robust-group-admins built the same thing as this branch's Phase 1: a single
writer for Participant.adminAt, run at creation, on the Welcome, on every
commit and once at start. Its AdminFlags is kept as that writer; this
branch's MarmotInboundManager.reconcileAdmins and adminFlagChanges are
gone, and the direct-message and convenient-room creation sites and the
detail screen's catch-up call AdminFlags instead. The admin captions stay,
on top of it.
Both sides added to the room's details: the founding-admin repair and
invite beside the member menu, admin labels and governance section. The
member row keeps one label line -- Admin from adminAt, Holds a share
beside it -- and the removal message now has three cases: proposed for the
group's signature, rotation held, or sent. The rotation offer waits for
both: a rotation available, and the removal not still awaiting signatures.
addAdmins, the founding-admin repair, proposes its commit for the group's
signature in a governed room instead of committing it bare.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
giza brought rotation-waits-for-key-state, built in parallel from the
same base, and robust-group-admins. The first overlaps this branch, and
the two agreed on not asking the proposer. Where they met:
- The proposer's dialog is this branch's, read from the proposal's own
plan with its refusal, under giza's title and caveat; giza's dialog,
which listed stale members from the summary, went. The preview's
refusal carries rotationHold's reason, and ChatRoomDetailSharesJvmTest
asks its question of the kept dialog.
- The proposer is approved to take part only; giza also set
confirmApprovedAt, which nothing reads.
- The Shares section keeps both: giza's held button, its reason and
'Ask the group to sign', and this branch's running card and abandon.
- giza's hold tests left the new key state unsigned by not signing it.
It signs itself now, so they hold the signing messages after the
proposal (signingHeldOpen). This branch's test of two rotations opened
at once gave way to giza's, which asserts more.
jvmTest 1281/1281, compileDebugKotlinAndroid, m3Audit at its budgets,
brand and wallet audits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first draft's Phase 0 changed mls-kmp and marmot-kmp so that a device
could refuse an unsigned commit. Instead the group signs an event whose
content is the complete kind:445 commit, published as an application
message; every device checks it on a throwaway copy of the group and hands
the inner event to the engine, and drops a bare commit at the one inbound
door. The rule is a marker in the room's profile description, switched on
once every member has said it can follow it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan is marked built, with a table of the nine places the build
chose differently -- among them that Phase 4 acts on a room at epoch 0
rather than on rows that were never written, since rows are hard-deleted,
and that it also fixed the current-profile routing bug Phase 0 found.
The README row says built; automatic-key-ceremony.md gains step 4 and
subgroups.md the repository taking the ceremony instead of a list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan gets a Built header and a table of where the build chose
differently: the proposer was asked twice not three times; two rotations
opened at once never reach the write-once rule; the stall-clock test had
to backdate its messages to catch anything; one full run died on a
SQLite SIGSEGV unrelated to this change. frost-share-refresh.md's gate
table shrinks to one row with the history of CONFIRM, its key-state step
names the rule that now signs it, and README says both notes are built.
automatic-key-ceremony.md points here for the second automated key
state.
Not done: the emulator session. Nothing here has run on a device.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three rules: every admin holds a share, every commit in a keyed room is a
proposal until the group's threshold signature is on it (a member's own
leave and key update excepted), and a robust group keeps at least three
admins. Phase 0 is upstream work in mls-kmp and marmot-kmp.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A recipient is asked three times today: to deal, to store the new share,
and to sign the new generation's key state. Only the first is a decision.
The plan removes the other two in seven phases, and names what removing
them breaks: abandon lives only on an approval row, and nothing resumes a
rotation without a message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ceremony note's approval section becomes 'Joining is the only
approval'; the subgroup note says which of its four steps anybody is
asked about; the plan records where the build chose differently and
that its device session has not been run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phased plan to make a key ceremony run by itself once a member has
joined: rounds 1 and 2 automatic, a resume sweep in place of the tap,
the coordinator's follow-up steps and the key state's signatures
automatic, and abandon kept for a member who goes quiet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enrollment evaluates the same polynomial, so it cannot rotate a share; a
zero-sum refresh can. Thirteen phases from a frost_refresh module in
secp256k1-zkp to the cutover, removal, repair and UI in Giza. D1-D8 are
decided as recommended.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4 settled the blob and left the database alone, because there was nothing
to settle: the state is opaque to Room and its version is inside it. Phase 8 added
a table, and that turns "does an existing install still open?" from a question
about MLS into a question about Room. They fail differently. A blob the engine
cannot read costs one room; a migration Room cannot find costs the app, on every
device that has ever had it, on the first launch after the update.
That second one is also the easiest here to ship by accident, because a fresh
install never migrates anything. Measured rather than assumed: with
`AutoMigration(from = 36, to = 37)` commented out, 32 database tests ran and 4
failed -- all four of them the new ones.
ShippedProfileUpgradeJvmTest builds a v36 database on disk from the exported v36
schema, down to its indices, its room_master_table identity hash and its
user_version, puts a profile and two rooms in it with the Phase 4 blob in one, and
opens it with the app's own getRoomDatabase. Four claims: it reaches v37 with
Room's own identity hash stamped and every table's columns and indices equal to
37.json's; the legacy room's bytes come back unchanged and MarmotEngine.groupFor
restores a group with its 0xF2EE metadata and a 32-byte kind:445 key; opening the
profile rewrites nothing, which is asserted only after checking the restore held
the room; and the new table takes a row keyed to a ChatRoom that predates it.
Room opens lazily, so a test that builds a database and closes it migrates
nothing. The first version of this did that and failed on user_version still
reading 36.
The blob itself moves to OldEngineBlob in commonTest, read by both tests. The
only thing those bytes are worth is that they are old ones, and a blob living in
two files can be regenerated in one of them.
1171 tests across 157 classes, 0 failures; the four audits unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The piece Phase 7 deferred, in both directions, because they are one question:
a group's state is a few kilobytes of ratchet tree, group context and epoch
secrets, and the app was rewriting all of it to record things that moved a
counter.
Sending an application message advances exactly one thing -- this leaf's entry
in the secret tree (RFC 9420 §9) -- so the library carries the position as its
own record, `MlsGroupStateStore.saveSenderRatchet`, in the spirit of OpenMLS
keeping `message_secrets` apart from `group_state`. Giza defaulted that to
false, which sent the manager back to a full save per message. It is now a
`MarmotSenderRatchet` row, one per room, schema 36 -> 37 with an AutoMigration.
The bytes are stored as the library wrote them -- the `MarmotPublishObligation`
precedent, not the retained-epoch one -- because a record whose whole job is to
never go backwards is safest when nothing here re-encodes it; the epoch, leaf
and generation sit beside it, read off those same bytes, so they cannot drift.
The hazard this introduces is an ordering, and it is in the app's code, not the
library's. `MlsGroupManager.restoreAll` applies the record itself. A room joined
after the engine restored is loaded from its row by `MarmotEngine.groupFor`
instead, and that has to apply the record BEFORE `adoptGroup`, because adopting
persists and persisting rewrites the row from the group being adopted. The other
way round, the next restart re-emits generations already published, under AEAD
keys and nonces already used.
Finding the test that could tell the two orders apart took two goes. The first
asserted the row after a lazy load and passed with the order inverted: a state
saved before this leaf ever sent has no ratchet entry, `exportOwnSenderRatchet`
returns null, and the adopt writes nothing. The order cannot matter until the
stored state holds a position of its own behind the record's, and a received
message is what puts one there. With one receive in the middle the inverted
order fails with expected:<2> but was:<1>.
The receive side is a full save, from `MarmotEngine.processGroupEvent`, which
`NostrDao` now reads inbound events through so a second caller cannot forget it.
And a correction to Phase 5, which said an unwritten row still lost the late
message. It does not: mls-kmp writes the skipped keys beside the positions they
belong to, so an unwritten row is an older COHERENT state, and a position that
has not passed the late generation derives it forward. quartz's engine saved the
positions and dropped the keys -- that pair is what lost messages. The cost of
an unwritten row is the re-deriving, against SecretTree's thousand-step cap. The
reason the write lands now is the send side: until this change every send wrote
the whole state, so the row could not fall far behind inside an epoch.
1167 tests across 156 classes, 0 failures; Android and JVM compile clean; the
four audits unchanged. docs/mls-skipped-keys.md loses its mitigation claim and
gains the correction; docs/marmot-kmp.md gains Phase 8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phases 0 to 7, one commit each but for 5 and 6, which share one because the fork probe
produced no code. 1161 tests, 0 failures; compileDebugKotlinAndroid and compileKotlinJvm
clean; four audits green, the new one among them.
Three things it does not claim, said at the top rather than left to be discovered at the
end of a phase. No manual upgrade of a profile with real rooms has been done, and that is
the last check before a release -- a fixture is one member at epoch 0. The sender ratchet
record and the receive-side write are deferred together, because they are one decision
about how often this app persists a group and they want a schema change. And the authored
fork is still not settled; Phase 6 probed it and the gap is the library's, unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
quartz 2.3.0 dropped the Marmot engine. Everything this app imports from
`com.vitorpamplona.quartz.marmot` but the event classes -- the MLS engine, the three
processors, convergence, the publish gate, the app components, the KeyPackage managers --
is in marmot-kmp over mls-kmp over crypto-kmp now, and quartz 1.15.2 is the last version
that still has it inside. So the app is not behind on a version; it is on a branch of the
engine that ended.
The note is the move: where each of the 228 import lines goes and the one rule that places
all but two of them, the two constraints (the group state already on devices, and that the
fork still cherry-picks from a Bennu that is on 1.15.2), the six decisions -- keep
`MarmotEngine`, pin quartz to the 2.7.3 marmot 2.2.1 was built against, declare crypto-kmp
rather than inherit it -- and eight phases that put the swap in one commit with the
evidence around it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 23 wallet notes move to docs/retired/ with a banner; every link between
notes is rewritten for the move and checked. The index lists them as one
Retired paragraph, and seven kept notes carry a line on what changed. The
README and CLAUDE.md describe a Giza with no wallet.
brand-audit.sh loses its "bennu/ exception: every such tag was a wallet's,
so one now is a wallet coming back. wallet-audit.sh --check, in check and
in CI, fails on a retired kind in the app's code, a lightning-kmp import,
a file named for a wallet's pieces, or sats in a string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Lightning events, managers, Iceberg ceremony, wallet/lightning, the
repository, five screens with their view models, states and routes, the
four DAOs, and the regtest network with its build wiring. The entities
stay until Phase 5's migration.
FROST's sweep path goes here rather than in Phase 4, since it was built on
GroupSweep: a sweep that arrives is filed declined without being read.
Lightning kinds fall to the retired-kinds arm; existing Lightning lines
stay as settled lines that open nothing. The 147 strings Phases 1 and 2
left unread go, and a Phase 1 test name that said Bennu is renamed.
jvmTest: 1,440 run, 0 failed, 0 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- rootProject.name is Giza. Res is pinned, so no import moves.
- Regtest: GIZA_REGTEST, GIZA_SPLICE_DELAYS and the gizaRegtest task input;
node aliases giza-lsp and giza-payer.
- README describes Giza and says what it shares with Bennu: one network, one
derivation, and a recovery phrase that must not run in both apps at once.
The clone URL is the planned giza-kmp repository, which does not exist yet.
- docs/README.md is titled Giza docs and says how to read the documents
written while the app was Bennu.
- CLAUDE.md gains the rule: name the app Giza, never name Bennu outside a
comment, and never rename a mantra/ or bennu/ derivation tag.
- docs/scripts/brand-audit.sh --check, run by check (brandAudit) and by the CI
budgets job, fails on Bennu anywhere in composeApp, iosApp, testing or the
gradle scripts except in a comment or a "bennu/ tag. It catches the strings
a merge from Bennu brings in, which giza-rename.sh cannot word.
- The plan gains the twelve bennu/ tags, missed when it was written.
jvmTest: 1643 run, 0 failed, 2 skipped. compileDebugKotlinAndroid, m3Audit and
brandAudit pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED is true, by decision, ahead of the plan's own Phase 0 check
on mainnet: ACINQ's LSP has not yet been seen to accept a splice whose funding key from us does not
change, so the first purchase there is that check. If it refuses, the splice aborts before anything is
signed into it and the purchase is reported failed. A purchase is bounded meanwhile by the mainnet
channel cap, the fee cap the group signs, and every co-signer's checks. The wallet screen now shows Add
liquidity, and the operator's node buys what the group authorises.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan's build table now says each phase's state. Phase 9, a splice the LSP starts to deliver a
payment, is left to the group as the plan left it. GroupLightningRollout.LIQUIDITY_ENABLED stays
off: the regtest run passed, but the mainnet half of Phase 0 -- ACINQ's LSP accepting a splice whose
funding key from us does not change, and its rates -- needs a purchase with real money. The group
Lightning wallet note's check 8 points here, as do the docs index and the regtest README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review asked whether the wallet's operator can spend lightning funds
without t-1 other share holders. The core claim holds; the seven exceptions
each get a phased plan under docs/lightning/, with an index giving the
severity table and the build order.
Every Lightning kind but the three the group signs reaches the transcript's
unsupported arm and leaves a raw-JSON bubble, and the Iceberg ceremony never
got the standing notice above the composer. Seven phases to put both right.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in an Electrum client for a profile with no node: IdentityElectrum
gives an nsec or npub profile a StandaloneElectrum of its own, so every
profile can watch the chain.
For the group Lightning wallet:
- GroupChainClients now sits on IdentityElectrum's client for the node's
network, so group wallets and the watcher work on profiles with no node
too.
- Each other network (testnet3, for the Lightning wallet) now gets a
StandaloneElectrum instead of this branch's own connection loop. The
old loop picked a server with ElectrumServers and connected directly,
ignoring the profile's Tor setting, so a profile with Tor on would have
reached a testnet3 server in the clear. The new one uses onion servers
while Tor is on. A test covers it.
- The group's Lightning node takes its context and logger from the app,
not the identity's Phoenix business, so a profile with no node that
holds a share can be elected and run it.
- The member wallet's follow() keeps its network parameter.
The full JVM suite (1,568 tests) and the regtest run pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in the guarded member wallets, guarded subgroup wallets, ceremony
creation, and the removal of the group's nostr profile, relays and posts.
Two clashes needed more than a textual resolution:
- Event kinds. The guarded-wallet family took 30333-30337, the numbers
the Lightning family used for its ceremony. Nothing conflicted
textually and nothing would have failed, since each side reads the
other's events by kind. The Lightning family moves to a fresh run,
30350-30366, which costs nothing: rumor kinds that never shipped.
GroupLightningEventsTest now knows the guarded-wallet kinds and asserts
the family starts past every kind the app uses.
- Schema versions. bennu used 27-31. This branch's four versions were
never on an installed database, so they become one migration, 31 to 32,
adding the 13 Lightning tables.
Also:
- bennu's new member-wallet calls (broadcast, confirmationsOf,
guardianSpends, the fee suggestion) now take the network, because this
branch made Electrum clients per network.
- bennu's watcher conflict check uses the transaction's own network.
- NEVER_BROADCAST is gone with the broadcast screen, and so is the test
that checked the Lightning statements against it.
The full JVM suite (1,554 tests) and the regtest run pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in guarded-wallet forwarding (docs/guarded-wallet-forwarding.md),
which made telling the groups above automatic and touched the same
sharing code in GuardianManager.
Resolved by keeping both: its upwardOf, elected sender and catch-up,
and this branch's naming and certificate tag. Its automatic forward now
carries the guardian's birth certificate too (guardianCertificateFor),
and D5's re-tell rule moved into its told(), replacing alreadyTold. Its
wallet-level named() is dropped in favour of this branch's, which also
fills the guardian and branch names.
GuardedWalletForwardJvmTest's "the button offers only what goes up"
now shares with the certificate, as every share from this build does;
without it the wallet is rightly offered once more.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
member-wallet-guarding-group.md is marked built, with a table of where
the build chose differently from the plan. The member-guarded-wallets
note's Phases 10 and 11 and the guardians note's How an ancestor finds
the coins point to it, and the README's reading order places it.
Still to do by hand: the signet run with three emulators.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan is marked built, with a table of the nine places the build
chose differently -- the forwarder's own line written by share so the
button writes it too, a notice carried on by any device that believes
it whether or not it holds the room's key, one explanatory line under
the fallback section rather than one per row, and the signet run still
to make. The guardians and member-guarded-wallets notes say forwarding
no longer waits on a tap, and the README that it has been built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An ancestor's guarded-wallet list shows @alice with nothing saying which
group in the lineage signed her wallet's certificate, so two wallets
under different branches read the same. The plan names the direct
guardian (the certificate's signer, guardians[0]) by its founding name,
carries that group's birth certificate on the forwarding notice so a
device outside it can name it, and gathers a person's wallets under one
header on the group's wallet screen and one row per wallet on their
profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A group above can use its leaf in a guarded wallet only once told, and
today that is the Share button on the lower group's wallet screen. The
plan has every device that files a guarded wallet it believes tell the
groups above it is in -- one elected sender at once, the rest in a
catch-up when a group's chat or wallet screen opens -- and keeps the
button as the fallback for a notice lost on the wire.
It fixes two bugs in the button on the way: it tells guardian groups
below the current one, and a guarding group's own member certificate
never counts as told.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
member-wallet-delay.md is marked built, with a table of where the build
chose differently -- most of all that a request carrying no policy still
reads, so wallets guarded before policies keep verifying. The member
wallets note's "full control" stops saying 12, and its D3 adds that only
an open group takes a request; the guardian-delay note's member-wallet row
and the README follow.
The three-emulator run is still to do by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The member-wallet policy (30337) becomes the group's opt-in: no policy
means the group does not guard members' wallets (D8), so every new member
wallet's delay is one its group chose. A newer policy with ["closed"]
instead of a delay stops new wallets (D9); it never releases one already
guarded, whose addresses carry the group's leaf. Opening again is a newer
open policy.
The signer table, the picker's refusals (POLICY_UNKNOWN, NOT_OFFERED,
CLOSED), the request, the screen -- now MemberWalletPolicyScreen, with
Stop guarding new wallets -- and the emulator run follow. Phases 4, 5 and
6 now ship together, since 4 and 5 close every group until 6 opens it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The group's quorum signs a standing policy in its own room -- a new kind,
30337, ["guardian_delay", <blocks>] -- rather than a birth certificate
tag: the certificate is the parent's statement, frozen at birth, and a
root group has none. A member's request is built under the newest policy
and carries it whole, so late members (through the key notice) and
signers who missed it judge it alike; signers refuse a stale or missing
one. A wallet already guarded keeps its delay. Seven phases, not built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in member guarded wallets and funding a descendant's guarded wallet.
- Schema: bennu's v30 (MemberWallet, MemberWalletSpend) is kept as it is;
DkgSession.guardianDelay moves to v31, with a 30 -> 31 auto-migration.
- Conflicts: strings and README take both sides; the send form's guardian
delay line moves into the shared SpendForm; the guarded wallet card keeps
its Fund and Spend buttons and gains this group's own leaf's delay.
- bennu's uses of ANCESTOR_DELAY become each leaf's own delay:
GuardedWalletRow.arriving, the funding form's "spend these coins again"
line, the member wallet screens' reach text (MemberWalletManager.delaysOf)
and the member certificate's proposal summary.
- Four of bennu's fixtures built a "guarded" wallet with no guardian leaf;
they now carry the ancestor's, as a verified statement would.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in a group funding a descendant's guarded wallet. Three conflicts:
- GroupSendScreen: funding replaced the address field and named the
funded wallet in the preview, inside the fields this branch moved
into SpendForm. SpendForm now takes a destination slot, which a
funding fills with its card, and the funded wallet's name; the
preview takes both that name and the member's ownWallet words.
- GroupWalletScreen: the guarded wallet row is funding's card with Fund
beside Spend, headed by this branch's #name / @name and carrying a
member's label.
- docs/README.md: both rows.
Funding reads guarded wallets through GuardianManager.guardedWalletsOf,
which this branch widened to members' wallets, so a group can now fund
a member's guarded wallet. Every place funding named a wallet with
`name ?: "a subgroup"` -- the title, the destination card, the preview,
the proposal summary, a signer's refusal -- uses displayName, so it
reads "Fund @alice's guarded wallet". A test funds a member's wallet
end to end through GroupSpend.fundingsOf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan is marked built, with a table of the thirteen places the build
chose differently -- the key notice carrying the key rather than the
signed key state, the request travelling whole inside an inner event,
Put to the group living on the group's page, the wallet screen
following a member's spends while open, and the signet run still to
make before the mainnet gate lifts. The guardians and subgroups notes
point here, and the README says it has been built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
guardian-delay.md is marked built, with a table of where the build chose
differently. group-wallet-guardians.md's "Why 12, and why for everybody"
becomes "Why a delay, and who sets it": each parent chooses its own leaf's
delay from 6 to 65,535 blocks, inherited ones keep theirs, and a long
delay is a backstop rather than an override. The policy note's picker
section and the README follow.
The three-emulator run is still to do by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
testing/regtest/README.md now covers the prerequisites and ports, where
the run's output and eclair's log end up, and a troubleshooting table. The
docs index and CLAUDE.md's "Checking your work" link to it.
The test checks the network before it starts. If a service isn't
listening, or `regtest.sh up` didn't finish, it fails at once, names what
is missing and says how to start it. Before, that was a bare connection
error or a three-minute timeout.
BENNU_REGTEST is now an input of the test task. Before, a skipped run left
jvmTest up to date, and asking for the regtest run afterwards replayed the
skip without running anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A parent picks its own leaf's delay when it makes a guarded subgroup, from
6 blocks to 65,535 (BIP68's block-based ceiling, about 15 months); an
inherited ancestor keeps the delay it chose. The delay rides the ceremony
proposal, is signed into the certificate's guardian tag and checked by
both quorums, and every screen that quotes "12" says each leaf's own
delay as blocks with an approximate duration. Eight phases, not built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The member's device makes a random key, works out every ancestor leaf
and both descriptors, and only then asks the group. The group's quorum
signs a member wallet certificate of its own kind (30334) rather than a
birth certificate, since every reader of 30329 assumes a room. Ancestors
list the wallet as @name, and the group's page opens the member's profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
subgroup-wallet-policy.md is marked built, with a table of where the
build chose differently. group-wallet-guardians.md's "why it is still the
child's choice" becomes "whose choice it is": the parent decides, the
chain still does not enforce it, and an older certificate still leaves it
to the child. subgroups.md gains the wallet tag and the policy as the
second value the coordinator picks for other people.
The three-emulator run is still to do by hand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>