Commit Graph
968 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 fc437d0511 fix: a device does not vouch for a rotation's key state on its own
Material Design conformance / budgets (push) Canceled after 0s
Material Design conformance / tests (push) Canceled after 0s
The automatic ceremony lets a device sign, without asking its owner, the
one key state that can be true for a ceremony it finished
(GroupKeyStateManager.vouchesFor). Its seventh condition -- no state for
the room already signed here -- was what kept a share rotation's key
state out, and only in rooms that already had one. An eighth makes it
explicit: a state naming a share generation or a member binding says
more than the ceremony did, and its owner is asked.

Found by ShareRefreshRitualJvmTest after the merge: its devices hold no
first state, and the generation-1 state signed itself. jvmTest
1229/1229, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-20 00:08:21 +02:00
Kgothatso Ngako f88c70bee4 Merge branch 'claude/frost-reenrollment-plan-055ba8' into giza-refresh 2026-11-20 00:03:13 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4949f0fefe feat: the recovery walk, from the host key to the live share (frost-share-refresh, Phase 12)
ShareGenerations.recover rebuilds a device's share of every generation
from its host secret key alone: ChillDKG's recovery data gives generation
0, and each refresh's recovery data, applied to the generation before,
gives the next. It stops at a generation the host key was withheld from,
since a repaired share leaves no recovery data. Nothing calls it yet.

Tested three refreshes on, against every device's live share and each
generation's table. With the release-build test, jvmTest 1200/1200,
compileDebugKotlinAndroid and the audits pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:53:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 992290903b feat: a Shares section, behind a flag that is off in release (frost-share-refresh, Phases 11 and 13)
The room detail screen shows a key share by share: the generation the
group signs with, who holds a share, who waits to be brought back and who
was removed for good; what this device is being asked (take part in a
rotation, store the new share, help bring a member back), with approve
and abandon; and the two things it may start -- rotate the shares, or ask
to be brought back. The copy says what a rotation does not do.

ExperimentalFeatures.shareRefresh gates all of it (D4): on in debug and
development builds, off in release until the zkp modules are reviewed.
Off, nothing is offered, and a rotation this device is asked into is
declined out loud. The desktop build can opt in with
-Dgiza.experimental=true. The iOS actual was not built.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:53:06 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 1c3e0e934e feat: re-enrollment, a stale member repaired into the generation the group signs with (frost-share-refresh, Phase 10)
ShareRepairManager brings back a participant id a refresh left stale, with
FrostReducedEnrollment in repair mode, on kinds 30346-30349. t live helpers
approve and run it; their round-1.1 shares and round-1.2 sums are raw
additive shares, so each goes NIP-44-encrypted between the two parties'
ChillDKG host keys. The target checks the result against the public share
the group signed -- never one the helpers supply -- stores it, and proves
it with a Schnorr signature by the share, which every device checks before
marking the id live. The share is a point of the new polynomial that the
old device never had.

10b: a new identity at an id -- a lost device, a compromised account -- is
bound by a group-signed key state first (frost_member, GroupKeyState
.memberBindings, schema 40), applied only to an id that is not live. Until
then its request waits, with nothing sent. A key state amending one at the
same generation is stamped a second later, so a binding can never tie with
the state it adds to.

jvmTest 1198/1198, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:46:38 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c4fe4c9c26 feat: rotating a group's shares without a member it removed (frost-share-refresh, Phase 9)
A removal takes a member out of the room, not out of the key: their share
still helps sign. After an admin removes a member who holds a live share,
the room screen offers to rotate without them -- a second act, never
folded into the removal, since it needs every remaining holder.
ShareRefreshManager.proposeWithout withholds them for good (RETIRED); the
refusals say when that would leave fewer than t holders (the group could
not sign at all) or not a majority (remove fewer at a time).

Tested in the ritual harness: in a 2-of-3, the other two sign at
generation 1 and the removed member's old share signs nothing with a new
one. jvmTest 1195/1195, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:36:48 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 51615992ee feat: the group signs its new generation, and every device deletes the old share (frost-share-refresh, Phase 8)
When a refresh completes the coordinator asks the group to sign the key
state at the new generation -- the same room, key, path and parentage, plus
frost_generation, a hash of the public-share table, the refresh and any
retired ids. It is the new shares' first signature, and what D6 waits on:
a device that files that state, holds the generation active and agrees
with the group's table fails every signing session left at an older
generation, out loud, and deletes the older shares, the ceremony's
randomness that rebuilds generation 0's, and the WAL's page images of them.

A key state at a higher generation wins whatever its timestamp, in the
DAO and among signed events. A proposal at a generation this device has
confirmed and is still waiting on the certificate for waits instead of
declining, and resumes when the generation activates.

jvmTest 1193/1193, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:32:14 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 0a60da6e47 feat: a ceremony's own key state signs itself (automatic ceremony, Phase 7)
For a ceremony a device finished there is one true statement of what
its room signs with: its key, at the admin path, naming the room that
derives, with the parent's certificate for a subgroup. A signing
proposal that is exactly that statement is approved on arrival.
GroupKeyStateManager.vouchesFor checks it with the rules stateFrom
applies to a signed state, minus the signature; anything else, a key
state included, is asked about as before.

SignedGroupKeyStateTest's two approval-gate tests now assert the new
rule. CeremonyNetwork relays signing messages, so a ceremony runs from
the joins to a signed key state with nobody asked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:28:25 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 f8974aec81 feat: a group rotates its shares, end to end between devices (frost-share-refresh, Phase 7)
ShareRefreshManager runs a FROST share refresh in the Marmot room the key
derives, on kinds 30340-30345, in the image of ChillDkgRitualManager:
every inbound message stored, every step recomputed from stored inputs,
nothing of a member's own published before they approve, at two gates
(DEAL, CONFIRM). Recipients are at least t and a majority of the ids not
retired, and a device confirms one refresh per base generation --
ShareRefreshConfirmation, written in the same transaction as the pending
generation it confirms -- so two refreshes from one generation cannot both
complete. The certificate activates the new generation; a withheld device
learns its table from the recovery data and files it with no share.

Schema 39 (AutoMigration): ShareRefreshSession, ShareRefreshMessage,
ShareRefreshConfirmation. Transcript lines as system lines; dispatch in
the Marmot inbound path.

ShareRefreshRitualJvmTest: three devices with real host keys refresh
through bitcoin-kmp's FrostRefresh and then sign at generation 1 as the
same room. jvmTest 1190/1190, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, audits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:25:45 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 73fcfff0da feat: the coordinator's device takes a finished ceremony to its room (automatic ceremony, Phase 6)
CeremonyFollowThrough asks a subgroup's parent to certify it, asks the
group to sign the key state, and creates the room, from stored rows and
one step at a time. It runs beside the live subscription, outside the
inbound lock, since creating a room waits on key packages the inbound
path delivers. It looks again when a ceremony finishes, a certificate
or key state is signed, or a key package arrives.

Only the coordinator's device acts on its own, and never again after a
signing session failed; the ladder keeps the buttons for both. Once the
room exists the ladder's last rung opens it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:10:56 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4c75ca1b03 feat: a stalled key ceremony says on whom, and offers abandon there (automatic ceremony, Phase 5)
Once everyone has joined nothing is asked, so a ceremony that sits still
is waiting on a device that is not answering. After a day without a new
message, the ritual screen names who it is waiting on and since when,
with the abandon action beside it. Nothing abandons on its own.

A ceremony message is now stored once, on first arrival, so its time is
when it first came and a relay's redelivery does not restart the clock.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 23:02:46 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 d71cf0c093 feat: one approval screen for a key ceremony (automatic ceremony, Phase 4)
The join screen carries what the round-one screen showed, the members
in particular, and says the device takes it from there. The round-one
and round-two screens, their routes and their strings are gone; the
ritual screen offers only the join, and the ladder describes each round
as something the device does.

Old request lines still read as answered: the automatic round writes
the same line a tapped one did.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:55:44 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 9278ccd54e feat: running key ceremonies resume when the app starts (automatic ceremony, Phase 3)
A ritual moved on an arriving message or a member's tap. Without the
tap, a ceremony holding every message it needs -- one an older build
left waiting to be told to contribute, or one interrupted between
storing a message and acting on it -- would never move.

resumeRunning advances every ceremony this user has joined. Sync runs
it once per activation, after reopening the inbox.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:51:09 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 ca5cda81db feat: joining is the only approval a key ceremony asks for (automatic ceremony, Phase 2)
advance no longer stops at rounds 1 and 2. Contributing follows from
having joined, and confirming is ChillDKG's own check, which refuses a
substituted result whether or not anybody is looking. pendingApproval
returns the join or nothing, and approving a round is a no-op.

ROUND_1 and ROUND_2 stay in the enum, and their timestamps in the
schema, so rows written by older builds keep decoding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:49:12 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 fce51e20f6 feat: a key's shares have generations, and signing reads the one it names (frost-share-refresh, Phase 6)
Schema 38 (AutoMigration): KeyShareGeneration and KeyShareMember for every
generation a refresh makes, FrostSigningSession.generation, and
GroupKeyState.generation and publicSharesHash. Generation 0 has no row: it
stays where ChillDKG wrote it, with ids derived from the host keys as
before.

ShareGenerations is the one door signing reads a share through.
FrostSigningManager fixes a session to the generation the group signs with
when it is proposed, carries it as frost_generation from generation 1 (a
generation-0 proposal is byte for byte what it was), and a device holding
no share of the named generation declines out loud with
GENERATION_REFUSAL instead of waiting or signing with the wrong share.

ShareGenerationsJvmTest refreshes a 2-of-3 group's shares by hand with a
zero-constant polynomial; the new shares sign and the signature verifies
as the unchanged room. jvmTest 1183/1183, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, and
the M3, brand and wallet audits pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:48:42 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 e9c413ac66 test: a key ceremony run across devices with real ChillDKG (automatic ceremony, Phase 1)
CeremonyNetwork gives each member a database of their own and relays
what each queues to the others, stored first the way the inbound path
stores it. No test ran the rounds before: the others stop at the host
key or take a dealer's key.

Pins today's gates: members who have only joined stop at round 1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:45:20 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4040ae7424 fix: a deleted share is gone from aux.db, and aux.db leaves the phone in no backup (frost-share-refresh, Phase 5)
Every connection opens with PRAGMA secure_delete = ON (SecureDeleteDriver),
and GizaDatabase.scrubFreedPages truncates the write-ahead log, which keeps
whole page images of a share after its row is gone. Android backups and
device-to-device transfers carry none of the app's data: aux.db holds FROST
shares in plaintext, and a share copied somewhere the app cannot reach
cannot be rotated away from.

SecureDeleteJvmTest reads the database's files byte by byte; its two
controls find the share with secure_delete off and before the scrub.
jvmTest 1176/1176.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 22:40:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 1321962b3f test: the version the app ships, opened by the version it builds (marmot-kmp, Phase 9)
Phase 4 settled the blob and left the database alone, because there was nothing
to settle: the state is opaque to Room and its version is inside it. Phase 8 added
a table, and that turns "does an existing install still open?" from a question
about MLS into a question about Room. They fail differently. A blob the engine
cannot read costs one room; a migration Room cannot find costs the app, on every
device that has ever had it, on the first launch after the update.

That second one is also the easiest here to ship by accident, because a fresh
install never migrates anything. Measured rather than assumed: with
`AutoMigration(from = 36, to = 37)` commented out, 32 database tests ran and 4
failed -- all four of them the new ones.

ShippedProfileUpgradeJvmTest builds a v36 database on disk from the exported v36
schema, down to its indices, its room_master_table identity hash and its
user_version, puts a profile and two rooms in it with the Phase 4 blob in one, and
opens it with the app's own getRoomDatabase. Four claims: it reaches v37 with
Room's own identity hash stamped and every table's columns and indices equal to
37.json's; the legacy room's bytes come back unchanged and MarmotEngine.groupFor
restores a group with its 0xF2EE metadata and a 32-byte kind:445 key; opening the
profile rewrites nothing, which is asserted only after checking the restore held
the room; and the new table takes a row keyed to a ChatRoom that predates it.

Room opens lazily, so a test that builds a database and closes it migrates
nothing. The first version of this did that and failed on user_version still
reading 36.

The blob itself moves to OldEngineBlob in commonTest, read by both tests. The
only thing those bytes are worth is that they are old ones, and a blob living in
two files can be regenerated in one of them.

1171 tests across 157 classes, 0 failures; the four audits unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 18:57:12 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 e07bb68014 feat: the sender ratchet as its own row, and the receive side beside it (marmot-kmp, Phase 8)
The piece Phase 7 deferred, in both directions, because they are one question:
a group's state is a few kilobytes of ratchet tree, group context and epoch
secrets, and the app was rewriting all of it to record things that moved a
counter.

Sending an application message advances exactly one thing -- this leaf's entry
in the secret tree (RFC 9420 §9) -- so the library carries the position as its
own record, `MlsGroupStateStore.saveSenderRatchet`, in the spirit of OpenMLS
keeping `message_secrets` apart from `group_state`. Giza defaulted that to
false, which sent the manager back to a full save per message. It is now a
`MarmotSenderRatchet` row, one per room, schema 36 -> 37 with an AutoMigration.
The bytes are stored as the library wrote them -- the `MarmotPublishObligation`
precedent, not the retained-epoch one -- because a record whose whole job is to
never go backwards is safest when nothing here re-encodes it; the epoch, leaf
and generation sit beside it, read off those same bytes, so they cannot drift.

The hazard this introduces is an ordering, and it is in the app's code, not the
library's. `MlsGroupManager.restoreAll` applies the record itself. A room joined
after the engine restored is loaded from its row by `MarmotEngine.groupFor`
instead, and that has to apply the record BEFORE `adoptGroup`, because adopting
persists and persisting rewrites the row from the group being adopted. The other
way round, the next restart re-emits generations already published, under AEAD
keys and nonces already used.

Finding the test that could tell the two orders apart took two goes. The first
asserted the row after a lazy load and passed with the order inverted: a state
saved before this leaf ever sent has no ratchet entry, `exportOwnSenderRatchet`
returns null, and the adopt writes nothing. The order cannot matter until the
stored state holds a position of its own behind the record's, and a received
message is what puts one there. With one receive in the middle the inverted
order fails with expected:<2> but was:<1>.

The receive side is a full save, from `MarmotEngine.processGroupEvent`, which
`NostrDao` now reads inbound events through so a second caller cannot forget it.
And a correction to Phase 5, which said an unwritten row still lost the late
message. It does not: mls-kmp writes the skipped keys beside the positions they
belong to, so an unwritten row is an older COHERENT state, and a position that
has not passed the late generation derives it forward. quartz's engine saved the
positions and dropped the keys -- that pair is what lost messages. The cost of
an unwritten row is the re-deriving, against SecretTree's thousand-step cap. The
reason the write lands now is the send side: until this change every send wrote
the whole state, so the row could not fall far behind inside an epoch.

1167 tests across 156 classes, 0 failures; Android and JVM compile clean; the
four audits unchanged. docs/mls-skipped-keys.md loses its mitigation claim and
gains the correction; docs/marmot-kmp.md gains Phase 8.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 09:55:31 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 3b2b5e3614 test: the skipped keys, half closed and half pinned (marmot-kmp, Phases 5 and 6)
Phase 6 is a probe with no code of its own, so it rides along: both fork tests pass
unchanged, which means marmot-kmp 2.2.1 still scores a fork this device is half of the way
quartz 1.15.2 did. The assertion whose message is "the two sides agree -- the library has
been fixed" did not fire. What changed is that the fix docs/marmot-v2.md predicts is now a
first-class thing on the library's side -- MlsGroup.stageCommit, with the staged commit in
MlsGroupState from its STATE_VERSION 9 -- so it is a choice in MlsCandidateStateEngine
between replaying a branch and taking the state that was kept. Both notes say so.

Phase 5 is the skipped keys, and it is half closed. mls-kmp's state carries them:
skippedApplicationSecrets and skippedHandshakeSecrets, exported by saveState and imported
by restore, arriving at STATE_VERSION 5 so a version-4 blob reads them as an empty map.
That is steps 1 to 3 of the fix docs/mls-skipped-keys.md proposed. Step 4 is not done:
consumedGenerations, the replay guard, is still one SecretTree's field.

The app does not benefit yet, and the first draft of this test claimed it did.
MlsGroupManager.decrypt persists only when the message was a commit that advanced the
epoch, so the secret reaches the live group and never the row. The draft delivered
generation 1, rebuilt the engine, delivered generation 0 and asserted it decrypted -- and
it did, for the wrong reason: a rebuilt engine restores a blob whose sender ratchet never
moved, so generation 0 is simply the next one it expects. A green test proving nothing,
caught by the assertion beside it that looked redundant.

So the three tests say what is true: the secret is in the state the engine would save, a
group rebuilt from those bytes reads the late message, and the stored state does not carry
it. The last one is pinned in the style of the authored fork, with its KDoc saying what to
invert when the receive path starts persisting -- deliberately not done here, because it
is a write per inbound message that re-encodes the ratchet tree, the group context and
every epoch secret. saveSenderRatchet is the library's answer to that cost on the send
side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:15:28 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 b2539773ce test: the state on every device still opens (marmot-kmp, Phase 4)
C1 is the constraint the whole move hangs on: ChatRoom.mlsGroupState is a
MlsGroupState.encodeTls() blob written by quartz 1.15.2 on every device that has ever been
in a group, and a blob the new engine cannot read costs a user every room they are in --
there is no in-place migration from a legacy group.

The argument was checkable before a test was written. quartz 1.15.2's own sources, in the
sources jar beside the artifact in the gradle cache, declare STATE_VERSION = 4; mls-kmp
1.3.0 declares 10 and accepts 1..10, appending only. So every blob in the wild is version
4 and the window covers it six times over.

The measurement is docs/tools/old-state-blob, whose only dependency is
com.vitorpamplona.quartz:quartz:1.15.2 -- it prints a real 1033-byte blob for a legacy
MIP-01 group at epoch 0, which is the shape every room in the wild started as. It is
checked in because once it is gone nothing in the hex says whether the fixture came from
the old engine or the new one, and a fixture written by the new engine would pass while
testing nothing.

MlsGroupStateCompatibilityTest pins it six ways: the fixture is still version 4 (asserted
alone, so a fixture that drifted to 10 cannot make the rest pass vacuously); mls-kmp
decodes it; the group rebuilds from it with 0xF2EE, its nostr_group_id and its name
intact, still reading as legacy; the kind:445 outer key off a restored old group is 32
bytes, which is Phase 1's policy finding pinned against real pre-migration bytes; a
re-save lands on version 10 and still decodes, same group id and epoch; and
RetainedEpochSecrets still round-trips the five fields RoomMlsGroupStateStore stores it as.

No schema change: the blob is opaque to Room and the version is inside it, so 36 stands.

Not done, and not automatable here: one manual upgrade of a profile with real rooms in it.
A fixture is one member at epoch 0; the rooms that matter have epochs, members and a
retained window behind them. That is the last thing between this and a release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:08:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 763edcde9f test: the app's orchestration against the library's own client (marmot-kmp, Phase 3)
`MarmotStandIn` moved to marmot-kmp's managers in Phase 1 with nothing but its imports
changing, and it stays as it is: the convergence and lifecycle tests need a processor they
can reach into -- `recordLocalCommit` with a state snapshot of their own, `buildAppEvent`
with a payload they wrote -- which a `MarmotManager` would take away.

So the second stand-in is additive. `MarmotClientStandIn` is a `MarmotManager` over an
`InMemoryMlsGroupStateStore` and a publisher that says yes, with no message store and no
KeyPackage store because both are nullable and a client that persists nothing is all a
test wants from one. It is what Amethyst, its desktop app and the `amy` CLI drive.

The two are not redundant, and the difference is the difference between the two questions
this migration has to answer. In CurrentProfileInteropJvmTest the test's own code decides
how the Welcome is sealed and what an application payload looks like, and asks whether two
engines agree. Here the library decides -- `addMemberInvites` picks the commit's shape,
`MarmotWelcomeSender` wraps the Welcome -- and the question is whether the app's own
orchestration, `MarmotEngine` and the DAOs and the outbound queue, reaches the same group
as the orchestration the library ships. It does, on the first run: the app joins a group
the client made and invited it to, under the routing id the client minted; it files and
attributes a `buildTextMessage` from it; and the client decrypts what the app's outbound
path sends and decodes it as a canonical payload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 00:05:11 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 9bc05c112d refactor: the names quartz 2.x gave the kinds (marmot-kmp, Phase 2)
Most of this phase was answered by Phase 1 rather than built. `GroupEventResult` still has
exactly nine variants -- `MarmotEngine.inRoom` is an exhaustive `when` used as an
expression, so the compiler says so rather than a reading of the source. The convergence
and lifecycle surface takes and returns what `settleLater` and `awaitSettled` already
expected, `allowsOutboundWork` included. `stageAddMember` -> `StagedCommit` ->
`gate.prepare` -> `installState` needed no edit. And no test's assertions moved: seven
fixtures now build their group with `MarmotGroupPolicy` as the app does, which is a
construction-site change, not a weakened expectation.

What was left is the six classes quartz 2.x renamed to match what the NIPs call the kinds,
and kept deprecated typealiases for: SealedRumorEvent -> SealEvent, ChatMessageRelayListEvent
-> DmRelayListEvent, RelayFeedsListEvent -> FavoriteRelayListEvent, LnZapEvent ->
ZapReceiptEvent, LongTextNoteEvent -> LongFormContentEvent, ChannelListEvent ->
PublicChatListEvent. 104 references in 25 files; same packages, so each is an identifier
rename. None reaches a string the app persists -- no Room column, no string resource, no
kind number -- and after it the build has no quartz deprecation warnings left.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 23:59:35 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 fc80a089aa build: the Marmot engine comes from marmot-kmp (marmot-kmp, Phase 1)
quartz 1.15.2 -> 2.7.3, and the engine it used to carry from marmot 2.2.1 over mls 1.3.0
over crypto 2.1.0. docs/scripts/marmot-kmp-imports.sh --apply moved 187 lines by the rule;
42 `quartz.marmot` imports stay, which are the event classes quartz kept.

The 854 non-Marmot quartz imports came through the major bump without an edit. All 45
compile errors were in the engine seam, and 44 were one thing: five accessors that were
members of `MlsGroup` in quartz's engine are extension functions in marmot-kmp
(`currentGroupState`, `currentMarmotData`, `currentNostrGroupId`, `currentAdminIdentities`,
`isLocalAdmin`), so 14 files import one now. The 45th, `buildCurrentProfileFrom`, likewise.
No constructor the app drives changed shape, and `GroupEventResult` still has exactly nine
variants -- `MarmotEngine`'s exhaustive `when` compiling is the proof there is no tenth to
drop on the floor.

One change here is not a rename. `MlsGroupPolicy` is new in mls-kmp: quartz's engine
hardcoded Marmot's rules, mls-kmp made them an argument, and every factory defaults it to
`Permissive` -- so the eleven places this app builds a group itself were building a
non-Marmot group. The loud half is that `commitExporter` is then null, `preCommitExporterSecret`
comes back empty and `GroupEventEncryption.encrypt` refuses it ("Group key must be 32
bytes"), which is the one test that failed. The silent half matters more: `Permissive`
greases the leaf's capabilities, which MDK has never been tested against; it knows neither
`0xF2EE` nor the app-data dictionary, so RFC 9420 13.4 refuses a GroupContextExtensions
proposal in a group we are a member of; and it authorizes every commit, proposal and
SelfRemove without a check. So `MarmotGroupPolicy` goes in at all eleven. The
current-profile paths needed none -- `CurrentProfileGroupFactory` and every
`MlsGroupManager` entry point pass it themselves.

1149 tests, 0 failures; compileDebugKotlinAndroid clean; the three audits unchanged.
Import blocks were re-sorted in the touched files only: 253 further files in composeApp
have blocks that were already out of order, and C2 is the reason to leave them be.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 23:56:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b27ed2a05f docs: retire the wallet notes, and guard against a wallet coming back (wallet removal, Phase 8)
The 23 wallet notes move to docs/retired/ with a banner; every link between
notes is rewritten for the move and checked. The index lists them as one
Retired paragraph, and seven kept notes carry a line on what changed. The
README and CLAUDE.md describe a Giza with no wallet.

brand-audit.sh loses its "bennu/ exception: every such tag was a wallet's,
so one now is a wallet coming back. wallet-audit.sh --check, in check and
in CI, fails on a retired kind in the app's code, a lightning-kmp import,
a file named for a wallet's pieces, or sats in a string.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:15:13 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 005cbc2f23 refactor: composeApp stops importing lightning-kmp (wallet removal, Phase 7a)
W3: a Lightning invoice in a note is a card that opens a lightning: link
in the device's own wallet app, undecoded -- decoding was lightning-kmp's,
and paying from the card was never wired. The dead pay and zap hooks go.

Lightning.randomBytes becomes quartz's RandomInstance; the tests'
LocalKeyManager becomes PhraseKeys; NodeParamsManager.chain becomes
PROFILE_CHAIN, the mainnet constant every profile's preference files are
named under.

What is left of the library is storage (keystore, credentials, seed file,
preferences). Moving it into the app and off the composite build is
Phase 7b, which needs an iOS build and a device to check, and is left for
its own branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:08:52 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 84be1c5beb refactor: no node behind a recovery phrase (wallet removal, Phase 6)
PhraseKeys derives a phrase's nostr key (NIP-06, m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0) and
its profile id (hash160 of m/50'/0', the old node key) with bitcoin-kmp's
DeterministicWallet. ForkCompatibilityTest's Phase 0 pins pass unchanged
through it, so the same phrase is the same person with the same
preference files.

No profile starts a node: Identity.business, startupNode and its state
machine, the platform start/schedule/stop actuals, LightningApplication,
BusinessManager.initialize, the NFC hooks and POST_NOTIFICATIONS go. A
switch is clearing the identity and nothing else. Copy that promised funds
or a wallet is reworded, and the switcher's badge says Recovery phrase.

Forgetting a phrase profile is still refused (now PhraseAttached): the
phrase would derive the key again, and offering it is new UI.

iosMain was edited without an iOS build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 16:03:47 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 9c2cbf0295 feat: schema 35 -> 36, the wallets' tables and rows dropped (wallet removal, Phase 5)
MIGRATION_35_36, by hand: the wallets' chat lines; GroupTransaction; every
signing session over a transaction or a sweep, with its items and its
members' messages; the other fifteen wallet tables, children first; and
FrostSigningItem.inputIndex, DkgSession.guardianDelay and
ChatMessage.lightningFactKey. DkgSession.walletPolicy stays: the join
screen reads a Bennu ceremony's tag from it. The 36 schema is committed.

The wallet line-type constants and the transcript's arms for them go with
the rows they named.

jvmTest: 1,150 run, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 15:54:21 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 c6b231fa84 refactor: remove the group's on-chain wallet, guardians and the subgroup wallet policy (wallet removal, Phase 4)
wallet/ (Electrum included), nostr/wallet/, the policy and guardian tags,
GroupWalletDerivation, GroupWalletManager, GuardianDerivation,
GuardianManager, ProposedSpend, three screens with their view models,
states and routes, and FROST's spend half.

FROST is back to signing events. Every transaction proposal from a Bennu
peer is filed declined without being read, and the decline goes out
through advance(). Certificates and ceremonies carry no wallet tag; a
guarded subgroup's ceremony is filed and not joined, and its join screen
says why (W5). A key state carrying a wallet's certificate is declined.
The last bennu/ derivation tag leaves the code, and the last wallet pins
with it.

jvmTest: 1,148 run, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 15:48:11 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 db38640e57 refactor: remove member guarded wallets (wallet removal, Phase 3)
The member-wallet events, MemberWalletManager, MemberWalletDerivation, the
repository and DAO, five screens with their view models, states and routes,
and the 74 strings only they read. GuardianManager stops reading member
certificates. The entities stay until Phase 5's migration.

Guardians and the subgroup wallet policy move to Phase 4: they are built
into the group's on-chain wallet and cannot leave before it and compile.

jvmTest: 1,311 run, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 15:32:04 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 1bd0761339 refactor: remove the group Lightning wallet and Iceberg (wallet removal, Phase 2)
The Lightning events, managers, Iceberg ceremony, wallet/lightning, the
repository, five screens with their view models, states and routes, the
four DAOs, and the regtest network with its build wiring. The entities
stay until Phase 5's migration.

FROST's sweep path goes here rather than in Phase 4, since it was built on
GroupSweep: a sweep that arrives is filed declined without being read.
Lightning kinds fall to the retired-kinds arm; existing Lightning lines
stay as settled lines that open nothing. The 147 strings Phases 1 and 2
left unread go, and a Phase 1 test name that said Bennu is renamed.

jvmTest: 1,440 run, 0 failed, 0 skipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 15:25:15 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 8e0f1bd38a feat: Giza neither offers nor signs a wallet (wallet removal, Phase 1)
A Bennu member can put a wallet to a group Giza is in. Giza can no longer
check one, so it declines on arrival, out loud: the proposal is filed as a
declined session and advance() publishes the DECLINE, which the group
counts. Refusing used to be silent, which looks like a phone in a pocket.

- RetiredKinds: 30331-30337 and 30350-30366 stay Bennu's, never reused.
- WalletRefusal: what is a wallet's to sign, read by tag name so it
  outlives the wallet's parsers. approve() declines one instead.
- A retired kind is one line or none in the transcript, never a raw bubble.
- No Lightning dispatch, no guarded-wallet forwarding, no key answers.
- The detail and profile screens and the subgroup picker lose their
  wallets; a guarded room says why it offers no subgroup (W5), and
  certificates carry no wallet tags.
- The wallet tests this behaviour breaks are deleted with it.

jvmTest: 1,495 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 15:14:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 94b45c0bc8 test: pin a recovery phrase's npub, profile id and host key (wallet removal, Phase 0)
Through LocalKeyManager, the code Phase 6 replaces, on NIP-06's own test
vector. A different npub would be a different person, and a different id
would lose the profile's preference files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 14:59:22 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 caf1fb1855 test: name the pinned tags in comments, not test names (fork, Phase 8)
Material Design conformance / budgets (push) Canceled after 0s
Material Design conformance / tests (push) Canceled after 0s
ForkCompatibilityTest's method names began with `bennu`, which is neither a comment nor a
"bennu/ tag, so the brand audit -- and with it ./gradlew check -- failed from 851ff0c8 on.
The audit ran in Phase 6 and was not run again over Phase 8. Each test now carries the tag
it pins in a comment above it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 12:48:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 851ff0c8c2 test: Giza derives what Bennu derives, every tag pinned (fork, Phase 8)
ForkCompatibilityTest pins each mantra/ and bennu/ derivation tag through the
function that hashes it: the ChillDKG host key, the Marmot shared-key tweak,
the group Lightning basepoints, the Iceberg pool label and the session,
contribution, commitment, seed and transcript hashes, the member wallet id and
possession message, and the group wallet address and guardian root. A sweep
that renames one of them now fails a test rather than moving a group's coins
and splitting Giza from Bennu.

The vectors come from this tree. A diff against 4e106fb5 shows that the files
holding the tags differ only in packages, imports, comments and the database's
type name, so the vectors are Bennu's too.

docs/giza-rebrand.md gains a table of where the build stands and what turned
out differently, the twelve bennu/ tags first.

jvmTest: 1651 run (1643 + 8), 0 failed, 2 skipped. m3Audit and brandAudit pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 11:00:44 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5b92b83869 chore: tooling, docs and a guard for the name (fork, Phase 6)
- rootProject.name is Giza. Res is pinned, so no import moves.
- Regtest: GIZA_REGTEST, GIZA_SPLICE_DELAYS and the gizaRegtest task input;
  node aliases giza-lsp and giza-payer.
- README describes Giza and says what it shares with Bennu: one network, one
  derivation, and a recovery phrase that must not run in both apps at once.
  The clone URL is the planned giza-kmp repository, which does not exist yet.
- docs/README.md is titled Giza docs and says how to read the documents
  written while the app was Bennu.
- CLAUDE.md gains the rule: name the app Giza, never name Bennu outside a
  comment, and never rename a mantra/ or bennu/ derivation tag.
- docs/scripts/brand-audit.sh --check, run by check (brandAudit) and by the CI
  budgets job, fails on Bennu anywhere in composeApp, iosApp, testing or the
  gradle scripts except in a comment or a "bennu/ tag. It catches the strings
  a merge from Bennu brings in, which giza-rename.sh cannot word.
- The plan gains the twelve bennu/ tags, missed when it was written.

jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid, m3Audit and
brandAudit pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:53:17 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4f3f0da3ca feat: Giza in everything a person reads and on the wire (fork, Phase 4)
- Strings: app_name and the giza key say Giza, as do the eight values that
  named Bennu. Two keys that contained the name are renamed. Two messages that
  meant "has no Marmot key package yet" now say so, since a Bennu user counts.
- Restore: when a recovery phrase is recognised, the sign-in screen says to stop
  using it anywhere else. A seed running in Bennu and Giza at once is two copies
  of one Lightning wallet, which can lose funds.
- Desktop: the window title and the unlock heading come from the catalogue.
  The installers are named Giza (giza on Linux), with a fixed Windows upgrade
  UUID of their own so a Giza MSI never upgrades a Bennu one.
- iOS: PRODUCT_NAME and the product reference are Giza.app.
- Wire: the client tags are Giza and giza. Nothing compares them.
- The twelve bennu/ derivation tags stay as they are. They are hash inputs like
  mantra/, and a Bennu peer and a Giza peer derive the same keys through them.
  Each now has a note saying so. The rebrand-history comments count four.

jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid passes.
m3-audit: all budgets met. It differs from the baseline only by the new restore
line (one more stringResource and one more bodyMedium).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:46:57 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 34e802ce6f refactor: packages, classes and Res under mobi.giza (fork, Phase 3b)
docs/scripts/giza-rename.sh, run over the moves of Phase 3a:

- com.machankura.bennu.{compose,android,desktop} -> mobi.giza.{...}, in
  package lines, imports, fully qualified references, the manifest, mainClass,
  the Android namespace (one value with applicationId again), the m3Audit
  source path, the six docs/scripts tools, and the source links in docs/;
- Res moves from bennu.composeapp.generated.resources to
  mobi.giza.compose.resources, now pinned with packageOfResClass so a later
  rename of the root project leaves the imports alone;
- BennuDatabase, BennuTheme and the other eleven Bennu identifiers are Giza*.

The script's search is now the same pattern as its sed expressions, so on a
renamed tree it finds nothing and changes nothing.

Checked against the Phase 0 baseline: jvmTest 1643 run (1642 + AppDirJvmTest),
0 failed, 2 skipped; compileDebugKotlinAndroid passes; m3-audit prints the
baseline report line for line. iOS is not compiled on this Linux host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:40:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 30d5feaf87 refactor: move the sources to mobi/giza, paths only (fork, Phase 3a)
docs/scripts/giza-rename.sh --moves-only: com/machankura/bennu becomes
mobi/giza in all six source sets, the nine files named Bennu* are named Giza*,
and the Room schema directory moves to mobi.giza.compose.database.GizaDatabase.
Every source file is a 100% rename, so log --follow and blame go straight
through.

This commit does not compile on purpose: the next one rewrites the contents.
The script, which does both, comes with it so a merge from Bennu can re-run it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:35:04 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 78d913aaf2 feat: Giza installs beside Bennu and never opens its data (fork, Phase 2)
The store identities move first, before any rename, because they are what keep
two installed apps apart:

- the desktop data directory is giza, not curated, which is Bennu's. A Giza
  build in curated would open Bennu's database, key store and wallet;
- the Android applicationId is mobi.giza.android (mobi.giza.android.debug on
  debug). The namespace follows with the sources in Phase 3;
- the iOS bundle id is exactly mobi.giza.ios, without the $(TEAM_ID) suffix
  the template appended to Bennu's;
- the regtest compose project is giza-regtest, so it does not replace Bennu's
  containers. The ports are shared, which the README now says.

AppDirJvmTest checks the directory name on all three OS branches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-18 10:34:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4f1b4a4384 feat(lightning): buying inbound liquidity is on, on mainnet
GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED is true, by decision, ahead of the plan's own Phase 0 check
on mainnet: ACINQ's LSP has not yet been seen to accept a splice whose funding key from us does not
change, so the first purchase there is that check. If it refuses, the splice aborts before anything is
signed into it and the purchase is reported failed. A purchase is bounded meanwhile by the mainnet
channel cap, the fee cap the group signs, and every co-signer's checks. The wallet screen now shows Add
liquidity, and the operator's node buys what the group authorises.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 13:09:42 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 94015fd3f8 test(lightning): the group buys liquidity on regtest, end to end (liquidity, Phase 8)
GroupLightningRegtestJvmTest now buys inbound liquidity between receiving and paying: a member prices
200,000 sats from the operator's snapshot, the group authorises it, the operator's node splices, and
every co-signer checks the first commitment on the new output and the shared input before the group
signs. The channel grows from 100,000 to 299,779 sats for 2,521 sats, what the member's device
estimated; a 50,000-sat payment then arrives without an on-the-fly splice; and the run's payment,
mutual close and sweep follow on the spliced channel. No device refuses, and the room gets one line
for the liquidity added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:47:07 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 db7d12b606 feat(lightning): a member asks the group to add inbound liquidity (liquidity, Phase 7)
GroupLightningLiquidityScreen asks as Phoenix asks its owner: Phoenix's amounts on a discrete slider,
less those the LSP does not sell and those past the channel cap; the miner fee, service fee, its year
and the total, priced on this device from the operator's report with lightning-kmp's own arithmetic
(LiquidityPrice, which matches what eclair charged on regtest to the sat); Phoenix's warning at a
quarter of the amount and its stop at the balance; a fee cap with room above the estimate; and a
review sheet with Phoenix's acknowledgement. Then a proposal, and the signing session it opens.

The wallet screen gains Add liquidity on its balance card, or the reason it is not there, a purchase's
state on its channel row, and Inbound liquidity added in its payment list (a nullable liquiditySat on
the payment row, in schema 35). The room gets a line when a purchase locks or fails.

All of it is behind GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED, off until the regtest run passes; the
operator's node buys nothing while it is off. m3Audit meets every budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:45:01 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 be90715dd3 feat(lightning): the operator's node buys the liquidity the group authorised (liquidity, Phase 6)
GroupLightningNode.buyAuthorised runs with the node's other actions, on the watch of kind 30363: for
each open buy-liquidity it has not taken on, it finds the LSP's rate for the amount, estimates at the
node's own feerate, and splices only if the estimate is within the authorisation's cap, buying at the
feerate the estimate raised to, as Phoenix does. Once per authorisation; not while the channel has a
splice that has not locked, which eclair would refuse; a failure is reported and not retried.

The snapshot now carries the LSP's rates and the node's feerate, for a member to price a purchase from,
each purchase's state (waiting, pending, locked, failed with its reason), how many funding outputs each
channel has live, and the purchase as a `liquidity` payment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:33:50 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b481c14cf9 feat(lightning): every co-signer checks a liquidity purchase before the group signs it (liquidity, Phase 5)
A co-signer keeps a ledger per funding output now (schema 35: IcebergChannelLedger keyed by output,
with its index, the parent it spent and the purchase that let it). A commitment on an output it has
no ledger for is the first commitment on a splice's new one: it must follow the newest output by one
index, rebuild from its context, and open from the parent's ledger at the same number with the same
HTLCs, the group's balance lower by no more than an open buy-liquidity authorisation's fee cap
(CoSignerPolicy.openSplice). The shared input is then held to that authorisation: it spends the pinned
output, makes one new output of the group's key with the LSP's under the cap, buys the amount the
group named, is paid from the channel balance alone, costs what the first commitment took to the
msat and no more than the cap, and the LSP puts in what it is paid for. An authorisation is bound to
the parent of the first splice it let, so however many attempts there are, one confirms.

While two outputs are live a payment settles on both at one commitment number; each ledger records
what its last commitment consumed, and a sibling spends only the difference. Before this the second
commitment was refused as under its floor.

GroupLightningSpliceCoSigningJvmTest, seven four-device tests on regtest and mainnet: a purchase the
group signs and the script interpreter accepts, payments over both live outputs, and each refusal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:30:10 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 28f2d5a72a feat(lightning): the group decides to buy inbound liquidity (liquidity, Phase 4)
A fourth action for kind 30363, `buy-liquidity`: one channel, an amount of inbound, a cap on the fee
(our share of the splice's mining fee and the purchase's own together), an expiry, and an id so two
purchases for one channel are two events. An older build reads it as no authorisation at all, and
refuses the splice that follows.

GroupLightningAuthorisations gains liquidityPurchases, prepareBuyLiquidity -- which refuses a purchase
of nothing, or one past the mainnet channel cap, with a LiquidityProblem of its own -- and
proposeBuyLiquidity. The proposal reads "Add 500,000 sats of inbound liquidity", with the fee cap and
the LSP's year, and the room gets a line once the group signs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:14:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 89504df765 feat(lightning): the co-signing wire carries a splice (liquidity, Phase 3)
A splice's shared input now reaches every co-signer with what it is: CoSigningWire.Context type
`splice`, with the parent funding output, the new one by index, the counterparty's new key, both
contributions, the liquidity purchase and the feerate. A commitment's context names its funding index,
and a request carries every other output the transaction spends.

messageOf computes the taproot sighash at the input that spends the funding output, over every spent
output, and is null when the request leaves one out; check 3 lets a splice spend the funding output
once beside the counterparty's inputs, and refuses a request with no hash to compute. A splice is
still refused, now by name, until the co-signer checks one (Phase 5). The context's spec is optional,
since a splice has none, and every check that reads one refuses a context without it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:14:55 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 5bc3f126da test(lightning): a node that keeps its funding key buys liquidity from eclair (liquidity, Phase 0)
LiquidityPurchaseRegtestJvmTest runs on the regtest network: a stock lightning-kmp node whose channel
keys serve index 0's funding key at every index, as a group's node will, buys 200,000 sats of
inbound three times on one channel, each with its signatures delayed longer, then receives a payment
the channel had no room for before.

What it found, recorded in the plan: eclair v0.14.4 accepts a splice whose funding key from us does
not change, and rotates its own; a purchase needs exactly two group signatures, and eclair allows the
whole splice one minute from quiescence (channel.quiescence-timeout), so both have to fit in it
together; the estimate is our mining share plus the purchase's own fees; and a splice does not raise
the channel's in-flight maximum, which this LSP fixes at the capacity the channel opened with.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:13:27 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 dcde4a7330 feat(lightning): the fork tells a signer it is signing a splice (liquidity, Phase 2)
Advances lightning-kmp to the splice signing context: a splice's shared input is signed with a
SigningContext.Splice that names the parent and new funding outputs, both contributions and the
liquidity purchase, and every commitment's context names the funding output it is on. The app maps
the new context to nothing on the wire for now, so a co-signer still reads a splice as unsaid and
refuses it, as before; Phase 3 carries it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:13:14 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 84984ca887 feat(lightning): the key ceremony asks once, and ends itself when it stalls
Joining is now the only approval. Every check in the other two rounds --
a contribution against its commitment, everyone's transcript hash, the
public shares making one key -- is the device's, so after joining it sends
its contributions and confirms by itself. Asking a person to tap through
them only let a member who joined and never came back hold the ceremony
open for everybody.

A ceremony that has not finished 24 hours after its proposal is abandoned
by the first participant's device to notice, checked each minute beside
the group nodes, naming who had not taken their part. The deadline runs
from the proposal's own timestamp, so every device agrees on it, and a
proposal read after its deadline is not filed. Any participant can also
abandon a ceremony from its screen. Before this a ceremony nobody finished
blocked the room for good, since a room runs one at a time.

The group screen's Lightning row test now covers both sides of the row
waiting for an onchain wallet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 10:11:57 +02:00