diff --git a/bip-0053.mediawiki b/bip-0053.mediawiki
index b2dd9c81..ccc3f2fd 100644
--- a/bip-0053.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0053.mediawiki
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ This has been mitigated by Bitcoin Core's relay policy and the RPC interface sin
 64-byte transactions introduce block malleability. Malicious peers can construct consensus valid and invalid 64-byte
 transactions that have the same serialization as the concatenation of 2 hashes in the Merkle tree.
 
-Assume we have a valid Bitcoin block with 2 transactions in it that have transaction ids of T<sub>0</sub> and T<sub>1</sub>.
-The Merkle root for this block is H(T<sub>0</sub>||T<sub>1</sub>).
-A malicious user could find a 64-byte transaction T<sub>m</sub> that serializes to T<sub>0</sub>||T<sub>1</sub>.
+Assume we have a valid Bitcoin block with 2 transactions in it with Txid<sub>0</sub> and Txid<sub>1</sub>.
+The Merkle root for this block is H(Txid<sub>0</sub>||Txid<sub>1</sub>).
+A malicious user could find a 64-byte transaction T<sub>m</sub> that serializes to Txid<sub>0</sub>||Txid<sub>1</sub>.
 Next that user relays the block containing the malicious T<sub>m</sub> rather than the
-valid Bitcoin transactions that correspond with T<sub>0</sub> and T<sub>1</sub>.
+valid Bitcoin transactions that correspond to Txid<sub>0</sub> and Txid<sub>1</sub>.
 
 ==== Block malleability with consensus INVALID transactions ====