frost_enrollment: document future Kyber lessons
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@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += doc/release-process.md doc/safegcd_implementation.md
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EXTRA_DIST += doc/ellswift.md doc/musig.md doc/iceberg.md doc/prefractal.md
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EXTRA_DIST += src/modules/frost/frost.md src/modules/chilldkg/chilldkg.md
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EXTRA_DIST += src/modules/frost_enrollment/frost_enrollment.md
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EXTRA_DIST += src/modules/frost_enrollment/kyber-future.md
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EXTRA_DIST += examples/EXAMPLES_COPYING
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EXTRA_DIST += sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage
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EXTRA_DIST += sage/gen_split_lambda_constants.sage
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@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ The full and reduced protocols MUST NOT be mixed within a run. They have
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incompatible message graphs and tagged-hash encodings. The example in
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`examples/frost_enrollment.c` uses reduced enrollment.
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For optional future distributed-integration lessons from Kyber, see
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`src/modules/frost_enrollment/kyber-future.md`. That design note does not change
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the current protocol or API.
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Unlike the frost module, which tracks BIP 445, these protocols have no BIP.
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Their tagged hashes and parameter serializations are this module's own and are
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pinned by `src/modules/frost_enrollment/vectors.h`.
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@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
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Future optional lessons from Kyber resharing
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============================================
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Status
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------
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This is a design note for possible future work, not a specification of the
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current API and not a commitment to change it. The reduced-enrollment
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implementation should remain lightweight until there is a concrete deployment
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requirement for these layers.
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The reference for this note is dedis/kyber at commit
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`3194be036a906ef79fa0e87d439bfd7d6e4e0afe`, primarily its Pedersen DKG
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resharing implementation:
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- https://github.com/dedis/kyber/tree/3194be036a906ef79fa0e87d439bfd7d6e4e0afe/share/dkg/pedersen
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- https://github.com/dedis/kyber/blob/3194be036a906ef79fa0e87d439bfd7d6e4e0afe/share/dkg/pedersen/dkg.go
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- https://github.com/dedis/kyber/blob/3194be036a906ef79fa0e87d439bfd7d6e4e0afe/share/dkg/pedersen/structs.go
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- https://github.com/dedis/kyber/blob/3194be036a906ef79fa0e87d439bfd7d6e4e0afe/share/dkg/pedersen/protocol.go
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Kyber calls the relevant operation resharing, not re-enrollment. Its operation
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is cryptographically different from this module's enrollment RTS.
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Current design to preserve
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--------------------------
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The current reduced protocol evaluates the existing joint polynomial at a new
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participant index. It has these important properties:
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- enrollment changes `(t, n)` to `(t, n+1)` and repair reproduces an existing
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share;
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- the group public key, threshold, joint polynomial and existing shares do not
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change;
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- no trusted dealer or reconstruction of the group secret is needed during
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enrollment or repair;
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- any sufficient helper set can run the protocol;
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- helpers exchange a triangular additive-share matrix, using u(u+1)/2 secret
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values for u helpers;
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- the public API operates on bytes and does not impose a network, identity,
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storage, authorization or consensus implementation;
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- fresh session identifiers and helper randomness, per-helper session hashes,
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mandatory target public-share verification and constant-time secret arithmetic
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are already implemented;
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- public shares can be derived by interpolation or from an aggregate VSS
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commitment polynomial.
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The original full-enrollment API and its regression vectors must remain
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unaffected by optional integration work. The reduced API and vectors should also
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remain stable unless a separately versioned protocol change is deliberately
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specified.
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The key difference from Kyber
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-----------------------------
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Kyber resharing has every old participant create a fresh random polynomial whose
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constant term is that participant's old share. New participants interpolate the
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qualified dealers' shares and commitments. The resulting joint polynomial has
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the same constant-term secret but fresh coefficients, and its degree can change
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with the new threshold.
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Kyber therefore addresses proactive refresh, membership changes and threshold
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changes as well as adding participants. The current enrollment module does not.
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It should not acquire those semantics implicitly.
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Useful Kyber ideas to adapt
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---------------------------
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The most useful lessons are operational rather than changes to the reduced
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scalar arithmetic:
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1. Kyber's `Node` associates a stable participant index with a long-term public
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key, and `DistKeyShare` carries public polynomial commitments.
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2. Its packets have canonical hashes and signatures, with signature verification
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based on the sender's old- or new-group role.
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3. Its packet collector accepts an identical retransmission but treats a
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different packet from the same sender in the same role as equivocation.
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4. Its explicit phases separate deal processing, responses, justifications and
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finalization.
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5. Its result contains the public commitments and qualified participant list,
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allowing participants to compare their public results before accepting them.
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6. Its resharing configuration explicitly distinguishes the old threshold from
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the new threshold, preventing an implicit threshold downgrade.
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The first five ideas can be adapted without changing the enrollment algorithm.
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The sixth matters only for a future resharing protocol with distinct old and
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new thresholds; the current enrollment session already binds its unchanged
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threshold explicitly.
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Proposed layering
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-----------------
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Keep the existing scalar-level API as the inner layer. Add optional integration
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layers only when needed:
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application policy, authorization, persistent storage and consensus
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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optional protocol driver, timeouts, retries and finalization
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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optional canonical requests, message hashes and message collector
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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authenticated group descriptor and long-term participant identities
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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existing full/reduced enrollment arithmetic (unchanged)
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The first versions of these layers can live in the example or in the consuming
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application. They should become public library APIs only after their semantics
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and wire formats are stable and independently reviewed.
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No layer should silently turn into a bespoke transport, encryption, signature,
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consensus or persistent-database framework. Those remain application choices.
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1. Authenticated group descriptor
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---------------------------------
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Define a versioned public descriptor containing at least:
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- protocol and serialization versions;
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- group threshold public key;
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- current n and t;
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- participant identifiers and their long-term host public keys;
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- the public-share table or aggregate VSS commitment polynomial;
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- any group epoch or configuration sequence number required by the application.
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Define a canonical serialization and a descriptor hash. The descriptor binds
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identifiers to host identities and public key material, rather than treating a
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bare integer identifier as a network identity.
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The descriptor must be authenticated independently of enrollment messages.
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Possible distributed sources include a certified DKG transcript, an existing
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signed group configuration, or another mechanism already trusted by the group.
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A hash embedded in the descriptor does not authenticate the descriptor itself.
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There is no need to introduce a trusted dealer merely to provide this metadata.
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The descriptor should be validated before use:
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- all identifiers and host keys are unique and in range;
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- n and t match the authenticated configuration;
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- public shares validate against the threshold public key with
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`secp256k1_frost_threshold_info_validate`, or commitments have the expected
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constant-term commitment and encoding;
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- every participant uses the same descriptor hash for the session.
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The current aggregate-commitment derivation can be reused. It does not need a
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ChillDKG build dependency.
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2. Signed enrollment or repair request
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--------------------------------------
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Define a request containing:
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- request protocol version;
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- fresh 32-byte session identifier;
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- authenticated group descriptor hash;
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- enrollment or repair mode;
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- target participant identifier;
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- target long-term host public key;
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- canonically sorted helper identifier set;
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- current n and t, even though the descriptor also commits to them;
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- an application-defined expiration, epoch or timeout value if required;
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- an application authorization reference or policy version, if applicable.
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Define a canonical request hash. The target signs the request with its long-term
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host key. Every helper verifies the signature, descriptor, participant roles,
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helper set, mode and expiration before applying its own authorization policy.
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This is particularly important for repair. The requester cannot prove possession
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of the lost FROST share, so it needs an independent, stable identity. A target
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host key provides that identity without introducing a dealer.
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Authentication is not authorization. A valid target signature proves which host
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made the request; it does not prove that the group permits the requested
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operation. Each helper still needs an explicit approval decision.
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Any change to the existing reduced parameters-hash encoding must be a new
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protocol version with new tags and vectors. An optional request hash can instead
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reference the existing parameters hash without changing it.
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3. Canonical message hashes and transcript
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------------------------------------------
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Define canonical hashes for delta, sigma and finalization messages. These are
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separate from the existing parameters hash, which remains the common session
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identifier used by the reduced arithmetic.
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A delta message hash should bind:
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- request hash or reduced parameters hash;
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- message type and protocol version;
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- sender identifier;
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- recipient identifier;
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- the 32-byte delta value.
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A sigma message hash should bind the same fields except that it has the target
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as its recipient role and carries the 32-byte sigma value.
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A finalization message hash should additionally bind the post-enrollment public
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state described below.
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Canonical encodings must define integer widths and endianness, point encoding,
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array ordering, message lengths and rejection of trailing data. Reordering a
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set must not change a set-level hash; changing a sender, recipient, message type
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or value must change it. Secret values still require confidential transport.
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Signing or hashing a secret message does not make it safe to publish.
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Applications may sign these hashes with their existing host-key scheme. The
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library need not mandate Kyber's ECIES or invent a new encryption scheme.
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Where secure channels already exist, canonical hashes are primarily useful for
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transcript consistency, equivocation detection, auditing and interoperability.
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4. Duplicate and equivocation-aware message collection
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------------------------------------------------------
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Add an optional collector, initially in the driver or reference integration,
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that keys messages by:
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(session, protocol phase, sender identifier, recipient identifier)
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Its behavior should be deterministic:
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- an identical duplicate is idempotent and does not produce a second
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contribution;
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- a different message in the same slot is equivocation: reject it, record the
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sender and abort the run;
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- an unknown sender, unexpected recipient or out-of-phase message is rejected;
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- an incomplete expected set cannot proceed to the next phase;
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- a message with an invalid scalar, incorrect parameters hash or nonzero
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structurally omitted delta fails according to the existing arithmetic API.
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Record enough public evidence to diagnose the abort, such as both message hashes
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for an equivocation. Do not log delta or sigma values themselves.
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The current array-based APIs remain valid. The collector is responsible for
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constructing those arrays and establishing exactly one contribution per expected
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sender before calling them.
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5. Explicit driver and failure model
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------------------------------------
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An optional driver can use a small state machine:
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REQUESTED -> DELTAS -> SIGMAS -> VERIFIED -> FINALIZED
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\ \ \ \
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----------+---------+----------> ABORTED
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It should validate every transition, reject calls in the wrong phase and ensure
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that all secret temporary values are erased on abort.
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Timeouts and retries are liveness concerns, not reasons to change the scalar
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protocol. A timeout may abort a run, but it must not cause the caller to reuse
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helper randomness or accept a partial set as though it were complete.
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On an unrecoverable fault:
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1. erase temporary deltas, sigmas and helper randomness;
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2. abort the current session;
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3. select helpers and authorize a fresh session according to policy;
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4. generate fresh session and helper randomness;
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5. restart from round 1.1.
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||||
|
||||
Do not drop a bad sigma and continue with the remaining contributions. Reduced
|
||||
Lagrange coefficients depend on the helper set committed at session creation.
|
||||
Removing a helper changes those coefficients and invalidates the run.
|
||||
|
||||
Crash recovery needs the same caution. Unless a separately reviewed persistent
|
||||
protocol state exists, a process restart should abort rather than resume from
|
||||
partial secret intermediate values. Session randomness must never be replayed.
|
||||
|
||||
6. Deterministic finalization
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Define a finalization message binding:
|
||||
|
||||
- request hash and session identifier;
|
||||
- original descriptor hash;
|
||||
- target identifier and derived public share;
|
||||
- unchanged threshold public key and t;
|
||||
- updated n and participant list;
|
||||
- updated public-share table or new group descriptor hash;
|
||||
- successful completion status, or a canonical abort reason for diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
Every participant verifies the same finalization hash before committing any
|
||||
state update. For enrollment, n and the public-share table are updated only
|
||||
after verification. For repair, the public descriptor remains unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
The group still needs its own mechanism for distributing and agreeing on this
|
||||
message. A finalization hash detects inconsistent states; it does not provide
|
||||
consensus or atomic storage across processes.
|
||||
|
||||
Tests should simulate a participant receiving a different finalization and
|
||||
confirm that it performs no persistent update and cannot enter a signing session
|
||||
with stale metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
What not to import from Kyber
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Public justifications
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Kyber can resolve VSS complaints by revealing a dealer's share and can evict a
|
||||
dealer once enough complaints make its polynomial reconstructable. That is part
|
||||
of its VSS security design.
|
||||
|
||||
Publishing reduced-enrollment deltas or sigmas is not an equivalent operation.
|
||||
These values mask existing secret shares. Revealing them can expose helper share
|
||||
information when combined with other transcript values. Do not add public
|
||||
justification rounds to reduced enrollment without a new proof system and a new
|
||||
security analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
Qualified-helper filtering after round 1
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Kyber can construct a result from qualified VSS dealers after complaints and
|
||||
justifications. Reduced enrollment cannot discard an arbitrary helper after the
|
||||
weighted contributions have been generated, because all weights were computed
|
||||
for the original helper set. Abort and restart instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Threshold changes inside the current API
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Kyber explicitly tracks old and new thresholds. Current enrollment keeps t
|
||||
fixed and already binds it into every session. If threshold changes are ever
|
||||
required, specify old and new thresholds separately and design a new resharing
|
||||
protocol rather than overloading `new_id` or adding a threshold argument to the
|
||||
existing calls.
|
||||
|
||||
Consensus assumptions
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Kyber's complaint and eviction consistency relies on its protocol and broadcast
|
||||
assumptions. Signed messages alone do not give every participant the same view.
|
||||
Do not claim robust Byzantine agreement, guaranteed termination or identifiable
|
||||
misbehavior for an integration that lacks those mechanisms.
|
||||
|
||||
Optional future resharing module
|
||||
--------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
If proactive refresh, signer removal or threshold changes become requirements,
|
||||
consider a separate `frost_resharing` design based on Kyber's fresh-polynomial
|
||||
approach. It should not change the meaning of the current enrollment functions.
|
||||
|
||||
That design would need, at minimum:
|
||||
|
||||
- independently specified old and new participant sets and thresholds;
|
||||
- fresh random polynomials with each old share as a constant term;
|
||||
- encrypted secret deals and authenticated, session-bound messages;
|
||||
- verification that each dealer's constant commitment equals its old public
|
||||
share;
|
||||
- a complaint/justification and qualification model with an explicit security
|
||||
proof for FROST;
|
||||
- coefficient-wise reconstruction of the new public polynomial;
|
||||
- verification of every resulting secret share;
|
||||
- deterministic finalization and persistent epoch handling;
|
||||
- explicit deletion of old shares where revocation is intended.
|
||||
|
||||
Fresh coefficients do not magically revoke old shares. Old participants that
|
||||
retain a threshold of old shares can still reconstruct or use the old secret.
|
||||
Deletion assumptions and collusion remaining after a refresh must be documented
|
||||
just as carefully as the new protocol's correctness properties.
|
||||
|
||||
Phased implementation roadmap
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Phase A: integration specification
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
- Write the descriptor, request, message and finalization encodings.
|
||||
- Define host-key and authentication interfaces without mandating a scheme.
|
||||
- Document the broadcast, timeout, crash and authorization assumptions.
|
||||
- Decide which components remain application examples and which justify public
|
||||
APIs.
|
||||
- Preserve all current vectors and call signatures.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit criterion: two independent reviewers can derive identical message graphs,
|
||||
hashes, trust inputs and failure transitions from the specification.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase B: descriptor and signed request
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
- Implement canonical descriptor and request hashing in a reference integration.
|
||||
- Validate descriptor provenance and group key material.
|
||||
- Verify target host signatures and helper authorization checkpoints.
|
||||
- Bind requests to the existing reduced parameters hash without altering it.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit criterion: wrong target identity, group, descriptor, helper set, mode,
|
||||
threshold, session or expiration is rejected before any secret share is used.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase C: transcript and collector
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
- Add canonical delta and sigma hashes.
|
||||
- Add exact-duplicate idempotence and conflicting-duplicate detection.
|
||||
- Add phase, sender, recipient and completeness validation.
|
||||
- Exercise the existing reduced rounds through the collector rather than by
|
||||
manually assembling arrays.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit criterion: all malformed, reordered, duplicated, conflicting, missing and
|
||||
out-of-phase messages have deterministic outcomes, with no secret data logged.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase D: finalization and driver
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
- Add finalization hashes and post-update descriptor validation.
|
||||
- Add explicit driver states, abort cleanup and fresh-session restart.
|
||||
- Add timeouts and crash-abort behavior at the application layer.
|
||||
- Demonstrate the integration in a multi-process example initialized by a
|
||||
distributed DKG rather than the current single-process trusted-dealer example.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit criterion: every participant either accepts the same public result or
|
||||
performs no update; a failed run cannot reuse randomness or continue with a
|
||||
partial helper set.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase E: separate resharing evaluation
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Only if refresh, removal or threshold changes are required:
|
||||
|
||||
- write a standalone protocol specification and threat model;
|
||||
- obtain cryptographic review before selecting public APIs;
|
||||
- implement it as a separate module with separate vectors and documentation;
|
||||
- do not weaken or repurpose reduced enrollment to accommodate it.
|
||||
|
||||
Test requirements for future layers
|
||||
-----------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Retain all existing full and reduced tests and vectors, then add:
|
||||
|
||||
- descriptor round trips, non-canonical encoding rejection and provenance tests;
|
||||
- request signatures with wrong keys, targets, modes, groups, thresholds,
|
||||
sessions, helper sets and expired requests;
|
||||
- identical versus conflicting duplicate delta and sigma messages;
|
||||
- sender/recipient swapping, phase confusion and incomplete sets;
|
||||
- finalization disagreement and stale-signing-state rejection;
|
||||
- aborts at every state transition, checking secret cleanup and output zeroing;
|
||||
- retries with different helper sets and rejection of old-session messages;
|
||||
- process crashes before and after each round, without randomness reuse;
|
||||
- multi-process enrollment and repair initialized by a distributed DKG;
|
||||
- constant-time, sanitizer, Valgrind and installed-library checks for any new
|
||||
secret-bearing code;
|
||||
- interoperability vectors for all new public encodings and hashes.
|
||||
|
||||
Review gates
|
||||
------------
|
||||
|
||||
Before any new layer becomes a supported public API, review:
|
||||
|
||||
- descriptor provenance and the absence of circular authentication;
|
||||
- target identity and the authorization policy for repair;
|
||||
- canonical encoding and transcript domain separation;
|
||||
- equivocation behavior and whether honest participants reach consistent aborts;
|
||||
- finalization consistency and stale-state handling;
|
||||
- randomness and crash-recovery requirements;
|
||||
- the difference between liveness failures and cryptographic faults;
|
||||
- independent cryptographic review of any new resharing or complaint mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
The current module remains experimental. These future layers should not be used
|
||||
to imply production readiness without the corresponding reviews.
|
||||
|
||||
Recommended priority
|
||||
--------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The highest-value, lowest-risk sequence is:
|
||||
|
||||
1. authenticated descriptor and signed target request;
|
||||
2. canonical message hashes and duplicate/equivocation-aware collection;
|
||||
3. deterministic finalization and an optional driver;
|
||||
4. only later, a separately reviewed resharing protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
This sequence keeps the current lightweight enrollment implementation intact
|
||||
while addressing the practical lessons most relevant to distributed deployments.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user