frost_enrollment: specify reduced enrollment v2
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@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ extern "C" {
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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/** This module implements FROST enrollment, the protocol of Section 4.1.1 of
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* the FROST paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1155.pdf). It converts a
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* (t, n) FROST group into a (t, n+1) group without re-running key generation
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/** This module implements FROST enrollment, the full enrollment RTS of
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* Section 4.1.1 of "A Survey and Refinement of Repairable Threshold Schemes"
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* (https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1155.pdf). It converts a (t, n) FROST group
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* into a (t, n+1) group without re-running key generation
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* and without any participant revealing its secret share. The same mechanism
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* repairs a lost share: running it with the target identifier of an existing
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* participant reproduces exactly that participant's share.
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@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
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Notes on the frost_enrollment module API
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========================================
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This module implements FROST enrollment, the protocol of Section 4.1.1 of the
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FROST paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1155.pdf). It turns a (t, n) FROST
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group into a (t, n+1) group without re-running key generation and without any
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participant revealing its secret share, and it repairs a lost share by running
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the same protocol at the identifier of an existing participant.
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This module implements FROST enrollment, the full enrollment RTS of Section
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4.1.1 of "A Survey and Refinement of Repairable Threshold Schemes"
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(https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1155.pdf). It turns a (t, n) FROST group into a
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(t, n+1) group without re-running key generation and without any participant
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revealing its secret share, and it repairs a lost share by running the same
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protocol at the identifier of an existing participant.
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Unlike the frost module, which tracks BIP 445, this protocol has no BIP. It is
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specified by the paper and by the reference proof of concept at
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@@ -27,6 +28,108 @@ serialization and the share-splitting derivation — are frozen by the
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regression vectors, so changing one is a deliberate, vector-breaking change
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rather than a silent one.
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Reduced enrollment version 2 specification
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==========================================
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This is the normative specification for the reduced-enrollment revision being
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implemented. Until the versioned API lands, the sections below describe the
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existing version 1 full-enrollment implementation. The target protocol is the
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reduced enrollment RTS from Section 4.1.3 of Laing and Stinson's survey, linked
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from https://gist.github.com/nickfarrow/64c2e65191cde6a1a47bbd4572bf8cf8.
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Scope and security model
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------------------------
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Version 2 has two operations. Enrollment turns a `(t, n)` group into a `(t,
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n+1)` group at `new_id = n`; repair recreates the existing share at `new_id <
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n`. Both retain the original group public key, threshold, polynomial and
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existing shares. Neither operation refreshes the polynomial or revokes a copied
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share. Signer removal, threshold changes, proactive refresh and fragment-based
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enrollment are outside this protocol.
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Participants are identified by `uint32` identifiers `0..n-1`, and identifier
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`i` corresponds to polynomial x-coordinate `i+1`. The helper set contains `u`
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unique existing participant identifiers, sorted numerically for protocol
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purposes, with `2 <= t <= u`. The target cannot be a helper. Enrollment allows
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`u <= n`; repair allows at most `n-1` helpers. The paper specifies `u = t`.
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Support for `u > t` uses the same triangular-matrix construction and requires
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the generalized coalition argument to be reviewed before the experimental
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warning can be removed.
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The privacy goal is the enrollment RTS goal against coalitions of fewer than t
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participants executing the protocol honestly. Every helper-to-helper and
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helper-to-target secret value MUST use a confidential and authenticated channel.
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Public-share verification detects a bad result but does not identify a helper
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that supplied a bad sigma; identifiable malicious fault tolerance is not
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claimed. Authorization is separate from authentication and remains a caller
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precondition: a helper must run only after approving the exact session, group,
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helper set, operation and target.
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Triangular share exchange
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-------------------------
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Write `h_0, ..., h_(u-1)` for the sorted helpers, `x_new = new_id+1`, and `q`
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for the secp256k1 group order. Helper `h_i` computes
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lambda_i = product_{k != i} (new_id-h_k)/(h_i-h_k) mod q
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v_i = lambda_i * secshare_i.
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For every `j > i`, it generates a random masking scalar `delta_(j,i)`. Entries
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`delta_(j,i)` with `j < i` are structurally zero and are not transmitted. The
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helper keeps the diagonal remainder
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delta_(i,i) = v_i - sum_{j=i+1}^{u-1} delta_(j,i) mod q
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and sends `delta_(j,i)` to helper `h_j` only when `j > i`. Helper `h_j` then
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computes and sends to the target
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sigma_j = sum_{i=0}^{j} delta_(j,i) mod q.
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The target sums all u sigma values. The result is `f(x_new)` because every row
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sums to `v_i`, every column sums to `sigma_j`, and the sum of the weighted
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shares is the Lagrange interpolation of `f` at `x_new`.
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The triangular exchange sends `u(u-1)/2` helper-to-helper values and u
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helper-to-target values, for `u(u+1)/2` values in total. For `u = t`, this is
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the communication complexity proven optimal for the reduced enrollment RTS.
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Buffers may retain a square `u*32` representation for API alignment, but zero
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cells are not routing markers: canonical sender and recipient identifiers
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determine which cells have messages.
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Session and message contract
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----------------------------
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A target starts a run with a fresh 32-byte session identifier. A version 2
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parameters hash binds the reduced-protocol domain, threshold public key, n, t,
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new_id, sorted helper identifiers and session identifier. The share-splitting
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hash has a separate reduced-protocol domain and binds the same parameters hash
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as well as the sender and recipient identifiers. These version 2 tags and
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encodings deliberately replace the frozen version 1 encodings; there is no
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implicit wire compatibility between the full and reduced protocols.
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Every transmitted delta or sigma is accompanied by its parameters hash and
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sender identifier; a delta also names its recipient. A recipient accepts only
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the exact expected sender/recipient pairs and one contribution per sender. The
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target checks every helper's parameters hash, not merely a representative one.
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The checked target API requires an expected public share and returns a secret
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share only after `secshare*G` equals it.
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The expected public share may be interpolated from authenticated public shares
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or evaluated from an authenticated aggregate VSS commitment polynomial. Neither
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construction authenticates its own inputs. In particular, matching the constant
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commitment or interpolated group key does not stop colluding helpers from
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supplying a different polynomial with the same constant term. The target MUST
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authenticate the group descriptor independently of the enrollment messages.
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After enrollment, all existing participants and the target must update n and
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append the derived public share only after verification. Repair leaves group
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metadata unchanged. The library supplies deterministic derivation and
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verification; transport, authorization, consensus and atomic persistent state
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updates remain application responsibilities.
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Version 1 full-enrollment protocol
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==================================
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The protocol
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------------
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