dbdff55ee0f038ec912885743f2a0336f88232f6
12 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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1448ed5ad8 |
docs(frost): record batch signing as built, and what rollout needs
Phase 7 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md, which is the phase with no code in it. Nothing needs a feature flag. k=1 is the entire behaviour of the app as shipped -- no caller batches anything yet -- and at k=1 every message is byte-identical to the app before Phase 1: encodeProposal returns the bare event object, joinPayload of one value is that value, and every plural branch in the transcript is only taken above one. The doc now tabulates that rather than asserting it in prose, since it is the claim the whole rollout rests on. The one rollout constraint stands: before a caller batches, the group has to be on a build that understands array proposals. There is no negotiation for it and adding one is not worth it -- an old device refuses an array proposal outright, so the failure mode is a batch that never reaches threshold and is abandoned, visible in the transcript and costing a retry. Also records what is left, which is nothing in the protocol: deciding what to batch is a product question, bounded only by "a batch is only as available as its worst item" and "GroupKeyStateManager.propose must never batch". The phases are kept as written rather than rewritten into a description of the result -- the code reads better against the argument it came from -- with the two places the implementation chose differently (itemIndex over index, DROP COLUMN over a table rebuild) marked in their own sections. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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dff41d417d |
feat(frost): move a signing session's per-event columns onto FrostSigningItem
Phase 1 of docs/frost-batch-signing.md, which is added here as the plan the next phases follow. Schema only: a session still signs exactly one event, the wire is byte-identical, and every existing test passes on the moved columns. ## What moved, and why it had to A batch of k events is k independent FROST instances sharing a signer set, not one signature over k messages. That is forced rather than chosen: a Schnorr partial signature is `s = k + e·x` with `e = H(R‖P‖m)`, so two messages under one nonce R give two equations in one unknown and the secret share falls out. So the five columns that enter that equation -- unsignedEventJson, eventId, nonceRandom, aggregatedNonce, signature -- move to a child table keyed (sessionId, itemIndex). What stays on FrostSigningSession is everything outside it: the ceremony, the threshold, the derivation path, the signer set, and the one approval. itemIndex is protocol rather than presentation -- nonces and partial signatures are joined positionally against it -- so getItems() orders by it and nothing re-sorts. Spelled itemIndex rather than index to keep hand-written queries free of backticks. No itemCount column. The count is a COUNT(*), for the same reason signerIds is derived from the ceremony's participant order rather than stored: a denormalised count is one more thing that can disagree with the rows. ## Migration 9 -> 10 Manual, not auto: Room can create the table and drop the columns but cannot copy between them, and the copy is the whole point. A session in flight at upgrade holds its nonce seed and the aggregate it is already signing against, and neither can be regenerated -- losing either makes the next pass derive a different nonce for the same message and publish a second partial signature over it, which is the extraction case. Both are copied verbatim into item 0, so an in-flight session resumes as though nothing happened. Removing the columns uses ALTER TABLE DROP COLUMN rather than the usual create-copy-drop-rename rebuild. FrostSignerMessage and FrostSigningItem both reference FrostSigningSession(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, and DROP TABLE fires cascades -- with foreign keys enforced the rebuild would delete every signer message and every item just written. Whether it does depends on Room disabling foreign keys around migrations, which is not worth depending on when DROP COLUMN cannot go wrong. It needs SQLite 3.35 and unindexed, unconstrained columns; these five qualify, and getRoomDatabase pins BundledSQLiteDriver on every platform. ## Invariants established here for the phases that follow - signerIds and every item's aggregatedNonce are one write-once unit, applied by applyAggregate() -- items first in one transaction, then the session, so "some items aggregated" is unreachable and signerIds != null stays the gate. - Signatures likewise, via applySignatures(); isSigned() counts rows instead of reading a flag. - complete() verifies every signature before applying any event, so a batch is all-or-nothing rather than half-filed. - itemsOver() gives each item its own 32 bytes of seed. Independent seeds mean an off-by-one in index handling produces a session that fails to aggregate rather than one that signs two messages under a single nonce. signedEvent() and isAwaitingApproval() now take the item(s) rather than the session, which propagates to the repository, the view model and the screen. advance() reads items.first() and Phase 2 turns that into a loop. ## Tests - FrostSigningSessionDaoJvmTest: index ordering, single-item read, upsert replacing rather than accumulating, signed-item counting, cascade delete. - FrostSigningItemMigrationJvmTest (new): the backfill against a real v9 database, asserting the seed and aggregate values survive -- not merely that a row appeared -- plus the exact column lists Room will check at open time. - 338 jvmTest and 217 testDebugUnitTest pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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af81933ab4 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/room-db-testing-setup-b053cd
Brings the branch up to date with the 40 commits mantra gained while the jvm target was being built, so that merging the other way is a fast-forward. One conflict, in docs/README.md, where both sides added rows to the index table. Kept both, and gave the jvm-target note a clause in the closing prose since it is the one document there that is not about the protocol. One thing the auto-merge could not have caught. `9250991` added NostrEventDao.getMarmotGroupNostrEventsByChatRoomId as a blocking query, which android accepts and which Room refuses to generate for any other target -- so the merged tree failed :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm with the same "Only suspend functions are allowed in DAOs declared in source sets targeting non-Android platforms" that phase 4 dealt with 58 times. Made suspend; its only caller, NostrDao.reindexMarmotGroupEvents, was already suspend, so again no cascade. That is now a standing cost of this branch rather than a one-off: any DAO method added on mantra while this is outstanding will break the jvm build on merge. It is a one-word fix each time, and the compiler names the line. Verified on the merged tree: :composeApp:compileKotlinJvm and :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid green, :composeApp:testDebugUnitTest 208 passing, :composeApp:jvmTest 214 passing -- both test tasks re-run from scratch rather than taken from the cache. The jvm figure is larger than the android one because jvmTest inherits commonTest, so declaring the target quietly gained the whole shared suite a second execution environment. That is worth knowing independently of whether desktop ever ships: the same tests now run on the host, without an emulator. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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5abc37e463 |
docs: scope the jvm target, and separate it from testing the daos
Two questions arrived together -- whether Room's own testing guidance applies to this project, and what desktop support would cost -- and they turned out to have opposite answers. Both are now in docs/jvm-target.md, phased, with the blocking work separated from the mechanical work. **The expensive part is already done.** The four-deep native chain -- secp256k1 -> bitcoin-kmp -> lightning-kmp -> lightning-kmp-app -- already builds for JVM, on every android build we do. The comment at composeApp/build.gradle.kts:50 records the mechanism without drawing the conclusion: lightning-kmp-core publishes no android variant, so our android target resolves it to the *jvm* one, which pulls secp256k1-kmp-jni-jvm desktop natives, which is exactly why the build has to name the android artifact by hand. Read the other way round, every JVM artifact in the chain is already compiled from source by the composite build. A jvm target adds no cinterop, no C compilation and no new native constraints. That was the part worth being afraid of, and it is finished. **The blocker is one level down, and smaller than it looks.** lightning-kmp-app/library declares 25 expects and implements them across 35 androidMain files. Its jvmMain holds exactly one: fibiprops.jvm.kt, the Kotlin multiplatform library template's Fibonacci boilerplate, satisfying two of the 25 -- both of them the template's own. So 23 actuals are missing, which is why jvm() is commented out there (library/build.gradle.kts:18), which is why it is commented out here (composeApp/build.gradle.kts:46). Mantra cannot declare the target until the fork does. Six phases, ordered by that dependency. 0 build config; 1 the fourteen mechanical phoenix actuals; 2 the three SQLDelight JDBC drivers and NetworkMonitor; 3 key storage; 4 mantra's own sixteen expects; 5 the desktop entry point. 1-3 are independent and parallelisable, 4 is where the compiler finally checks the whole thing. Roughly a week to a launchable build. **Phase 3 has no day estimate, deliberately.** keyStoreEncryption / keyStoreDecryption and their two graceful* wrappers delegate on android to KeystoreHelper.kt -- 116 lines against AndroidKeyStore, StrongBox attempted first and fallen back from, key material never leaving hardware. Desktop JVM has no equivalent, so this is a decision rather than a port, and the doc gives the three real options against what each actually protects. A fixed-key JCEKS file is named there as a liability rather than a stopgap: this is wallet seed material, and it lands on top of the plaintext-key finding already open against this codebase. Recommended sequencing is a passphrase-derived KEK with the desktop build marked unsuitable for real funds, so phases 4 and 5 can proceed without the security question being quietly treated as answered. Two inherited mistakes are called out rather than carried forward. The old Aux jvmMain put the database in java.io.tmpdir behind a TODO -- the doc says not to inherit that in either phase that touches it. And schedulePlatformLogic goes through WorkManager on android with no desktop counterpart, so the doc asks for an explicit choice between a no-op and an in-process coroutine, written down. **The DAO answer is an appendix, because it is the opposite answer.** None of the above is needed to test the DAOs, and burying that would have been misleading. room3-runtime-android:3.0.1 already exposes the no-Context inMemoryDatabaseBuilder(Function0<T>) overload, and MantraDatabaseConstructor already supplies what it needs, so Room's recommended host-machine form compiles in commonTest and runs under testDebugUnitTest today. The one trap is native and is the secp256k1 problem mirrored: sqlite-bundled-android ships only android-ABI .so under jni/, so a local unit test's JVM cannot load it and BundledSQLiteDriver fails at construction; sqlite-bundled-jvm on the androidUnitTest classpath is the fix. Robolectric neither helps nor is needed -- it cannot load android .so on the host either. Everything structural here was checked against the artifacts rather than recalled: the Room builder overloads by javap on room3-runtime-android, the two sqlite-bundled native layouts by unzipping both, and the availability of room3-runtime-jvm, room3-testing, quartz-jvm and the two SQLDelight drivers by request against the repositories this build actually resolves from. The absence of android.* and java.* imports in commonMain, and of any NFC reference from it, was likewise grepped rather than assumed. **Not verified: anything that requires compiling.** No jvm target was turned on, nothing was built, and the day estimates are estimates. Phase 4 is where dependency-substitution surprises would surface if there are any, and it is precisely the phase nothing here exercises. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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39eac61838 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/long-running-chat-sync-8983dc
mantra had moved on ~30 commits, several of them in exactly this area — and it turns out both branches independently found the same bug and drew the same conclusion about the same filter. **The overlap.** |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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bcdfd2ec94 |
Merge branch 'mantra' into claude/marmot-direct-message-type-7a0473
Twenty-two commits had landed on mantra since this branch left it, several of them in the same files. Merged this way round so mantra stayed untouched until the result compiled and its tests passed. The migration had to be renumbered, and this is the conflict that mattered. mantra is at database version 7 and already has its own 5.json -- for MarmotInnerEvent.payloadEventId, nothing to do with direct messages. This branch had also written a 5.json, for a different schema. Resolved by restoring mantra's 5.json untouched and moving the direct message columns to an AutoMigration(7, 8) with a regenerated 8.json. Taking either 5.json over the other would have left every device validating a migration chain against a schema it was never built from; keeping version = 5 would have made a v7 install refuse to open at all. The regenerated 8.json is two ADD COLUMNs and nothing else, same as before. fromGroupEventResult was restructured on mantra: the kind switch moved into applyInnerEvent, and a SubmissionEvent envelope now wraps nip30303 payloads. Took that structure and re-applied the direct message branch ahead of it rather than inside it -- a gift wrap is not a nip30303 payload to apply, and what happens to it depends only on whether this device's key opens it, so it does not belong in a function about applying submissions. The isUserMessage fix was re-applied to the eight call sites mantra's version has, up from the six it had here. ChatMessageListViewModel and ChatRoomMessagingScreen took mantra's versions with the composer state, the two renderings and the reply action layered back on. docs/README.md keeps both new rows and mantra's closing note about the skipped-keys document. 108 tests pass, up from 50 here and 83 on mantra. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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d110737f9a |
fix: keep a room's MlsGroup alive so a late message can still be read
Two events published in the same second reliably lose one of them. The receiver stores the kind:445 and produces nothing from it -- no inner event, no chat line, no error anybody sees, because MarmotGroupEvent is written before the message is decrypted and so survives while everything downstream silently does not. Observed as a FROST signing session that never started on the receiver: proposeSigning publishes the proposal and then the proposer's own nonce, the relay handed them back in the other order, and the proposal was dropped. The nonce is still sitting there filed against a session that will never exist. The same bug ate a dialect earlier, which then took out the artifact referencing it via a foreign key. MLS is specified to tolerate this. RFC 9420 says a receiver that gets generation N+1 before N keeps the intermediate keys so the older message can still be read, and quartz's SecretTree does exactly that, in a private skippedKeys map. What it does not do is persist it: exportSenderStates() returns the ratchet positions only, so saveState() drops the cache. NostrDao rebuilt the group from stored state for every inbound event, so the cache was empty every single time, and generation N arriving after N+1 failed `require(generation >= applicationGeneration)` and was swallowed. Terminal -- the key is derived from a ratchet that has moved past it, and nothing asks the sender to resend. This keeps the instance alive instead. MlsGroupCache holds one MlsGroup per room, and the inbound path goes through it, so skippedKeys survives from one message to the next. That covers the case that actually bites -- a burst arriving in one sync, decrypted one after another against the same tree -- which is what every bursty flow needs: proposeRitual sends two, addArtifact sends two, and addChapter sends one per paragraph plus one, of which only the ones arriving in ascending generation order survived. Reuse is conditional on the stored state still being exactly what the cache last wrote. Sending a message advances the sender ratchet and saves; so does adding a member. When that happens the cache rebuilds rather than carrying on from a group that has been overtaken -- which is what keeps this from being worse than no cache at all: the fallback is always the old behaviour, never a diverged ratchet. One lock per room, not one overall, because the group is mutable and decryption advances it: two events for the same room decrypted at once would corrupt the tree, and a busy room should not hold up a quiet one. **This is a mitigation, not the fix.** It does not survive a restart, and it does not survive another writer, so a long enough reorder still loses the message. The fix belongs in quartz -- carry skippedKeys through saveState/restore -- and quartz is a mavenCentral binary, not a fork, so it cannot be made here. docs/mls-skipped-keys.md has the analysis, the patch, the migration constraint on the persisted state format, and the three ways to actually land it. Not verified end to end: the proposal that exposed this cannot be recovered, since its generation is already past, so confirming the fix needs a fresh burst. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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635cef9311 |
docs: write down how a direct message travels, and what it costs
The reasoning behind this is not recoverable from the code, which is the bar docs/README.md sets for having a document at all. Three things in particular would otherwise have to be rediscovered by whoever changes this next, and two of them are traps. Why the wrap uses a throwaway key rather than the sender's own -- and what that does not buy. It does not hide the sender from the group: MLS authenticates every application message to a leaf, so the identity is there regardless. What it costs is a carve-out in MIP-03's pubkey check and the sender's ability to ever read their own messages back. Why the check that carve-out removes is not a hole. The authorship claim moves from the wrap's plaintext pubkey to the seal's verified signature, bound to the MLS leaf that sent it -- strictly harder to forge than what it replaced. The one query that would broadcast one of these. What this builds is a genuine, correctly signed NIP-59 gift wrap, indistinguishable from what the NIP-17 path would be right to publish, and the only thing keeping it off a relay is that it never becomes a GiftWrapPayload. Written against what shipped rather than what was planned, so it records two deviations. senderIdentity is resolved in NostrDao rather than added to GroupEventResult.ApplicationMessage, because quartz is a binary dependency here and the local checkout is a reference copy, not a build input. And a failed validation drops the message and logs rather than throwing, because the caller is inside storeNostrEvent's transaction. The unbuilt parts are listed as absences rather than left implied: there is no member picker, so a private message can only be a reply to one somebody already sent, and nothing in the UI yet tells a user in words that the group can see who they messaged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kgothatso Ngako
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c8c962e4f4 |
docs: inventory the unreferenced code in the sync and relay stack
Found while building the long-running sync. One item was orphaned by that
change; the rest was already dead and only became visible because the subsystem
was being read closely. Written down rather than deleted because several pieces
are one decision away from being wanted, and those decisions are not the sync
change's to make.
Every claim is "this identifier appears exactly once in composeApp/src, at its
own declaration", with the two things that method cannot see called out: Room
DAO methods are reached through generated code, and Compose entry points can be
invoked without a textual reference. The DAO cluster is flagged as the least
certain for exactly that reason.
Three findings are more than leftovers:
- RelaysSocketManager.userRelays is a field nothing ever writes. The
`userRelays` inside observeRelays is a different, shadowing local, so the
single-argument publishEvent always takes its FALLBACK_RELAYS branch and the
user's own relay list is never used for publishing. That is a bug wearing
dead code's clothes, and the fix is to populate the field, not to delete it.
- NostrPublisherRepository is entirely unreferenced, and it is the only
consumer of CachingImportRepository.importEvents. RelayPool and
RelaysSocketManager each take a cachingImportRepository parameter they store
and never dereference, satisfied by NO_OP_CACHING_IMPORT_REPOSITORY — so the
whole seam is a parameter passed from nowhere to nothing. Removing the
publisher lets the interface and both parameters go with it.
- sendAUTH is unused because NIP-42 is unimplemented, not because it is
surplus. AuthMessage is parsed and dropped, so a relay answering CLOSED with
auth-required is retried forever and can never succeed. Deleting sendAUTH
means deciding against authenticated relays; that is worth doing on purpose
or not at all. sendCOUNT and CountMessage are a similar matched pair — both
go or neither, since a CountMessage cannot arrive if nothing sends a COUNT.
isRecommendedRelay on the two request entities is separated out as its own risk
class: never written, never read, but a Room column, so it wants a migration
rather than a delete.
Ends with an order to do it in, cheapest and least risky first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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385c58ba7e |
docs: rewrite the sync note as what exists rather than what to build
The design landed across the six commits before this one, so the note is now
describing code. Reorganised around that: the reasoning that made it worth
writing is unchanged, but "the shape to build" is now "how it holds together"
and points at the classes, and the numbered traps have become properties of the
thing rather than warnings about a thing that did not exist yet.
Three sections earn their place after the fact:
- the two timestamp decisions, which are the ones most likely to be "cleaned
up" by someone who has not read this: no `since` on kind 1059 because our
own wraps are stamped up to two days in the past, and no watermark on 445
even though it would be safe, because `limit` already bounds the burst.
- the four ways a group id can appear, which is why the group filter is
derived from the room list rather than wired at the join sites.
- "Not done", which was previously implicit in a staging plan: connectivity
changes, NIP-42 AUTH, the collector-per-socket router the design originally
called for, and the fact that the DM relay set is one relay.
The "suggested order" section is gone; git log is a better record of it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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178ddd0181 |
docs: write down how a long-running chat sync would work
Every chat sync today is a pull: a screen queues a request row, a pump drains
it, the relay answers, the subscription is closed. Nothing arrives between
pulls, so a message sent one second after EOSE waits for the next time someone
opens a screen.
This note works out what it takes to hold the two chat subscriptions open for
as long as the app is active — kind 1059 p-tagged to us, and kind 445 h-tagged
with every group we belong to — and, more usefully, what in the current
pipeline quietly assumes a subscription is short:
- completeOnSubscriptionEnd finishes the flow at EOSE, which is what releases
the slot and sends the CLOSE,
- SUBSCRIPTION_TIMEOUT hard-kills anything still open at 120s,
- subscriptionSlots is a Semaphore(4) shared with the backfill queue, so a
permanent subscription is a permanently-held permit,
- both saveNostrEvent overloads need a request row to attach provenance to
and to flip to "processed",
- and nothing in the app reconnects a dropped socket at all. That is
invisible today only because every subscription is short and the next
queued request re-opens the socket on its way out.
The design keeps the queue and its three pumps exactly as they are: live
subscriptions replace polling, not reconciliation. Negentropy stays the tool
for first login, the catch-up after a background gap, and "load older".
The group filter is derived from chatRepository.observeChatRoomListByPublicKey
rather than wired at each join site, because a group id can appear four ways
and only one of them (creating a group) is somewhere anyone would think to call
a subscribe function — being added arrives as a Welcome processed deep inside
NostrDao.storeNostrEvent. Observing the room list also closes the loop: a
Welcome lands on the live gift wrap subscription, a ChatRoom row is written,
the Flow re-emits, and the group filter widens without anyone opening a chat.
Two findings fell out of checking the details against our own code:
- `since = now` on kind 1059 would silently drop messages. Gift wraps are
stamped with TimeUtils.randomWithTwoDays(), so a wrap published now can
carry a created_at two days in the past. Kind 445 uses TimeUtils.now() and
can take a watermark — opposite treatment for the two kinds we care about.
- the "sent-messages" filter (kinds=[1059], authors=[me]) cannot match
anything, because gift wraps are signed with a fresh throwaway KeyPair().
It is also unnecessary: createNip17ChatRoom puts the user in their own
participant list, so we wrap a copy to ourselves and the account-wide
#p=[me] subscription already picks it up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kgothatso Ngako
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b99cb8fcd5 |
docs: write down the shared-key subsystem and how Marmot membership fails
First docs in the repo -- README.md is still the stock KMP template. Three documents plus an index, covering the parts whose behaviour is not recoverable by reading the code: where the reasoning lives in a protocol, where a failure mode is silent, or where a decision looked arbitrary and was not. marmot-membership.md is the one that earns its place. Everything about adding a member compiles, the invite reports success, and a member simply never appears -- and the reason is never in the invite code. It records that inviteMemberToChatRoom hardcodes isOneMemberInitialGroupCreation = false and that ChatRepository does not expose it, so every group invite takes the deferred-welcome path including the first, when the group is still just its creator and the commit has no audience at all. Then why that is silent rather than noisy: MarmotInboundManager refuses future-epoch messages outright, on both wire formats, with no queue and no replay, so a commit arriving before its recipient's welcome is dropped and that member never advances. EPOCH_RETENTION_WINDOW retains past epochs and does nothing for messages from ahead. Three options are set out with the per-invite correctness table, including the honest limit that the recommended one narrows the race without closing it. shared-key-derivation.md argues why the paths are not BIP32 -- no chain code exists, hardened derivation is impossible rather than unimplemented, and a FROST tweak takes the scalar as input so the chain code leaves the problem entirely. It records the x-only serialisation trap avoided by choosing the scalar directly, and states the rule that must not be broken: never reconstruct a derived key in the clear, because k = k' - t hands over the group key rather than one derived key. shared-key-ceremony.md covers the seven kinds, the three approval gates and why the coordinator's aggregations are deliberately not among them, faults as values rather than exceptions, and the transcript's idempotency-by-construction. It also writes down the invariant that produces no error when broken: pendingApproval must mirror the gates in advance, or the screen offers an approval that does nothing -- or none while the ritual sits still. Every factual claim was checked against the source rather than recalled, which turned up one correction worth having: there are two future-epoch refusals, for PrivateMessage and for Commit, so the drop covers both wire formats and not just one. Each document leads with the failure mode rather than the architecture, on the grounds that a failure is what sends somebody to docs in the first place, and each lists its known gaps -- including that none of this has run on a physical device. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |