Commit Graph
741 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 cd7aa36cd0 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/bennu' into claude/group-chain-wallet-plan-93f0e1
Every conflict was the curated-lists removal on bennu meeting a wallet
line added beside it: the removal is taken and the wallet lines kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 10:04:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b8194a4ba3 refactor(wallet): GroupChainWallet is GroupOnchainWallet
And its registry, GroupChainWallets, is GroupOnchainWallets, with the
files, the test and the plan's references following.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 09:52:25 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 f83fe35a45 feat(wallet): ship behind the rollout gates (Phase 10)
GroupWalletRollout holds the three gates, each with what lifts it. The
flag is on, its condition met. Send-an-amount is off, so the form sends
everything confirmed to one address and says so. A spend proposed from
this device on mainnet may send at most 100,000 sats; test networks
have no cap. The gates are on the composer and nothing else: a device
behind them still accepts, shows and signs what another member
proposes, through every check GroupSpend makes.

The plan is marked built, with its table of where the build chose
differently. Full JVM suite: 1474 tests, none failing; the Android
target compiles; every M3 budget is met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:52:16 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 0db1fe8fc8 feat(wallet): the group's spends on its wallet screen (Phase 9, part 2)
Every spend the room proposed, newest first, for every member whether
or not they have a node: what it sends and where it has got to --
waiting for signatures, abandoned, signed, sent (reported back by
Electrum, not merely broadcast), confirmed, or replaced by a later
spend. A signed spend Electrum has not reported can be sent again; a
signed, unconfirmed one can be bumped to twice its feerate, a new
session over the same coins that whichever confirms settles. Each row
opens its signing session.

Full JVM suite: 1473 tests, none failing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:48:19 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 58da7c1285 feat(wallet): broadcast signed spends and settle what a confirmation decides (Phase 9, part 1)
GroupTransactionWatcher, one per identity beside its wallets: every
signed spend still on its way is sent from this device too, sent again
every ten minutes while Electrum has not reported it -- its broadcast
reports success whatever the server said -- and followed to a
confirmation. FrostSigningManager.recordConfirmed then settles every
other spend of the same coins: one still collecting is abandoned as
spent by another transaction, one already signed is marked replaced
rather than failed, and the room gets one line saying it confirmed.

GroupSpendBuilder.bump re-spends the same coins at a higher feerate,
the extra taken from the change or, for a send-all, the one payment.

The test caught a stale write: a pass followed each spend from the list
it started with, so settling one spend was undone by writing the next
back from its old copy. follow() reads its row again first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:43:19 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b1d5963b53 feat(wallet): a form to propose a spend from the group's wallet (Phase 8, part 2)
GroupSendRoute and GroupSendScreen, behind a Send button on the wallet
screen for a member who holds a share and has a node to see the coins
with. Address, amount or send everything, and a feerate prefilled from
Electrum's six-block estimate. The preview is GroupSpendBuilder over the
same inputs the proposal is built from -- what leaves, the fee, what
comes back as change, or why it cannot be built -- and proposing moves
onto the signing session, replacing the form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:38:19 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 6d066e19c0 feat(wallet): build a spend and show it for approval (Phase 8, part 1)
GroupSpendBuilder: send-all, as Phoenix's final wallet does, and an
amount paid largest coin first with change to the next change address,
or to fees when it would be dust. Confirmed coins only, never one an
open spend already holds; the fee is exact before signing because every
witness is 64 bytes. Every built spend passes GroupSpend.check.

The signing screen draws a spend where it draws events: every output
with its address and amount, change labelled, the fee and feerate, and
the coins spent -- read from FrostSigningManager.checkedSpend, the
stored PSBT checked again, and unsignable when this device cannot check
it. The proposal list and the chat notice say "Spend from the group's
wallet". FrostSigningRepository gains proposeSpend, checkedSpend and
reservedOutPoints.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:33:36 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 a24c107b26 feat(wallet): the signing manager signs a spend from the group's wallet (Phase 7)
Kind 30332 opens a session over a PSBT, one item per input, each its own
FROST instance over that input's BIP341 sighash with its own nonce seed
and its own tweak cache. proposeSpend and acceptSpendProposal run the
same GroupSpend checks: every input derives under the account the
room's verified statement gives -- looked up under the ceremony's own
key -- default sighash only, no script-path fields, replaceable, change
only where its claim derives, and a fee under a ceiling. A second
proposal under one id is ignored. completeSpend checks each signature
against its coin's output key and the whole transaction with
correctlySpends before writing it.

An old build does not route 30332, so it never signs a transaction it
cannot show. Resend repeats the PSBT byte for byte. Two-device test:
a quorum spends two coins and both devices hold a transaction that
correctlySpends; each check refuses a hand-built proposal outright.
Full JVM suite: 1458 tests, none failing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:28:32 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 f7a9e05bbc feat(wallet): schema v26 for spends from a group's wallet (Phase 6)
FrostSigningSession.subject, NOT NULL with a default of EVENTS, says
what a session's items are messages of; FrostSigningItem.inputIndex
names the input a transaction item signs, with message and payload as
getters over the existing columns. GroupTransaction holds a spend from
proposal on: the PSBT, written once with IGNORE, the txid fixed before
signing, and the signed transaction, broadcast, seen and confirmed.

AutoMigration(25, 26) is three ADD COLUMNs and a CREATE TABLE -- no
rebuild of either signing table, so no cascade fires.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:15:00 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 24d06d2eee feat(wallet): a screen to open a group's wallet and receive into it (Phase 5)
GroupWalletRoute and GroupWalletScreen, reached from a Group wallet row
on the group's screen. A group that has not opened a wallet gets an
empty state with, for a member who can sign, what opening one asks of
everybody -- including that shares are unencrypted at rest -- and the
button that proposes the statement. An open wallet shows the balance,
confirmed and on the way said apart, the next receive address as a
BIP21 QR code, selectable text and a copy button, the coins, and an
export of the two watch-only descriptors with what they give away.

The wallets are watched on the identity's own Electrum client and made
per PhoenixBusiness in BennuNavHost; a profile with no node sees the
wallet and is told it cannot watch the chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:11:47 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4ab47ba432 feat(wallet): watch a group's wallet on the identity's Electrum client (Phase 4)
GroupChainWallet is Phoenix's FinalWallet for a group: two
ElectrumMiniWallets, one per BIP44 branch since a mini-wallet holds one
generator, gap-limited at 10 for receive and 3 for change, on the shared
client. GroupWalletState gives the coins with the derivation that spends
each, the confirmed and pending balances, the next receive address and
change index, and derivationOf -- bounded by the addresses the wallet
has generated, which is how far a check of a claim will look.

Tested against a fake IElectrumClient: a payment moves the receive
address on, change is counted and never offered, and two groups on one
client see only their own coins.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:05:28 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 caddfdc107 feat(wallet): the group opens its wallet by signing a statement (Phase 3)
Kind 30331, inner only: the account xpub, the network, the account
number and both descriptors. A reader believes one only when the room
signed it and the room's threshold key rederives every value it
carries -- GroupWallet.of, used by the repository and by the transcript
arm alike. The broadcast screen refuses the kind twice, at the loader
and in sendToRelays, because the xpub on a relay is the whole balance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 08:00:59 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 4330faacd7 feat(wallet): derive a group wallet's keys from its threshold key (Phase 1)
GroupWalletDerivation: a public account step -- a tagged HMAC over the
threshold key, the network and an account number -- gives a depth-0 xpub,
and below it BIP86's own unhardened tail, /<change>/<index>, with the
key-path tweak on top. Each address is computed twice, as points and as
tweaks on a FROST cache, and refused if the two disagree.

Tests: BIP86's published vectors through the cache prove the tail; a
pinned vector freezes the account step; a sweep covers both parities.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 07:55:01 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 56a942c610 Remove the curated-lists feature
Bennu no longer speaks curare.to's list protocol. The schemas, templates,
entries and the suggestion queue go, with their six screens, routes, view
models, strings and tests, and the hooks into the group screen, the paste
proposal, proposal summaries, broadcast relay seeding, the chat repository
and the transcript.

The two transcript message types stay as private legacy names so rows
already stored still render as system lines rather than chat bubbles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 11:45:45 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5.5 b75d4b427f Rebrand Curare to Bennu under com.machankura.bennu
Move the packages to com.machankura.bennu.{compose,android,desktop}, the
Android applicationId to com.machankura.bennu.android and the iOS bundle
id to com.machankura.bennu.ios. The root project, launcher label, iOS
product, desktop window, user-facing strings, client tags and the
Curare* classes all say Bennu now.

Left alone on purpose: the mantra/ derivation tags, the `curated` desktop
data directory, the mantra.press relay and the curare.to references.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 13:53:45 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 72cfb561c4 feat(proposals): ask again about everything the filter is showing
The bulk control I argued against, built -- and the objection turned out to be
solvable rather than fatal, so it is worth recording what happened to it.

Half of it was already handled. Two resends in the same second do not collide
on the outbound row id: `broadcast` hashes that id over the session's own tags
and steps a second forward when it finds a collision rather than overwriting.
Different sessions were never at risk.

The other half was real. A resend publishes two messages, and `resend` keeps to
two deliberately because "publishing in bursts is what the skipped-keys bug
feeds on"; three proposals at once is six, in the same second that "two events
published in the same second race, and exactly one survives" was written about.
So the sessions are spaced rather than the budget quietly raised --
`resendAll` waits `RESEND_SPACING` between them, one second, which is the
resolution the protocol works in because `created_at` is stored to the second.

The pacing lives in the manager and not in the loop that wanted it, because
everything that justifies it does: MLS generations, relay ordering, outbound
ids. A caller that launched `resend` per session would put every burst into one
second, and the call site is the wrong place to know why that matters. There is
a test against the real manager that three sessions take longer than two
spacings and claim three different seconds.

What it acts on is `visible`, not the room: a bulk control reaching rows the
reader cannot see is its one unforgivable move. A cooling-down row is left out
of the count rather than included and skipped, because the count is what the
button says out loud and offering three while able to send two is a lie told
before the tap. Offered from two up: one is what the row's own button is for.

Every covered row goes quiet for the whole run rather than for its own turn --
a paced run means a row whose turn has not come is still about to publish, and
a row button offering to send it meanwhile would send it twice. A session
already in flight on its own is left out of the run for the same reason.

It is offered on any filter showing two it can act on, not only "being signed".
That filter is where it earns its place -- three rows stalled for one reason --
but the rule is about what is on screen, not about which chip put it there.

1419 jvm tests pass, the Android target compiles, all audit budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 16:04:13 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 4330d718be feat(proposals): ask the quiet members again from the row
The offer the signing screen already makes, reached from the list. A
coordinator whose room has stalled should not have to open each proposal in
turn to find the button, and filtering to "being signed" now puts every stalled
one in front of them at once.

It is on the row and not on the chip, which is where it was asked for, for
three reasons. A chip is a selection control, and giving it a second action
would make the control that publishes the one you cannot undo. A chip stands
for several proposals while `resend` takes one session, so a chip-level button
means resending all of them -- and the manager caps itself at two messages per
resend precisely because "publishing in bursts is what the skipped-keys bug
feeds on", which three proposals at six messages would re-create. And the offer
is the coordinator's alone and only exists while somebody owes, so on a chip
standing for a mixed set it would be enabled for proposals it cannot act on.

It is called "ask again" rather than "re-broadcast" for the same reason the
list calls a review a review: somebody who found the button on the signing
screen and then found this one should not have to work out that two labels are
one button.

Whether to offer it is asked of `membersOwing`, not derived from the signature
count. Past the nonces a signer who refused has answered and is owed nothing
while the count is still short by one, so a row reading `have < need` would
offer to knock on a door that has already been shut. That is one query per row
and the only one on this screen, so it is asked for as few rows as possible:
not ours to send, nothing to send, and already ended all answer without
touching the database. An ended session is left out although the manager would
take it -- re-sending a completed one delivers the signature to a member who
never applied it, which is worth a button on the one proposal's screen rather
than a query per row on a list that only grows. The signing screen still offers
it.

Guarded per session rather than by one flag for the screen, because these rooms
have several proposals open at once and a coordinator working down the list
should not be locked out of the second by the first still publishing. The
cooldown disables rather than hides, as it does on the signing screen: a
control that vanishes after a tap reads as one that failed.

1396 jvm tests pass, the Android target compiles, all audit budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 15:45:58 -05:00
Kgothatso Ngako 1f82d66f57 Merge branch 'curated' into claude/proposal-state-filters-8cc06c 2026-10-08 14:56:24 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 7c6e9b0a84 feat(proposals): say how far a proposal has got, not just what it is waiting for
A row said "waiting for 2 of 3 members to take part" on the day a proposal was
made and on the day before it completed. That is the rule, not the progress.
Now it says "1 of 3 members have offered to sign", and on the next stage "2 of
3 signatures are in" -- the fractions that actually move.

Nothing is counted once it has ended, which is both endings and not only the
happy one. A signed session has nothing left to gather; an abandoned one has
counts frozen where they stopped, and "2 of 3" beside a failure invites the
reader to wait for a third that is never coming. The failure reason is what
that row has to say.

The denominators are the ones the protocol gates on. `orderedNonces` returns
nothing until `threshold` nonces have arrived and then takes the first
`threshold` of them, so the threshold is both what is needed and what is used --
the room's size is a bigger number nothing waits for. Once the signer set
exists it is the set being waited on, which is the same count from the other
side.

The numerator is the part that had to be got right. A nonce or a partial
signature is recorded with no check on who sent it, unlike a refusal, and
`orderedNonces` drops the ones from members holding no share when it
aggregates. So the tally joins `DkgParticipantMessage` on HOST_KEY and counts
members rather than rows: a count including strangers would have a row read
ahead of the coordinator, saying the group has what it needs while the session
sits still. That is the one direction a progress figure must never be wrong in,
and there is a DAO test for it. A count that still runs ahead -- a nonce
landing before this device runs `advance` -- is clamped, because a fraction
over one reads as a bug rather than as a session about to move.

The counts travel as their own `GROUP BY` flow, combined with the sessions in
the view model. They change far more often than the rows do, and carrying the
messages themselves would carry every nonce payload the room has ever exchanged
to a screen that only wants to count them.

The progress is its own line rather than a clause, so a reader scanning for the
one that is nearly there does not have to read a sentence to find out. That
left `statusOf` saying only who the reader is in the proposal, and since this
adds user-facing text its remaining literals moved to the catalogue with it --
nine strings that had been raw in the screen since before the catalogue rule.

1367 jvm tests pass, the Android target compiles, all audit budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 14:53:59 -05:00
Kgothatso Ngako f0cbb2785b Merge branch 'curated' into claude/partial-signature-collection-d44dab 2026-10-08 14:38:13 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 a9532ff115 fix(frost): resume a session whose own turn was cut short
Every step a session takes is driven by a message arriving, and a device
killed part way through its own pass is waiting on one that has already
been delivered. The signer set is recorded, so it will never be processed
again; the partial signature it would have produced was never made. The
coordinator asking again cannot reach past it either -- what a resend
asks a member for is the message this device believes it already sent --
so the session is a dead end on both sides, and in a room with several
open proposals it is the one that was mid-pass that stops.

So one sweep that no message drives: on opening a room, every session in
it that is not settled and whose owner has answered is handed to
`advance`, which does what it always does. It publishes nothing new --
each step asks whether its output exists rather than whether a stage says
it ran -- and only answered sessions are passed in, so the approval gate
is not approached, let alone reached past. A refusal counts as an answer
for the same reason: a device killed between deciding and publishing says
it on the next open rather than never.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 14:33:13 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 1e59fd2334 fix(frost): a knock past the nonces is for the signers, not the quiet
A resend had one idea of who it was for at every stage -- the share
holders it had heard nothing at all from -- and that is a question only
the first stage can answer. A session reaches
COLLECTING_PARTIAL_SIGNATURES because enough members offered a nonce, so
every member who could be holding it up has been heard from: the set came
back holding the members who were never chosen and owe nothing, while the
chosen signer whose partial signature went missing was named nowhere.
Once the unchosen had answered or refused the set was empty, and the
control gave up before it reached the branch written for the stall it was
meant to repair.

So the set asks what the stage can answer. Of the signers the coordinator
chose, who has yet to send a partial signature -- which is the half of a
resend only they can carry out, since a partial signature is read by
nobody but the coordinator and no other device can repeat it. COMPLETE
keeps the old reading, and correctly: the signature is the coordinator's
own and nobody answers it.

The screen now asks the manager who is owed rather than deriving it from
the rows beside the button, the way it already asks about approvals: the
same reading decides whether a resend publishes anything, and two copies
of a rule that changes with the stage is a screen offering a knock the
manager would refuse. The transcript line and the notice say what the
members named are short of, since past the nonces they have answered once
already.

The test that looked like it covered this passed because it wrote the
stage into the row with no nonce on file anywhere -- a state the protocol
cannot produce, and exactly the state that hid the bug. It now reaches
the stage by offering a real nonce.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 14:32:09 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 13ae0a1def feat(proposals): tell the two open stages apart, because they are not alike
"In progress" was one chip over two situations that ask different things of
the reader, and collapsing them was the wrong call.

Short of members, a proposal can still die of indifference: refusals are
counted against `declinesThatAbandon`, so one more may end it, and a member who
is offline is indistinguishable from one who has not looked. It is also the
only stage the coordinator's resend is for. These are the proposals somebody
may have to do something about.

Once the signer set is written, none of that is true. `signerIds` is written
once and never revised, so no further refusal is counted against it, and what
is left is arithmetic the chosen devices have already committed to. Where one
asks whether this will happen, the other says it is happening.

So: WAITING_ON_MEMBERS and BEING_SIGNED, named for what the reader is waiting
on rather than for the protocol step -- "collecting nonces" is true and says
nothing. The icons carry it as well as the labels, people against machinery,
which is the only signal a monochrome display has.

What is *not* split, and the comments say why: whether this device was picked
to sign, and whether the reader agreed or declined. Those are facts about the
reader rather than states of the proposal, so they stay a sentence on the row.
Splitting on them would be splitting every state by who is looking.

The classification is now the stage plus one, which is the shape it was always
going to take -- the one being NEEDS_YOU, which no stage can express.

Six chips means the last two now sit past the fold at phone widths, so the
screen test measures order only over what the viewport lays out and the full
lifecycle order is pinned on the enum, where no viewport is involved.

1342 jvm tests pass, the Android target compiles, all audit budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 14:26:25 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 18c6245181 feat(proposals): open on the queue when that is what was asked for
The transcript's notice counts the proposals waiting on this member and says
so. A tap on it that then showed the room's whole signing history would have
the reader go and find the three it had just named for them, so the route
carries a filter and the notice asks for the queue.

`ProposalListRoute.filter` defaults to ALL, which is both the honest default
and what every caller predating it reads back as -- the group's own Proposals
row still means "show me the room".

The transcript's other way in turns out to be two ways, not one, and they
wanted different lists. A line too old to name its session could be about
anything the group has ever signed, so it opens the room. A tap held back
*because several decisions are waiting* was held back for those decisions, not
for the history -- so it opens on them. That decision now lives in
`proposalDestination` instead of in a condition nine levels down a LazyColumn,
which is the only way anything could be held to it.

Nine tests over the three branches, including that the queue is offered only
for the proposal actually tapped -- a line about something already signed is
history, and handing its reader the queue would invert what
`hidesOtherDecisions` is for. The filter's ride on a type-safe route is pinned
too: navigation reads an argument's NavType off the serial descriptor and takes
an ENUM as a string, so the test fails if the filter ever becomes a shape
navigation cannot place.

The notice's own one-line wiring is not itself covered -- it builds a route
inside the transcript's lambda -- so it rests on the route tests and on review.

1338 jvm tests pass, the Android target compiles, all audit budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 12:01:40 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 ef2b461c5c feat(proposals): a chip row over the list, and four ways of being empty
Five chips under the app bar, each carrying its count, scrolling sideways. The
row is outside the list rather than its first item, because a control that
scrolls away is a control the reader has to scroll back for -- and the list it
filters is as long as the group's whole signing history. It scrolls rather than
wraps for the same reason from the other side: five counted chips do not fit
the sixty characters `readableContent` holds the column to at the largest text
size a reader can ask for, and a row reflowing to a second line moves the list
under the thumb about to tap it.

Unfiltered, the two sections stay. Filtered, they go: "waiting for you" against
"everything else" is a distinction the reader has already made by tapping, and
heading a single-state list with it would answer a question nobody asked.

A room with nothing in it gets no chips at all. Five chips reading 0 over an
empty screen would be five ways of saying what the empty state says once.

The screen also picks up the state widgets it never had -- `LoadingDataIndicator`,
`ErrorState` with an explicit `onRetry = null` because a room missing from this
device will not appear by looking again, and `EmptyState` with a message per
filter. That last one is the point: one shared default is how five different
absences here came to say one thing. A group never asked to sign and a queue
the reader has worked through are not the same fact, and the second is not an
absence at all -- it keeps the queue's own icon and reads as finished.

`initialFilter` reaches the screen and is applied in the view model's `init`,
so a `Loaded` handed in for a preview cannot open with its chips saying one
thing and its rows showing another. Nothing passes it yet.

Fourteen screen tests, and the audit's budgets all still met: 0 hardcoded
colours, 0 dp literals in spacing positions, 0 title-case strings, both floors
held. 1329 jvm tests pass; the Android target compiles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 11:53:45 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 f42f4913c4 feat(proposals): a filter over those states, that a busy room cannot clear
`Loaded` gains the selection, the rows it selects and a count per state. The
rows come from the selection and the numbers come from the room, on purpose: a
chip reading its own count off the filtered list would say 0 for every filter
but the one already chosen, which is the one number the reader does not need.

Every state gets a chip, zero included. A row that gains and loses chips as
sessions advance moves under the thumb of the person reading it -- and sessions
advance while this screen is open, because someone else signing is exactly when
a member comes to look.

The selection lives on the view model and not only on the state drawn from it,
which is the part worth the comment it carries. `observeSessionsForChatRoom`
re-emits whenever any member's message moves any session in the room, and the
collect block builds a whole new `Loaded` each time; one built with the field's
default would snap the chips back to "all" mid-scroll, most often in the
busiest rooms. Four of the seven view-model tests fail if that line goes, which
was checked by removing it.

`initialFilter` is threaded through the constructor and the factory so a caller
can land on a filter -- the first emission is then already filtered, and the
reader never sees the unfiltered list flash past. Nothing passes it yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 11:40:51 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 6a55889676 feat(proposals): name the four states a proposal can be in
The list screen asks "where has this got to" in four places -- the section
split, the row's icon, that icon's description and its status line -- and each
worked it out for itself from the stage and the approval timestamps. A filter
over those states would have been a fifth derivation, and a fifth derivation is
how a chip comes to count a proposal the row beneath it describes differently.

So the question is asked once, on `Proposal`, and the four readers read it.

The classification deliberately is not `FrostSigningStage`. The one state
anybody opens this screen looking for -- waiting on me -- is not a stage at all:
an open session waiting on this member and one waiting on everybody else are
both COLLECTING_NONCES, and what separates them is `signApprovedAt` and
`signDeclinedAt` being null. `awaitsYou` is tried first and wins; the stage
decides only among the rest, exhaustively and with no `else`, so a stage added
later fails to compile here rather than landing quietly in IN_PROGRESS.

`statusOf` still switches on the stage, and has to: the three things it says
about an open session -- you agreed, you declined, you were picked to sign --
are exactly the distinctions IN_PROGRESS collapses.

Two behaviours are pinned rather than fixed, because both are parity with
`isAwaitingApproval` and the signing screen gates its buttons on that:

 - a session whose proposal has not arrived yet classifies NEEDS_YOU, although
   the card says there is nothing in it to read;
 - a batch the group finished without this member is IN_PROGRESS until
   `advance` closes it, which is also what the row already said.

The preview gains an in-progress and an abandoned sample, so the conformance
sweep renders every icon and every status line in all six schemes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 11:34:36 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 daf8365a6e fix(frost): a resend names the whole room, because the p-tags are its identity
The resend narrowed its NIP-17 p-tags to the members it was for, on the
reasoning that a wrap is sealed per recipient so repeating one for the whole
room wastes wraps. Both halves of that were wrong.

A receiver does not read the p-tags as a recipient list. It hashes them together
with the sender to work out which room the payload belongs to --
`GiftWrapPayload.aggregatedParticipantsPublicKey`, via
`ChatRoom.deriveChatRoomId`, which is what `GiftWrapSeal.decryptGiftWrapPayload`
files an inbound payload under. Leave a member out and the id changes, so the
resend is filed under a room that does not exist; `getOrCreateChatRoom` then
mints that room rather than rejecting it. A repaired session would have become a
phantom two-person conversation in the reader's list, and the session would have
stayed stalled.

There was no saving to trade against it either: `sealGiftWrapPayload` wraps for
every participant of the room it looks up, not for the p-tags it was handed, so
a narrowed payload cost exactly as many wraps as a full one.

Who a resend is for travels in `frost_silent`, which is not part of that hash,
so nothing is lost by naming everybody.

Marmot was never affected -- a group event names nobody and is routed by its
h-tag.

The two tests that asserted the narrowing now assert the opposite, which is the
property worth having: the p-tag set does not change between a publish and its
repeat. The p-tags were the right thing to assert all along; they just mean
something other than what they look like.

Found while answering whether this is backwards compatible with older receivers.
It is -- no new kind, an unknown tag that old builds ignore, and every
duplicate-folding gate in `record` and `acceptProposal` predates this work. This
bug was never a compatibility bug; it broke old and new receivers identically.

1279 tests, no failures. m3Audit: all budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 15:22:52 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 2edd05f3ca fix(frost): a broadcast that queued nothing records nothing
`broadcast` now says whether it queued anything, and `publishOwn` records the
local copy only when it did. The copy is what stops `advance` from publishing
that message again, so writing one for a message that never went out is a
message the group waits on forever -- the exact opposite of the trade the
queue-then-record order exists to make. The comment on `publishOwn` had that
trade written down in one direction only.

Reachable only through the id-collision guard added with the resend, which
refuses after four tries rather than overwriting a sent row. Four consecutive
seconds of the same message is not something a person with a button can do, but
"unreachable" and "safe when reached" are different claims.

Also brings the docs up to what was built: the resend note is in the index, the
skipped-keys note points at it as the recovery for the failure it describes --
a new message is encrypted at a generation the receiver has not passed, which is
the whole mechanism -- and the plan records the two things landing it turned up,
plus `ask_again` being reused from the catalogue rather than duplicated.

1279 tests, no failures. m3Audit: all budgets met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 15:09:57 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 aee19737f6 feat(frost): the knock, under the list of doors it is for
The resend gets its affordance on the signing screen, below the member list and
above the approval block. The list is already the screen's answer to whose door
to knock on; this is the knock.

Coordinator only, and the state says why rather than leaving it to the button:
`acceptProposal` takes a session's coordinator from the author of the proposal
that opened it, so a resend from anybody else would have a member who was
missing the session believe the resender coordinates -- and then drop the real
coordinator's signer set.

`silent` is derived on the UI state rather than collected. Everything it is made
of is already there -- the share holders, who offered a nonce, who signed, who
refused -- and a second flow would be a second thing that can disagree with the
rows the screen draws. A member who refused is not silent: they answered.

The cooldown disables the button rather than hiding the section, because a
control that vanishes after a tap reads as one that failed, and what happened is
that it worked. `resend` hands back whether anything went out, so the snackbar
says which: asked again, or everyone has since answered and there was nobody
left to ask.

The transcript line gets its own icon. A resend must not read as a second
proposal, which is the one thing a session can never have -- two proposals under
one session id would be asking for two signatures out of one secret nonce.

`ask_again` already existed in the catalogue for re-querying a list's relays and
means exactly this, so it is reused rather than duplicated.

m3Audit: all budgets met. jvmTest: 1260 tests, no failures.

Plan: docs/frost-session-resend.md, Phases 5-7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 15:01:09 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 01e022fdcc feat(frost): a proposer can resend a signing session
A session can sit in COLLECTING_NONCES forever waiting on a member who would
have agreed, because the message asking them never arrived. MLS moved its
ratchet past the generation it came in at, which is terminal at the receiver and
invisible to the sender (docs/mls-skipped-keys.md); or a disappearing-message
group expired it off the relay; or the member joined the room after the proposal
was made, holding a share from an earlier ceremony. None of them heals on its
own, and nothing asked the sender to resend.

`FrostSigningManager.resend` repeats what the coordinator wrote -- the proposal,
and whichever of the signer set or the signature the stage has reached. A resent
message is a *new* message: new created_at, new id, encrypted at a generation
the receiver has not passed, carrying a fresh expiry. That is why it works where
the first copy did not.

Two and never three. Publishing in bursts is what the skipped-keys bug feeds on,
and a recovery for it that re-creates it is no recovery, so the stage table is a
minimum rather than "send everything".

The resent proposal names the members the coordinator has heard nothing from, and
a named device republishes what *it* already sent -- the stored bytes, under its
own key. That is the only half that can repair a nonce lost on the way *to* the
coordinator: `advance` republishes a message it has no local copy of, so a device
that published and recorded its nonce would never send it again. It publishes
nothing new, so a nudge cannot talk a device into putting its share behind events
its owner has not approved.

Coordinator-only, both halves, and that is correctness rather than etiquette:
`acceptProposal` takes coordinatorPublicKey from the proposal's author, so a
non-coordinator resending to a member with no session row would have that member
drop the real coordinator's signer set.

Also fixes a bug `broadcast` had all along. An outbound row's primary key is a
hash over its created_at, stored to the second, so a message re-published inside
that second hashes to the id of the copy it repeats -- and the upsert put an
already-sent row back on the queue with marmotGroupEventId cleared, double-sending
it and losing its mapping to the group event it became. It now steps past a taken
id rather than writing over it, and refuses after four tries.

Schema 24 -> 25 for FrostSigningSession.resentAt, which is the cooldown and the
second line of defence on that collision. Phase 4's column, pulled forward
because Phase 2 needs it.

Plan: docs/frost-session-resend.md, Phases 2-4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 14:56:15 -05:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 7bc00af304 feat(frost): a tag naming the members a resend is for
A proposer can resend what the proposer wrote and nothing else. A nonce or a
refusal relayed by somebody else is filed under the relayer -- `record` keys a
signer's message on the inner event's own pubkey -- and for a refusal that is a
way to manufacture one, which in an n-of-n group abandons a session nobody
refused.

So a resent proposal names the quiet members instead, and their own devices
republish what they already said, under the keys that said it. This is the tag
that names them: `frost_silent`, all-or-nothing like `frost_signers`, because a
list naming the wrong people is worse than no list at all.

Additive on the wire. A build that does not know the tag ignores it and accepts
the proposal it rides on, which is the half of a resend that fixes the common
case -- a member who never saw the proposal because MLS dropped the generation
it arrived at (docs/mls-skipped-keys.md) or a disappearing-message group expired
it off the relay.

Plan: docs/frost-session-resend.md, Phase 1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 14:46:18 -05:00
Kgothatso b9140c6a27 fix(ios): build ktor clients on Darwin so wss/https work on a device
CIO has no TLS implementation on kotlin/native, so every secure
connection died at the handshake with "TLS sessions are not supported
on Native platform". Pick the engine per platform -- CIO on android
and the desktop jvm, Darwin on ios -- and pin both the relay socket
client and coil's image fetcher to it.
2026-09-15 09:42:38 +02:00
Kgothatso 987df2c8f6 feat(ios): declare publish cancellation and the Room constructor to swift
@Throws(CancellationException) on the publish path so swift sees a
cancellation as one, @ConstructedBy so Room can build the database on
ios, an unused import out of Platform.ios.kt, and the development
TEAM_ID for signing.
2026-09-15 08:58:53 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 79ff9ee1fc fix(chat): the detail pane's view models are the selected room's, not the first one's
In an expanded window the transcript beside the room list showed the
first room opened and stayed there: pick another room and the list
moved on while the pane did not. HomeScreen wraps the pane in
key(chatRoomId), which rebuilds the composition when the selection
changes, but viewModel() does not read composition keys. It scopes to
the nearest ViewModelStoreOwner, and in the pane that is the home
destination's one back stack entry for every room, so the second room's
viewModel(factory = ...) got the first room's ChatRoomMessagingViewModel
and ChatMessageListViewModel back with its factory ignored. A phone never
showed it because a pushed room is its own entry with its own store.

The pane now provides LocalViewModelStoreOwner with
rememberViewModelStoreOwner() under the room key: a store per room,
cleared when the selection moves on, and parked in the home entry's
store so that it survives a rotation. Keying the two viewModel() calls
on the room would have unstuck the pane too, at the price of keeping
every room ever opened -- four DB collectors each -- in the home entry's
store for as long as the home screen lives.

ChatPaneSelectionJvmTest opens two rooms and comes back to the first,
told apart by what was said in them since a name is on the row as well
as the bar; its third case checks the room left behind stops collecting,
which is the case the keyed alternative fails. The conformance doc's
account of the hand-built pair records the trap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 20:10:13 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 30685924db feat(curated): the date field type, and an unknown type is kept aside rather than dropped
CuratedFieldType had no `date`, so a schema declaring one lost the field
at parse: entries were read without it, the accept flow copied a
suggestion into a canonical entry without it, validation never asked for
it, and the entry published cleanly -- and was refused by every client
that did know the type, for the required field it lacked. Fourteen of
bitcoin.necropolis.report's entries went out that way without a `died`.

`Date` is the NIP's tenth type: `YYYY`, `YYYY-MM` or `YYYY-MM-DD`, at
whatever precision the record allows, with `min` and `max` bounding the
year. `CuratedDate.parse` is the check -- month 1-12, day on the calendar
for that month and year, leap days included -- and the value is kept as
written. `checkValue` returns early the way the numeric branch does, so
`max` is a year and never a length cap. The value is not numeric, so
`isNumeric` stays false; `isBounded` is what the editor keys its min/max
inputs off instead, labelled as years for a date.

The root failure was wider than one type: any type this build does not
know was dropped the same way. A `field` tag of an unknown type is now
kept aside as CuratedUnsupportedField, the way CuratedFieldConfig.others
keeps unknown config keys. Reading is unchanged -- an entry is checked
against the fields a reader understands, which is the NIP's tolerance --
but the accept flow refuses to propose under a required one, naming the
type, and the schema editor carries it through an edit and writes it back
as it came, so re-signing a list here cannot change its rules unseen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 19:30:02 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 984db0a180 Merge branch 'curated' into claude/quartz-1-15-2-compat-c8267f
Both sides had taken schema version 21: curated for the nullable
FrostSigningSession.signDeclinedAt (one refusal takes a member out of the n),
this branch for the Marmot current profile's three columns, with 22 and 23
behind it for the routing table and the publish obligations. Curated keeps 21.
This branch's three migrations move up one -- 21->22, 22->23, 23->24 -- and
the database is at 24; the comment on 22 says they moved and why.

The exported schemas for 22 and 23 could not be hand-edited, since each is a
snapshot of the whole entity set with an identity hash over it, and could
not be produced from the merged tree, which only exports its own version. So
each was regenerated the way the originals were: the tree of the commit that
introduced it (Phase 3 for 22, Phase 4 for 23), with curated's entity change
and its 21.json dropped in, the version bumped, and KSP run. The result is
what a device on curated's 21 migrates through: 22 adds the three columns
and nothing else, 23 adds MarmotRouting, 24 adds MarmotPublishObligation and
MarmotOutboundGate together with MarmotCommitResult.obligationId, and every
one of them carries signDeclinedAt. 24.json is the merged tree's own export.

Everything else merged itself: ChatMessage's kinds and line types, the
transcript's icons, the strings, the nav host. Full jvmTest 1220 green,
Android debug compile, M3 audit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 08:09:54 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 9b404e2035 fix(frost): the signing screen lists the key's share holders, not the room
The members list on "Sign with the group's key" was the room's roster, and a
room is not the set that can sign with its key. A member invited after the
ceremony holds no share: the proposal they receive is dropped before it
becomes a session on their device, and no nonce or refusal of theirs would
count. The screen drew them a row anyway, in a list whose whole purpose is to
say whose door to knock on.

The list is now the ceremony's share holders -- the members who put a host
key into it, read off DkgParticipantMessage through the new
FrostSigningRepository.observeShareHolders. That is the same set
FrostSigningManager places signer ids over, so what the screen lists cannot
disagree with whose messages the session counts, and a ceremony cannot
complete without every participant's host key, so for a completed one it is
the whole participant set. Names still come off the room, in the room's
order; a share holder the room no longer holds keeps a placeholder row, since
their share did not leave with them.

The view model follows the session to its ceremony with flatMapLatest, and
the list is empty until the ceremony has been read rather than falling back
to the room -- a fallback would flash everybody and then correct itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 07:53:21 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 a7f3917e65 fix(frost): one refusal takes a member out of the n; it takes n - t + 1 to abandon
"Don't sign" ended the session for everybody: decline() failed it locally and
broadcast a FAILURE, which every other device failed on arrival. In a group
whose whole reason for running a ceremony was that no one member is needed,
one member's no was everybody's.

A refusal is now its own kind, DECLINE (30330), and one FrostSignerMessage per
member, like a nonce. Every device counts the refusals it has received from
ceremony participants against the same arithmetic -- FrostSigningSession.
declinesThatAbandon(), which is n - t + 1 -- and fails the session only on the
refusal that leaves fewer than t who could still sign. Nobody broadcasts the
abandonment, because nobody has to: each device reaches it the way each writes
its own transcript, and a FAILURE sent to say so would blame one member for the
group's arithmetic. In a 2-of-3 group the first refusal changes nothing the
other two can do; the second ends it. FAILURE keeps meaning abandon-and-blame,
for the faults no quorum can work around, and a build predating the new kind
still sends its refusals that way and is honoured as it always was.

decline() takes approve()'s shape: the decision goes on the row, as the new
nullable signDeclinedAt (Room v21, an AutoMigration), and advance() publishes
it whenever the row says so and no copy is on file -- so a device killed
between deciding and sending says it on the next message rather than never. A
member who refused is not asked again, but the session stays open around them
and closes when the group's signature arrives. Refusals from a member holding
no share of the key are turned away at the door.

fail() now leaves a COMPLETE session alone. A member who refused before their
device had seen the signature has refused something that no longer needed
them, and a late FAILURE used to flip a signed session to failed.

The transcript gets a TYPE_FROST_DECLINED line for a refusal the session
survives, with the count -- "declined to sign. It takes 2 of 3 members, and 2
could still sign." -- and the tipping refusal is written as the FAILED line in
that member's name, saying both that they declined and that it was the one
that ended it. A reader's own refusal settles their request line, and only
theirs; nothing earns a tick. The signing screen marks who declined and says
how many could still sign, and the proposal list says "You declined." where it
said "You agreed."

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 07:37:29 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 de5b2bd4a6 docs(marmot): the v2 plan is built -- where the build chose differently, and where the rollout stands (v2 Phase 9)
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 9. The phase has no code in it; it is the rollout,
and the rollout is a flip and a retirement that wait on the people this
app's users invite. What the phase owes the document is the repo's
convention for a plan that has been built: the status paragraph, the table
of where the implementation chose differently, the thing found on the way
that belongs to nobody's phase, and the commit the account was written
against. All four are here now, and the phases themselves are kept as
written, because they are the reasoning and the code reads better against
the argument it came from than against a summary of itself.

The table has twenty-two rows, and the first is the one to read before any
of the code: the plan said the library's engine replaces the app's pipeline,
and the build made a room's profile pick its pipeline instead -- legacy
rooms keep the app's path, comparator and cache included, and retire with
the profile; current-profile rooms go through `MarmotEngine`. The library's
processor has no carve-out for the bare gift wrap a legacy direct message is
carried in, so under it every one of those would have stopped decrypting,
and the legacy pipeline is frozen anyway. Most of the other rows follow from
that one: one store rather than four, no message-id column, the rotation
manager constructed and unused, the engine hanging off the database rather
than an identity's scope. The rest record the smaller turns -- the envelope's
kind, the chronicle cap measured escaped, the KeyPackage not last-resort, the
admin refused before a leave is attempted, captions from the participants
diff rather than a snapshot column, no rename, the two non-chat kinds only,
the four Phase 8 scenarios spread over four tests -- and the three
follow-ups that closed lines the phases' own commits had missed: the
outbound hold while a pass is open, the rejected commit discarded, and the
1210/1009 bubbles.

The thing found on the way is quartz 1.15.2's: its convergence rebuilds a
candidate branch by replaying its commits against the retained parent, and
a member cannot replay a commit it authored, so a fork this device is half
of is scored with its own branch stale and two committers swap branches
rather than agree. Every device that only observed still agrees, which is
the case the app depends on and the first fork test holds; the second pins
the swap and says what to do the day it fails. The paragraph says the
practical exposure is small and why, and that the Phase 5 follow-up on
withdrawing a losing branch's rows waits on the same fix.

Phase 9's own section gains "Where it stands": everything ships built and
unflipped -- `DEFAULT_FOR_NEW_ROOMS` is legacy, both slots are published, no
room is on the current profile unless a caller asked by name -- so the first
of the three one-way doors is behind us and the other two wait on the flip.
The README's row and reading-order paragraph now say the plan has been
built and point at the table's first and last rows.

One code change, a comment: the plan's Phase 5 asked that the two library
gaps the rewrite does not close -- the retained-epoch decrypt without sender
verification, and the skipped keys that do not survive `saveState` -- be
said where the new code is, rather than let the rewrite look like it closed
them. `MarmotEngine`'s class doc now says both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 00:16:10 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 2bbe1fc9bc feat(marmot): a commit every relay refuses is discarded, and the room is free again
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 6: "a terminal rejection resolves FAILED, discarding
the pending state with the live group already correct." The phase's commit
built the CONFIRMED half and left every other outcome pending, on the
grounds that the broadcast queue reported a timeout and a relay's refusal
the same way -- both were "failed" -- and a timeout must stay pending, since
its retry re-sends the same bytes and may yet be accepted. The cost of that
was a room whose commit a relay refused outright: its obligation never
resolved, `canPrepareLocalCommit` stayed false, and every later invite,
removal or disband was refused with "try again in a moment" for as long as
the room existed. The refusal was re-sent on every launch and refused again.

The two are distinguishable, and now are. `RelayPool` already surfaces an
`["OK", id, false, reason]` as a `NostrPublishException` carrying the relay's
reason, apart from socket errors and timeouts; `BroadcastStatus.of(error)`
turns that into a status. A reason a relay will keep giving -- `blocked:`,
`invalid:`, `pow:`, `restricted:` -- is the new "rejected", which the requeue
on launch leaves alone: the same bytes to the same relay get the same answer.
A `rate-limited:` or `error:` refusal is "failed" like a timeout, because
those change. And a `duplicate:` refusal is "published": the relay is saying
it has the event, which is what published means, and it is the answer a
byte-identical retry gets from a relay that took the first copy. The four
statuses that were string literals across the sync pump, the navigation gate
and the DAO are named on the same object.

`DatabaseNostrRepository.broadcastProcessed` gains the relay's reason and a
"rejected" branch. One relay's refusal decides nothing -- another may still
accept, and a timeout on another is retried -- so the obligation is
discarded only when every request row for the event is "rejected":
`MarmotEngine.discardRejected` resolves it FAILED, the gate drops the clone,
the live group having never advanced, and the room can prepare a commit
again. Nothing is told to convergence, since a commit no relay carries is not
a branch any member will see. The room says what happened, in the relay's
words, because the screen that asked closed when the commit was made: an
invite gets the existing `TYPE_MEMBER_INVITE_FAILED` line, and a removal or
a disband step gets a new `TYPE_CHANGE_REJECTED` line, since the caption
written when it was asked for would otherwise stand uncorrected.

`PublishBeforeApplyJvmTest` gains the plan's third case: with a two-relay
scope, one refusal leaves the obligation, a timeout on the other leaves it,
the other's refusal discards it -- epoch unchanged, the peer not a member,
the line naming the reason -- and the same peer can be invited again. 1187
tests green, Android debug compile, M3 audit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 00:12:52 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 0b3780c604 feat(marmot): nothing goes out against a state that may lose
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 5, the last line of "Welcome and outbound", which the
phase's commit left out: before encrypting or committing, read
`convergenceStatus(groupId).allowsOutboundWork`. While a convergence pass is
open the room's canonical state is provisional -- two members committed
against the same epoch and the pass has not picked between them -- and a
message keyed under the branch that loses is one no peer will ever read,
while a commit against it makes a three-way fork out of a two-way one. The
library defines the flag and nothing in it reads it; the app is where the
outbound work is, so the app reads it.

`MarmotEngine.awaitSettled(routingId)` is the read. It is a short wait rather
than a refusal because a pass settles at the quiescence window -- one quiet
second, five at the outside -- so a caller that waits gets its work done in
order, whereas one that threw would hand its row back to a queue that
re-emits only when its table changes, which a pass settling does not do. The
wait ticks `settleDueConvergence` itself rather than relying on `settleLater`
having been armed, and gives up after three ticks with
`MarmotConvergencePendingException`, whose message the add-member screen
shows like the other two refusals; the bound is short because most of the
callers hold a Room transaction while they wait.

Five callers: the message send in `encryptAndSendMarmotInnerEvent` (the
current-profile branch; a legacy room has no convergence to wait for), the
invite past the founding Add, `publishGatedCommit` (so removal and both
disband steps), and `leave`, each after the publish gate's own check and
before the manager stages anything.

The observer fork test now settles the app's side through `awaitSettled`
instead of resolving it directly -- asserting outbound work is refused before
and allowed after -- and finishes with what settling is for: a message the
app sends once settled is an `ApplicationMessage` on Dana's side. 1186 tests
green, Android debug compile, M3 audit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 00:04:39 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 437fd3e18b fix(marmot): a received kind:1210 or kind:1009 is not a bubble
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 7, the line the phase's commit missed: "a received
kind:1210 or kind:1009 gets no bubble". Both are kinds the current profile
defines as not-chat. A 1210 is a group system row -- member added, member
left -- and the profile is explicit that one arriving over the wire is one
member's assertion rather than a fact; this device derives its own from the
commit it applied (`TYPE_MEMBER_ADDED` and its siblings, written by
`processGroupMembershipChanges`), so the received one adds nothing it can
trust. A 1009 is an in-place edit, which the app does not apply. Until now
either fell off the end of `applyInnerEvent`'s `when` into `unsupported()`,
which is the raw-JSON bubble, so a White Noise member leaving a room would
have put their client's system row into the transcript as a block of JSON
under the caption this device wrote for the same fact.

Both kinds now return null: no line. The bubble stays for every other
unknown kind, which is narrower than the plan's "neither does any other
unknown kind". Two reasons. The `TextNoteEvent` arm reaches `unsupported()`
deliberately -- a kind:1 the room did not sign is a member's own note
travelling through the room and has always rendered as this -- and the
bubble is the only trace an unrecognised payload leaves; retiring it would
make the next new kind a silent drop, which is the failure mode the chronicle
note complains about from the other side. The Phase 9 table records the
narrowing.

`MarmotSystemRowJvmTest` holds both: the two kinds make no row, and kind
31337 is still the bubble.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:59:18 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 c4a46e892f feat(marmot): leaving, removal, disbanding, and captions derived from the state (v2 Phase 7)
The lifecycle of a current-profile room, through the publish gate. docs/marmot-v2.md,
Phase 7.

Leaving used to be a local flag and a "Left group" chat line: the group never
learned of it, and the leaf stayed in the tree holding the group's keys. A
current-profile room is now left the way v2 leaves: a standalone SelfRemove
proposal on the wire as a kind:445, the LEAVING gate raised first and durably,
the local state dropped, the room closed on this device with its own line. It
is not a commit, so it waits on no relay -- there is no state of ours it would
make canonical. An admin's device that receives the proposal commits it on
receipt, as the library expects, so a leaver is out of the tree without anyone
pressing anything; the commit goes through the gate like every other. The
library refuses a SelfRemove from an admin outright -- an admin self-demotes
first -- so an admin's leave is refused here before anything is raised or
dropped, in words a person can act on: hand over admin, or, for the only
admin, disband. Legacy rooms leave the way they always did.

An admin removes a member with stageRemoveMember through the gate; the library's
admin-depletion guard refuses a commit that would leave no admin. An admin
disbands with stageEnableDisbanding and stageDisband -- two commits when the
group predates the lifecycle component, one otherwise -- under the DISBANDING
gate, which is durable so a crash between raising it and publishing does not
lose the request; the second step is taken by continueDisband when the first
is accepted. Both are on the room detail screen, for a device that administers
a current-profile room: a remove action on every member row but its own, and a
disband button beside leave, with an explainer that says nobody rejoins. A
disbanded room says so and hides every write entrance.

The captions are derived, never received. v2 spells them as kind-1210 system
rows and is explicit that a row arriving over the wire is one member's
assertion, not a fact; here they are written by processGroupMembershipChanges
from the difference between the room's members before a commit and after it --
"X joined the group", "X left the group", "The group was disbanded", "You were
removed from the group" -- on every device that applies the commit, including
the one that made it, which is why an admin's own removal no longer writes a
line of its own: every device says the same thing at the same point. A commit
that removed our own leaf, or disbanded the group, closes the room here as well.
A commit this device made is applied at the relay's OK, where the room now
follows the state it gained. MarmotCommitResult.NO_INVITEE marks a commit that
invites nobody, so the OK sends no Welcome for it.

Tests: GroupLifecycleJvmTest, with quartz's own managers standing in for the
other member, covers an admin committing a member's leave on receipt and the
room saying they left; a removal applied on both sides once the commit lands; a
disband ending the group for everyone, closing the room and refusing what
follows; an admin's leave refused with its reason; and a member's leave sending
the proposal the other side stages, dropping the state and closing the room.
The stand-in is now one fixture, MarmotStandIn, shared with the interop test.
Full JVM suite: 1,182 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:43:11 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 f617560cf9 feat(marmot): publish before apply (v2 Phase 6)
A commit this device makes into an established current-profile room is no
longer applied and then broadcast. It is prepared on a clone by the manager,
recorded as a durable obligation before anything is broadcast, sent, and
installed only when a relay in its scope accepts it. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 6.

The library's gate explains why apply-and-roll-back is not the same thing:
between applying a local commit and undoing it on failure there is a window in
which this client's canonical state is an epoch no peer has, and a crash inside
it makes the fork permanent. Recording the obligation before the broadcast
closes the mirror-image window -- a commit peers accepted that this device has
no memory of preparing, and would mint a replacement for at the next start.

Two new tables (schema 22 -> 23), MarmotPublishObligation and MarmotOutboundGate,
back RoomPublishObligationStore; MarmotEngine holds a MarmotPublishGate over it
and restores it after the groups. MarmotCommitResult -- the row that already
held a commit's Welcome until the relay's OK -- carries the obligation id, and
DatabaseNostrRepository.broadcastProcessed resolves it on "published" through
MarmotEngine.confirmPublished, which installs the pending state, tells
convergence of the commit we authored (without which a peer's competing commit
would look like an orphan rather than a fork we are half of), and only then
lets the Welcome go out: the MIP-02 ordering enforced by sequence rather than by
hope. A second OK for the same event from another relay finds no obligation
and changes nothing.

The founding Add keeps its exception. A group that is only its creator has no
peer a failure to publish could fork, so it installs at once -- the library's
satisfyEmptyObligation draws the same line, "creation and its immediately
following founding Add, never a later commit". While an obligation is pending
the room cannot prepare another commit: a second invite is refused with
MarmotCommitPendingException, shown as itself on the confirmation screen, rather
than forked; the membership note's batching closed the race inside one invite,
and this closes it between invites. The broadcast queue's requeue re-sends the
same signed event, which is the byte-identical retry the rule demands, and a
"failed" from the pump -- a timeout or a relay's refusal, which the pump does
not tell apart -- leaves the obligation pending rather than discarding a state
some relay may have taken. Legacy rooms are unchanged.

Tests: PublishBeforeApplyJvmTest pins the founding Add installing at once, a
later commit prepared and queued but not applied, the second Welcome held back,
a concurrent invite refused, the OK installing the state and queueing the
Welcome, a second OK changing nothing, and an obligation restored by an engine
rebuilt over the same database and installed by a late OK. Full JVM suite:
1,177 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:27:40 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 8e1037dff1 feat(marmot): the library's engine over Room, for current-profile rooms (v2 Phase 5)
A current-profile room is now read and written by quartz's own managers:
MlsGroupManager holds its live group and persists through a store over the
app's tables, MarmotInboundProcessor reads its kind:445s -- settling same-epoch
commits through the convergence engine and recognising redelivery by the
Marmot message id -- and MarmotOutboundProcessor builds the ones this device
sends. Everything in docs/marmot-v2.md's "v2 says" column that is not a wire
shape lives in those three, and the app no longer carries its own copy of
their logic for these rooms.

Where the build chose differently from the plan: **a room's profile picks its
pipeline**. The plan had one engine for every room. Two things stood against
that once the code was open. The library's processor has no carve-out for the
bare gift wrap a legacy room carries a direct message in -- it would refuse
every legacy DM as an author that is not the sender -- and the manager's
installState declines a state whose group context matches the live one, so a
legacy path that mutates the manager's instance and then asks it to persist
would persist nothing, while its own retained-epoch list would drift from the
manager's. So legacy rooms keep MarmotInboundManager over MlsGroupCache,
unchanged, and retire with it; current-profile rooms go through MarmotEngine.
A room is on one profile for life, so the two never hold the same group, which
is what keeps the manager's live instance the single writer of a
current-profile room's state. For the same reason the library's KeyPackage
rotation manager is constructed but not fed: Welcomes are matched to this
device's bundles by the app's own profile-aware table, by reference, and the
processor reads the rotation manager only on its own Welcome path. The
vendored CommitOrdering therefore stays, for legacy rooms.

RoomMlsGroupStateStore resolves the library's key -- the routing address --
through MarmotRouting to the room, keeps the state in ChatRoom.mlsGroupState
as before, and keeps the retained epochs as MarmotRetainedEpochSecret rows,
which until now were written by the outbound path and read back by nothing:
every epoch the inbound path retained was a map in an object, gone at the next
launch. The engine is owned by the database (CurareDatabase.marmotEngine),
because the DAOs that need it are made by Room from that instance and can be
handed nothing else; it restores every group once, seeds convergence with each,
and loads a room made or joined later from its row on first ask.

Inbound, NostrDao.indexMarmotGroupEvent branches on ChatRoom.marmotProfile()
-- read off the stored state's group context without rebuilding the group --
and the result handling every kind:445 shares (membership changes, the chat
line, the signing and ceremony dispatch) is one function for both pipelines.
The processor names the group by its address; the result is re-addressed to
the room once. A pass a commit opened is driven to its cutoff by a ticking
coroutine, since a quiet group has nothing else to drive it. Outbound, an
application message in a current-profile room is built by the outbound
processor over the engine's group, and an invite or batched add is staged on a
clone by the manager and installed at once -- retained, persisted -- with the
callers' own state writes skipped for these rooms; installing on a relay's OK
rather than at once is what Phase 6 changes. A reindex closes the room's open
convergence pass before replaying.

Tests: CurrentProfileInteropJvmTest puts two implementations in one group --
the app's engine over a CurareDatabase and a bare library stand-in playing
Amethyst -- and has the stand-in invite the app through a gift-wrapped Welcome,
messages cross in both directions (the app's read by the stand-in as a
canonical payload), a commit from the other side move the room's membership
and epoch, and a second engine over the same database read a message from the
epoch before that commit -- the case the old pipeline could not pass.
RoomMlsGroupStateStoreJvmTest pins the store's contract. Full JVM suite: 1,175
tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:20:02 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 9b5e4c95fc feat(marmot): current-profile rooms, and a routing address apart from the room id (v2 Phase 4)
After this the app can create rooms on the current profile -- behind
MarmotProfile.DEFAULT_FOR_NEW_ROOMS, which stays legacy until the rollout flips
it -- and every path keyed on the `h` tag reads the room through its address.
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 4.

The room's id is a key. A room built around a threshold key is keyed on the id
derived from that key -- the one it signs as and every chronicle is verified
against -- and every member can compute it unaided. v2's routing component
says of `nostr_group_id` the opposite: random, never derived from any public
key, because a derivable address lets a relay link a group's traffic to the
identity behind it, which here is the key that authors the group's published
entries. Both are right about their own value, so they are two values now. A
new MarmotRouting table (schema 21 -> 22) maps an address to its room; a
current-profile room this app creates mints a random one, and every other
room -- legacy, or made by another client -- has a row whose address is its
own id, or no row at all and is addressed by its own id, which every reader
falls back to. The inbound ingest, the reindex, the negentropy answer for a
`#h` filter, the chat list's sync request and the live subscriptions all
resolve or emit addresses; LocalChatRoom carries its routings as a relation so
the subscription planner needs no query; the outbound commit, application and
Welcome templates are stamped with the room's address rather than its id.

A joiner keys a room on the group's `nostr_group_id`, which for a
current-profile room would be the address, and the creator, the joiner's own
DKG session and every chronicle know the room by its derived id. The
components carry no field for it, so it rides in the group profile's
description as one line -- `Room id: <hex>` -- the way the derivation path
already does, and MlsGroup.roomId() reads it back first. It is a claim by the
creator, exactly as the legacy `nostr_group_id` was, and is trusted no further.

MarmotGroupFactory is now the one place a group is minted. The three sites --
a direct message, the convenient room, and the derived room MarmotGroupCreation
builds -- say what the room is, and the factory decides the profile: a legacy
group is the 0xF2EE extension as before; a current-profile group is quartz's
own CurrentProfileGroupFactory with the admin policy, routing, profile and the
creator's proof-bearing leaf, and no 0xF2EE at all, because RFC 9420 requires
every member to support every GroupContext extension and an MDK leaf does not
advertise it. Creating a direct-message room reads the identity from the chat
repository, which now takes it, so the creator's leaf can carry its proof.

A peer's KeyPackage is picked by the room's profile rather than by age: a
current-profile room takes the newest current-profile package or none, since
the legacy package is deliberately the newest a peer publishes. A leaf on the
wrong profile is refused a step before the library refuses it, with a reason
the member can act on -- their package is from an older profile -- shown on
the confirmation screen and in the room's line rather than as "try again".

Tests: MarmotGroupFactoryJvmTest pins both profiles' shapes, the address
minted apart from the room id, the room id riding in the description, the
read-only creator refused on the current profile, and which leaves fit which
groups; MarmotGroupCreationJvmTest adds a current-profile room keeping its
derived id with a routing row, a legacy room unchanged, and a kind:445 under
the address filed in the room; MarmotRoomIdentityTest the description line;
LiveSubscriptionPlanTest the addresses watched. Full JVM suite: 1,166 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 23:03:52 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 99dba546d8 feat(marmot): identity proofs and the current-profile KeyPackage (v2 Phase 3)
After this a peer on Amethyst 1.15.2 or White Noise can add this app's users to
their current-profile groups, and the app joins. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 3.

A current-profile leaf carries an app data dictionary with three components: the
component ids it supports, an explicitly empty safe_aad list, and the 104-byte
account identity proof -- the account's Nostr key signing a kind-450 template that
is never published and names this leaf's own Ed25519 signature key. MLS never
checked that the account in a credential agreed to the signature key beside it;
the proof is what makes a leaf unforgeable, and a current-profile group refuses a
leaf without one at add time. Only the account signer can make it, and it has to
exist before the leaf is built, so publishMarmotKeyPackageBundle now takes the
KeyPair rather than the public key it used to. The current-profile package comes
from quartz's own CurrentProfileGroupFactory -- the same leaf shape Amethyst
publishes, including the agent-text-stream component the reference client
requires of every leaf it invites -- and its kind:30443 from
KeyPackageEvent.buildCurrentProfileFrom: framed content, the 0x0006 extension,
the 0x0008 and 0x000a proposals, an app_components tag, no encoding and no relays
tag. KeyPackageUtils.isValid checks all of it, and the tests run that validator
because it is the one a peer runs on ours.

The legacy package is still published, in a second slot, for as long as builds
that decode kind:30443 content as a bare KeyPackage are inviting people (Phase 9
retires it). It is stamped one second after the current-profile package, every
time both are published: an inviter picks a peer's newest package by created_at,
and an old build then fails on a framed one, so the legacy package has to stay
the newest. Each profile now has a slot whose d-tag is minted once and reused on
every rotation, so a replacement supersedes the previous event on relays instead
of accumulating beside it -- the "TODO: Persist this" on the random d-tag.

Schema 20 -> 21, an AutoMigration: MarmotKeyPackageBundle.profile and .dTag, and
MarmotKeyPackage.profile filled at ingest from KeyPackageEvent.isCurrentProfile().
Rows from before read back null, which every reader takes as legacy. The notary
keeps one publishable bundle per profile rather than any bundle at all, because
a current-profile peer consumes only the current-profile package and the legacy
one still being active would otherwise mean nothing was republished for them.
The key-package screen takes the identity, not just its public key, and refuses
to publish for one that cannot sign rather than reporting "published".

KeyPackages now also go to the account's NIP-65 write set, unioned with the
default DM relays -- transports/nostr.md has a conformant peer look there and
nowhere else, "there is no dedicated KeyPackage relay list" -- and the member
and peer sync requests ask for kind 10002 alongside the legacy 10051 hint.

Tests: CurrentProfileKeyPackageJvmTest pins one package per profile with the
legacy one a second later, both passing the peer's validator, the proof binding
the leaf to the account, a rotation reusing its slot, and the join: a group made
by quartz's own factory standing in for Amethyst adds the app's package, the
Welcome arrives as a NIP-59 gift wrap through the sync funnel, and the app lands
in a room keyed by the routing id from the 0x8004 component with the inviter as
admin. The npub round-trip test now waits for both bundles. Full JVM suite: 1,153
tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 22:46:22 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 3cdce6a908 feat(marmot): send the canonical app payload, and an envelope for direct messages (v2 Phase 2)
What goes into MLS is now the Marmot app event the spec defines: six members and
no `sig`. The rumor serialised as an Event carried `"sig":""`, which a conformant
decoder refuses outright -- a payload with a signature would be a standalone relay
event, republishable as a signed statement by its author. The id does not move,
because NIP-01 never hashed the signature, so every row filed under an inner
event's id stays valid; and the build already in the field reads the new shape,
because Event.fromJsonOrNull defaults a missing signature. This switch alone needs
no gating and is made everywhere at once. The `encoding` tag comes off the
application kind:445 while here -- transports/nostr.md forbids it on every shape.
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 2.

A direct message could not make that switch as it was. Its payload is a NIP-59
wrap signed by a throwaway key, which a conformant peer refuses twice over: for
the sig member and for an author that is not the MLS sender. In a current-profile
room the wrap now travels inside an envelope -- an unsigned app event of kind
30330 authored by the sender, one `p` tag for the recipient, the wrap's JSON as
content. The envelope passes the author check like any payload, so the carve-out
in mip03Rejection that admitted bare wraps is confined to legacy rooms by a new
`legacyRoom` flag: in a current-profile room a bare kind:1059 is refused as every
other conformant client refuses it. Every property the throwaway key was chosen
for survives -- the envelope is unsigned and so a claim rather than a proof, the
wrap inside is still signed by nobody, and the seal-to-leaf binding in classify
still decides who wrote the words. The line for a message this device cannot read
now hangs off the row the payload was filed under (the envelope's id in a
current-profile room), which ChatMessage's foreign key requires.

The envelope is gated, and the gate is the room's profile: an old build renders
it as a raw-JSON bubble, so a legacy room keeps sending the bare wrap, and a
current-profile room -- which admits only leaves carrying an identity proof,
which only a build past Phase 3 can make -- never holds an old build. That is the
flag for every wire change after this one.

A conformant decoder bounds the whole app payload at 64 KiB, and a chronicle page
rides inside one as JSON-escaped content. The new bounds test caught what the
arithmetic missed: dense JSON payloads escape to half again their size, so a 48
KiB page became a 70 KiB app event. The packer now measures a page by
ChronicleEvent.escapedByteSize -- the bytes it will occupy inside the envelope --
against MAX_PAGE_BYTES, lowered from 64 to 48 KiB, and MAX_PAGE_EVENTS drops from
128 to 96 so the count cap still binds under it, as the comment on the two caps
insists. The receiver's raw-bytes check is unchanged and now holds by
construction.

Tests: MarmotMip03CarveOutTest becomes the test that the exemption is confined to
legacy rooms and that an envelope passes the ordinary check; MarmotDirectMessageTest
round-trips the envelope through the strict decoder and opens the wrap inside;
MarmotPayloadBoundsTest asserts the largest chronicle pages and an envelope are
conformant app events, including the dense-content page measured the way the
packer measures it. The ingest test's tamper case flips a decoded byte rather
than the base64 tail, which could change nothing but padding. Full JVM suite:
1,148 tests pass. The direct-message and chronicle notes record the changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 22:32:30 +02:00
Kgothatso NgakoandClaude Opus 5 a68cad06a4 feat(marmot): read both Marmot profiles (v2 Phase 1)
After this the app can be a member of a current-profile group and can invite a
current-profile peer -- an Amethyst 1.15.2 user -- into one of its own legacy
rooms. Nothing it sends changes. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 1.

Seventeen sites read `currentMarmotData()`, which is the legacy 0xF2EE
extension and is null on a current-profile group: ten for the room id, and the
Welcome path threw MarmotMissingNostrGroupDataExtension on that null, so a v2
Welcome was not a room the app could not read but an exception it could not get
past. The others read the admins -- SubgroupManager's "only an admin can make a
subgroup" and processGroupMembershipChanges' adminAt stamp both saw no admins at
all on a v2 group -- the relays, the name and the retention. MlsGroupProfile.kt
writes the fallback once per field (current profile first, 0xF2EE second) and
the sites read roomId(), roomName(), roomDescription(), roomRelays(),
retentionSeconds() and the library's currentAdminIdentities(). The retention
one is the bug the library's own outbound processor had: read only 0xF2EE and
disappearing messages simply did not disappear in v2 groups.

A current-profile kind:30443 frames its KeyPackage in an MLSMessage, and the
invite decoded whatever the ingest stored as a bare KeyPackage, taking the
frame's version and wire-format words for the package's own. The ingest now
validates with KeyPackageUtils.isCryptographicallyValid -- the check a
conformant peer runs on ours, covering tags, signature, lifetime and on the
current profile the identity proof; nothing checked any of it before -- and
stores the package bare, so MlsGroup.proposeAdd and every other consumer of the
row read the same bytes whichever way it was published.

The inbound author check decodes the canonical payload strictly first
(MarmotAppEvent: six members, no sig, an id that rehashes) and falls back to
Event.fromJsonOrNull only for the legacy rumor shape every build before Phase 2
sends. The fallback would accept the canonical shape too, but by defaulting the
signature rather than checking anything.

A Welcome is matched to this device's bundle by the KeyPackageRef the Welcome
itself names, in RFC 9420 order, before the `e` tag is consulted: the tag is
what the inviter thinks it used, and MDK stamps the id of a cached copy, so a
peer who rotated while an inviter kept inviting from cache was unjoinable by
the tag alone. WelcomeBundleMatch is pure and scans the handful of bundle rows
rather than adding a column. The exception the tag-only path threw when the tag
was missing has no caller left and goes.

Tests: MarmotKeyPackageIngestJvmTest runs both published shapes through the
sync funnel, invites a current-profile package into a legacy room and sees the
member in the tree, and refuses a tampered package; WelcomeBundleMatchJvmTest
picks the addressed bundle in either candidate order, none when none is ours,
and survives an unreadable row; MarmotAppPayloadTest pins that the legacy rumor
and its canonical form share an id, that the strict decoder refuses a sig
member and a forged id, and that the fallback reads both. The KeyPackage test
fixture's lifetime drops from 90 days to the app's own 30 because 1.15.2 caps
it at 84 and the ingest now checks. Full JVM suite: 1,140 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 22:15:13 +02:00