Two events published in the same second reliably lose one of them. The receiver stores the kind:445 and produces nothing from it -- no inner event, no chat line, no error anybody sees, because MarmotGroupEvent is written before the message is decrypted and so survives while everything downstream silently does not. Observed as a FROST signing session that never started on the receiver: proposeSigning publishes the proposal and then the proposer's own nonce, the relay handed them back in the other order, and the proposal was dropped. The nonce is still sitting there filed against a session that will never exist. The same bug ate a dialect earlier, which then took out the artifact referencing it via a foreign key. MLS is specified to tolerate this. RFC 9420 says a receiver that gets generation N+1 before N keeps the intermediate keys so the older message can still be read, and quartz's SecretTree does exactly that, in a private skippedKeys map. What it does not do is persist it: exportSenderStates() returns the ratchet positions only, so saveState() drops the cache. NostrDao rebuilt the group from stored state for every inbound event, so the cache was empty every single time, and generation N arriving after N+1 failed `require(generation >= applicationGeneration)` and was swallowed. Terminal -- the key is derived from a ratchet that has moved past it, and nothing asks the sender to resend. This keeps the instance alive instead. MlsGroupCache holds one MlsGroup per room, and the inbound path goes through it, so skippedKeys survives from one message to the next. That covers the case that actually bites -- a burst arriving in one sync, decrypted one after another against the same tree -- which is what every bursty flow needs: proposeRitual sends two, addArtifact sends two, and addChapter sends one per paragraph plus one, of which only the ones arriving in ascending generation order survived. Reuse is conditional on the stored state still being exactly what the cache last wrote. Sending a message advances the sender ratchet and saves; so does adding a member. When that happens the cache rebuilds rather than carrying on from a group that has been overtaken -- which is what keeps this from being worse than no cache at all: the fallback is always the old behaviour, never a diverged ratchet. One lock per room, not one overall, because the group is mutable and decryption advances it: two events for the same room decrypted at once would corrupt the tree, and a busy room should not hold up a quiet one. **This is a mitigation, not the fix.** It does not survive a restart, and it does not survive another writer, so a long enough reorder still loses the message. The fix belongs in quartz -- carry skippedKeys through saveState/restore -- and quartz is a mavenCentral binary, not a fork, so it cannot be made here. docs/mls-skipped-keys.md has the analysis, the patch, the migration constraint on the persisted state format, and the three ways to actually land it. Not verified end to end: the proposal that exposed this cannot be recovered, since its generation is already past, so confirming the fix needs a fresh burst. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Messages are lost when two arrive out of order
A group event that a relay hands back a moment late is dropped and cannot be recovered. Two messages published in the same second reliably lose one of them.
This is a conformance gap in quartz's MLS implementation, not in this app. What this app can do about it from outside the library is partial, and is described at the end.
Symptom
The receiver stores the kind:445 group event and produces nothing from it. No
inner event, no chat line, no error the user sees. MarmotGroupEvent is written
before the message is decrypted, so the row survives while everything
downstream of it silently does not:
receiver, room 6d8ec3ad ("Frosty (#admins)")
20:36:55 kind 9 chat message decrypted, applied
20:37:34 kind 30321 nonce decrypted, applied
20:37:34 kind 30320 proposal group event stored, no inner event
Both 20:37:34 events were published by the same sender in the same
proposeSigning call. Every message that arrived on its own decrypted fine; the
back-to-back pair lost exactly one.
Downstream the failure reads as something else entirely. In the case above a FROST signing session never started on the receiver, because the proposal that opens one never arrived — leaving a nonce filed against a session that will never exist. An earlier instance of the same bug dropped a dialect, and the artifact referencing it then failed a foreign key and rolled back its whole transaction.
Cause
MLS is specified to tolerate out-of-order delivery inside an epoch. RFC 9420
§9.1: a receiver that gets generation N+1 before N derives the intermediate
keys and keeps them, so the older message can still be read when it turns up.
Quartz does implement this. SecretTree caches them:
// SecretTree.kt
private val skippedKeys = mutableMapOf<Pair<Int, Int>, KeyNonceGeneration>()
fun applicationKeyNonceForGeneration(leafIndex: Int, generation: Int): KeyNonceGeneration {
val cachedKey = skippedKeys.remove(Pair(leafIndex, generation))
if (cachedKey != null) { /* ...replay check... */ return cachedKey }
val state = getOrInitSender(leafIndex)
require(generation >= state.applicationGeneration) {
"Generation $generation already consumed (current: ${state.applicationGeneration})"
}
...
}
The gap is that the cache is never persisted:
// SecretTree.kt
fun exportSenderStates(): Map<Int, SenderRatchetState> = senderState.toMap()
fun importSenderStates(states: Map<Int, SenderRatchetState>) {
senderState.putAll(states)
}
exportSenderStates() returns the ratchet positions only. MlsGroup.saveState()
calls it (senderRatchetStates = secretTree.exportSenderStates()) and
MlsGroup.restore() calls importSenderStates. So skippedKeys exists only in
one SecretTree instance's memory.
That would be harmless if the group instance outlived the messages. It does not:
NostrDao rebuilds it from stored state for every inbound event and saves it
back afterwards. So the sequence is
- generation 1 arrives, ratchet advances 0 → 2, generation 0's key goes into
skippedKeys saveState()—skippedKeysis dropped on the floor- generation 0 arrives, a fresh tree is restored with
applicationGeneration = 2, the cache is empty,requirefails - the exception is swallowed, the event yields no
ApplicationMessage
Step 3 is terminal. The key is derived from a ratchet that has moved past it and cannot be recovered, and nothing asks the sender to resend.
Verified against the published artifact rather than a checkout:
quartz-1.14.0-sources.jar, commonMain/com/vitorpamplona/quartz/marmot/mls/schedule/SecretTree.kt.
Why it is not an edge case here
Nostr relays make no ordering guarantee at all, and negentropy reconciliation hands back a room's backlog in whatever order it likes. Any two messages close enough together can swap.
Several flows publish in bursts, and each of them is a reliable trigger:
| flow | messages in one pass |
|---|---|
FrostSigningManager.proposeSigning |
proposal, then the proposer's nonce |
ChillDkgRitualManager.proposeRitual |
proposal, then the host key |
MantraDao.addArtifact |
the artifact, then its first version |
MantraDao.addChapter |
the chapter, then one per paragraph chunk |
addChapter is the worst of these: a chapter with twenty paragraphs publishes
twenty-one events at once, and only the ones that happen to arrive in ascending
generation order survive.
The fix, in quartz
Carry the skipped keys through saveState/restore alongside the ratchet
positions.
1. Export and import them. In SecretTree:
fun exportSkippedKeys(): Map<Pair<Int, Int>, KeyNonceGeneration> = skippedKeys.toMap()
fun importSkippedKeys(keys: Map<Pair<Int, Int>, KeyNonceGeneration>) {
skippedKeys.putAll(keys)
}
MAX_SKIPPED_KEYS already bounds the map, so the serialised size is bounded by
the same constant and needs no separate cap.
2. Put them in the group state. MlsGroup.saveState() already writes
senderRatchetStates = secretTree.exportSenderStates(); add a sibling field, and
have restore() call importSkippedKeys next to its existing
importSenderStates.
3. Keep old state readable. The persisted state is a TLS-encoded struct that existing installs already hold, so the new field has to be optional: absent means an empty map, which is exactly the behaviour today. Without that, every device with a stored group is broken by the upgrade.
4. Consumed-generation replay protection. consumedGenerations guards
against a replayed message re-using a cached key. It is in-memory too, so it
should travel with the skipped keys or the guard weakens across restarts. Worth
deciding deliberately rather than by omission.
A test worth having with it: save and restore a group between the two messages of an out-of-order pair, and assert the older one still decrypts. That is the property, and it is invisible to any test that keeps one instance alive.
Getting the change into this build
Quartz is not a local fork. It is com.vitorpamplona.quartz:quartz, pinned
in gradle/libs.versions.toml and resolved from mavenCentral;
settings.gradle.kts only includeBuilds lightning-kmp-app. Nothing in this
repository can change it.
There is a full amethyst clone at ~/Documents/development/nostr/amethyst whose
SecretTree.kt was byte-identical to published 1.14.0 when this was written, so
the patch itself is a small delta against a known-good base. Landing it means one
of:
- Upstream it. It is a genuine RFC 9420 conformance gap and affects any client that reloads group state per message, which is the ordinary shape for a mobile app. Slowest, and the only option that leaves this repo's build reproducible.
- Patch the clone and publish to mavenLocal, then add
mavenLocal()here and pin the patched version. Fast, but the build then depends on a patched crypto library built from one machine's filesystem. - Wire quartz as a composite build, the way
lightning-kmp-appis. Same coupling to a path outside the repo, but the source is at least visible.
What this app does in the meantime
MlsGroupCache keeps a room's MlsGroup instance alive between messages instead
of rebuilding it from stored state each time, so skippedKeys survives for as
long as the process does. The inbound path in NostrDao goes through it.
This covers the case that actually bites — a burst arriving in one sync, decrypted one after another against the same tree — and it is what makes the flows in the table above work.
It is not the fix, and it is worth being precise about what it leaves broken:
- A restart loses the cache. Messages skipped before the app closed cannot be read after it reopens.
- Another writer invalidates it. Sending a message advances the sender ratchet and saves the room's state; adding a member does too. The cache reuses its instance only while the stored state is still exactly what it last wrote, and rebuilds otherwise — dropping the skipped keys at that point, exactly as before.
- Nothing helps a long reorder. A message the relay holds back until after a restart or an outbound send is gone.
The staleness check is what keeps the cache from being worse than no cache: a group that has been overtaken by another writer is never carried on with, so the fallback is always the old behaviour rather than a diverged ratchet.