Tim Ruffing ed1b91171a
Merge #700: Allow overriding default flags
ca739cba238cdd7c513abfc719b0b0eb957c9458 Compile with optimization flag -O2 by default instead of -O3 (Jonas Nick)
83fb1bcef49b1c12ef349f62d90bfcc83f0f7398 Remove -O2 from default CFLAGS because this would override the -O3 flag (see AC_PROG_CC in the Autoconf manual) (Jonas Nick)
ecba8138ec163f5ad4c303df9f8744810a3dfc03 Append instead of Prepend user-CFLAGS to default CFLAGS allowing the user to override default variables (Jonas Nick)
613c34cd869e56dee2ea5fb701f05b07da7069c8 Remove test in configure.ac because it doesn't have an effect (Jonas Nick)

Pull request description:

  Right now, it's not easy to reduce the optimization level with `CFLAGS` because `configure` overwrites any optimization flag with `-O3`. The [automake documentation](https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/manual/html_node/Flag-Variables-Ordering.html) states that:

   > The reason ‘$(CPPFLAGS)’ appears after ‘$(AM_CPPFLAGS)’ or ‘$(mumble_CPPFLAGS)’ in the compile command is that users should always have the last say.

  and also that it's incorrect to redefine CFLAGS in the first place

  > You should never redefine a user variable such as CPPFLAGS in Makefile.am. [...] You should not add options to these user variables within configure either, for the same reason

  With this PR `CFLAGS` is still redefined, but user-provided flags appear after the default `CFLAGS` which means that they override the default flags (at least in clang and gcc). Otherwise, the default configuration is not changed. This also means that if CFLAGS are defined by the user, then -g is not added (which does not seem to make much sense). In order to keep the `-O3` despite the reordering we need to explicitly tell autoconf to not append `-O2` by setting the default to `-g` with `: ${CFLAGS="-g"}` as per [the manual](https://www.gnu.org/savannah-checkouts/gnu/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/autoconf.html#C-Compiler) (EDIT: link fix).

ACKs for top commit:
  real-or-random:
    ACK ca739cba238cdd7c513abfc719b0b0eb957c9458
  theuni:
    ACK ca739cba238cdd7c513abfc719b0b0eb957c9458.
  elichai:
    ACK ca739cba238cdd7c513abfc719b0b0eb957c9458

Tree-SHA512: be92589faa461d245203385d44b489c7d6917b0c68472b8d7576806c0250cf5ff61d5c99ce04eebb8ff5279b9987185d4e5d2da979683fb1c489fdf3e5b59630
2020-03-20 16:56:33 +01:00
2020-01-08 09:13:09 +00:00
2013-04-11 12:46:39 +02:00
2017-09-24 17:53:13 -07:00
2020-02-24 18:59:30 +00:00
2013-05-09 15:24:32 +02:00
2019-10-28 14:59:05 +00:00
2013-05-06 13:28:46 +02:00

libsecp256k1

Build Status

Optimized C library for ECDSA signatures and secret/public key operations on curve secp256k1.

This library is intended to be the highest quality publicly available library for cryptography on the secp256k1 curve. However, the primary focus of its development has been for usage in the Bitcoin system and usage unlike Bitcoin's may be less well tested, verified, or suffer from a less well thought out interface. Correct usage requires some care and consideration that the library is fit for your application's purpose.

Features:

  • secp256k1 ECDSA signing/verification and key generation.
  • Additive and multiplicative tweaking of secret/public keys.
  • Serialization/parsing of secret keys, public keys, signatures.
  • Constant time, constant memory access signing and public key generation.
  • Derandomized ECDSA (via RFC6979 or with a caller provided function.)
  • Very efficient implementation.
  • Suitable for embedded systems.
  • Optional module for public key recovery.
  • Optional module for ECDH key exchange (experimental).

Experimental features have not received enough scrutiny to satisfy the standard of quality of this library but are made available for testing and review by the community. The APIs of these features should not be considered stable.

Implementation details

  • General
    • No runtime heap allocation.
    • Extensive testing infrastructure.
    • Structured to facilitate review and analysis.
    • Intended to be portable to any system with a C89 compiler and uint64_t support.
    • No use of floating types.
    • Expose only higher level interfaces to minimize the API surface and improve application security. ("Be difficult to use insecurely.")
  • Field operations
    • Optimized implementation of arithmetic modulo the curve's field size (2^256 - 0x1000003D1).
      • Using 5 52-bit limbs (including hand-optimized assembly for x86_64, by Diederik Huys).
      • Using 10 26-bit limbs (including hand-optimized assembly for 32-bit ARM, by Wladimir J. van der Laan).
    • Field inverses and square roots using a sliding window over blocks of 1s (by Peter Dettman).
  • Scalar operations
    • Optimized implementation without data-dependent branches of arithmetic modulo the curve's order.
      • Using 4 64-bit limbs (relying on __int128 support in the compiler).
      • Using 8 32-bit limbs.
  • Group operations
    • Point addition formula specifically simplified for the curve equation (y^2 = x^3 + 7).
    • Use addition between points in Jacobian and affine coordinates where possible.
    • Use a unified addition/doubling formula where necessary to avoid data-dependent branches.
    • Point/x comparison without a field inversion by comparison in the Jacobian coordinate space.
  • Point multiplication for verification (aP + bG).
    • Use wNAF notation for point multiplicands.
    • Use a much larger window for multiples of G, using precomputed multiples.
    • Use Shamir's trick to do the multiplication with the public key and the generator simultaneously.
    • Optionally (off by default) use secp256k1's efficiently-computable endomorphism to split the P multiplicand into 2 half-sized ones.
  • Point multiplication for signing
    • Use a precomputed table of multiples of powers of 16 multiplied with the generator, so general multiplication becomes a series of additions.
    • Intended to be completely free of timing sidechannels for secret-key operations (on reasonable hardware/toolchains)
      • Access the table with branch-free conditional moves so memory access is uniform.
      • No data-dependent branches
    • Optional runtime blinding which attempts to frustrate differential power analysis.
    • The precomputed tables add and eventually subtract points for which no known scalar (secret key) is known, preventing even an attacker with control over the secret key used to control the data internally.

Build steps

libsecp256k1 is built using autotools:

$ ./autogen.sh
$ ./configure
$ make
$ make check
$ sudo make install  # optional

Exhaustive tests

$ ./exhaustive_tests

With valgrind, you might need to increase the max stack size:

$ valgrind --max-stackframe=2500000 ./exhaustive_tests

Test coverage

This library aims to have full coverage of the reachable lines and branches.

To create a test coverage report, configure with --enable-coverage (use of GCC is necessary):

$ ./configure --enable-coverage

Run the tests:

$ make check

To create a report, gcovr is recommended, as it includes branch coverage reporting:

$ gcovr --exclude 'src/bench*' --print-summary

To create a HTML report with coloured and annotated source code:

$ gcovr --exclude 'src/bench*' --html --html-details -o coverage.html

Reporting a vulnerability

See SECURITY.md

Description
Experimental fork of libsecp256k1 with support for pedersen commitments and range proofs.
Readme 12 MiB
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