bitcoin/bips
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/bitcoin/bips.git synced 2025-12-22 14:45:19 +00:00
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

BIP53: Use different notation for txids and tx-bytes

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Hodlinator 2025-11-27 21:03:42 +01:00
parent cbaedf2dfc
commit c569e23641
No known key found for this signature in database
1 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

8
bip-0053.mediawiki
View File

@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ This has been mitigated by Bitcoin Core's relay policy and the RPC interface sin
64-byte transactions introduce block malleability. Malicious peers can construct consensus valid and invalid 64-byte
transactions that have the same serialization as the concatenation of 2 hashes in the Merkle tree.
Assume we have a valid Bitcoin block with 2 transactions in it that have transaction ids of T<sub>0</sub> and T<sub>1</sub>.
The Merkle root for this block is H(T<sub>0</sub>||T<sub>1</sub>).
A malicious user could find a 64-byte transaction T<sub>m</sub> that serializes to T<sub>0</sub>||T<sub>1</sub>.
Assume we have a valid Bitcoin block with 2 transactions in it with Txid<sub>0</sub> and Txid<sub>1</sub>.
The Merkle root for this block is H(Txid<sub>0</sub>||Txid<sub>1</sub>).
A malicious user could find a 64-byte transaction T<sub>m</sub> that serializes to Txid<sub>0</sub>||Txid<sub>1</sub>.
Next that user relays the block containing the malicious T<sub>m</sub> rather than the
valid Bitcoin transactions that correspond with T<sub>0</sub> and T<sub>1</sub>.
valid Bitcoin transactions that correspond to Txid<sub>0</sub> and Txid<sub>1</sub>.
==== Block malleability with consensus INVALID transactions ====