute counts as a failure, so an LSP that hangs up on our
features isn't redialled every two seconds. Each drop is logged with its reason. When the
LSP's init doesn't offer a feature we require, the log names it. The node waits up to a
second for that init, because the socket can read as closed before the init's event arrives.
Run against ACINQ's mainnet LSP on an emulator, every drop reads: "Connection closed: the
LSP does not offer simple_taproot_channels, which this node requires". The plan doc now
records that against Phase 0's first step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Advances lightning-kmp-app to the commit that writes to Logcat when no SLF4J provider is installed.
This app installs none, so lightning-kmp's lines, the group node's among them, were dropped on
Android; on desktop they already went to stdout and on iOS to the unified log.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Lightning wallet now opens on the node's own network, mainnet,
where the group's onchain wallet already is, so the separate testnet3
onchain wallet and its row on the group's screen are gone.
GroupLightningRollout.allows takes mainnet and regtest, nothing else.
This lifts the plan's mainnet gate by decision, ahead of its condition:
an outside review of the Iceberg scheme and the DKG, and a month on
testnet3. The LSP's signing deadline was never measured either.
Meanwhile:
- Every co-signer refuses to sign for a mainnet channel over
MAINNET_CHANNEL_CAP, 1,000,000 sats, so a bigger one never opens; none
grows, since splices are refused.
- The opening screen says the scheme is unreviewed and names the cap.
Running the co-signing suite on mainnet (now a second test class) found a
bug that would have stopped everything there: every key manager was built
with a testnet swap-in tpub, which lightning-kmp rejects on mainnet. That
covers every co-signer and the operator's node. Mainnet now takes the
mainnet LSP's published xpub; nothing derives from it.
The full JVM suite (1,578 tests) and the regtest run pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GroupLightningRollout.ENABLED is now true. A Marmot group's screen offers
the Lightning wallet and the testnet3 onchain wallet it closes to, and
devices run the group nodes they are elected to. NIP-17 rooms still get
neither: they have no key to sign with. Mainnet is still refused by
GroupLightningRollout.allows, whatever a screen offers.
It was turned on before Phase 0's testnet3 measurement of how long the
LSP waits for a signature, so the 60-second signing deadline is a guess
until the first groups run there. The plan doc says so.
The wallet-row test now finds the onchain row by its title and status,
since the testnet3 row is also "Not opened yet". A new test checks that
the Lightning rows open the Lightning wallet and the testnet3 wallet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in an Electrum client for a profile with no node: IdentityElectrum
gives an nsec or npub profile a StandaloneElectrum of its own, so every
profile can watch the chain.
For the group Lightning wallet:
- GroupChainClients now sits on IdentityElectrum's client for the node's
network, so group wallets and the watcher work on profiles with no node
too.
- Each other network (testnet3, for the Lightning wallet) now gets a
StandaloneElectrum instead of this branch's own connection loop. The
old loop picked a server with ElectrumServers and connected directly,
ignoring the profile's Tor setting, so a profile with Tor on would have
reached a testnet3 server in the clear. The new one uses onion servers
while Tor is on. A test covers it.
- The group's Lightning node takes its context and logger from the app,
not the identity's Phoenix business, so a profile with no node that
holds a share can be elected and run it.
- The member wallet's follow() keeps its network parameter.
The full JVM suite (1,568 tests) and the regtest run pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in the guarded member wallets, guarded subgroup wallets, ceremony
creation, and the removal of the group's nostr profile, relays and posts.
Two clashes needed more than a textual resolution:
- Event kinds. The guarded-wallet family took 30333-30337, the numbers
the Lightning family used for its ceremony. Nothing conflicted
textually and nothing would have failed, since each side reads the
other's events by kind. The Lightning family moves to a fresh run,
30350-30366, which costs nothing: rumor kinds that never shipped.
GroupLightningEventsTest now knows the guarded-wallet kinds and asserts
the family starts past every kind the app uses.
- Schema versions. bennu used 27-31. This branch's four versions were
never on an installed database, so they become one migration, 31 to 32,
adding the 13 Lightning tables.
Also:
- bennu's new member-wallet calls (broadcast, confirmationsOf,
guardianSpends, the fee suggestion) now take the network, because this
branch made Electrum clients per network.
- bennu's watcher conflict check uses the transaction's own network.
- NEVER_BROADCAST is gone with the broadcast screen, and so is the test
that checked the Lightning statements against it.
The full JVM suite (1,554 tests) and the regtest run pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The wallets are non-null wherever a screen is reached with an identity, and
with them go GroupWalletAddressesUIState.CannotWatch, the CANNOT_WATCH refusal,
canWatch on both wallet states and the new-member-wallet view model, and the
two strings that explained it. An nsec profile can now ask for a member wallet.
The profile screen keeps a nullable wallets, for previews and tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
IdentityElectrum hands the nav host the node's client for a profile with a
node, and a StandaloneElectrum for one without, stopping the last before the
next is made. The group wallets and the transaction watcher are made from it,
so they now exist for every profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
StandaloneElectrum is the node daemon's Electrum branch without the business:
the identity's server, the same pauses and handshake timeouts, a fresh start
on any change to the network, Tor or the server, and no clearnet connection to
a server the user wants reached only over Tor. Not wired in yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in guarded-wallet forwarding (docs/guarded-wallet-forwarding.md),
which made telling the groups above automatic and touched the same
sharing code in GuardianManager.
Resolved by keeping both: its upwardOf, elected sender and catch-up,
and this branch's naming and certificate tag. Its automatic forward now
carries the guardian's birth certificate too (guardianCertificateFor),
and D5's re-tell rule moved into its told(), replacing alreadyTold. Its
wallet-level named() is dropped in favour of this branch's, which also
fills the guardian and branch names.
GuardedWalletForwardJvmTest's "the button offers only what goes up"
now shares with the certificate, as every share from this build does;
without it the wallet is rightly offered once more.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
member-wallet-guarding-group.md is marked built, with a table of where
the build chose differently from the plan. The member-guarded-wallets
note's Phases 10 and 11 and the guardians note's How an ancestor finds
the coins point to it, and the README's reading order places it.
Still to do by hand: the signet run with three emulators.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wallets your groups guard drew one row per holding group, so a wallet
held by a group and its parent appeared twice, each row calling its
holder the guardian. MemberWalletManager.byWallet gathers the rows into
one entry per wallet: headed by its label, "Guarded by #M" for the
group that signed its certificate, and under it each group here with a
leaf in it, nearest first -- "#P: after 144 blocks, about 1 day" --
with Spend where this device holds a share, described as "Spend from
Savings as #P".
GuardedHere.guardianName, which was the holder's room name, is now
holderName, so it is not mistaken for the direct guardian's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Members' guarded wallets move under a Members' wallets sub-heading, one
header per person -- @alice, "2 wallets, guarded by 2 groups" -- that
opens their profile, with a card per wallet beneath it. Each card says
which group below guards it: "Guarded by #N", "Guarded by #M, below
#P" where it is further down than this group's own child, "Guarded by
this group", or, with no name this device can check, "Guarded by a
group below #P". An unlabelled wallet is headed by that line.
Fund and Spend now name the wallet as well as the person, so a screen
reader tells one member's several wallets apart. The spend form's
title, the proposal a signer reads and the transcript line name a
labelled member wallet the same way: @alice's guarded wallet "Savings".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
byPerson() gathers the member wallets among an ancestor's guarded rows
into one PersonGuardedWallets per member: their rows nearest first,
then by the guarding group's name, and a count of the distinct groups
that directly guard them. Subgroups' wallets are left out. Pure, over
the rows the screen already holds, so nothing has to be kept in step
while the chain redraws them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A 30333 carrying a 30334 gains ["certificate", <30329>]: the birth
certificate of the group that signed the member's wallet, so a device
in a group above that was never in that room can name it. It is a tag,
so an older build still believes the wallet, and it is checked with
certifies before it names anything.
GuardedWallet carries the checked certificate, Shareable passes it on,
and share writes it, so each hop up the tree hands it further. A room
told before notices carried it is offered again, once, when this
device has one to add.
Tell the groups above now offers only guardians above the room it is
shown from. It offered every guardian but that room, so a device in P
and M was asked to tell M about M's own member's wallet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GuardedSubject.Member gains guardianName and branchName, filled in
GuardianManager.named beside ownerName, so every caller of
guardedWalletsOf gets them without a lookup in a composable.
Each name is the room's founding name, read off a birth certificate its
parent signed and checked with SubgroupBirthCertificateEvent.certifies,
whoever handed it over: the certificates the parent signed, the room's
own key state, or one a subgroup's statement told to the holding room
carries. Without one, the room's name here; without that, null.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guarded wallets are told to the groups above without a tap: upward
only, by one elected device as they arrive and by the rest when a
group's chat or wallet screen opens, with Share as the fallback.
docs/guarded-wallet-forwarding.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan is marked built, with a table of the nine places the build
chose differently -- the forwarder's own line written by share so the
button writes it too, a notice carried on by any device that believes
it whether or not it holds the room's key, one explanatory line under
the fallback section rather than one per row, and the signet run still
to make. The guardians and member-guarded-wallets notes say forwarding
no longer waits on a tap, and the README that it has been built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GuardedWallet gains three derived properties: directGuardianChatRoomId,
the nearest guardian, which for a member's wallet is the group that
signed its certificate; isGuardedHere; and branchChatRoomId, the
holding group's own child the wallet sits under. All are read off the
guardians and the line of descent a verified certificate already gives.
LineageExample is the note's R/P/M/N tree with Alice's two wallets in
it, for this phase's tests and the later ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tell the groups above stays, as the fallback for what the automatic
forwarding could not send, and now says so once under its heading:
this device tells the groups above on its own when it can, and Share
is for a group above that has not heard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With several devices able to forward, a group can be told about one
wallet more than once. A notice now writes its transcript line only
when it is the first the room holds for that statement, and none when
the room signed the statement itself; a duplicate is filed and silent.
share writes the forwarder's own line into each group it tells, since a
sender is never handed its own MLS message back -- for the automatic
forwarding and the button alike.
Two older tests described a notice under an id other than the one they
filed, which now reads as a second notice; they describe the filed one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GuardianManager.forwardAll forwards everything the button would list
from a room, on every network, without the election: what the elected
device never sent, what arrived while this one was offline, and every
certificate and statement filed before forwarding existed. It runs as
the group's chat opens and before its wallet screen reads what is left
to share, through ChatRepository.forwardGuardedWallets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three arrivals now forward, on the device elected to send at once: a
member wallet certificate filed in the group that signed it, a guarded
wallet statement filed in a subgroup, and a notice arriving in a group
-- the statement inside goes on a generation further, from any device
that believes it, whether or not it holds that room's key. Each rides
on the arrival and never fails it.
GroupWalletRollout.FORWARDS_GUARDED_WALLETS is the switch; the button
does not read it. A member's wallet signed two generations down now
reaches the root with nobody calling share.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An ancestor's guarded-wallet list shows @alice with nothing saying which
group in the lineage signed her wallet's certificate, so two wallets
under different branches read the same. The plan names the direct
guardian (the certificate's signer, guardians[0]) by its founding name,
carries that group's birth certificate on the forwarding notice so a
device outside it can name it, and gathers a person's wallets under one
header on the group's wallet screen and one row per wallet on their
profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GuardianManager.forward tells every group above a room that this device
can tell about a statement it believes, as the profile in that room.
With whenElected it sends only where this device is the elected sender
among the members of both rooms; the catch-up will send the rest.
The button's targets move onto the same rules, which fixes two bugs in
it: it offered to tell guardian groups below the room as well as above
-- the root re-telling the middle group that told it -- and a guarding
group's own member certificate, held as a signed event, never counted
as told. A target belonging to another profile on the device is never
told either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GuardianManager.verify splits into believable -- everything it checks
except the walk down from an ancestor's own guardian root, which only a
device holding that key can make -- and the walk. believable is what a
device checks before passing a statement on.
upwardOf is the groups a statement is told to from a room: those after
it in the guardian list, never those before. electedSender is who, of
the members in both rooms, sends at once. Nothing calls either yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A group above can use its leaf in a guarded wallet only once told, and
today that is the Share button on the lower group's wallet screen. The
plan has every device that files a guarded wallet it believes tell the
groups above it is in -- one elected sender at once, the rest in a
catch-up when a group's chat or wallet screen opens -- and keeps the
button as the fallback for a notice lost on the wire.
It fixes two bugs in the button on the way: it tells guardian groups
below the current one, and a guarding group's own member certificate
never counts as told.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A direct chat is a Marmot room of exactly two people, and never has a key
-- a ceremony needs three -- so it passed the picker's only filter and sat
there asking for a key nobody can answer with. MemberWalletManager.couldGuard
leaves out a room of fewer than three members unless this device knows its
key, so a real group that shrank to two after its ceremony stays. The
picker (groupsOf) and the group page's members' wallet section and Ask
button use the same rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Choose a group to guard it" no longer lists a group that never opened to
its members' wallets, or has closed: neither is a choice. A group whose
key -- and so whose policy -- this device has not been told stays, with
the button that asks, since the answer is how it learns the group is
open; so do the refusals about the profile itself. The empty list now
says how that changes: a group's signers can turn it on from its page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
member-wallet-delay.md is marked built, with a table of where the build
chose differently -- most of all that a request carrying no policy still
reads, so wallets guarded before policies keep verifying. The member
wallets note's "full control" stops saying 12, and its D3 adds that only
an open group takes a request; the guardian-delay note's member-wallet row
and the README follow.
The three-emulator run is still to do by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The group's page shows, first in Members' guarded wallets, where the group
stands -- guarding them after a delay, never having said so, or having
stopped -- to everybody in a Marmot group, with Change or Guard members'
wallets for a device that can sign. It opens MemberWalletPolicyScreen:
the delay chooser, what a change reaches (only wallets asked for from now
on), the older-app caveat, Ask the group, and for an open group Stop
guarding new wallets behind a dialog saying closing releases nothing.
Each proposes a 30337 through the existing signing session.
GuardianDelayChooser and its state, GuardianDelayInput, move out of the
subgroup picker so both screens share them; the picker's behaviour is
unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MemberWalletManager.judgePolicy is D6 of docs/member-wallet-delay.md: a
request carrying an open policy its group signed is judged at that delay
unless this device holds a newer one -- then it is stale, asked under a
changed delay or of a group that has since closed. A request carrying no
policy, a closed one or another group's is refused. refuseCertificate
checks the grant at the judged delay, and putToGroup runs the same check
before it proposes.
The member sees it: a wallet not yet guarded carries refusedBecause, the
wallet screen says why, and Ask again makes a new request under the
group's newest policy with a new key -- the old one, never offered, is
discarded -- or, for a closed group, leaves only Discard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MemberWalletManager.refusal gains NOT_OFFERED -- the group has signed no
policy -- and CLOSED, after the refusals it had; a member with no key yet
still gets KEY_UNKNOWN and its button to ask, since the answer brings the
policy too. request() works out the grant at the open policy's delay and
the request carries that policy whole as ["member_wallet_policy", ...];
delaysOf reads it, and is null for a group that is not open.
MemberWalletRequestEvent.verified gains a sixth check: a carried policy is
an open one the asked group signed, and the nearest guardian's delay is
its delay. A request carrying none still reads, so certificates signed
before policies keep verifying; that a new request must carry one is the
signers' rule, which comes next.
The member-wallet test fixtures open their groups at the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A member welcomed after the group signed its policy cannot decrypt it, so
the key notice that already tells them what the group signs with now
carries the newest 30337 the answering device holds, open or closed, as
["member_wallet_policy", <event>]. GroupKeyNoticeEvent.read verifies it as
the room's own signature, and an answer carrying one that does not verify
does not read at all. MemberWalletManager.policyFor considers carried
policies beside stored ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MemberWalletManager.policyFor: the newest 30337 the group's own room
signed among the GroupSignedEvent rows this device holds, open or closed;
null for a group that never signed one. The transcript gets a line for a
verified policy -- "The group guards members' wallets, after 144 blocks,
about 1 day", or "has stopped guarding new members' wallets" -- so an
older-looking raw-JSON bubble never shows, and ProposedEvent says what a
signer is agreeing to, reading the proposal's shape through the new
MemberWalletPolicyEvent.read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MemberWalletPolicyEvent, kind 30337: ["d", "member-wallets"] with exactly
one of ["guardian_delay", <6..65,535>] or ["closed"], signed by the group's
own room. verify refuses a policy that says both, neither, or something out
of range, or that another room signed; newestAmong picks by created_at then
id, open or closed. Nothing produces one yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The member-wallet policy (30337) becomes the group's opt-in: no policy
means the group does not guard members' wallets (D8), so every new member
wallet's delay is one its group chose. A newer policy with ["closed"]
instead of a delay stops new wallets (D9); it never releases one already
guarded, whose addresses carry the group's leaf. Opening again is a newer
open policy.
The signer table, the picker's refusals (POLICY_UNKNOWN, NOT_OFFERED,
CLOSED), the request, the screen -- now MemberWalletPolicyScreen, with
Stop guarding new wallets -- and the emulator run follow. Phases 4, 5 and
6 now ship together, since 4 and 5 close every group until 6 opens it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The group's quorum signs a standing policy in its own room -- a new kind,
30337, ["guardian_delay", <blocks>] -- rather than a birth certificate
tag: the certificate is the parent's statement, frozen at birth, and a
root group has none. A member's request is built under the newest policy
and carries it whole, so late members (through the key notice) and
signers who missed it judge it alike; signers refuse a stale or missing
one. A wallet already guarded keeps its delay. Seven phases, not built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in member guarded wallets and funding a descendant's guarded wallet.
- Schema: bennu's v30 (MemberWallet, MemberWalletSpend) is kept as it is;
DkgSession.guardianDelay moves to v31, with a 30 -> 31 auto-migration.
- Conflicts: strings and README take both sides; the send form's guardian
delay line moves into the shared SpendForm; the guarded wallet card keeps
its Fund and Spend buttons and gains this group's own leaf's delay.
- bennu's uses of ANCESTOR_DELAY become each leaf's own delay:
GuardedWalletRow.arriving, the funding form's "spend these coins again"
line, the member wallet screens' reach text (MemberWalletManager.delaysOf)
and the member certificate's proposal summary.
- Four of bennu's fixtures built a "guarded" wallet with no guardian leaf;
they now carry the ancestor's, as a verified statement would.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>