935a8fe37a
Phase 2 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md. Pure refactor: proposals still carry one event, the wire is byte-identical, and every test passes unchanged -- 344 jvmTest and 217 testDebugUnitTest, none of them edited in this commit. advance() now loops over FrostSigningItem rows rather than reading the first one. One nonce per item, one aggregate per item, one Session.create per item, one partial signature per item, one signature per item. The signer set, the public shares, the tweak cache and the approval stay shared, because they are the terms that do not enter e = H(R‖P‖m). The coordinator's aggregation is the place where that distinction bites: it builds one AggregatedNonce per item, each from that item's nonce from each chosen signer. Reusing one across two items would be reusing R across two messages. ## The payload codec, early joinPayload/splitPayload land here rather than with the wire change, because at a batch of one a comma join is the identity -- the payload is the bare value it has always been. That leaves Phase 3 to the proposal encoding alone. splitPayload is strict: a payload that is not exactly the batch's length is dropped rather than truncated or padded. It runs in orderedNonces, orderedPartialSignatures and splitForSession -- never in record(), which stores payloads without parsing them so that a nonce can arrive before the proposal that would give it a length to check against. ## Two short-circuits, and one trap in the first advance() runs on every arriving message, so at a batch of k it was k native key generations, k Session.creates and k signs each time, usually to discover there was nothing left to do. - Nonces are generated by `lazy`. The obvious version -- a guard computing `ownNonce == null || (isSigner() && ownPartial == null)` -- is wrong, and wrong in a way that reads fine and fails every signing test: the coordinator settles the signer set further down the same pass, so isSigner() at the top is false on exactly the pass where the coordinator goes on to sign, and the nonces are never generated. Reproduced as IndexOutOfBounds before switching to lazy, which has no prediction to make. - A device that is neither signing nor aggregating leaves before building any FROST session, rather than building k of them to do nothing with. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mantra docs
Notes on the parts of this app whose behaviour is not recoverable by reading the code alone — where the reasoning lives in a protocol, a failure mode that is silent, or a decision that looked arbitrary and was not.
| document | covers |
|---|---|
| shared-key-ceremony.md | ChillDKG over NIP-17: the rounds, the approval gates, the chat transcript, participant ordering |
| shared-key-derivation.md | deriving further keys from the group's threshold key with FROST tweaks — why not BIP32, why no chain code, and the one rule that must not be broken |
| frost-batch-signing.md | signing several events in one ceremony — why one nonce can never cover two messages, and the phased schema, wire and UI work that follows from it |
| marmot-membership.md | how members join an MLS group, and the epoch race that makes a missing member look like a successful invite |
| marmot-direct-messages.md | a one-to-one message inside a group as a stock NIP-59 gift wrap — what its MIP-03 carve-out costs, why the sender cannot read their own, and the one query that would broadcast it |
| mls-skipped-keys.md | why a group event that arrives a moment late is dropped for good, which flows trigger it, the quartz fix, and the partial mitigation in this app |
| long-running-sync.md | the chat subscriptions that stay open instead of pulling once per screen — why the request queue could not simply hold one, and how the group filter follows the room list |
| dead-code.md | code in the sync and relay stack that nothing calls, why each piece is still there, and which of it is a bug rather than a leftover |
| jvm-target.md | what desktop support cost, phased — why the native chain was already done, why an empty source set in our phoenix fork was the real blocker, and why DAO tests need none of it |
Start with the ceremony if you are new to this area; the Marmot notes all assume it. Read the skipped-keys note before debugging any "the other device never got it" report — it is silent, and it looks like every other kind of delivery failure. The sync note stands alone, and the dead-code inventory reads as a follow-up to it. The batch-signing note is a plan rather than a description of what is there: read it after the derivation note, whose one rule is the same one it is built around. The jvm-target note is unrelated to all of them: it is a build and packaging story.