The s-values produced by secp256k1_surjection_genrand previously depended only on their indices and the difference between input_blinding_key and output_blinding_key. Calls with the same difference therefore reused s-values even when their proof inputs differed. For proofs with the same used-input selection and honest input index, the same generated s-value was used as the signing nonce. Reusing this nonce across different proof messages allowed recovery of the blinding-key difference. The remaining repeated s-values also revealed the honest input index. This commit affects proof generation only; verification is unchanged.
119 lines
4.9 KiB
C
119 lines
4.9 KiB
C
/**********************************************************************
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* Copyright (c) 2016 Andrew Poelstra *
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* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
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* file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
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**********************************************************************/
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#ifndef SECP256K1_SURJECTION_IMPL_H
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#define SECP256K1_SURJECTION_IMPL_H
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "../../eckey.h"
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#include "../../group.h"
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#include "../../scalar.h"
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#include "../../hash.h"
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SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_surjection_genmessage(const secp256k1_hash_ctx *hash_ctx, unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_generator *ephemeral_input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, const secp256k1_generator *ephemeral_output_tag) {
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/* compute message */
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size_t i;
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unsigned char pk_ser[33];
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size_t pk_len = sizeof(pk_ser);
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secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en;
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secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en);
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for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) {
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pk_ser[0] = 2 + (ephemeral_input_tags[i].data[63] & 1);
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memcpy(&pk_ser[1], &ephemeral_input_tags[i].data[0], 32);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, pk_ser, pk_len);
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}
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pk_ser[0] = 2 + (ephemeral_output_tag->data[63] & 1);
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memcpy(&pk_ser[1], &ephemeral_output_tag->data[0], 32);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, pk_ser, pk_len);
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secp256k1_sha256_finalize(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, msg32);
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secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha256_en);
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}
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/* Derive the ring's s-values, one of which is used as the signing nonce, from a
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* seed that hashes the passed-in arguments. See the call site for how these
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* correspond to the proof inputs. */
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SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_genrand(const secp256k1_hash_ctx *hash_ctx, secp256k1_scalar *s, size_t ns, size_t n_inputs, const unsigned char *used_inputs, const unsigned char *msg32, size_t input_index, const unsigned char *input_blinding_key, const unsigned char *output_blinding_key) {
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size_t i;
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size_t used_inputs_len;
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unsigned char n_inputs_ser[4];
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unsigned char index_ser[4];
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unsigned char counter[4];
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unsigned char seed[32];
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unsigned char out[32];
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secp256k1_sha256 sha256_en;
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used_inputs_len = (n_inputs + 7) / 8;
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secp256k1_write_be32(n_inputs_ser, (uint32_t)n_inputs);
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secp256k1_write_be32(index_ser, (uint32_t)input_index);
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/* Hash the arguments into the seed. */
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secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, n_inputs_ser, 4);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, used_inputs, used_inputs_len);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, msg32, 32);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, index_ser, 4);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, input_blinding_key, 32);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, output_blinding_key, 32);
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secp256k1_sha256_finalize(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, seed);
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secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha256_en);
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/* compute s values */
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for (i = 0; i < ns; i++) {
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int overflow = 0;
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secp256k1_write_be32(counter, (uint32_t)i);
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secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha256_en);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, counter, 4);
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secp256k1_sha256_write(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, seed, 32);
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secp256k1_sha256_finalize(hash_ctx, &sha256_en, out);
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secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha256_en);
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secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s[i], out, &overflow);
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if (overflow == 1) {
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secp256k1_memclear_explicit(out, sizeof(out));
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secp256k1_memclear_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
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return 0;
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}
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}
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secp256k1_memclear_explicit(out, sizeof(out));
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secp256k1_memclear_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
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return 1;
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}
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SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_surjection_compute_public_keys(secp256k1_gej *pubkeys, size_t n_pubkeys, const secp256k1_generator *input_tags, size_t n_input_tags, const unsigned char *used_tags, const secp256k1_generator *output_tag, size_t input_index, size_t *ring_input_index) {
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size_t i;
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size_t j = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < n_input_tags; i++) {
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if (used_tags[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) {
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secp256k1_ge tmpge;
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secp256k1_generator_load(&tmpge, &input_tags[i]);
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secp256k1_ge_neg(&tmpge, &tmpge);
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VERIFY_CHECK(j < SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_USED_INPUTS);
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VERIFY_CHECK(j < n_pubkeys);
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secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pubkeys[j], &tmpge);
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secp256k1_generator_load(&tmpge, output_tag);
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secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pubkeys[j], &pubkeys[j], &tmpge, NULL);
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if (ring_input_index != NULL && input_index == i) {
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*ring_input_index = j;
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}
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j++;
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}
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}
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#ifdef VERIFY
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/* Caller needs to ensure that the number of set bits in used_tags (which we counted in j) equals n_pubkeys. */
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VERIFY_CHECK(j == n_pubkeys);
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#else
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(void)n_pubkeys;
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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