frost: nonce generation

This commits adds nonce generation, as well as serialization and
parsing.
This commit is contained in:
Jesse Posner
2024-07-15 17:54:31 -07:00
parent 197fb7efb9
commit f606507120
10 changed files with 382 additions and 23 deletions

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ extern "C" {
* This module implements a variant of Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr
* Threshold Signatures (FROST) by Chelsea Komlo and Ian Goldberg
* (https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/frost/).
*
* Following the convention used in the MuSig module, the API uses the singular
* term "nonce" to refer to the two "nonces" used by the FROST scheme.
*/
/** Opaque data structures
@@ -34,6 +37,61 @@ typedef struct {
unsigned char data[36];
} secp256k1_frost_share;
/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's _secret_ nonce.
*
* Guaranteed to be 68 bytes in size.
*
* WARNING: This structure MUST NOT be copied or read or written to directly.
* A signer who is online throughout the whole process and can keep this
* structure in memory can use the provided API functions for a safe standard
* workflow. See
* https://blockstream.com/2019/02/18/musig-a-new-multisignature-standard/ for
* more details about the risks associated with serializing or deserializing
* this structure.
*
* We repeat, copying this data structure can result in nonce reuse which will
* leak the secret signing key.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[68];
} secp256k1_frost_secnonce;
/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's public nonce.
*
* Guaranteed to be 132 bytes in size. It can be safely copied/moved.
* Serialized and parsed with `frost_pubnonce_serialize` and
* `frost_pubnonce_parse`.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[132];
} secp256k1_frost_pubnonce;
/** Parse a signer's public nonce.
*
* Returns: 1 when the nonce could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: nonce: pointer to a nonce object
* In: in66: pointer to the 66-byte nonce to be parsed
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_parse(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *nonce,
const unsigned char *in66
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Serialize a signer's public nonce
*
* Returns: 1 when the nonce could be serialized, 0 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: out66: pointer to a 66-byte array to store the serialized nonce
* In: nonce: pointer to the nonce
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_serialize(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
unsigned char *out66,
const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *nonce
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Serialize a FROST share
*
* Returns: 1 when the share could be serialized, 0 otherwise
@@ -181,6 +239,59 @@ SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_compute_pubshare(
size_t n_participants
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
/** Starts a signing session by generating a nonce
*
* This function outputs a secret nonce that will be required for signing and a
* corresponding public nonce that is intended to be sent to other signers.
*
* FROST, like MuSig, differs from regular Schnorr signing in that
* implementers _must_ take special care to not reuse a nonce. This can be
* ensured by following these rules:
*
* 1. Each call to this function must have a UNIQUE session_id32 that must NOT BE
* REUSED in subsequent calls to this function.
* If you do not provide a seckey, session_id32 _must_ be UNIFORMLY RANDOM
* AND KEPT SECRET (even from other signers). If you do provide a seckey,
* session_id32 can instead be a counter (that must never repeat!). However,
* it is recommended to always choose session_id32 uniformly at random.
* 2. If you already know the seckey, message or aggregate public key, they
* can be optionally provided to derive the nonce and increase
* misuse-resistance. The extra_input32 argument can be used to provide
* additional data that does not repeat in normal scenarios, such as the
* current time.
* 3. Avoid copying (or serializing) the secnonce. This reduces the possibility
* that it is used more than once for signing.
*
* Remember that nonce reuse will leak the secret key!
* Note that using the same agg_share for multiple FROST sessions is fine.
*
* Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid and 1 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static)
* Out: secnonce: pointer to a structure to store the secret nonce
* pubnonce: pointer to a structure to store the public nonce
* In: session_id32: a 32-byte session_id32 as explained above. Must be
* unique to this call to secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen and
* must be uniformly random unless you really know what you
* are doing.
* agg_share: the aggregated share that will later be used for
* signing, if already known (can be NULL)
* msg32: the 32-byte message that will later be signed, if
* already known (can be NULL)
* agg_pk: the FROST-aggregated public key (can be NULL)
* extra_input32: an optional 32-byte array that is input to the nonce
* derivation function (can be NULL)
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce,
secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pubnonce,
const unsigned char *session_id32,
const secp256k1_frost_share *agg_share,
const unsigned char *msg32,
const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *agg_pk,
const unsigned char *extra_input32
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif