diff --git a/include/secp256k1_frost.h b/include/secp256k1_frost.h
index 524a4ab7..99cbcafe 100644
--- a/include/secp256k1_frost.h
+++ b/include/secp256k1_frost.h
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ extern "C" {
  * This module implements a variant of Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr
  * Threshold Signatures (FROST) by Chelsea Komlo and Ian Goldberg
  * (https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/frost/).
+ *
+ * Following the convention used in the MuSig module, the API uses the singular
+ * term "nonce" to refer to the two "nonces" used by the FROST scheme.
  */
 
 /** Opaque data structures
@@ -34,6 +37,61 @@ typedef struct {
     unsigned char data[36];
 } secp256k1_frost_share;
 
+/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's _secret_ nonce.
+ *
+ *  Guaranteed to be 68 bytes in size.
+ *
+ *  WARNING: This structure MUST NOT be copied or read or written to directly.
+ *  A signer who is online throughout the whole process and can keep this
+ *  structure in memory can use the provided API functions for a safe standard
+ *  workflow. See
+ *  https://blockstream.com/2019/02/18/musig-a-new-multisignature-standard/ for
+ *  more details about the risks associated with serializing or deserializing
+ *  this structure.
+ *
+ *  We repeat, copying this data structure can result in nonce reuse which will
+ *  leak the secret signing key.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char data[68];
+} secp256k1_frost_secnonce;
+
+/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's public nonce.
+*
+*  Guaranteed to be 132 bytes in size. It can be safely copied/moved.
+*  Serialized and parsed with `frost_pubnonce_serialize` and
+*  `frost_pubnonce_parse`.
+*/
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned char data[132];
+} secp256k1_frost_pubnonce;
+
+/** Parse a signer's public nonce.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 when the nonce could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
+ *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:   nonce: pointer to a nonce object
+ *  In:     in66: pointer to the 66-byte nonce to be parsed
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_parse(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *nonce,
+    const unsigned char *in66
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Serialize a signer's public nonce
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 when the nonce could be serialized, 0 otherwise
+ *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:   out66: pointer to a 66-byte array to store the serialized nonce
+ *  In:    nonce: pointer to the nonce
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_serialize(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *out66,
+    const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *nonce
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
 /** Serialize a FROST share
  *
  *  Returns: 1 when the share could be serialized, 0 otherwise
@@ -181,6 +239,59 @@ SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_compute_pubshare(
     size_t n_participants
 ) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
 
+/** Starts a signing session by generating a nonce
+ *
+ *  This function outputs a secret nonce that will be required for signing and a
+ *  corresponding public nonce that is intended to be sent to other signers.
+ *
+ *  FROST, like MuSig, differs from regular Schnorr signing in that
+ *  implementers _must_ take special care to not reuse a nonce. This can be
+ *  ensured by following these rules:
+ *
+ *  1. Each call to this function must have a UNIQUE session_id32 that must NOT BE
+ *     REUSED in subsequent calls to this function.
+ *     If you do not provide a seckey, session_id32 _must_ be UNIFORMLY RANDOM
+ *     AND KEPT SECRET (even from other signers). If you do provide a seckey,
+ *     session_id32 can instead be a counter (that must never repeat!). However,
+ *     it is recommended to always choose session_id32 uniformly at random.
+ *  2. If you already know the seckey, message or aggregate public key, they
+ *     can be optionally provided to derive the nonce and increase
+ *     misuse-resistance. The extra_input32 argument can be used to provide
+ *     additional data that does not repeat in normal scenarios, such as the
+ *     current time.
+ *  3. Avoid copying (or serializing) the secnonce. This reduces the possibility
+ *     that it is used more than once for signing.
+ *
+ *  Remember that nonce reuse will leak the secret key!
+ *  Note that using the same agg_share for multiple FROST sessions is fine.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid and 1 otherwise
+ *  Args:         ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static)
+ *  Out:     secnonce: pointer to a structure to store the secret nonce
+ *           pubnonce: pointer to a structure to store the public nonce
+ *  In:  session_id32: a 32-byte session_id32 as explained above. Must be
+ *                     unique to this call to secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen and
+ *                     must be uniformly random unless you really know what you
+ *                     are doing.
+ *          agg_share: the aggregated share that will later be used for
+ *                     signing, if already known (can be NULL)
+ *              msg32: the 32-byte message that will later be signed, if
+ *                     already known (can be NULL)
+ *             agg_pk: the FROST-aggregated public key (can be NULL)
+ *      extra_input32: an optional 32-byte array that is input to the nonce
+ *                     derivation function (can be NULL)
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce,
+    secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pubnonce,
+    const unsigned char *session_id32,
+    const secp256k1_frost_share *agg_share,
+    const unsigned char *msg32,
+    const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *agg_pk,
+    const unsigned char *extra_input32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/src/group.h b/src/group.h
index 81b159c8..43cf57fd 100644
--- a/src/group.h
+++ b/src/group.h
@@ -202,6 +202,10 @@ static void secp256k1_ge_from_bytes(secp256k1_ge *r, const unsigned char *buf);
  */
 static int secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(const secp256k1_ge* ge);
 
+static void secp256k1_point_save_ext(unsigned char *data, secp256k1_ge *ge);
+
+static void secp256k1_point_load_ext(secp256k1_ge *ge, const unsigned char *data);
+
 /** Check invariants on an affine group element (no-op unless VERIFY is enabled). */
 static void secp256k1_ge_verify(const secp256k1_ge *a);
 #define SECP256K1_GE_VERIFY(a) secp256k1_ge_verify(a)
diff --git a/src/group_impl.h b/src/group_impl.h
index f27b7d99..fb475217 100644
--- a/src/group_impl.h
+++ b/src/group_impl.h
@@ -914,6 +914,23 @@ static int secp256k1_gej_has_quad_y_var(const secp256k1_gej *a) {
     return secp256k1_fe_is_square_var(&yz);
 }
 
+static void secp256k1_point_save_ext(unsigned char *data, secp256k1_ge *ge) {
+    if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(ge)) {
+        memset(data, 0, 64);
+    } else {
+        secp256k1_ge_to_bytes(data, ge);
+    }
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_point_load_ext(secp256k1_ge *ge, const unsigned char *data) {
+    unsigned char zeros[64] = { 0 };
+    if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(data, zeros, sizeof(zeros)) == 0) {
+        secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(ge);
+    } else {
+        secp256k1_ge_from_bytes(ge, data);
+    }
+}
+
 static int secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(const secp256k1_ge* ge) {
 #ifdef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER
     secp256k1_gej out;
diff --git a/src/modules/frost/Makefile.am.include b/src/modules/frost/Makefile.am.include
index 1fea08d2..7e44e6ea 100644
--- a/src/modules/frost/Makefile.am.include
+++ b/src/modules/frost/Makefile.am.include
@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_frost.h
 noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/frost/main_impl.h
 noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/frost/keygen.h
 noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/frost/keygen_impl.h
+noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/frost/session.h
+noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/frost/session_impl.h
diff --git a/src/modules/frost/keygen.h b/src/modules/frost/keygen.h
index bc1082a1..c6811423 100644
--- a/src/modules/frost/keygen.h
+++ b/src/modules/frost/keygen.h
@@ -10,4 +10,8 @@
 #include "../../../include/secp256k1.h"
 #include "../../../include/secp256k1_frost.h"
 
+#include "../../scalar.h"
+
+static int secp256k1_frost_share_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar *s, const secp256k1_frost_share* share);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/src/modules/frost/main_impl.h b/src/modules/frost/main_impl.h
index 66068ba7..a126f452 100644
--- a/src/modules/frost/main_impl.h
+++ b/src/modules/frost/main_impl.h
@@ -8,5 +8,6 @@
 #define SECP256K1_MODULE_FROST_MAIN
 
 #include "keygen_impl.h"
+#include "session_impl.h"
 
 #endif
diff --git a/src/modules/frost/session.h b/src/modules/frost/session.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d4b922be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/frost/session.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2021-2024 Jesse Posner                               *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying   *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_FROST_SESSION_H
+#define SECP256K1_MODULE_FROST_SESSION_H
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/frost/session_impl.h b/src/modules/frost/session_impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..07c53196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/frost/session_impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2021-2024 Jesse Posner                               *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying   *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_FROST_SESSION_IMPL_H
+#define SECP256K1_MODULE_FROST_SESSION_IMPL_H
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../../../include/secp256k1.h"
+#include "../../../include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
+#include "../../../include/secp256k1_frost.h"
+
+#include "keygen.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "../../eckey.h"
+#include "../../hash.h"
+#include "../../scalar.h"
+#include "../../util.h"
+
+static const unsigned char secp256k1_frost_secnonce_magic[4] = { 0x84, 0x7d, 0x46, 0x25 };
+
+static void secp256k1_frost_secnonce_save(secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce, secp256k1_scalar *k) {
+    memcpy(&secnonce->data[0], secp256k1_frost_secnonce_magic, 4);
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&secnonce->data[4], &k[0]);
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(&secnonce->data[36], &k[1]);
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_frost_secnonce_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_scalar *k, secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce) {
+    int is_zero;
+    ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&secnonce->data[0], secp256k1_frost_secnonce_magic, 4) == 0);
+    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&k[0], &secnonce->data[4], NULL);
+    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&k[1], &secnonce->data[36], NULL);
+    /* We make very sure that the nonce isn't invalidated by checking the values
+     * in addition to the magic. */
+    is_zero = secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&k[0]) & secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&k[1]);
+    secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &is_zero, sizeof(is_zero));
+    ARG_CHECK(!is_zero);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* If flag is true, invalidate the secnonce; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. */
+static void secp256k1_frost_secnonce_invalidate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce, int flag) {
+    secp256k1_memczero(secnonce->data, sizeof(secnonce->data), flag);
+    /* The flag argument is usually classified. So, above code makes the magic
+     * classified. However, we need the magic to be declassified to be able to
+     * compare it during secnonce_load. */
+    secp256k1_declassify(ctx, secnonce->data, sizeof(secp256k1_frost_secnonce_magic));
+}
+
+static const unsigned char secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_magic[4] = { 0x8b, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0xc2 };
+
+/* Requires that none of the provided group elements is infinity. Works for both
+ * frost_pubnonce and frost_aggnonce. */
+static void secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_save(secp256k1_frost_pubnonce* nonce, secp256k1_ge* ge) {
+    int i;
+    memcpy(&nonce->data[0], secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_magic, 4);
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        secp256k1_point_save_ext(nonce->data + 4+64*i, &ge[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Works for both frost_pubnonce and frost_aggnonce. Returns 1 unless the nonce
+ * wasn't properly initialized */
+static int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ge* ge, const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce* nonce) {
+    int i;
+
+    ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(&nonce->data[0], secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_magic, 4) == 0);
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        secp256k1_point_load_ext(&ge[i], nonce->data + 4+64*i);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_serialize(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *out66, const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce* nonce) {
+    secp256k1_ge ge[2];
+    int i;
+
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(out66 != NULL);
+    memset(out66, 0, 66);
+    ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL);
+
+    if (!secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_load(ctx, ge, nonce)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        int ret;
+        size_t size = 33;
+        ret = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&ge[i], &out66[33*i], &size, 1);
+#ifdef VERIFY
+         /* serialize must succeed because the point was just loaded */
+         VERIFY_CHECK(ret && size == 33);
+#else
+        (void) ret;
+#endif
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_parse(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_frost_pubnonce* nonce, const unsigned char *in66) {
+    secp256k1_ge ge[2];
+    int i;
+
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(nonce != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(in66 != NULL);
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&ge[i], &in66[33*i], 33)) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(&ge[i])) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    /* The group elements can not be infinity because they were just parsed */
+    secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_save(nonce, ge);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_nonce_function_frost(secp256k1_scalar *k, const unsigned char *session_id, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *key32, const unsigned char *pk32, const unsigned char *extra_input32) {
+    secp256k1_sha256 sha;
+    unsigned char seed[32];
+    unsigned char i;
+    enum { n_extra_in = 4 };
+    const unsigned char *extra_in[n_extra_in];
+
+    /* TODO: this doesn't have the same sidechannel resistance as the BIP340
+     * nonce function because the seckey feeds directly into SHA. */
+
+    /* Subtract one from `sizeof` to avoid hashing the implicit null byte */
+    secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(&sha, (unsigned char*)"FROST/nonce", sizeof("FROST/nonce") - 1);
+    secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, session_id, 32);
+    extra_in[0] = msg32;
+    extra_in[1] = key32;
+    extra_in[2] = pk32;
+    extra_in[3] = extra_input32;
+    for (i = 0; i < n_extra_in; i++) {
+        unsigned char len;
+        if (extra_in[i] != NULL) {
+            len = 32;
+            secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &len, 1);
+            secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, extra_in[i], 32);
+        } else {
+            len = 0;
+            secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &len, 1);
+        }
+    }
+    secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, seed);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        unsigned char buf[32];
+        secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha);
+        secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, seed, 32);
+        secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &i, sizeof(i));
+        secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, buf);
+        secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&k[i], buf, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+int secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce, secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pubnonce, const unsigned char *session_id32, const secp256k1_frost_share *share, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *pk, const unsigned char *extra_input32) {
+    secp256k1_scalar k[2];
+    secp256k1_ge nonce_pt[2];
+    int i;
+    unsigned char pk_ser[32];
+    unsigned char *pk_ser_ptr = NULL;
+    unsigned char sk_ser[32];
+    unsigned char *sk_ser_ptr = NULL;
+    int sk_serialize_success;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(secnonce != NULL);
+    memset(secnonce, 0, sizeof(*secnonce));
+    ARG_CHECK(pubnonce != NULL);
+    memset(pubnonce, 0, sizeof(*pubnonce));
+    ARG_CHECK(session_id32 != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
+    if (share == NULL) {
+        /* Check in constant time that the session_id is not 0 as a
+         * defense-in-depth measure that may protect against a faulty RNG. */
+        unsigned char acc = 0;
+        for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+            acc |= session_id32[i];
+        }
+        ret &= !!acc;
+        memset(&acc, 0, sizeof(acc));
+    }
+
+    if (share != NULL) {
+        /* Check that the share is valid to be able to sign for it later. */
+        secp256k1_scalar sk;
+
+        ret &= secp256k1_frost_share_load(ctx, &sk, share);
+        secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk);
+
+        sk_serialize_success = secp256k1_frost_share_serialize(ctx, sk_ser, share);
+        sk_ser_ptr = sk_ser;
+#ifdef VERIFY
+    VERIFY_CHECK(sk_serialize_success);
+#else
+    (void) sk_serialize_success;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (pk != NULL) {
+        if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(ctx, pk_ser, pk)) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+        pk_ser_ptr = pk_ser;
+    }
+    secp256k1_nonce_function_frost(k, session_id32, msg32, sk_ser_ptr, pk_ser_ptr, extra_input32);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&k[0]));
+    VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&k[1]));
+    VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_eq(&k[0], &k[1]));
+    secp256k1_frost_secnonce_save(secnonce, k);
+    secp256k1_frost_secnonce_invalidate(ctx, secnonce, !ret);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+        secp256k1_gej nonce_ptj;
+        secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &nonce_ptj, &k[i]);
+        secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&nonce_pt[i], &nonce_ptj);
+        secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &nonce_pt[i], sizeof(nonce_pt));
+        secp256k1_scalar_clear(&k[i]);
+    }
+    /* nonce_pt won't be infinity because k != 0 with overwhelming probability */
+    secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_save(pubnonce, nonce_pt);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/musig/keyagg.h b/src/modules/musig/keyagg.h
index 620522fe..1497659d 100644
--- a/src/modules/musig/keyagg.h
+++ b/src/modules/musig/keyagg.h
@@ -27,12 +27,6 @@ typedef struct {
     int parity_acc;
 } secp256k1_keyagg_cache_internal;
 
-/* point_save_ext and point_load_ext are identical to point_save and point_load
- * except that they allow saving and loading the point at infinity */
-static void secp256k1_point_save_ext(unsigned char *data, secp256k1_ge *ge);
-
-static void secp256k1_point_load_ext(secp256k1_ge *ge, const unsigned char *data);
-
 static int secp256k1_keyagg_cache_load(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_keyagg_cache_internal *cache_i, const secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache *cache);
 
 static void secp256k1_musig_keyaggcoef(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_keyagg_cache_internal *cache_i, secp256k1_ge *pk);
diff --git a/src/modules/musig/keyagg_impl.h b/src/modules/musig/keyagg_impl.h
index aff95542..992fd9a3 100644
--- a/src/modules/musig/keyagg_impl.h
+++ b/src/modules/musig/keyagg_impl.h
@@ -17,23 +17,6 @@
 #include "../../hash.h"
 #include "../../util.h"
 
-static void secp256k1_point_save_ext(unsigned char *data, secp256k1_ge *ge) {
-    if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(ge)) {
-        memset(data, 0, 64);
-    } else {
-        secp256k1_ge_to_bytes(data, ge);
-    }
-}
-
-static void secp256k1_point_load_ext(secp256k1_ge *ge, const unsigned char *data) {
-    unsigned char zeros[64] = { 0 };
-    if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(data, zeros, sizeof(zeros)) == 0) {
-        secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(ge);
-    } else {
-        secp256k1_ge_from_bytes(ge, data);
-    }
-}
-
 static const unsigned char secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache_magic[4] = { 0xf4, 0xad, 0xbb, 0xdf };
 
 /* A keyagg cache consists of