fix(frost): a resend names the whole room, because the p-tags are its identity
The resend narrowed its NIP-17 p-tags to the members it was for, on the reasoning that a wrap is sealed per recipient so repeating one for the whole room wastes wraps. Both halves of that were wrong. A receiver does not read the p-tags as a recipient list. It hashes them together with the sender to work out which room the payload belongs to -- `GiftWrapPayload.aggregatedParticipantsPublicKey`, via `ChatRoom.deriveChatRoomId`, which is what `GiftWrapSeal.decryptGiftWrapPayload` files an inbound payload under. Leave a member out and the id changes, so the resend is filed under a room that does not exist; `getOrCreateChatRoom` then mints that room rather than rejecting it. A repaired session would have become a phantom two-person conversation in the reader's list, and the session would have stayed stalled. There was no saving to trade against it either: `sealGiftWrapPayload` wraps for every participant of the room it looks up, not for the p-tags it was handed, so a narrowed payload cost exactly as many wraps as a full one. Who a resend is for travels in `frost_silent`, which is not part of that hash, so nothing is lost by naming everybody. Marmot was never affected -- a group event names nobody and is routed by its h-tag. The two tests that asserted the narrowing now assert the opposite, which is the property worth having: the p-tag set does not change between a publish and its repeat. The p-tags were the right thing to assert all along; they just mean something other than what they look like. Found while answering whether this is backwards compatible with older receivers. It is -- no new kind, an unknown tag that old builds ignore, and every duplicate-folding gate in `record` and `acceptProposal` predates this work. This bug was never a compatibility bug; it broke old and new receivers identically. 1279 tests, no failures. m3Audit: all budgets met. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1994,8 +1994,7 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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kind = FrostSigningEvents.PROPOSAL,
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content = FrostSigningEvents.encodeProposal(unsigned),
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includeKey = true,
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silentMembers = silent.toList(),
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recipients = silent
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silentMembers = silent.toList()
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)
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when (session.stage) {
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@@ -2009,8 +2008,7 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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session = session,
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kind = FrostSigningEvents.SIGNER_SET,
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content = joinPayload(aggregated.map { it!! }),
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signerIds = chosen,
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recipients = silent
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signerIds = chosen
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -2023,8 +2021,7 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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localChatRoom = localChatRoom,
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session = session,
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kind = FrostSigningEvents.SIGNATURE,
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content = joinPayload(signatures.map { it!! }),
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recipients = silent
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content = joinPayload(signatures.map { it!! })
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -2109,14 +2106,18 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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"republishing ${own.size} message(s) it already sent"
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)
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// To the room, not to the coordinator alone. Only the coordinator reads a
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// nonce, so addressing one would be the honest shape -- but on NIP-17 the
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// p-tag set is the room's identity rather than a recipient list, and
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// naming fewer members files the message under a different room. See
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// [recipientTags].
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own.forEach { message ->
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broadcast(
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database = database,
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localChatRoom = localChatRoom,
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session = session,
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kind = message.kind,
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content = message.payload,
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recipients = setOf(session.coordinatorPublicKey)
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content = message.payload
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)
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}
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}
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@@ -2375,8 +2376,7 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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content: String,
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includeKey: Boolean = false,
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signerIds: List<Int>? = null,
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silentMembers: List<HexKey>? = null,
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recipients: Set<HexKey>? = null
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silentMembers: List<HexKey>? = null
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): Boolean {
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val sessionTags = FrostSigningEvents.assembleTags(
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sessionId = session.id,
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@@ -2393,7 +2393,7 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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val tags = if (isMarmotRoom) {
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sessionTags
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} else {
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recipientTags(localChatRoom, session.userPublicKey, recipients) + sessionTags
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recipientTags(localChatRoom, session.userPublicKey) + sessionTags
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}
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// The rumor id the outbound pipeline will recompute from these same
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@@ -2491,21 +2491,29 @@ object FrostSigningManager {
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* records it locally. Deduplicated by member, since `localParticipants` is a
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* row list and a room can carry the same person twice.
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*
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* [only] narrows it, for a resend: a wrap is sealed per recipient, so
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* repeating a message for the two members who missed it costs two wraps
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* rather than the room's worth. Null means everybody, which is what every
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* first-time publish wants -- and a narrowing that matched nobody is read as
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* null rather than as a message addressed to no one, since an untagged
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* NIP-17 payload reaches nobody at all.
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* **Every member, always.** This list is not a recipient list that a caller
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* may narrow -- on this transport it is the room's *identity*. A receiver
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* computes the room a payload belongs to as
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* `ChatRoom.deriveChatRoomId({sender} + p-tags)`; see
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* `GiftWrapPayload.aggregatedParticipantsPublicKey`, which is what
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* `GiftWrapSeal.decryptGiftWrapPayload` files an inbound payload under. Leave
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* a member out and the id changes, so the message is filed under a room that
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* is not the one it was sent in -- and `getOrCreateChatRoom` will mint that
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* room rather than reject it, which turns a lost message into a phantom
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* conversation in the reader's list.
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*
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* A resend was briefly narrowed to the members it was for, on the reasoning
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* that a wrap is sealed per recipient and repeating one for the whole room
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* wastes wraps. Both halves of that were wrong: the saving does not exist
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* either, because `sealGiftWrapPayload` seals for every participant of the
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* room it looks up rather than for the p-tags it was handed.
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*/
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private fun recipientTags(
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localChatRoom: LocalChatRoom,
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senderPublicKey: HexKey,
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only: Set<HexKey>? = null
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senderPublicKey: HexKey
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): Array<Array<String>> = localChatRoom.localParticipants
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.distinctBy { it.participant.participantPublicKey }
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.filter { it.participant.participantPublicKey != senderPublicKey }
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.filter { only.isNullOrEmpty() || it.participant.participantPublicKey in only }
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.map { localParticipant ->
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PTag.assemble(
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localParticipant.participant.participantPublicKey,
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+20
-11
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ class FrostSigningResendJvmTest {
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}
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@Test
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fun `a resend is narrowed to the members it is for`() = runBlocking {
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fun `a resend names the whole room, because the p-tags are the room's identity`() = runBlocking {
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openDevice()
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val session = propose()
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@@ -365,11 +365,17 @@ class FrostSigningResendJvmTest {
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val resent = queuedBy(FrostSigningEvents.PROPOSAL) { assertTrue(resend(session.id)) }
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// A NIP-17 payload is sealed once per p-tag, so repeating a message for
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// the one member who missed it should cost one wrap and not the room's
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// worth. The first proposal named everybody; this one names Carol.
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assertEquals(setOf(carol), pTags(resent.tags))
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assertEquals(setOf(bob, carol), pTags(first.tags))
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// Tempting to send this to Carol alone, and wrong. A receiver works out
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// which room a NIP-17 payload belongs to by hashing the sender together
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// with the p-tags -- `GiftWrapPayload.aggregatedParticipantsPublicKey`.
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// Name fewer members and the id changes, so the resend is filed under a
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// room that does not exist, and `getOrCreateChatRoom` mints it rather
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// than rejecting it: a phantom conversation instead of a repaired
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// session. Who the resend is *for* travels in the silent tag, which is
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// not part of that hash.
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assertEquals(pTags(first.tags), pTags(resent.tags))
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assertEquals(setOf(bob, carol), pTags(resent.tags))
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assertEquals(setOf(carol), FrostSigningEvents.parseSilentMembers(resent.tags)?.toSet())
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}
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@Test
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@@ -526,20 +532,23 @@ class FrostSigningResendJvmTest {
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}
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@Test
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fun `a republished nonce goes only to the coordinator`() = runBlocking {
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fun `a republished nonce names the whole room`() = runBlocking {
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openDevice(bob)
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val session = proposalArrivedAt(bob)
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FrostSigningManager.approve(database = db, localChatRoom = room, sessionId = session.id)
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val first = queued(FrostSigningEvents.NONCE).single()
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val resent = queuedBy(FrostSigningEvents.NONCE) {
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receive(session.id, FrostSigningEvents.PROPOSAL, alice, proposalContent(), silent = listOf(bob))
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}
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// A nonce is read by nobody but the coordinator -- `orderedNonces` is
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// called under `isCoordinator` -- so repeating it for the room would be
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// two wraps spent telling people who do not look.
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assertEquals(setOf(alice), pTags(resent.tags))
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// Only the coordinator reads a nonce, so addressing one would be the
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// honest shape -- and it would file the message under a two-person room
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// that is not the one the session is running in. The p-tag set is the
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// room's identity on this transport, not a recipient list.
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assertEquals(pTags(first.tags), pTags(resent.tags))
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assertEquals(setOf(alice, carol), pTags(resent.tags))
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}
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@Test
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@@ -257,10 +257,21 @@ group event reaches everybody, and every receiver folds the duplicate away, whic
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is cheaper than one message per silent member and tells the room nothing it does not
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already know.
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NIP-17 is the opposite — `recipientTags` seals one wrap per recipient — so there the
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resend narrows to the silent set plus the chosen signers, which is a real saving in
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a room where one member out of nine is quiet. This is the first signature a group
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makes, on gift wraps, per `GroupKeyStateManager.propose`.
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NIP-17 names everybody too, and the reason is worth getting right because the
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first version of this got it wrong. **On that transport the p-tag set is the
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room's identity, not a recipient list.** A receiver works out which room a payload
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belongs to by hashing the sender together with the p-tags —
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`GiftWrapPayload.aggregatedParticipantsPublicKey`, via `ChatRoom.deriveChatRoomId`
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— so leaving a member out changes the id, and the resend is filed under a room
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that does not exist. `getOrCreateChatRoom` then mints that room rather than
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rejecting it, which turns a repaired session into a phantom conversation in the
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reader's list.
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There is no saving to trade against that, either: `sealGiftWrapPayload` wraps for
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every participant of the room it looks up, not for the p-tags it was handed, so a
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narrowed payload costs exactly as many wraps as a full one. Who a resend is *for*
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travels in `frost_silent`, which is not part of the hash. This is the first
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signature a group makes, on gift wraps, per `GroupKeyStateManager.propose`.
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## Phase 3 — a named member republishes what it authored
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@@ -545,11 +556,18 @@ queued nothing must record nothing, or the group waits forever on a message that
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never went out. The comment on `publishOwn` had the trade written down in one
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direction only.
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**Narrowing is a `recipientTags` change, not a `broadcast` branch.** On NIP-17 a
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resend names the quiet members and the signers; on Marmot the parameter is
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ignored, because a group event is encrypted to the group and names nobody. One
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optional argument covers both, which is the shape `broadcast` already had for
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the transports.
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**Narrowing the recipients is not something this transport allows, and the test
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meant to prove it instead encoded the bug.** A resend was narrowed to the quiet
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members, with a passing test asserting the p-tags were narrowed. Both the code and
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the test were wrong about what a p-tag is for: on NIP-17 the set is hashed into
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the room id a receiver files the payload under, so a narrowed resend would have
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landed in a room nobody is in — and `getOrCreateChatRoom` would have created it.
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Found by asking whether the change was backwards compatible. It was; this was
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never a compatibility bug, it broke old and new receivers identically.
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The lesson is narrower than "assert behaviour, not bytes". The p-tags *are* the
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right thing to assert — they just mean something other than what they look like,
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and the assertion needed to be that they do not change.
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## What this does not do
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@@ -601,10 +619,12 @@ events where one does, and per `docs/marmot-direct-messages.md` every member of
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group sees that a private message was sent and to whom — so a nudge would read as a
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side channel in a room where the nudge is public information anyway.
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**Narrowing the Marmot resend to the silent set.** There is no narrowing to do: a
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group event is encrypted to the group and names nobody, which is the point
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`broadcast` makes about why its p-tags are not cosmetic. Narrowing is real on
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NIP-17, where a wrap is sealed per recipient, and Phase 2 does it there.
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**Narrowing the resend to the silent set.** Tried, landed, and reverted. On Marmot
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there is nothing to narrow — a group event is encrypted to the group and names
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nobody. On NIP-17 it is actively wrong: the p-tag set is what a receiver hashes
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into the room id, so a narrowed resend lands in a room that does not exist, and it
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buys nothing anyway because the sealer wraps per room participant rather than per
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p-tag. See the transport note in Phase 2.
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**Resetting the queue row instead of writing a new one.** `@Upsert` of a
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`MarmotInnerEvent` with `marmotGroupEventId = null` puts an already-sent row back on
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