a673c85e9366994eefce90d35ad35d300667dbc1
742
Commits
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b9140c6a27 |
fix(ios): build ktor clients on Darwin so wss/https work on a device
CIO has no TLS implementation on kotlin/native, so every secure connection died at the handshake with "TLS sessions are not supported on Native platform". Pick the engine per platform -- CIO on android and the desktop jvm, Darwin on ios -- and pin both the relay socket client and coil's image fetcher to it. |
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aa9312f0ee |
build(ios): unbreak the ios link tasks
linkDebugTestIosArm64: Kotlin/Native rejects backticked test names
containing a comma ("Name contains illegal characters: ','"), so the
commas come out of the commonTest names.
linkReleaseFrameworkIosArm64: Kotlin 2.4.10's release backend crashes
in StaticInitializersOptimization on this module's call graph, so
RemoveRedundantCallsToStaticInitializersPhase is disabled for the
release native links. The pass is an optimization only.
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987df2c8f6 |
feat(ios): declare publish cancellation and the Room constructor to swift
@Throws(CancellationException) on the publish path so swift sees a cancellation as one, @ConstructedBy so Room can build the database on ios, an unused import out of Platform.ios.kt, and the development TEAM_ID for signing. |
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79ff9ee1fc |
fix(chat): the detail pane's view models are the selected room's, not the first one's
In an expanded window the transcript beside the room list showed the first room opened and stayed there: pick another room and the list moved on while the pane did not. HomeScreen wraps the pane in key(chatRoomId), which rebuilds the composition when the selection changes, but viewModel() does not read composition keys. It scopes to the nearest ViewModelStoreOwner, and in the pane that is the home destination's one back stack entry for every room, so the second room's viewModel(factory = ...) got the first room's ChatRoomMessagingViewModel and ChatMessageListViewModel back with its factory ignored. A phone never showed it because a pushed room is its own entry with its own store. The pane now provides LocalViewModelStoreOwner with rememberViewModelStoreOwner() under the room key: a store per room, cleared when the selection moves on, and parked in the home entry's store so that it survives a rotation. Keying the two viewModel() calls on the room would have unstuck the pane too, at the price of keeping every room ever opened -- four DB collectors each -- in the home entry's store for as long as the home screen lives. ChatPaneSelectionJvmTest opens two rooms and comes back to the first, told apart by what was said in them since a name is on the row as well as the bar; its third case checks the room left behind stops collecting, which is the case the keyed alternative fails. The conformance doc's account of the hand-built pair records the trap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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30685924db |
feat(curated): the date field type, and an unknown type is kept aside rather than dropped
CuratedFieldType had no `date`, so a schema declaring one lost the field at parse: entries were read without it, the accept flow copied a suggestion into a canonical entry without it, validation never asked for it, and the entry published cleanly -- and was refused by every client that did know the type, for the required field it lacked. Fourteen of bitcoin.necropolis.report's entries went out that way without a `died`. `Date` is the NIP's tenth type: `YYYY`, `YYYY-MM` or `YYYY-MM-DD`, at whatever precision the record allows, with `min` and `max` bounding the year. `CuratedDate.parse` is the check -- month 1-12, day on the calendar for that month and year, leap days included -- and the value is kept as written. `checkValue` returns early the way the numeric branch does, so `max` is a year and never a length cap. The value is not numeric, so `isNumeric` stays false; `isBounded` is what the editor keys its min/max inputs off instead, labelled as years for a date. The root failure was wider than one type: any type this build does not know was dropped the same way. A `field` tag of an unknown type is now kept aside as CuratedUnsupportedField, the way CuratedFieldConfig.others keeps unknown config keys. Reading is unchanged -- an entry is checked against the fields a reader understands, which is the NIP's tolerance -- but the accept flow refuses to propose under a required one, naming the type, and the schema editor carries it through an edit and writes it back as it came, so re-signing a list here cannot change its rules unseen. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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984db0a180 |
Merge branch 'curated' into claude/quartz-1-15-2-compat-c8267f
Both sides had taken schema version 21: curated for the nullable FrostSigningSession.signDeclinedAt (one refusal takes a member out of the n), this branch for the Marmot current profile's three columns, with 22 and 23 behind it for the routing table and the publish obligations. Curated keeps 21. This branch's three migrations move up one -- 21->22, 22->23, 23->24 -- and the database is at 24; the comment on 22 says they moved and why. The exported schemas for 22 and 23 could not be hand-edited, since each is a snapshot of the whole entity set with an identity hash over it, and could not be produced from the merged tree, which only exports its own version. So each was regenerated the way the originals were: the tree of the commit that introduced it (Phase 3 for 22, Phase 4 for 23), with curated's entity change and its 21.json dropped in, the version bumped, and KSP run. The result is what a device on curated's 21 migrates through: 22 adds the three columns and nothing else, 23 adds MarmotRouting, 24 adds MarmotPublishObligation and MarmotOutboundGate together with MarmotCommitResult.obligationId, and every one of them carries signDeclinedAt. 24.json is the merged tree's own export. Everything else merged itself: ChatMessage's kinds and line types, the transcript's icons, the strings, the nav host. Full jvmTest 1220 green, Android debug compile, M3 audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9b404e2035 |
fix(frost): the signing screen lists the key's share holders, not the room
The members list on "Sign with the group's key" was the room's roster, and a room is not the set that can sign with its key. A member invited after the ceremony holds no share: the proposal they receive is dropped before it becomes a session on their device, and no nonce or refusal of theirs would count. The screen drew them a row anyway, in a list whose whole purpose is to say whose door to knock on. The list is now the ceremony's share holders -- the members who put a host key into it, read off DkgParticipantMessage through the new FrostSigningRepository.observeShareHolders. That is the same set FrostSigningManager places signer ids over, so what the screen lists cannot disagree with whose messages the session counts, and a ceremony cannot complete without every participant's host key, so for a completed one it is the whole participant set. Names still come off the room, in the room's order; a share holder the room no longer holds keeps a placeholder row, since their share did not leave with them. The view model follows the session to its ceremony with flatMapLatest, and the list is empty until the ceremony has been read rather than falling back to the room -- a fallback would flash everybody and then correct itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a7f3917e65 |
fix(frost): one refusal takes a member out of the n; it takes n - t + 1 to abandon
"Don't sign" ended the session for everybody: decline() failed it locally and broadcast a FAILURE, which every other device failed on arrival. In a group whose whole reason for running a ceremony was that no one member is needed, one member's no was everybody's. A refusal is now its own kind, DECLINE (30330), and one FrostSignerMessage per member, like a nonce. Every device counts the refusals it has received from ceremony participants against the same arithmetic -- FrostSigningSession. declinesThatAbandon(), which is n - t + 1 -- and fails the session only on the refusal that leaves fewer than t who could still sign. Nobody broadcasts the abandonment, because nobody has to: each device reaches it the way each writes its own transcript, and a FAILURE sent to say so would blame one member for the group's arithmetic. In a 2-of-3 group the first refusal changes nothing the other two can do; the second ends it. FAILURE keeps meaning abandon-and-blame, for the faults no quorum can work around, and a build predating the new kind still sends its refusals that way and is honoured as it always was. decline() takes approve()'s shape: the decision goes on the row, as the new nullable signDeclinedAt (Room v21, an AutoMigration), and advance() publishes it whenever the row says so and no copy is on file -- so a device killed between deciding and sending says it on the next message rather than never. A member who refused is not asked again, but the session stays open around them and closes when the group's signature arrives. Refusals from a member holding no share of the key are turned away at the door. fail() now leaves a COMPLETE session alone. A member who refused before their device had seen the signature has refused something that no longer needed them, and a late FAILURE used to flip a signed session to failed. The transcript gets a TYPE_FROST_DECLINED line for a refusal the session survives, with the count -- "declined to sign. It takes 2 of 3 members, and 2 could still sign." -- and the tipping refusal is written as the FAILED line in that member's name, saying both that they declined and that it was the one that ended it. A reader's own refusal settles their request line, and only theirs; nothing earns a tick. The signing screen marks who declined and says how many could still sign, and the proposal list says "You declined." where it said "You agreed." Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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de5b2bd4a6 |
docs(marmot): the v2 plan is built -- where the build chose differently, and where the rollout stands (v2 Phase 9)
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 9. The phase has no code in it; it is the rollout, and the rollout is a flip and a retirement that wait on the people this app's users invite. What the phase owes the document is the repo's convention for a plan that has been built: the status paragraph, the table of where the implementation chose differently, the thing found on the way that belongs to nobody's phase, and the commit the account was written against. All four are here now, and the phases themselves are kept as written, because they are the reasoning and the code reads better against the argument it came from than against a summary of itself. The table has twenty-two rows, and the first is the one to read before any of the code: the plan said the library's engine replaces the app's pipeline, and the build made a room's profile pick its pipeline instead -- legacy rooms keep the app's path, comparator and cache included, and retire with the profile; current-profile rooms go through `MarmotEngine`. The library's processor has no carve-out for the bare gift wrap a legacy direct message is carried in, so under it every one of those would have stopped decrypting, and the legacy pipeline is frozen anyway. Most of the other rows follow from that one: one store rather than four, no message-id column, the rotation manager constructed and unused, the engine hanging off the database rather than an identity's scope. The rest record the smaller turns -- the envelope's kind, the chronicle cap measured escaped, the KeyPackage not last-resort, the admin refused before a leave is attempted, captions from the participants diff rather than a snapshot column, no rename, the two non-chat kinds only, the four Phase 8 scenarios spread over four tests -- and the three follow-ups that closed lines the phases' own commits had missed: the outbound hold while a pass is open, the rejected commit discarded, and the 1210/1009 bubbles. The thing found on the way is quartz 1.15.2's: its convergence rebuilds a candidate branch by replaying its commits against the retained parent, and a member cannot replay a commit it authored, so a fork this device is half of is scored with its own branch stale and two committers swap branches rather than agree. Every device that only observed still agrees, which is the case the app depends on and the first fork test holds; the second pins the swap and says what to do the day it fails. The paragraph says the practical exposure is small and why, and that the Phase 5 follow-up on withdrawing a losing branch's rows waits on the same fix. Phase 9's own section gains "Where it stands": everything ships built and unflipped -- `DEFAULT_FOR_NEW_ROOMS` is legacy, both slots are published, no room is on the current profile unless a caller asked by name -- so the first of the three one-way doors is behind us and the other two wait on the flip. The README's row and reading-order paragraph now say the plan has been built and point at the table's first and last rows. One code change, a comment: the plan's Phase 5 asked that the two library gaps the rewrite does not close -- the retained-epoch decrypt without sender verification, and the skipped keys that do not survive `saveState` -- be said where the new code is, rather than let the rewrite look like it closed them. `MarmotEngine`'s class doc now says both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2bbe1fc9bc |
feat(marmot): a commit every relay refuses is discarded, and the room is free again
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 6: "a terminal rejection resolves FAILED, discarding the pending state with the live group already correct." The phase's commit built the CONFIRMED half and left every other outcome pending, on the grounds that the broadcast queue reported a timeout and a relay's refusal the same way -- both were "failed" -- and a timeout must stay pending, since its retry re-sends the same bytes and may yet be accepted. The cost of that was a room whose commit a relay refused outright: its obligation never resolved, `canPrepareLocalCommit` stayed false, and every later invite, removal or disband was refused with "try again in a moment" for as long as the room existed. The refusal was re-sent on every launch and refused again. The two are distinguishable, and now are. `RelayPool` already surfaces an `["OK", id, false, reason]` as a `NostrPublishException` carrying the relay's reason, apart from socket errors and timeouts; `BroadcastStatus.of(error)` turns that into a status. A reason a relay will keep giving -- `blocked:`, `invalid:`, `pow:`, `restricted:` -- is the new "rejected", which the requeue on launch leaves alone: the same bytes to the same relay get the same answer. A `rate-limited:` or `error:` refusal is "failed" like a timeout, because those change. And a `duplicate:` refusal is "published": the relay is saying it has the event, which is what published means, and it is the answer a byte-identical retry gets from a relay that took the first copy. The four statuses that were string literals across the sync pump, the navigation gate and the DAO are named on the same object. `DatabaseNostrRepository.broadcastProcessed` gains the relay's reason and a "rejected" branch. One relay's refusal decides nothing -- another may still accept, and a timeout on another is retried -- so the obligation is discarded only when every request row for the event is "rejected": `MarmotEngine.discardRejected` resolves it FAILED, the gate drops the clone, the live group having never advanced, and the room can prepare a commit again. Nothing is told to convergence, since a commit no relay carries is not a branch any member will see. The room says what happened, in the relay's words, because the screen that asked closed when the commit was made: an invite gets the existing `TYPE_MEMBER_INVITE_FAILED` line, and a removal or a disband step gets a new `TYPE_CHANGE_REJECTED` line, since the caption written when it was asked for would otherwise stand uncorrected. `PublishBeforeApplyJvmTest` gains the plan's third case: with a two-relay scope, one refusal leaves the obligation, a timeout on the other leaves it, the other's refusal discards it -- epoch unchanged, the peer not a member, the line naming the reason -- and the same peer can be invited again. 1187 tests green, Android debug compile, M3 audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0b3780c604 |
feat(marmot): nothing goes out against a state that may lose
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 5, the last line of "Welcome and outbound", which the phase's commit left out: before encrypting or committing, read `convergenceStatus(groupId).allowsOutboundWork`. While a convergence pass is open the room's canonical state is provisional -- two members committed against the same epoch and the pass has not picked between them -- and a message keyed under the branch that loses is one no peer will ever read, while a commit against it makes a three-way fork out of a two-way one. The library defines the flag and nothing in it reads it; the app is where the outbound work is, so the app reads it. `MarmotEngine.awaitSettled(routingId)` is the read. It is a short wait rather than a refusal because a pass settles at the quiescence window -- one quiet second, five at the outside -- so a caller that waits gets its work done in order, whereas one that threw would hand its row back to a queue that re-emits only when its table changes, which a pass settling does not do. The wait ticks `settleDueConvergence` itself rather than relying on `settleLater` having been armed, and gives up after three ticks with `MarmotConvergencePendingException`, whose message the add-member screen shows like the other two refusals; the bound is short because most of the callers hold a Room transaction while they wait. Five callers: the message send in `encryptAndSendMarmotInnerEvent` (the current-profile branch; a legacy room has no convergence to wait for), the invite past the founding Add, `publishGatedCommit` (so removal and both disband steps), and `leave`, each after the publish gate's own check and before the manager stages anything. The observer fork test now settles the app's side through `awaitSettled` instead of resolving it directly -- asserting outbound work is refused before and allowed after -- and finishes with what settling is for: a message the app sends once settled is an `ApplicationMessage` on Dana's side. 1186 tests green, Android debug compile, M3 audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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437fd3e18b |
fix(marmot): a received kind:1210 or kind:1009 is not a bubble
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 7, the line the phase's commit missed: "a received kind:1210 or kind:1009 gets no bubble". Both are kinds the current profile defines as not-chat. A 1210 is a group system row -- member added, member left -- and the profile is explicit that one arriving over the wire is one member's assertion rather than a fact; this device derives its own from the commit it applied (`TYPE_MEMBER_ADDED` and its siblings, written by `processGroupMembershipChanges`), so the received one adds nothing it can trust. A 1009 is an in-place edit, which the app does not apply. Until now either fell off the end of `applyInnerEvent`'s `when` into `unsupported()`, which is the raw-JSON bubble, so a White Noise member leaving a room would have put their client's system row into the transcript as a block of JSON under the caption this device wrote for the same fact. Both kinds now return null: no line. The bubble stays for every other unknown kind, which is narrower than the plan's "neither does any other unknown kind". Two reasons. The `TextNoteEvent` arm reaches `unsupported()` deliberately -- a kind:1 the room did not sign is a member's own note travelling through the room and has always rendered as this -- and the bubble is the only trace an unrecognised payload leaves; retiring it would make the next new kind a silent drop, which is the failure mode the chronicle note complains about from the other side. The Phase 9 table records the narrowing. `MarmotSystemRowJvmTest` holds both: the two kinds make no row, and kind 31337 is still the bubble. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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daac3962fa |
test(marmot): prove convergence where the app relies on it, and pin where quartz cannot yet
docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 8. The plan's last code phase is not code: it is the test that shows the app's forks settle the way Amethyst's do. Phase 7 wired `MarmotInboundProcessor`'s convergence into the app -- commits admitted as forks open a pass, `MarmotEngine.settleLater` resolves it at the cutoff, `resolveConvergence` is the reindex's way in -- but nothing yet held the property that is the whole point of a pass: two clients that freeze the same batch pick the same branch. This commit holds it, and in holding it found the one place quartz 1.15.2 does not deliver it. What the first test proves -------------------------- Alice's group, with Bob promoted to admin, Dana as a plain member, and the app joined last. Every commit Alice makes on the way there is fanned out to whoever is already in, so all four sit at one epoch before anything forks. Then Alice and Bob each add a different member against that epoch: two commits, one parent. The two observers -- the app, fed through the real ingest path (`storeInApp`, so `NostrDao.indexCurrentProfileGroupEvent`, the engine, the row), and Dana, driven through the processor directly -- are handed the two commits in opposite orders. Each applies the first as a plain linear commit and admits the second as a fork, which opens a pass on both. `resolveConvergence` is called on each without waiting for the cutoff -- the timers are scheduling, not semantics -- and the assertions are the property itself: both settled, both one epoch past the base, same members, same group context byte for byte, exactly one of the two additions surviving, and the app's `ChatRoom.mlsGroupState` row carrying what its engine holds. That is the case the app depends on. A device that only observes other members' commits is every device most of the time; the app's own commits go out through the publish gate one at a time, and the plan's Phase 7 argument was that a device which never applies before publishing rarely authors one side of a fork at all. What the second test pins ------------------------- The case it *can* author: the app, promoted to admin, adds peer A through `DatabaseChatRepository.inviteMember` and confirms the publish; the other admin adds peer B against the same epoch; each is handed the other's commit; each resolves its pass. The expectation was agreement. The result is a swap. On each side, the commit that side authored is scored STALE and the other's ACCEPTED, and both sides rewind -- onto each other's branch. The cause is in the library's candidate scoring, and it is structural rather than a tie-break: a pass rebuilds every branch by replaying its commits against the retained parent state, and a member cannot replay a commit it authored. The committer holds no ciphertext for its own copath in the UpdatePath, so `MlsGroup.restore(parent).processFramedCommit(ownCommit)` fails with "UpdatePath at common ancestor carries no ciphertext for us", the replay fails, and the branch is scored as if it could not be reached. The state that branch leads to is already in hand -- it was retained when the commit was recorded -- and needs no replay; using it is the library's fix, not this app's. Confirmed with a direct probe against `MlsGroup` before the test was written, so the pin is on the library and not on the app's wiring. The test asserts the defect exactly as observed -- own commit STALE on both sides, both rewound, the two sides' contexts differing, peer B on the app's side and peer A on the other's -- and one thing that must hold regardless: the app's row matches its engine. Its last assertion carries the note that the day the two sides agree, the library has been fixed and the test should become the agreement it was written to prove. Until then, an app device that authors one side of a fork against another admin's commit will take the other admin's branch, and the other admin will take the app's; the group is still one group on every device that only observed, which is the case the first test holds. The fixture ----------- `MarmotStandIn` gained `commitLocally`, which is what a stand-in's commit had been missing: `recordLocalCommit` with the pre-commit snapshot, the way Amethyst tells its own processor about its own commits. Without it, a competitor commit authored against the same parent is an orphan rather than a fork, and no pass opens. `inviteApp` now commits through it, and `lastCommitEvent` turns the newest commit into the kind:445 the other members are handed, which is what lets the first test fan Alice's commits out before the fork. Verified: full jvmTest 1184 tests green, Android debug compile, M3 audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c4a46e892f |
feat(marmot): leaving, removal, disbanding, and captions derived from the state (v2 Phase 7)
The lifecycle of a current-profile room, through the publish gate. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 7. Leaving used to be a local flag and a "Left group" chat line: the group never learned of it, and the leaf stayed in the tree holding the group's keys. A current-profile room is now left the way v2 leaves: a standalone SelfRemove proposal on the wire as a kind:445, the LEAVING gate raised first and durably, the local state dropped, the room closed on this device with its own line. It is not a commit, so it waits on no relay -- there is no state of ours it would make canonical. An admin's device that receives the proposal commits it on receipt, as the library expects, so a leaver is out of the tree without anyone pressing anything; the commit goes through the gate like every other. The library refuses a SelfRemove from an admin outright -- an admin self-demotes first -- so an admin's leave is refused here before anything is raised or dropped, in words a person can act on: hand over admin, or, for the only admin, disband. Legacy rooms leave the way they always did. An admin removes a member with stageRemoveMember through the gate; the library's admin-depletion guard refuses a commit that would leave no admin. An admin disbands with stageEnableDisbanding and stageDisband -- two commits when the group predates the lifecycle component, one otherwise -- under the DISBANDING gate, which is durable so a crash between raising it and publishing does not lose the request; the second step is taken by continueDisband when the first is accepted. Both are on the room detail screen, for a device that administers a current-profile room: a remove action on every member row but its own, and a disband button beside leave, with an explainer that says nobody rejoins. A disbanded room says so and hides every write entrance. The captions are derived, never received. v2 spells them as kind-1210 system rows and is explicit that a row arriving over the wire is one member's assertion, not a fact; here they are written by processGroupMembershipChanges from the difference between the room's members before a commit and after it -- "X joined the group", "X left the group", "The group was disbanded", "You were removed from the group" -- on every device that applies the commit, including the one that made it, which is why an admin's own removal no longer writes a line of its own: every device says the same thing at the same point. A commit that removed our own leaf, or disbanded the group, closes the room here as well. A commit this device made is applied at the relay's OK, where the room now follows the state it gained. MarmotCommitResult.NO_INVITEE marks a commit that invites nobody, so the OK sends no Welcome for it. Tests: GroupLifecycleJvmTest, with quartz's own managers standing in for the other member, covers an admin committing a member's leave on receipt and the room saying they left; a removal applied on both sides once the commit lands; a disband ending the group for everyone, closing the room and refusing what follows; an admin's leave refused with its reason; and a member's leave sending the proposal the other side stages, dropping the state and closing the room. The stand-in is now one fixture, MarmotStandIn, shared with the interop test. Full JVM suite: 1,182 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f617560cf9 |
feat(marmot): publish before apply (v2 Phase 6)
A commit this device makes into an established current-profile room is no longer applied and then broadcast. It is prepared on a clone by the manager, recorded as a durable obligation before anything is broadcast, sent, and installed only when a relay in its scope accepts it. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 6. The library's gate explains why apply-and-roll-back is not the same thing: between applying a local commit and undoing it on failure there is a window in which this client's canonical state is an epoch no peer has, and a crash inside it makes the fork permanent. Recording the obligation before the broadcast closes the mirror-image window -- a commit peers accepted that this device has no memory of preparing, and would mint a replacement for at the next start. Two new tables (schema 22 -> 23), MarmotPublishObligation and MarmotOutboundGate, back RoomPublishObligationStore; MarmotEngine holds a MarmotPublishGate over it and restores it after the groups. MarmotCommitResult -- the row that already held a commit's Welcome until the relay's OK -- carries the obligation id, and DatabaseNostrRepository.broadcastProcessed resolves it on "published" through MarmotEngine.confirmPublished, which installs the pending state, tells convergence of the commit we authored (without which a peer's competing commit would look like an orphan rather than a fork we are half of), and only then lets the Welcome go out: the MIP-02 ordering enforced by sequence rather than by hope. A second OK for the same event from another relay finds no obligation and changes nothing. The founding Add keeps its exception. A group that is only its creator has no peer a failure to publish could fork, so it installs at once -- the library's satisfyEmptyObligation draws the same line, "creation and its immediately following founding Add, never a later commit". While an obligation is pending the room cannot prepare another commit: a second invite is refused with MarmotCommitPendingException, shown as itself on the confirmation screen, rather than forked; the membership note's batching closed the race inside one invite, and this closes it between invites. The broadcast queue's requeue re-sends the same signed event, which is the byte-identical retry the rule demands, and a "failed" from the pump -- a timeout or a relay's refusal, which the pump does not tell apart -- leaves the obligation pending rather than discarding a state some relay may have taken. Legacy rooms are unchanged. Tests: PublishBeforeApplyJvmTest pins the founding Add installing at once, a later commit prepared and queued but not applied, the second Welcome held back, a concurrent invite refused, the OK installing the state and queueing the Welcome, a second OK changing nothing, and an obligation restored by an engine rebuilt over the same database and installed by a late OK. Full JVM suite: 1,177 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8e1037dff1 |
feat(marmot): the library's engine over Room, for current-profile rooms (v2 Phase 5)
A current-profile room is now read and written by quartz's own managers: MlsGroupManager holds its live group and persists through a store over the app's tables, MarmotInboundProcessor reads its kind:445s -- settling same-epoch commits through the convergence engine and recognising redelivery by the Marmot message id -- and MarmotOutboundProcessor builds the ones this device sends. Everything in docs/marmot-v2.md's "v2 says" column that is not a wire shape lives in those three, and the app no longer carries its own copy of their logic for these rooms. Where the build chose differently from the plan: **a room's profile picks its pipeline**. The plan had one engine for every room. Two things stood against that once the code was open. The library's processor has no carve-out for the bare gift wrap a legacy room carries a direct message in -- it would refuse every legacy DM as an author that is not the sender -- and the manager's installState declines a state whose group context matches the live one, so a legacy path that mutates the manager's instance and then asks it to persist would persist nothing, while its own retained-epoch list would drift from the manager's. So legacy rooms keep MarmotInboundManager over MlsGroupCache, unchanged, and retire with it; current-profile rooms go through MarmotEngine. A room is on one profile for life, so the two never hold the same group, which is what keeps the manager's live instance the single writer of a current-profile room's state. For the same reason the library's KeyPackage rotation manager is constructed but not fed: Welcomes are matched to this device's bundles by the app's own profile-aware table, by reference, and the processor reads the rotation manager only on its own Welcome path. The vendored CommitOrdering therefore stays, for legacy rooms. RoomMlsGroupStateStore resolves the library's key -- the routing address -- through MarmotRouting to the room, keeps the state in ChatRoom.mlsGroupState as before, and keeps the retained epochs as MarmotRetainedEpochSecret rows, which until now were written by the outbound path and read back by nothing: every epoch the inbound path retained was a map in an object, gone at the next launch. The engine is owned by the database (CurareDatabase.marmotEngine), because the DAOs that need it are made by Room from that instance and can be handed nothing else; it restores every group once, seeds convergence with each, and loads a room made or joined later from its row on first ask. Inbound, NostrDao.indexMarmotGroupEvent branches on ChatRoom.marmotProfile() -- read off the stored state's group context without rebuilding the group -- and the result handling every kind:445 shares (membership changes, the chat line, the signing and ceremony dispatch) is one function for both pipelines. The processor names the group by its address; the result is re-addressed to the room once. A pass a commit opened is driven to its cutoff by a ticking coroutine, since a quiet group has nothing else to drive it. Outbound, an application message in a current-profile room is built by the outbound processor over the engine's group, and an invite or batched add is staged on a clone by the manager and installed at once -- retained, persisted -- with the callers' own state writes skipped for these rooms; installing on a relay's OK rather than at once is what Phase 6 changes. A reindex closes the room's open convergence pass before replaying. Tests: CurrentProfileInteropJvmTest puts two implementations in one group -- the app's engine over a CurareDatabase and a bare library stand-in playing Amethyst -- and has the stand-in invite the app through a gift-wrapped Welcome, messages cross in both directions (the app's read by the stand-in as a canonical payload), a commit from the other side move the room's membership and epoch, and a second engine over the same database read a message from the epoch before that commit -- the case the old pipeline could not pass. RoomMlsGroupStateStoreJvmTest pins the store's contract. Full JVM suite: 1,175 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9b5e4c95fc |
feat(marmot): current-profile rooms, and a routing address apart from the room id (v2 Phase 4)
After this the app can create rooms on the current profile -- behind MarmotProfile.DEFAULT_FOR_NEW_ROOMS, which stays legacy until the rollout flips it -- and every path keyed on the `h` tag reads the room through its address. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 4. The room's id is a key. A room built around a threshold key is keyed on the id derived from that key -- the one it signs as and every chronicle is verified against -- and every member can compute it unaided. v2's routing component says of `nostr_group_id` the opposite: random, never derived from any public key, because a derivable address lets a relay link a group's traffic to the identity behind it, which here is the key that authors the group's published entries. Both are right about their own value, so they are two values now. A new MarmotRouting table (schema 21 -> 22) maps an address to its room; a current-profile room this app creates mints a random one, and every other room -- legacy, or made by another client -- has a row whose address is its own id, or no row at all and is addressed by its own id, which every reader falls back to. The inbound ingest, the reindex, the negentropy answer for a `#h` filter, the chat list's sync request and the live subscriptions all resolve or emit addresses; LocalChatRoom carries its routings as a relation so the subscription planner needs no query; the outbound commit, application and Welcome templates are stamped with the room's address rather than its id. A joiner keys a room on the group's `nostr_group_id`, which for a current-profile room would be the address, and the creator, the joiner's own DKG session and every chronicle know the room by its derived id. The components carry no field for it, so it rides in the group profile's description as one line -- `Room id: <hex>` -- the way the derivation path already does, and MlsGroup.roomId() reads it back first. It is a claim by the creator, exactly as the legacy `nostr_group_id` was, and is trusted no further. MarmotGroupFactory is now the one place a group is minted. The three sites -- a direct message, the convenient room, and the derived room MarmotGroupCreation builds -- say what the room is, and the factory decides the profile: a legacy group is the 0xF2EE extension as before; a current-profile group is quartz's own CurrentProfileGroupFactory with the admin policy, routing, profile and the creator's proof-bearing leaf, and no 0xF2EE at all, because RFC 9420 requires every member to support every GroupContext extension and an MDK leaf does not advertise it. Creating a direct-message room reads the identity from the chat repository, which now takes it, so the creator's leaf can carry its proof. A peer's KeyPackage is picked by the room's profile rather than by age: a current-profile room takes the newest current-profile package or none, since the legacy package is deliberately the newest a peer publishes. A leaf on the wrong profile is refused a step before the library refuses it, with a reason the member can act on -- their package is from an older profile -- shown on the confirmation screen and in the room's line rather than as "try again". Tests: MarmotGroupFactoryJvmTest pins both profiles' shapes, the address minted apart from the room id, the room id riding in the description, the read-only creator refused on the current profile, and which leaves fit which groups; MarmotGroupCreationJvmTest adds a current-profile room keeping its derived id with a routing row, a legacy room unchanged, and a kind:445 under the address filed in the room; MarmotRoomIdentityTest the description line; LiveSubscriptionPlanTest the addresses watched. Full JVM suite: 1,166 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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99dba546d8 |
feat(marmot): identity proofs and the current-profile KeyPackage (v2 Phase 3)
After this a peer on Amethyst 1.15.2 or White Noise can add this app's users to their current-profile groups, and the app joins. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 3. A current-profile leaf carries an app data dictionary with three components: the component ids it supports, an explicitly empty safe_aad list, and the 104-byte account identity proof -- the account's Nostr key signing a kind-450 template that is never published and names this leaf's own Ed25519 signature key. MLS never checked that the account in a credential agreed to the signature key beside it; the proof is what makes a leaf unforgeable, and a current-profile group refuses a leaf without one at add time. Only the account signer can make it, and it has to exist before the leaf is built, so publishMarmotKeyPackageBundle now takes the KeyPair rather than the public key it used to. The current-profile package comes from quartz's own CurrentProfileGroupFactory -- the same leaf shape Amethyst publishes, including the agent-text-stream component the reference client requires of every leaf it invites -- and its kind:30443 from KeyPackageEvent.buildCurrentProfileFrom: framed content, the 0x0006 extension, the 0x0008 and 0x000a proposals, an app_components tag, no encoding and no relays tag. KeyPackageUtils.isValid checks all of it, and the tests run that validator because it is the one a peer runs on ours. The legacy package is still published, in a second slot, for as long as builds that decode kind:30443 content as a bare KeyPackage are inviting people (Phase 9 retires it). It is stamped one second after the current-profile package, every time both are published: an inviter picks a peer's newest package by created_at, and an old build then fails on a framed one, so the legacy package has to stay the newest. Each profile now has a slot whose d-tag is minted once and reused on every rotation, so a replacement supersedes the previous event on relays instead of accumulating beside it -- the "TODO: Persist this" on the random d-tag. Schema 20 -> 21, an AutoMigration: MarmotKeyPackageBundle.profile and .dTag, and MarmotKeyPackage.profile filled at ingest from KeyPackageEvent.isCurrentProfile(). Rows from before read back null, which every reader takes as legacy. The notary keeps one publishable bundle per profile rather than any bundle at all, because a current-profile peer consumes only the current-profile package and the legacy one still being active would otherwise mean nothing was republished for them. The key-package screen takes the identity, not just its public key, and refuses to publish for one that cannot sign rather than reporting "published". KeyPackages now also go to the account's NIP-65 write set, unioned with the default DM relays -- transports/nostr.md has a conformant peer look there and nowhere else, "there is no dedicated KeyPackage relay list" -- and the member and peer sync requests ask for kind 10002 alongside the legacy 10051 hint. Tests: CurrentProfileKeyPackageJvmTest pins one package per profile with the legacy one a second later, both passing the peer's validator, the proof binding the leaf to the account, a rotation reusing its slot, and the join: a group made by quartz's own factory standing in for Amethyst adds the app's package, the Welcome arrives as a NIP-59 gift wrap through the sync funnel, and the app lands in a room keyed by the routing id from the 0x8004 component with the inviter as admin. The npub round-trip test now waits for both bundles. Full JVM suite: 1,153 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3cdce6a908 |
feat(marmot): send the canonical app payload, and an envelope for direct messages (v2 Phase 2)
What goes into MLS is now the Marmot app event the spec defines: six members and no `sig`. The rumor serialised as an Event carried `"sig":""`, which a conformant decoder refuses outright -- a payload with a signature would be a standalone relay event, republishable as a signed statement by its author. The id does not move, because NIP-01 never hashed the signature, so every row filed under an inner event's id stays valid; and the build already in the field reads the new shape, because Event.fromJsonOrNull defaults a missing signature. This switch alone needs no gating and is made everywhere at once. The `encoding` tag comes off the application kind:445 while here -- transports/nostr.md forbids it on every shape. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 2. A direct message could not make that switch as it was. Its payload is a NIP-59 wrap signed by a throwaway key, which a conformant peer refuses twice over: for the sig member and for an author that is not the MLS sender. In a current-profile room the wrap now travels inside an envelope -- an unsigned app event of kind 30330 authored by the sender, one `p` tag for the recipient, the wrap's JSON as content. The envelope passes the author check like any payload, so the carve-out in mip03Rejection that admitted bare wraps is confined to legacy rooms by a new `legacyRoom` flag: in a current-profile room a bare kind:1059 is refused as every other conformant client refuses it. Every property the throwaway key was chosen for survives -- the envelope is unsigned and so a claim rather than a proof, the wrap inside is still signed by nobody, and the seal-to-leaf binding in classify still decides who wrote the words. The line for a message this device cannot read now hangs off the row the payload was filed under (the envelope's id in a current-profile room), which ChatMessage's foreign key requires. The envelope is gated, and the gate is the room's profile: an old build renders it as a raw-JSON bubble, so a legacy room keeps sending the bare wrap, and a current-profile room -- which admits only leaves carrying an identity proof, which only a build past Phase 3 can make -- never holds an old build. That is the flag for every wire change after this one. A conformant decoder bounds the whole app payload at 64 KiB, and a chronicle page rides inside one as JSON-escaped content. The new bounds test caught what the arithmetic missed: dense JSON payloads escape to half again their size, so a 48 KiB page became a 70 KiB app event. The packer now measures a page by ChronicleEvent.escapedByteSize -- the bytes it will occupy inside the envelope -- against MAX_PAGE_BYTES, lowered from 64 to 48 KiB, and MAX_PAGE_EVENTS drops from 128 to 96 so the count cap still binds under it, as the comment on the two caps insists. The receiver's raw-bytes check is unchanged and now holds by construction. Tests: MarmotMip03CarveOutTest becomes the test that the exemption is confined to legacy rooms and that an envelope passes the ordinary check; MarmotDirectMessageTest round-trips the envelope through the strict decoder and opens the wrap inside; MarmotPayloadBoundsTest asserts the largest chronicle pages and an envelope are conformant app events, including the dense-content page measured the way the packer measures it. The ingest test's tamper case flips a decoded byte rather than the base64 tail, which could change nothing but padding. Full JVM suite: 1,148 tests pass. The direct-message and chronicle notes record the changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a68cad06a4 |
feat(marmot): read both Marmot profiles (v2 Phase 1)
After this the app can be a member of a current-profile group and can invite a current-profile peer -- an Amethyst 1.15.2 user -- into one of its own legacy rooms. Nothing it sends changes. docs/marmot-v2.md, Phase 1. Seventeen sites read `currentMarmotData()`, which is the legacy 0xF2EE extension and is null on a current-profile group: ten for the room id, and the Welcome path threw MarmotMissingNostrGroupDataExtension on that null, so a v2 Welcome was not a room the app could not read but an exception it could not get past. The others read the admins -- SubgroupManager's "only an admin can make a subgroup" and processGroupMembershipChanges' adminAt stamp both saw no admins at all on a v2 group -- the relays, the name and the retention. MlsGroupProfile.kt writes the fallback once per field (current profile first, 0xF2EE second) and the sites read roomId(), roomName(), roomDescription(), roomRelays(), retentionSeconds() and the library's currentAdminIdentities(). The retention one is the bug the library's own outbound processor had: read only 0xF2EE and disappearing messages simply did not disappear in v2 groups. A current-profile kind:30443 frames its KeyPackage in an MLSMessage, and the invite decoded whatever the ingest stored as a bare KeyPackage, taking the frame's version and wire-format words for the package's own. The ingest now validates with KeyPackageUtils.isCryptographicallyValid -- the check a conformant peer runs on ours, covering tags, signature, lifetime and on the current profile the identity proof; nothing checked any of it before -- and stores the package bare, so MlsGroup.proposeAdd and every other consumer of the row read the same bytes whichever way it was published. The inbound author check decodes the canonical payload strictly first (MarmotAppEvent: six members, no sig, an id that rehashes) and falls back to Event.fromJsonOrNull only for the legacy rumor shape every build before Phase 2 sends. The fallback would accept the canonical shape too, but by defaulting the signature rather than checking anything. A Welcome is matched to this device's bundle by the KeyPackageRef the Welcome itself names, in RFC 9420 order, before the `e` tag is consulted: the tag is what the inviter thinks it used, and MDK stamps the id of a cached copy, so a peer who rotated while an inviter kept inviting from cache was unjoinable by the tag alone. WelcomeBundleMatch is pure and scans the handful of bundle rows rather than adding a column. The exception the tag-only path threw when the tag was missing has no caller left and goes. Tests: MarmotKeyPackageIngestJvmTest runs both published shapes through the sync funnel, invites a current-profile package into a legacy room and sees the member in the tree, and refuses a tampered package; WelcomeBundleMatchJvmTest picks the addressed bundle in either candidate order, none when none is ours, and survives an unreadable row; MarmotAppPayloadTest pins that the legacy rumor and its canonical form share an id, that the strict decoder refuses a sig member and a forged id, and that the fallback reads both. The KeyPackage test fixture's lifetime drops from 90 days to the app's own 30 because 1.15.2 caps it at 84 and the ingest now checks. Full JVM suite: 1,140 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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96a0c81341 |
build(marmot): quartz 1.15.2, with the two things it broke (v2 Phase 0)
The bump to 1.15.2 -- the release that carries the Marmot current profile -- breaks the compile in exactly two places, and the rest of the ~130 quartz symbols the app imports are untouched. CommitOrdering is gone from the library. Its inbound processor now settles same-epoch commits through a convergence engine and calls the old rule superseded "and deliberately": created_at and the event id are both transport metadata the sender chooses and MLS never authenticates, so a member could win every race by backdating. The app's pipeline does not go through that processor -- it drives MlsGroup itself -- so the rule is vendored unchanged into managers/CommitOrdering.kt, with a header saying why the library dropped it, until Phase 5 of docs/marmot-v2.md replaces the pipeline. NostrDao and MarmotInboundManager only change their import. GroupEventResult gained AppMessageOnCandidateBranch and RefusedByLifecycle, so the exhaustive when in ChatMessage.fromGroupEventResult needs both. Neither is a delivery -- the first is a payload that decrypted only on a losing fork, which the library is explicit must not be rendered, the second is input a disbanded or unrecoverable group refuses -- so both get no chat line, the same as a duplicate. The app never constructs either today. Verified rather than assumed: the two sources jars were diffed file by file against the app's imports; all 1,128 JVM tests pass on 1.15.2; the rewritten Curve25519 field arithmetic matches the RFC 8032 and RFC 7748 vectors bit for bit (the app persists raw MLS private keys, so this mattered); the app's own KeyPackages sit inside the new 84-day lifetime ceiling at 30 days; no new EventFactory kind collides with the app's. One-way door: MlsGroupState's blob goes from version 2 to version 4 and 1.14.0 has `require(version in 1..2)`, so a room re-persisted under this build cannot be opened by the previous one again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8e502aa857 |
feat(groups): a new curated schema starts from one of curare.to's templates
"Add schema" opened the editor on the two fields every list has and left the member to build the rest. curare.to's /new page does it the other way round: a "Start a list" picker of four shapes -- links & text, discussion, catalogue, custom -- and an editor seeded from the one chosen. The button now pushes SelectCuratedSchemaTemplateScreen, that picker on a phone, and a card pushes the editor with the template's key, the same word the site takes as ?template=. Back from the editor is the picker and another shape; when a new list's proposal goes out the signing session replaces both. CuratedSchemaTemplate is lib/protocol/templates.ts field for field, with CuratedDeriveRule for the [rule:<key>] mark the site records in the identifier field's hint -- its own convention, not the NIP's, and the thing that lets that site's form derive an entry's d for a list the group starts here. The hint is written byte for byte as the site writes it; the app still composes no suggestions and applies no rule. Null or an unknown key seeds Custom, which is the bare two fields the editor opened on before, so a screen handed no template behaves as it did. The picker's one departure from the site: its cards list a template's fields by label, the way the group's schema cards do, rather than counting them -- what an entry asks for is what the choice is made on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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272b631633 |
feat(ui): a member on the room's screen opens the profile preview
The member rows on the chat room detail were the last "Profile detail" stub in the app: each pushed ImplementationPendingRoute. They now push ProfilePreviewRoute by the member's public key, which the nav host already serves, so a member arrives with the cached profile at once and the relays refreshing it, and the bar's action opens the chat that exists with them or starts one. The preview rather than the profile detail, because the detail is keyed by a kind 0's event id and a member whose profile has not arrived yet -- the "LOADING..." row MemberProfileSync exists for -- has none. The public key is the one thing every row has. A test pins both members opening the same screen, the named one and the one still named by its key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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80735df86a |
feat(ui): the preview's action is the app's extended FAB
curated gained ExtendedFab while the preview was being built: every screen's bottom-bar action, with an enabled that borrows the disabled colours, marks the node disabled and drops the press. The preview had chosen a Button for exactly the reason that widget removes -- a FAB had no disabled state -- so after the merge it was the one screen whose primary action was shaped somewhere else. Now it is that FAB in a bottom bar, the indicator in its icon slot while the key package is still owed, and the reason line stays in the body above it. Hidden, bar and all, for a read-only identity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f4b0347e90 | Merge branch 'curated' into claude/chat-creation-profile-preview-ae07be | ||
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ca6c16beb0 |
refactor(ui): one extended FAB for every screen's primary action, with a gap in it
Twenty screens end their bottom bar in an `ExtendedFloatingActionButton` --
twenty-one buttons, one screen having two -- and eighteen of those were built
from the content-lambda overload with an `Icon` directly followed by a `Text`.
That overload puts nothing between the two, so the icon touched the label on
every one of them: visible in any render, and unnoticed because every FAB in
the app looked the same. Thirteen of the eighteen also carried the same
twenty-line block for looking disabled, because M3 gives a FAB no `enabled`.
**`ExtendedFab`, once, in widgets/buttons.** A label, an icon slot, `enabled`
and `onClick`. It draws `space150` between icon and label, which is the 12dp
M3 names `ExtendedFabEndIconPadding`; it borrows the disabled colours every
other button in the app uses, marks the node disabled so a screen reader does
not announce a button it is happy to press, and drops the press -- so the
thirteen call sites lose their `if (!canX) return@…` guards along with the
block and the `buttonColors` each of them declared. An icon slot rather than
an image, because two screens put a progress indicator where the icon was
while the action they started is out, and they still do.
**Not M3's `text`/`icon` overload, which would have spaced them for free.**
Its source wraps the label in `clearAndSetSemantics {}`: the label leaves the
merged semantics tree, a screen reader is told only what the icon says, and a
test cannot find the button by what it says -- five screen tests do. The
three FABs that were on that overload move to the widget too, and two of them,
Home's "New chat" and "Start the key ceremony", had a decorative icon beside
the cleared label and so no accessible name at all until now.
`ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest` had gone to the unmerged tree to find "New chat"
for this reason; the habit is harmless and stays. Every icon's description is
as it was, since several tests reach their FAB by it.
`ExtendedFabJvmTest` pins the decision: found by its label in the merged tree,
the icon before the label with a gap between, and disabled both announced and
refusing the press. The two docs that recorded the old state -- the
conformance account's "left alone" and the npub plan's unmerged-tree note --
each say what superseded them.
Verified with :composeApp:m3Audit (all budgets met, 0 dp literals in spacing
positions), :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid and :composeApp:jvmTest
(1088 tests, 3 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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d2a4298d25 |
feat(groups): broadcast every accepted entry from one button, each to where its own would go
The entries screen had one "Broadcast" under each card, and each opened `BroadcastGroupSignedEventScreen` for that one entry: a group that has accepted twenty entries into its lists sent them with twenty trips through the relay picker. This is the other button. "Broadcast all", an extended FAB in a bottom bar, sends every entry on the screen, newest first, one after another, and says under each card what its relays answered. Behind no gate, like the button under each card: sending what the group has already signed takes no share of the key. **Each entry goes where its own broadcast screen would have started.** The list that screen seeds -- `defaultRelaysFor`: the group's General write relays or the app's publish set, plus the list's own relays, minus what the group has blocked -- is what a member who reads nothing and presses the button sends to, and this button is that member with twenty entries. The group's relay lists are read into the loaded state for it; the list's relays come off the entry, which carries its schema, so the rule is handed that one schema rather than all of the group's. Nothing is shown before the press, which is the difference from the one-event screen and the reason that screen stays: a refusal is answered there, where the relay can be changed and the send tried again. **One entry at a time, on purpose.** The rows fill in top to bottom, so the member can see where the batch is; and a public relay sent twenty events in one burst answers "rate-limited" to most of them, which would make the button worse than the presses it saves. Each entry's send has the same ceiling as a single broadcast and the batch has no other, since a long list is meant to take a while. It goes to the pool directly rather than through the queue, for the reason `BroadcastGroupSignedEventViewModel` gives, and it is only as durable as the press: leaving the screen ends it where it is. **The send is shared rather than copied.** What a relay's answer becomes -- an OK, a rejection in the relay's words, a failure, or no answer when the whole send runs out of time -- was decided inside `broadcast()` on the one-event view model. It is now `sendToRelays` on that model's companion, beside `defaultRelaysFor` and `wireEventOf`, and `broadcast()` keeps only the state around it; the thirteen tests on it pass unchanged. The words for an answer moved the same way, out of the relay row and into `RelayOutcome.label()`, which both screens now use. **What the member is told.** A line above the cards -- "Sending entry 3 of 12…", then "Accepted by every relay for 11 of 12 entries." -- persistent rather than a snackbar, because it is the answer the member came for and a snackbar would be gone before the last card had been read. Under each card, "Accepted by n of m relays." in the one-event screen's words, and one line per relay that did not say OK, named with its reason, because "blocked: not on the allow list" is something a member can act on and a count of two out of three is not. An entry with nowhere to go -- everything the seed would name blocked -- is marked so rather than sent to nobody. The FAB looks disabled while a batch is out, and a second press is refused. `GroupCuratedEntriesViewModelJvmTest` pins where each entry goes, that the next waits for the last to settle, what the answers become, and the refusals; the screen test drives the button end to end and checks that each answer sits between its card and that card's own broadcast. The shared fixture entry now carries the `a` root a real entry has -- without it the seed rule could not find the list's relays, which the first run of these tests found. Verified with :composeApp:m3Audit (all budgets met), :composeApp:compileDebugKotlinAndroid and :composeApp:jvmTest (1085 tests, 7 new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d649098504 |
feat(chat): the preview's button knows whether it can be pressed
Phase 4 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md. Phases 1-3 moved the twenty-second dead end one screen later: a person found on an indexer, a press, and InitiatingNewChat waiting for a key package that someone who has never opened Curare will never have published. The preview now reads the answer before the press. A room that already exists opens; a key package that is here enables "Start new chat"; one that is not, once the relays have had their time, disables it with the reason under it and a try-again that asks the DM relays alone. The existing-room check was a loop with a TODO inside initiateNewChat; it is ChatRepository.findDirectMessageRoom now -- a room whose members are exactly the two keys, or the one key when they are the same -- read by both screens and pinned by a test on an in-memory database. The old size-one branch would have opened any room the peer sat in alone, whoever they were. Both halves are observed together, as the chat screen does: a key package arriving after the profile touches a different table, and a collect on the profile alone would never see it. A room is read once up front, because a key package is meant to be used once and the relays need not hold a fresh one for someone you already talk to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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923b59ec32 |
feat(ui): the new-chat dialog opens the person, and no longer starts the chat
Phase 3 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md, and the user-visible change: "Direct message via npub" now shows who this is before anything is created. The dialog's button reads "Find profile" and pushes ProfilePreviewRoute; the chat is started from there. The field keeps what it parsed rather than whether it parsed. Its check and its decode used to be two different functions, which is how "nostr:npub1…" passed the one and failed the other, closing the dialog with nothing to show for it; CredentialParser.npubOrNull is the sign-in decode exposed for an address field -- an nsec is null there, because a field asking whom to write to must never take a secret for an answer -- and the enabled button and the route it pushes read the same key. The nip05 branch still lands on the placeholder, and the test says so. "Start chat" goes with its only reader. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8973c0058e |
feat(ui): the profile preview screen, reachable by nothing yet
Phase 2 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md. ProfilePreviewRoute is keyed by public key, because that is all the entrance has, and ProfilePreviewScreen draws the four states over a constant bar: the npub above the indicator while the relays are asked, the person -- avatar, name, nip05, the whole of the about, the npub that was pasted -- and under them "Start new chat", which hands over the route the dialog pushes today and creates nothing here. Not found is the sign-in screen's sentence with a try-again; a read-only identity is shown the person and nothing to do, and ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest gains the row. Registered in the host with the room replacing the preview, as it replaces the profile detail. No button navigates to it until Phase 3. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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37c6f7eabb |
feat(chat): the lookup behind a profile preview, and the sync it shares with the chat screen
Phase 1 of docs/npub-profile-preview.md. No screen yet: a view model that finds the person behind a pasted npub and says when it has stopped looking, over the row the device already holds -- cached first -- and two asks of the relays. The three-kind filter the chat screen queued privately is now DirectMessagePeerSync.requests, and the kind 0 alone goes to the indexers as profileRequests: a key pasted from elsewhere has lived elsewhere, and a three-kind filter sent to an indexer comes back with the kind 0 and nothing else. "A placeholder is not a profile" was spelled out twice as a comparison against GENESIS_AT; it is Profile.isResolved() now, and both sites read it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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88577bb5c3 |
test(identity): several profiles, both ways, and a boot
Phase 8 of docs/multiple-profiles.md: the seams of Phases 1 through 7 in a row, through the real view models on an in-memory database with a real key store. A is made from a phrase through the create view model and the seed writer, the way Landing makes the first profile: both files written, and listed once as a profile with a wallet attached, under the wallet's id, with the credential's key. A is opened with a node behind it -- a PhoenixBusiness that was never started, which is enough to make it one the switch has to stop. B's npub is signed in from inside through the sign-in view model; the switch stops A's node, B is open and read-only, the machine routes it from its placeholder, and nothing was ever started for a public key. A kind 1 queued for A while B is open waits three seconds unsigned; back to A, and it goes out, with nothing more stopped since B had no node. C is created from inside through the bare-key writer: a key, not a second wallet, routed, with no node, and the switch to it stops A's node again. C and B are forgotten through ForgetIdentity with the view model's writers, the default is cleared and the selector reset: A is listed alone, its credential is the only entry left in the file, B's and C's account rows went with them, and A itself cannot be forgotten because a wallet is attached. Then a fresh view model over the same directory, which is what a cold boot is: the repair finds nothing to do, A is listed from its credential rather than derived, and StartupChoice opens it without asking. A navigation state is matched to a profile by whichever step it is at -- UnsignedProfile, UnqueuedProfileSynchronization, UnannouncedProfile through the event the broadcast request names, ProfileLoaded -- because with the notary running, A's account moves from unsigned to announced-pending while the test looks, and what the test asserts is whose account it is, not which step it reached. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9bb340042d |
feat(ui): leaving one profile among several
Phase 7 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. Small, because the forget sequence was built right. Sign out of a read-only identity and "forget this key" for a bare key both run ForgetIdentity and then the tail -- re-list, clear the default since Phase 3, show the selector with what remains or Landing if nothing does -- and that is the right behaviour with several profiles as well; nothing in the sequence changes. A profile with a wallet attached answers WalletAttached from Phase 1 and is offered neither exit: its sign-out row stays the pending route, for the reason both sign-in plans gave, and it is now also the only way such a profile can leave, since the repair would write its credential back. What changes is that the user is no longer stuck behind it -- "switch profile" is the row above. The not-found screen learns about the others. It offers "try again" and, for a read-only identity, "use a different key", which forgets it; with another profile on the device it now offers "switch profile" as well, for every kind, pushing the switcher -- which has a back button, so the screen is still there if the user changes their mind. The identity that was not found stays listed; forgetting it remains a separate decision. The nav host passes the callback only when the listing holds more than one. Tests: ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest -- with another profile on the device the not-found state offers the switch beside the read-only exit and it calls through once; a signing identity that was not found gets it above the set-up form; with one profile there is nothing to switch to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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759199f2af |
feat(sync): a fetch queue per identity, and the inbox reopened on activation
Phase 6 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The one data problem, closed from both ends. The two queues that fetch -- SynchronizeNostrEventRequest and NegentropySynchronizeRequest -- gain a nullable ownerPublicKey, the identity that asked, because what a fetch brings back is opened with the fetcher's key. The pumps ask for their own: the head of the queue among this identity's requests and the ones nobody owns, so that a request another identity queued waits for that identity. Rows from before the column read back null, meaning "the device's", which is what they were, and any identity may drain them. The broadcast queue deliberately gets no owner: a signed event is anyone's to carry, and holding A's outgoing message until A is opened again would be a delivery failure the user would never be told about. Room version 20, an AutoMigration for two nullable columns, with the schema export committed beside its predecessors. The stamp is the repository's, not the call site's. Eighteen view models and two DAO paths queue requests, and every one of them does so as the active identity -- a screen cannot queue anything as anyone else. DatabaseNostrRepository takes the identity flow at construction, which meant moving the view model above the repositories in the nav host, and stamps every request it queues where the caller stamped nothing; a negentropy request carries its owner into the REQ it becomes. The DAO's own requests -- the placeholder-profile syncs it plants while indexing, and the participant syncs of a Marmot join -- stay unowned, on purpose and against the plan's sketch: they fetch public kinds that need no key to open, and any profile that is open may as well fetch them. The other end: wraps that were fetched under the wrong key -- before this, or by a read-only identity whose nsec was pasted later, the case the npub plan's DAO guard left with the words "the key that opens this one may be signed in later" and no code behind them. storeNostrEvent never indexes an event it already holds, so a wrap that arrived under the wrong key stayed closed for good: the live subscription re-received it, the DAO saw a known id, and returned. NostrDao.reopenInbox finds every wrap addressed to the active key that no seal names and runs each through indexNostrEvent again under the right key, one transaction per wrap so that one that cannot be opened rolls back its own changes and the next is still tried; one pass, since wraps do not depend on one another. It runs from the sync pumps' collector once per activation, for an identity that can sign, before the live inbox and the broadcast pump are launched -- so the sweep and the live subscription are not opening the same wrap at once; both are idempotent by event id. Found on the way: GiftWrapSeal.giftWrapMessageId, a foreign key to the wrap a seal came out of, existed and was never written, so nothing in the database could say which wraps had been opened. decryptGiftWrapSeal now sets it. A seal from before reads back null, is swept once, and comes back with the link -- the reindex is idempotent, and persistInboundChatMessage already files a message it has once. Tests: ReadOnlyGiftWrapDaoJvmTest -- a wrap for us stored under another profile's key is stored and not opened, a re-delivery under our key changes nothing, the sweep opens it once and finds nothing the second time; the other profile's sweep and a read-only pair open nothing; a wrap stored read-only is opened once the key is here. OwnedRequestQueueJvmTest -- A's request is offered to A and not to B, nobody's to both, oldest first; the repository stamps what it queues with the identity that is open, nothing when none is, and keeps an owner a caller named. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2f42023081 |
feat(identity): adding a profile from inside, as a key and not a second wallet
Phase 5 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The two entrances, and the two things that were only safe with one profile. Under the list, on the switcher and on the startup selector alike, two rows: "sign in with a key", to the sign-in screen, and "create a new profile", to the create screen. Both push a screen that has a back button. Landing is not one of them -- it has no back button and clears the stack on its way out, because it is the first-run screen, and pushing it from inside would make it a pushed screen on some days and a root on others. A device with one profile can now be given a second, which it could not: Landing showed only when the device held nothing. A profile created from inside is a bare key. CreateProfileScreen generated twelve words behind its form -- a seed, a node, a wallet, and at the NIP-06 path the key that becomes the profile -- which is right for the first profile on a device, the one the wallet will belong to, and wrong for the second: a user who wants another profile has not asked for another Lightning node, another set of channels, or a second phrase with funds behind it. The screen now takes a NewProfileWriter and does not know which it was given: seedProfileWriter from Landing, bareKeyProfileWriter from the switcher, thirty-two random bytes written the way a pasted nsec is. CreateProfileRoute carries the choice. The view model writes the secret first, then the six bootstrap events for the key it derives, then hands the id to the tail -- so the events are only ever queued for a key the device holds, and they are in the database before the tail activates the identity, an ordering the sign-in screen documents as load-bearing and the create flow used to get away with by luck. The tail gains the popUpTo(0) the sign-in tail has. A second wallet is not offered from inside; a pasted recovery phrase still brings its own. "End this" goes. It wiped the database -- every profile's rooms, MLS state, key packages and queues -- from the screen whose purpose is to add a profile; it was only ever a development exit, and with several profiles on a device it was a way to lose the others. wipeDatabase leaves the view model and stays on the repository for the tests that use it. A key already on the device is refused with the id it is listed under. WriteNostrCredentialResult.AlreadyExists and WritingSeedState.Error. SeedAlreadyExists carry it -- the wallet's id where a seed derives the key -- and the sign-in screen's error state gains one action, "switch to it", which is the sign-in tail with that id. From Landing "already on this device" was the whole message; from inside it is a sentence with an obvious next step, and a duplicate paste becomes the fastest switch in the app. Found on the way, and fixed in the jvm actuals: DataStoreManager caches one GlobalPrefs per process behind an unsynchronised check-then-set, and DataStore refuses a second instance over the same file. Two first calls at once -- the listing on IO and a sign-in's write, or the startup screen on Main -- could both see the empty cache and both build one, and the loser threw "multiple DataStores active for the same file" at first use. The test for this phase hit it one run in three. JvmGlobalPrefs is now the one way the jvm target reaches the prefs, under a lock; Android goes through the Application's single instance and never raced; the library's own callers come at node start, when the cache is long populated. Tests: AddProfileFromInsideJvmTest, through the real view models on an in-memory database -- A open, B's nsec committed and switched to, and back, both accounts intact with their own kind 0; A's key pasted again refused with A's id; a profile made through the bare-key writer lists as a bare key with the kind 0 first of its six bootstrap rows, none signed yet, and no node ran. SignInToProfileViewModelJvmTest and IdentityWriterJvmTest assert the ids the three refusals carry. ProfilesScreenJvmTest: the two rows call their callbacks and switch nothing, under the caption that the open profile stays. CreateProfileScreenJvmTest: the state that carried "end this" is composed and the words are not there. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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25464595f4 |
feat(ui): the switcher, showing the nostr profile and what the device holds for it
Phase 4 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. One pushed screen, and the startup selector brought up to match it. ProfilesRoute, reached from the profile tab's row -- "Switch profile", where it said "Change account" and went to the pending screen -- and drawn by ProfilesScreen: a top app bar with a back button, and WalletsSelector as its whole content with the open profile above the divider and the others below. Tapping another row is switchToIdentity and nothing else; the observer restarts the app as that identity through its lock gate, so the screen is never around to see the result. Tapping the open row does nothing. Three states, said so: loading while the list is read, which in practice is never seen; an unreadable key file, through ErrorState with a retry that re-lists; and the list. Empty cannot happen while something is signed in and the screen does not pretend it can. One column at every width. The row is offered to every kind: a read-only identity can leave for another profile the same way a signing one can. ProfilesViewModel joins the flows the app already holds -- the listing state, the identities, the active identity, the wallet metadata -- to the profile rows for the listed keys, through NostrRepository.observeProfilesOf, one map that moves when any of them does. Nothing in it writes. What a row shows changes. WalletsSelector showed "Default name" over a random emoji for every row, because nothing in this app writes the wallet metadata's name, and two profiles side by side both called Default name and told apart by a bech32 string is not a switcher. The row now takes the nostr profile -- humanReadableNameOrPubkey over ProfileAvatar, the widgets the profile tab draws itself with -- with the npub on the second line, and falls back to the npub over the metadata's emoji for a key the device has no kind 0 for yet: one just created, or a read-only one that was never found. And it says what the device holds for the profile before the tap: "Wallet" for a seed attached, beside the "Read only" that was already there, and nothing for the plain case of a bare key. It is the difference between a profile that can be signed out of and one whose sign-out is a wallet question, and between two profiles with the same name. The startup screen draws the same widget and gets the same map through rememberProfilesOf, so both lists look the same. The selector's dead globalPrefs parameter goes with the rewrite. Tests: ProfilesScreenJvmTest, on the unmerged tree, with a wallet-attached A open, a bare B and a read-only C -- A by its nostr name with its npub and "Wallet" under it, B and C by their npub with only C labelled, no "Default name" anywhere, the open one drawn above the others; tapping A calls nothing and tapping B calls the switch once with B's id; an unreadable key file is an error whose retry is counted; the bar has a back button. ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest asserts "Switch profile" for both kinds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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00fc996995 |
feat(identity): which profile opens, on launch and after a switch
Phase 3 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The startup screen learns to agree with the switch. The table that picks what to open is lifted out of the screen's remember into StartupChoice.resolve, where it can be read and tested, because its order was the whole decision and it was wrong in the one way a switch would hit: "!startWalletImmediately -> null" sat above "desiredWalletId != null", and nothing ever set the flag back to true. So after the first visit to the selector, every sign-in on that device landed on the selector instead of the profile it had just signed in. Two rows move: what a switch or a sign-in named goes above the user's earlier "show me the list", since it is the more specific instruction; and the single-identity row drops below it, since when both are set they name the same thing. The default is written. GlobalPrefs.getDefaultWallet has been read by startup since Phoenix and saved by nothing in this app, so a cold boot with two profiles was the selector every time with no memory of which one was open. setActiveIdentity now saves the id it activates -- every activation goes through it, startup for all three kinds and the two tails through startup -- so the default is always the profile most recently open. The two forget tails clear it, since the default is the one memory of an identity that would otherwise outlive it. Both writes are wrapped: a default that could not be recorded is a selector on the next boot, not a crash now. The screen reads the saved value as a default only when it names a wallet, which is the one thing left to decide at the call site. The startup screen's literals go to the catalogue, and "wallet" goes with them except in the one place a wallet is what is starting: "Starting wallet" is shown from StartupViewState.StartingBusiness, which only the branch with a wallet attached reaches, and stays. The rest become "Preparing profiles", "Opening profile", "Decrypting", "Loading preferences", "Unlock to continue" and "Could not load the profiles on this device"; the selector's title is "Choose a profile", and select_a_wallet goes. Tests: StartupChoiceTest in commonTest, one case per row and the two orderings this phase is for -- a desired id opens even after the user once asked for the list, and one identity with the list asked for still shows it. IdentitySwitchJvmTest gains the cold boot: activate A then B, and a fresh view model over the same directory resolves B without asking; forget the default, and it resolves nothing. Found on the way and recorded in the test: DataStoreManager caches the global preferences once per process, bound to whichever directory was current when the first test in the JVM asked -- the same trap the nsec plan recorded for user preferences -- so the test reads the default through the view model's own instance rather than one of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9b3a19278f |
feat(identity): a switch that tears down what it should
Phase 2 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. The transition, made correct, with nothing yet calling it from a screen: the view model, one manager, and three one-line actuals. switchToWallet becomes switchToIdentity, and does what a switch is: remember which one, set startWalletImmediately back to true -- a switch is the user saying which one, and the flag was only ever the user saying "show me the list"; nothing set it back before because nothing could switch -- clear the active identity, and stop the node of the profile being left, if it had one. The identity is cleared before the node is stopped, so that every collector that could reach the business is cancelled before the stop runs. The test is business != null, not the kind: whether the profile being left has a node behind it is the fact, and the kind is how it currently comes to be true. stopPlatformBusiness is an expect beside updateBusinessActiveInUI, for the reason that one is: BusinessManager is a per-platform object. Its three actuals call stopBusiness, which existed on every platform and nothing called. The manager is injected into the view model as a function so that the branch can be pinned without a node. RelaysSocketManager.observeActiveUserId becomes a child of collectLatest -- the shape the pumps and the notary already had. It used to keep one job per pubkey on its own scope and cancel only the job for the pubkey being started, which meant a switch left the previous identity's observer running: two observers feeding updateRelayPools, and the one pool following whichever relay list emitted last. The map goes; a null identity closes nothing, since the pool is shared by pumps a null identity has already cancelled, and the next identity's list replaces it through changeRelays as it always did. The scope is injectable and relayUrls is exposed, both for the test. The sign-in and create tails keep their own navigate beside the observer's, now with a comment saying why: the navigation state is a StateFlow, an update to a state equal to the current one emits nothing, and the explicit navigation is what guarantees the stack moves even on the day the state does not. Tests: IdentitySwitchJvmTest, through the real SovereignWalletViewModel with a real notary and navigation machine on an in-memory database -- A open and a kind 1 queued for A is signed; switch to B, the identity clears, the machine goes to startup, B is activated the way startup does and routed from its account; a kind 1 queued for A now waits three seconds unsigned, and goes out when A is back. Leaving a profile with a PhoenixBusiness behind it -- constructible without a node, since everything in it is lazy -- stops that node once; leaving nothing, or a bare key, stops nothing. RelaysSocketManagerSwitchJvmTest over a fake relay repository and fake sockets: after the switch the pool holds B's relays, a re-emission of A's list changes nothing -- the line that fails against the old observer -- and an identity whose list is still empty leaves the pool as it was, which is the behaviour updateRelayPools has always had for an empty list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3008137e3f |
feat(identity): a seed's key is a credential, and the seed is the wallet attached to it
Phase 1 of docs/multiple-profiles.md. No library change: the file format, the encrypted writer and the manager all exist, and the app already wrote the credentials file from the seed writer -- to delete a public entry a seed superseded. This changes what it writes there, and what the listing believes. Until now a seed's nostr key was never in nostr-credentials.dat. It was derived from the words at listing, to know which npub to show, and from the running node at activation, to know which key to sign with -- so a seed-backed profile existed only as a derivation, and the app had to start a Lightning node to find out who it was. Both sign-in plans made "one key, one file" an invariant, and it was the wrong one: it said a wallet is a profile. Now the credentials file is the list of profiles and a seed is a wallet attached to the entry its key derives. writeMnemonic writes two things, credential first: a Secret for the derived key under its x-only pubkey, replacing a public entry where there is one, and then the seed. Credential first because a crash between the two leaves a bare-key profile the phrase completes, which is a valid thing to hold and says the model out loud -- the profile exists, then a wallet is attached to it. The one refusal it drops is the phrase of a key held as a bare secret, SeedAlreadyExists under the nsec plan: the device did not have that wallet, so this is the profile acquiring the wallet that derives it. The entry stays a secret for the same key, the id becomes the wallet's, and the bare key's preference files go with the old id -- the profile's preferences are the wallet's now, fresh, which is right since there is a new secret to back up. The same seed twice is still refused, by wallet id, and is the only way a profile with a wallet attached is offered its phrase again. SeedCredentials.reconcile is the repair for every seed already on a device, beside migrateFromNostrKeys in listIdentities and shaped like it: a named, idempotent write, one file write for however many seeds are missing, nothing at all on a device with none or one already repaired. A failed write is a result, not a throw, and carries the map that was read: the listing goes on with it and merge derives the key of a seed that has no credential, so a seed this could not repair is still listed. A failed write must never hide a wallet. The plan had the repair running before the credentials file was read; it runs after, and hands the listing what it returns, so the file is decrypted once -- the doc now says so. StoredIdentity.merge inverts: the credentials are the list, and each seed is attached to the Secret its key derives -- listed once, as Mnemonic under the wallet's id, carrying the credential's key -- where before the seeds were the list and a secret for a seed's key was listed twice under two ids. Mnemonic gains privateKey. A Public for a seed's key is skipped with a log line, since the next repair upgrades it; a seed with no credential is listed by derivation, with a log line. IdentityKind.Mnemonic's doc changes to what the kind now means: the name records the attachment, not the source. setActiveWallet takes the StoredIdentity.Mnemonic and builds the identity from the credential's key, with the node's derivation as a cross-check -- a check(), because a node disagreeing with the credentials file is the one corruption worth refusing to run under, and it cannot fail for a file the repair wrote. The node still starts for a profile with a wallet attached: not for the key any more, but for what startNewBusiness does besides -- metadata, preferences, last-used build, and on Android the channel watcher a restored Phoenix phrase may need. Making it lazy is now one branch and is named as its own decision. forgetNostrCredential refuses a second thing: a key a seed derives. The seed would derive it again and the next repair would write it back, so a forget that succeeded would undo itself. NotACredential becomes WalletAttached in the writer's result and ForgetIdentity's outcome, since that is now the only reason a signing profile cannot be forgotten -- a key not in the file at all can, since the repair, only be a seed's key the repair could not write. The two sign-in docs' tables each gain a row pointing here for the invariant this supersedes. Tests: SeedCredentialsJvmTest against a device from before -- seed.dat written directly, no credentials -- writes exactly what is missing in one write; a device already repaired is not written to again, checked by the file's bytes since a rewrite would carry a fresh iv; a public entry for a seed's key is upgraded; bare keys are untouched; and a write that fails, with the key store locked, is reported with the map that was read and the wallet is still listed. IdentityWriterJvmTest drives the callback-shaped seed writer through a CompletableDeferred on a real Main dispatcher, since it reports after a real one-second delay: a phrase writes both files, its nsec and npub are then duplicates and its forget is WalletAttached; the same phrase twice is refused; the phrase of a bare key attaches, under the wallet's id, with the bare key's preferences gone; the phrase of a key held read-only attaches and the entry becomes a secret. StoredIdentityJvmTest lists a secret-plus-seed once with the credential's key, a seed without a credential by derivation, and a public entry for a seed's key as the wallet only. Not under test: the activation's cross-check, because a PhoenixBusiness cannot be built without a node. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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86cb876b77 | Merge branch 'claude/npub-readonly-signin-ec4398' into curated | ||
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315e93315a |
test(identity): the preview end to end, with nothing signed, and the upgrade
Phase 7 of docs/npub-sign-in.md. NpubPreviewRoundTripJvmTest is the nsec round trip with the repository made real: an in-memory database under the app's own DAOs, because the assertion this exists for is about what is not in it. An npub is signed in the way the sign-in screen does it, listed the way startup does, activated as a read-only identity, and handed to NavigationViewModel: it lands on UnqueuedProfileSynchronization. The kind 0 the relays would answer with is indexed through the read-only key pair: ProfileLoaded. And with the real NotaryViewModel watching the same rows for longer than its key package delay, nothing was signed -- the only unsigned row for the pubkey is the placeholder, still at genesis; nothing is queued for a signature; no key package bundle; no broadcast request; no node. The contrast that makes those assertions worth having: the same harness as a signing identity does sign -- the notary makes a key package bundle within its delay. Without it, "nothing was signed" could be true of a harness in which nothing can be signed. Then the upgrade: the nsec of the key held read-only signs in over it through the same view model, under the same id, leaving one credential that is now a secret, one listed identity, and one account -- the second sign-in planted nothing. The full jvm suites pass: 988 in the app, 159 in the library. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a586b7c116 |
feat(identity): two exits for an identity that holds no key
Phase 6 of docs/npub-sign-in.md. Leaving: one sequence, two doors. ForgetIdentity is NostrSecretViewModel.forgetKey's sequence lifted out -- the credential out of the file, the metadata hidden, the account rows gone, in that order so a failure partway leaves the credential on disk rather than an identity the selector lists but nothing can open. Since the credentials file the first step is the same call for both credential kinds, so it is one function; a mnemonic identity is refused at the first step, because removing a seed is a wallet question this does not answer. The nsec view model calls it now and keeps only its own state. Sign out on the profile tab does, for a read-only identity only, what its colour has been promising: a confirmation naming the npub -- this device holds no key for it, so there is nothing to lose; the profile stays on the relays -- then the identity leaves the device and the nav host's tail re-lists and clears the active identity, which shows the selector or, if this was the last one, Landing. It is the first real sign out in the app. For the other two kinds the button keeps its pending route. SignOutViewModel owns the confirmation and the in-flight state; SignOutDependencies bundles what the screen needs so that a caller with none of it -- previews, tests -- passes nothing. The not-found screen had, for a read-only identity, no exit: Phase 5 hid the set-up form (a kind 0 has to be signed), the profile tab is not reachable before ProfileLoaded, and a user whose npub was found on no relay could try again for ever. So a third action, shown only where the second is not: use a different key, which is the same sequence behind the same dialog, reached from the other end of the identity's life. Tests: the sequence and where it stops, the view model's states around it, and the two screens composed as each kind -- the profile's sign out asking first and naming the npub, the not-found screen offering the form to one kind and the other key to the other. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e31033e857 |
feat(ui): what a read-only identity is shown, and what it is not
Phase 5 of docs/npub-sign-in.md -- the half the nsec plan called a product. One question, asked in one way. LocalCanSign is a composition local for the snackbar host's reason: screens do not receive the identity, MetadataEventDetail -- where follow and send message live -- is several composables below anything that could be handed more, and a parameter threaded through twenty-six lists is forgotten in the twenty-seventh. ProvideSigningCapability sits once above the navigation suite. The default is true rather than an error, the one way this differs from the snackbar host: the provider cannot be forgotten per screen, so the only things composed outside it are previews and tests. And it is a capability, not a kind -- "can this identity sign?", not "is this an npub?" -- so that a remote signer is not a fourth value in every when. The inventory, hidden rather than disabled because the empty state beside each says why: HomeScreen's New chat in both layouts, its sheet and its npub dialog; MetadataEventDetail's follow, unfollow, follow back, edit profile and send message (the "follows you" state still shows -- a fact, not an action); ActiveProfileScreen's key package management and key recovery; ShareProfileScreen's re-broadcast, which signs nothing but queues a copy for the finder relays, and a read-only identity puts nothing on a relay; SocialPreconditionScreen's invite and view invites, pending today and writes when they exist; and the not-found screen's set-up form, since a kind 0 has to be signed. Everything else that writes is behind a chat room, which a read-only identity can never open. The Messages tab, for a read-only identity, is an EmptyState where the rooms would be -- one column at every width, since a two-pane layout is a list beside a detail and there is no list -- whose message says which absence it is and whose action is the upgrade: Sign in with the nsec, which opens the same screen as landing's, hits the credentials file's upgrade rule, and comes back through startup with rooms in it. ChatRoomListViewModel is not composed, so the inbox sync and the MLS negentropy it would queue are not queued. Tests: ReadOnlyEntrancesJvmTest composes the home and profile screens under each value of LocalCanSign and looks for the controls by text, on the unmerged tree so that "does not exist" is not vacuous. The M3 audit's budgets hold. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bfad1f39a2 |
feat(sign-in): an npub, recognised, confirmed as read-only, then written
Phase 4 of docs/npub-sign-in.md. The field accepts a third thing. CredentialParser recognises npub1... and nostr:npub1... as SignInCredential.NostrPublicKey: thirty-two bytes under the npub prefix that name a point on the curve -- the counterpart of the isValid() a secret is checked with, since not every x coordinate has a point above it. PublicKeyOnly goes, and its string with it; an npub that does not decode, or names no point, is InvalidKey. Hex stays a secret: a private key and an x-only public key are the same size, the confirm step shows the derived npub so a public key pasted as hex is visible for what it is, and guessing would never fire when it mattered, since an x coordinate is almost always also a valid scalar. The test pins the vector's own public key, pasted as hex, landing on a different npub. The confirm step's third arm says what the user is about to get and not get, once, before the choice: this profile and the people it follows; messages closed and nothing sent; paste the nsec later to open it. The landing caption, the field's label and its placeholder name the third input, the last with "to look around" for a user who does not know the word read-only. The view model takes the third writer the way it takes the other two and commits through one shared write-and-map. signInToProfile is idempotent by pubkey. Until now nothing called it twice for one key -- the writers refused a second sign-in before it got there. Pasting the nsec of a key held read-only is the first path that signs in a pubkey whose account already exists, and a second placeholder would be two kind-0 rows for one pubkey, two accounts disagreeing about which is this one. A repository test signs in twice and counts one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7db863e392 |
feat(identity): list, start and read as an identity that holds no key
Phase 3 of docs/npub-sign-in.md. listIdentities runs the migration from nostr-keys.dat before its read -- there rather than inside the reader, so a listing that writes is a named step and not a surprise, and from init, before anything else touches either file. An old file that cannot be read is left where it is and reported the way an unreadable credentials file is, so the user sees an error rather than silently losing every imported identity. The selector says "read only" under the npub of a public-key identity, before the tap: two identities can share an avatar and a name, and only one of them will let the user send a message. Identity.toKeyPair is now the one place a quartz KeyPair is built from an identity. With a secret it is the pair as before, the public key a cross-check; without one it is quartz's read-only constructor. What it must never be is KeyPair(privKey = null) with nothing else -- that is quartz's "make me a new key" -- and decryptGiftWrapSeal builds exactly that from a forwarded pair, which is why the helper has the trap on it. The synchronization view model runs the two pumps that read for every identity and the two that write only for one that can sign. Stated as a rule because Phase 5 leans on it: a read-only identity never sends anything to a relay, not a signature and not a copy. The broadcast pump would find nothing, and the live subscriptions are the gift-wrap inbox and the group-membership follow, both fetching what this identity cannot open. One guard in NostrDao.indexNostrEvent, after the isAddressedTo check: a wrap addressed to a key the pair does not hold is kept, event and wrap, the way someone else's mail already is. storeNostrEvent is @Transaction and indexes inside it, so before this the unseal ran with a key nobody has, threw, and the throw took the event with it while logging as a decryption failure. Verified both ways: the new DAO test fails on exactly that case with the guard removed and passes with it, and the same wrap opens once the pair holds its key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5efeae769f |
feat(identity): one credentials file, with a read-only kind and the upgrade in one write
Phase 2 of docs/npub-sign-in.md: the library half is lightning-kmp-app 01962f3 (claude/nostr-credentials), bumped in here; this is the app half. nostr-keys.dat becomes nostr-credentials.dat, one typed entry per public key -- a secret, or only the public key -- so that a profile signed in to read-only and the same profile with its nsec pasted later are one entry in one file. StoredIdentity gains NostrPublic, whose id is the one its secret would have (hash160 of the x-only key), and merge reads the typed map. It keeps the one precedence it needs: a public entry for a key a seed already derives lists the wallet only, which is the state the seed writer's two-file upgrade can leave behind if it dies between its writes. A secret for a seed's key is still listed twice, as before -- that is a duplicate the writers refuse, not a state the listing hides. IdentityWriter: writeNostrPublicKey beside writeNostrKey, both refusing a duplicate by public key against the seeds and the credentials, with the one exception that is the point of the file -- the nsec of a key held read-only is not a duplicate, since the device does not have that secret. writeNostrKey replaces the public entry with a secret one in a single write, under the id it already had, so the read-only identity's preferences are the ones the signing identity keeps. writeMnemonic has to span two files for the same upgrade and removes the credential first, then writes the seed: a crash between the two loses the read-only identity, which the npub pasted again restores, rather than listing one npub twice under two ids. forgetNostrKey becomes forgetNostrCredential and removes an entry of either kind; NotABareKey becomes NotACredential and still means a mnemonic. The startup screen's third branch is here rather than in Phase 3 because StoredIdentity is sealed and the compiler asked for it: a read-only identity is active the moment it is read, as the nsec one is. NostrSecretViewModel reads the secret entry and answers a public one with "no key for this identity", which the screen it belongs to will never show once Phase 5 hides the row. Tests: the writer's upgrade in both directions -- the nsec of a read-only key accepted under the same id, the npub of a secret refused -- and forget of either kind; merge listing all three kinds, the shared id of a public key and its secret, and the seed-over-public precedence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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15766596e4 |
feat(identity): a key the identity may not have
Phase 1 of docs/npub-sign-in.md. A type change and nothing a user can see. Identity.nostrPrivateKey becomes nullable and nostrPublicKey becomes a constructor field, because the kind this plan adds -- NostrPublic, a bare public key -- has nothing to derive a pubkey from. A data class would let the two disagree, so two checks in init refuse an identity whose kind and key disagree about whether there is one, and one whose key does not derive the public key it was given. Identity.signing derives the pubkey and refuses the read-only kind; Identity.readOnly builds the other; nothing else constructs one now. The id of a read-only identity is toWalletId() of the x-only key -- the same id its nsec would have -- which is what will let a read-only identity become a signing one and keep its preferences. canSign is a property of the identity rather than nostrPrivateKey != null at each site, so that a signer with no local key has one place to answer. Every reader of the key already reached it through ?. on a nullable identity, so the compiler forces nothing here; the sites that need a decision are the plan's Phase 5, found by reading. The one site that did change is KeyRecoveryScreen, whose two whens branched on NostrSecret with an else that meant "mnemonic": both are exhaustive now, so the new kind is not handed the phrase option by default. Tests: NavigationIdentityRoutingJvmTest gains a read-only fixture with the same id and pubkey as the secret one, the routing case for it (by its account, like any other), and the three refusals plus the factory's own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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55664cc7d4 |
feat(groups): a row per kind of signed work on the group's screen, each opening its own
The nostr profile, the relay lists, the posts, the curated schemas and the curated entries were five sections of cards on the group's screen, every card with a button under it, which made the screen as long as everything the group had ever said, with its members and its subgroups somewhere underneath. Each section is now a row -- a card with an icon and a chevron, the shape of the signing key row above them -- carrying the one line a member wants at a glance: the group's name and address, how many of the four lists it has agreed, and a count of posts, schemas and entries. The row opens a pushed screen holding what the section held, unchanged: the cards, the broadcast under each signed event, the queue under each schema, and the gated ways into the editors, which sit inside the empty state where there is nothing yet. The paste stays on the group's screen at the end of the block, since it is about the block rather than any one row, and the whole block is still absent in a NIP-17 room for the reason it always was. Five routes, screens, view models and states, each reading only what its screen shows plus whether this device can sign. The broadcast button becomes a widget, since five screens draw it, and inComparableGroups moves to the key extensions beside shortened, with the doc comment that had been orphaned from it. The section tests become a fixture object and six tests: one for the rows -- their order, what each says, which route each opens, their absence in a NIP-17 room -- and one per screen for what the sections' tests used to check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fedbe72481 |
Merge branch 'curated' into claude/curated-suggestion-accept-flow-9e5c3d
The back-button fix landed on curated while the accept flow was being built. One import conflict in the queue screen, resolved by keeping NavigateBackButton and dropping the notifier the sheet no longer uses; and the accept screen converted to the widget, so it is not the one screen spelling the button the old way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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732a4527c6 |
feat(groups): the entries the group has accepted, under the schemas on its screen
A section for the kind 31890s the group signed, read off GroupSignedEvent the way the profile, the posts, the relay lists and the schemas are. The reading gate is theirs -- the room as author, the room's real signature -- plus two of its own: an entry is matched to the list it replies to by the coordinate in its a root, and checked against that list's fields exactly as the queue checks a copy off a relay, so what this section calls accepted is what the queue will mark curated once the entry is broadcast and read back. Newest per coordinate, since re-curating is a newer event under the same d. Each card names the list, gives the queue row's glance of what the entry is, credits the suggester, and dates the group's decision; under it, the same broadcast button every signed event in the block has, gated on nothing. There is no way to add one here, because an entry is accepted from the queue on the schema's card above, and the empty state says so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |