3b68633f59
CI: - ci/ci.sh: new CHILLDKG environment variable, passed to configure as --enable-module-chilldkg (mirroring FROST). - .github/workflows/ci.yml: default CHILLDKG: 'no' and CHILLDKG: 'yes' in every job that enables FROST, except the x86_64 matrix entry that deliberately builds without the ecdh module (chilldkg requires schnorrsig + ecdh; the configure-time dependency error would fire there). YAML validity and per-job dependency presence checked programmatically. ctime_tests: - src/ctime_tests.c: run a full ChillDKG session (n = 2, t = 2) through the public API under the memory checker: hostpubkey_gen, params_hash, participant_step1, coordinator_step1, participant_step2, coordinator_finalize, participant_finalize, participant_recover and recovery_ack_sign. Host secret keys, session randomness, aux randomness and the resulting secret shares are undefined (secret); all protocol messages, the certificate, threshold public key, public shares, recovery data, ack signature and the secret-free state1 objects are defined (public). state2 stays secret (contains the secret share). Constant-time fixes found by running the new block under MemorySanitizer (valgrind unavailable locally; MSan build via clang + CMake). All are missing declassifications of secret-derived but public (or public-outcome) values, following the frost module's secp256k1_declassify pattern with justification comments; no real constant-time bugs were found: - hostpubkey_gen: declassify the computed host public key before serialization (public output). - participant_step1: declassify the zero-randomness check result (only reveals "the RNG returned 32 zero bytes", which aborts the session). - encpedpop participant_step1: declassify the pubnonce point before serialization (public, part of pmsg1). - chilldkg_schnorrsig_sign: declassify the signer public key before normalization/parity branch, and declassify the return value (a failure only reveals a zero derived nonce, negligible probability). - vss_commit: declassify the VSS commitments before serialization (public, part of pmsg1). - vss_verify_secshare: declassify secshare*G before the infinity/eq checks (equals the public pubshare in honest runs; the discrete log is not revealed). - simplpedpop_participant_investigate (proactive audit; not reached by ctime_tests): declassify the secshare-sum comparison result (the public fault code reveals it anyway). Verified: MSan ctime_tests exits 0; autotools make check 10/10 (the local tree is configured without --enable-ctime-tests because neither valgrind nor an MSan-instrumented gcc build is available; CI runs ctime_tests under valgrind as before); CMake ctest 428/428; ./tests --target=chilldkg and ./chilldkg_example pass.
595 lines
24 KiB
C
595 lines
24 KiB
C
/***********************************************************************
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* Copyright (c) 2020 Gregory Maxwell *
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* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
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* file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
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***********************************************************************/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "../include/secp256k1.h"
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#include "assumptions.h"
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#include "checkmem.h"
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#if !SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_ENABLED
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# error "This tool cannot be compiled without memory-checking interface (valgrind or msan)"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
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# include "../include/secp256k1_ecdh.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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# include "../include/secp256k1_recovery.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
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# include "../include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
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#include "../include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
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#include "../include/secp256k1_musig.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
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#include "../include/secp256k1_ellswift.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_S2C
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#include "../include/secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_ADAPTOR
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#include "../include/secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(__GNUC__)
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# pragma GCC diagnostic push
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# pragma GCC diagnostic warning "-Wunused-function"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_FROST
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#include "../include/secp256k1_frost.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_CHILLDKG
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#include "../include/secp256k1_chilldkg.h"
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#endif
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static void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key);
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int main(void) {
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secp256k1_context* ctx;
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unsigned char key[32];
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int ret, i;
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if (!SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_RUNNING()) {
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fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind because it was not compiled under msan.\n");
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fprintf(stderr, "Usage: valgrind ./ctime_tests (or with Autotools: libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./ctime_tests)\n");
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return EXIT_FAILURE;
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}
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ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY);
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/** In theory, testing with a single secret input should be sufficient:
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* If control flow depended on secrets the tool would generate an error.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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key[i] = i + 65;
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}
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run_tests(ctx, key);
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/* Test context randomisation. Do this last because it leaves the context
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* tainted. */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret);
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
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return EXIT_SUCCESS;
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}
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static void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key) {
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
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secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
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size_t siglen = 74;
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size_t outputlen = 33;
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int i;
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int ret;
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unsigned char msg[32];
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unsigned char sig[74];
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unsigned char spubkey[33];
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recoverable_signature;
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int recid;
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
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secp256k1_keypair keypair;
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
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unsigned char ellswift[64];
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static const unsigned char prefix[64] = {'t', 'e', 's', 't'};
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#endif
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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msg[i] = i + 1;
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}
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/* Test keygen. */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret);
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CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, spubkey, &outputlen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1);
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/* Test signing. */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&signature, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret);
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CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature));
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
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/* Test ECDH. */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, msg, &pubkey, key, NULL, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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/* Test signing a recoverable signature. */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &recoverable_signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&recoverable_signature, sizeof(recoverable_signature));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret);
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CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &recoverable_signature));
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CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid <= 3);
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#endif
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(msg, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, key, msg);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(msg, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, key, msg);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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/* Test keypair_create and keypair_xonly_tweak_add. */
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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/* The tweak is not treated as a secret in keypair_tweak_add */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, msg);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&keypair, sizeof(keypair));
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ret = secp256k1_keypair_sec(ctx, key, &keypair);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
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{
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secp256k1_pubkey pk;
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const secp256k1_pubkey *pk_ptr[1];
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secp256k1_xonly_pubkey agg_pk;
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unsigned char session_secrand[32];
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uint64_t nonrepeating_cnt = 0;
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secp256k1_musig_secnonce secnonce;
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secp256k1_musig_pubnonce pubnonce;
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const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonce_ptr[1];
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secp256k1_musig_aggnonce aggnonce;
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secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache cache;
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secp256k1_musig_session session;
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secp256k1_musig_partial_sig partial_sig;
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const secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *partial_sig_ptr[1];
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unsigned char extra_input[32];
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unsigned char sec_adaptor[32];
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secp256k1_pubkey adaptor;
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unsigned char pre_sig[64];
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int nonce_parity;
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pk_ptr[0] = &pk;
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pubnonce_ptr[0] = &pubnonce;
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
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memcpy(session_secrand, key, sizeof(session_secrand));
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session_secrand[0] = session_secrand[0] + 1;
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memcpy(extra_input, key, sizeof(extra_input));
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extra_input[0] = extra_input[0] + 2;
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memcpy(sec_adaptor, key, sizeof(sec_adaptor));
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sec_adaptor[0] = extra_input[0] + 3;
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partial_sig_ptr[0] = &partial_sig;
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CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key));
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CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &pk, &keypair));
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CHECK(secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(ctx, &agg_pk, &cache, pk_ptr, 1));
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CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &adaptor, sec_adaptor));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand, sizeof(session_secrand));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(extra_input, sizeof(extra_input));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(sec_adaptor, sizeof(sec_adaptor));
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ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(ctx, &secnonce, &pubnonce, session_secrand, key, &pk, msg, &cache, extra_input);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter(ctx, &secnonce, &pubnonce, nonrepeating_cnt, &keypair, msg, &cache, extra_input);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(ctx, &aggnonce, pubnonce_ptr, 1));
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/* Make sure that previous tests don't undefine msg. It's not used as a secret here. */
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));
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CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_process(ctx, &session, &aggnonce, msg, &cache, &adaptor) == 1);
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ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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ret = secp256k1_musig_partial_sign(ctx, &partial_sig, &secnonce, &keypair, &cache, &session);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&partial_sig, sizeof(partial_sig));
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CHECK(secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_agg(ctx, pre_sig, &session, partial_sig_ptr, 1));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pre_sig, sizeof(pre_sig));
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CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_parity(ctx, &nonce_parity, &session));
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ret = secp256k1_musig_adapt(ctx, sig, pre_sig, sec_adaptor, nonce_parity);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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ret = secp256k1_musig_extract_adaptor(ctx, sec_adaptor, sig, pre_sig, nonce_parity);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift, key, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift, key, ellswift);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ellswift, sizeof(ellswift));
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ret = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, msg, ellswift, ellswift, key, i, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ellswift, sizeof(ellswift));
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ret = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, msg, ellswift, ellswift, key, i, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_prefix, (void *)prefix);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_S2C
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{
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unsigned char s2c_data[32] = {0};
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unsigned char s2c_data_comm[32] = {0};
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secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c_opening s2c_opening;
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(s2c_data, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c_sign(ctx, &signature, &s2c_opening, msg, key, s2c_data);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(s2c_data, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_anti_exfil_host_commit(ctx, s2c_data_comm, s2c_data);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(s2c_data, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_anti_exfil_signer_commit(ctx, &s2c_opening, msg, key, s2c_data);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_ADAPTOR
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{
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unsigned char adaptor_sig[162];
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unsigned char deckey[32];
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unsigned char expected_deckey[32];
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secp256k1_pubkey enckey;
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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deckey[i] = i + 2;
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}
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ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &enckey, deckey);
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor_encrypt(ctx, adaptor_sig, key, &enckey, msg, NULL, NULL);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(adaptor_sig, sizeof(adaptor_sig));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(deckey, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor_decrypt(ctx, &signature, deckey, adaptor_sig);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&signature, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor_recover(ctx, expected_deckey, &signature, adaptor_sig, &enckey);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(expected_deckey, sizeof(expected_deckey));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(deckey, sizeof(deckey));
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ret = secp256k1_memcmp_var(deckey, expected_deckey, sizeof(expected_deckey));
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SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 0);
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_FROST
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{
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unsigned char thresh_seckey[32];
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unsigned char secshares[2 * 32];
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secp256k1_pubkey thresh_pk;
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secp256k1_pubkey pubshares[2];
|
|
uint32_t frost_ids[2] = { 0, 1 };
|
|
secp256k1_frost_tweak_cache cache;
|
|
secp256k1_frost_secnonce secnonce[2];
|
|
secp256k1_frost_pubnonce pubnonce[2];
|
|
const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pubnonce_ptrs[2];
|
|
secp256k1_frost_aggnonce aggnonce;
|
|
secp256k1_frost_session session;
|
|
secp256k1_frost_partial_sig partial_sig[2];
|
|
const secp256k1_frost_partial_sig *partial_sig_ptrs[2];
|
|
unsigned char session_secrand[2][32];
|
|
|
|
pubnonce_ptrs[0] = &pubnonce[0];
|
|
pubnonce_ptrs[1] = &pubnonce[1];
|
|
partial_sig_ptrs[0] = &partial_sig[0];
|
|
partial_sig_ptrs[1] = &partial_sig[1];
|
|
|
|
/* All public inputs are derived from defined memory. key is reused as
|
|
* the base of the (secret) threshold key and session randomness. */
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
|
|
memcpy(thresh_seckey, key, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
|
|
thresh_seckey[0] = thresh_seckey[0] + 1;
|
|
memcpy(session_secrand[0], key, 32);
|
|
session_secrand[0][0] = session_secrand[0][0] + 2;
|
|
memcpy(session_secrand[1], key, 32);
|
|
session_secrand[1][0] = session_secrand[1][0] + 3;
|
|
|
|
/* Test frost_trusted_dealer_keygen. The threshold secret key and the
|
|
* resulting secret shares are secret; the threshold public key and
|
|
* the public shares are public. */
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(thresh_seckey, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
|
|
ret = secp256k1_frost_trusted_dealer_keygen(ctx, secshares, &thresh_pk, pubshares, 2, 2, thresh_seckey);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&thresh_pk, sizeof(thresh_pk));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares, sizeof(pubshares));
|
|
|
|
/* The session setup uses only public inputs. */
|
|
CHECK(secp256k1_frost_tweak_cache_init(ctx, &cache, &thresh_pk) == 1);
|
|
/* Make sure that previous tests don't undefine msg. It's not used as a secret here. */
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));
|
|
|
|
/* Test frost_nonce_gen. The session randomness and the secret share
|
|
* are secret; the pubnonce is public. The secnonce stays secret. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand[i], 32);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
|
|
ret = secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(ctx, &secnonce[i], &pubnonce[i], session_secrand[i], &secshares[32 * i], &pubshares[i], NULL, msg, 32, NULL, 0);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&pubnonce[i], sizeof(pubnonce[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CHECK(secp256k1_frost_nonce_agg(ctx, &aggnonce, NULL, pubnonce_ptrs, 2) == 1);
|
|
CHECK(secp256k1_frost_session_init(ctx, &session, &aggnonce, frost_ids, pubshares, 2, 2, 2, &cache, msg, 32) == 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Test frost_sign. The secret share is secret (the secnonce is
|
|
* tainted through the tainted session randomness; its magic bytes
|
|
* must remain defined for the validity check). The partial signature
|
|
* is public. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
|
|
ret = secp256k1_frost_sign(ctx, &partial_sig[i], &secnonce[i], &secshares[32 * i], &session, frost_ids, pubshares, 2, frost_ids[i]);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&partial_sig[i], sizeof(partial_sig[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
CHECK(secp256k1_frost_partial_sig_agg(ctx, sig, NULL, &session, partial_sig_ptrs, 2) == 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Test frost_deterministic_sign. The secret share is secret; the
|
|
* pubnonce and the partial signature are public. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
secp256k1_frost_pubnonce det_pubnonce;
|
|
secp256k1_frost_partial_sig det_partial_sig;
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
|
|
ret = secp256k1_frost_deterministic_sign(ctx, &det_partial_sig, &det_pubnonce, &secshares[32 * i], frost_ids[i], &aggnonce, frost_ids, pubshares, 2, 2, 2, &cache, msg, 32, NULL);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&det_pubnonce, sizeof(det_pubnonce));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&det_partial_sig, sizeof(det_partial_sig));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_CHILLDKG
|
|
{
|
|
/* Full ChillDKG session with n = 2, t = 2 (pmsg1: 227 bytes, cmsg1:
|
|
* 357 bytes, cert: 128 bytes, recovery data: 394 bytes). */
|
|
unsigned char hostseckeys[2][32];
|
|
unsigned char hostpubkeys[2 * 33];
|
|
unsigned char dkg_random[2][32];
|
|
unsigned char aux_rands[2][32];
|
|
secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_state1 state1[2];
|
|
secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_state2 state2[2];
|
|
secp256k1_chilldkg_coordinator_state cstate;
|
|
unsigned char pmsgs1[2][227];
|
|
const unsigned char *pmsgs1_ptrs[2];
|
|
unsigned char cmsg1[357];
|
|
unsigned char pmsgs2[2][64];
|
|
const unsigned char *pmsgs2_ptrs[2];
|
|
unsigned char cmsg2[128];
|
|
unsigned char secshare32[32];
|
|
unsigned char thresh_pk33[33];
|
|
unsigned char pubshares33[2 * 33];
|
|
unsigned char recovery[394];
|
|
unsigned char rec_secshare32[32];
|
|
unsigned char rec_thresh_pk33[33];
|
|
unsigned char rec_pubshares33[33 * SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_MAX_PARTICIPANTS];
|
|
unsigned char rec_hostpubkeys33[33 * SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_MAX_PARTICIPANTS];
|
|
unsigned char ack_sig[64];
|
|
size_t rec_n;
|
|
uint32_t rec_t;
|
|
uint32_t fault_index;
|
|
secp256k1_chilldkg_fault fault;
|
|
|
|
pmsgs1_ptrs[0] = pmsgs1[0];
|
|
pmsgs1_ptrs[1] = pmsgs1[1];
|
|
pmsgs2_ptrs[0] = pmsgs2[0];
|
|
pmsgs2_ptrs[1] = pmsgs2[1];
|
|
|
|
/* All public inputs are derived from defined memory. key is reused as
|
|
* the base of the (secret) host keys, session randomness and
|
|
* auxiliary randomness. */
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
memcpy(hostseckeys[i], key, 32);
|
|
hostseckeys[i][0] = hostseckeys[i][0] + 4 + i;
|
|
memcpy(dkg_random[i], key, 32);
|
|
dkg_random[i][0] = dkg_random[i][0] + 6 + i;
|
|
memcpy(aux_rands[i], key, 32);
|
|
aux_rands[i][0] = aux_rands[i][0] + 8 + i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test chilldkg_hostpubkey_gen. The host secret keys are secret; the
|
|
* host public keys are public. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[i], 32);
|
|
ret = secp256k1_chilldkg_hostpubkey_gen(ctx, &hostpubkeys[33 * i], hostseckeys[i]);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&hostpubkeys[33 * i], 33);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test chilldkg_participant_step1. The host secret key and the
|
|
* session randomness are secret; pmsg1 and the state1 object (which
|
|
* contains no secrets) are public. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[i], 32);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(dkg_random[i], 32);
|
|
ret = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_step1(ctx, &state1[i], pmsgs1[i], hostseckeys[i], hostpubkeys, 2, 2, dkg_random[i]);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pmsgs1[i], sizeof(pmsgs1[i]));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&state1[i], sizeof(state1[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The coordinator's steps use only public inputs. */
|
|
fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_coordinator_step1(ctx, &cstate, cmsg1, &fault_index, pmsgs1_ptrs, hostpubkeys, 2, 2);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
|
|
CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
|
|
|
|
/* Test chilldkg_participant_step2. The host secret key and the aux
|
|
* randomness are secret; the CertEq signature is public. The state2
|
|
* object contains the secret share and stays secret. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[i], 32);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(aux_rands[i], 32);
|
|
fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_step2(ctx, &state2[i], pmsgs2[i], &fault_index, NULL, &state1[i], hostseckeys[i], cmsg1, aux_rands[i]);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
|
|
CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pmsgs2[i], sizeof(pmsgs2[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_coordinator_finalize(ctx, cmsg2, thresh_pk33, pubshares33, recovery, &fault_index, &cstate, pmsgs2_ptrs);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
|
|
CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
|
|
|
|
/* Test chilldkg_participant_finalize. The state2 input and the
|
|
* secshare output are secret; the threshold public key, the public
|
|
* shares and the recovery data are public. */
|
|
fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_finalize(ctx, secshare32, thresh_pk33, pubshares33, recovery, &fault_index, &state2[0], cmsg2);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
|
|
CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(thresh_pk33, sizeof(thresh_pk33));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares33, sizeof(pubshares33));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(recovery, sizeof(recovery));
|
|
|
|
/* Test chilldkg_participant_recover. The host secret key and the
|
|
* recovered secret share are secret; the recovery data and the
|
|
* remaining outputs are public. */
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[0], 32);
|
|
fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_recover(ctx, rec_secshare32, rec_thresh_pk33, rec_pubshares33, rec_hostpubkeys33, &rec_n, &rec_t, &fault_index, hostseckeys[0], recovery, sizeof(recovery));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
|
|
CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(rec_thresh_pk33, sizeof(rec_thresh_pk33));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(rec_pubshares33, 2 * 33);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(rec_hostpubkeys33, 2 * 33);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&rec_n, sizeof(rec_n));
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&rec_t, sizeof(rec_t));
|
|
CHECK(rec_n == 2 && rec_t == 2);
|
|
|
|
/* Test chilldkg_recovery_ack_sign. The host secret key and the aux
|
|
* randomness are secret; the acknowledgment signature is public. */
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[0], 32);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(aux_rands[0], 32);
|
|
ret = secp256k1_chilldkg_recovery_ack_sign(ctx, ack_sig, hostseckeys[0], hostpubkeys, 2, 2, recovery, sizeof(recovery), aux_rands[0]);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
|
|
CHECK(ret == 1);
|
|
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(ack_sig, sizeof(ack_sig));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__GNUC__)
|
|
# pragma GCC diagnostic pop
|
|
#endif
|