14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tim Ruffing
b5b8e7b719 Don't declare constants twice
This is forbidden in C++.
2021-07-04 11:35:52 +02:00
Dimitris Apostolou
07aa4c70ff
Fix insecure links 2020-12-18 00:24:22 +02:00
djb
dcb2e3b3ff
variable signing precompute table
make ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS configurable

ecmult_static_context.h: add compile time config assertion (#3) - Prevents accidentally using a file which was generated with a
different configuration.

README: mention valgrind issue

With --with-ecmult-gen-precision=8, valgrind needs a max stack size
adjustment to not run into a stack switching heuristic:

http://valgrind.org/docs/manual/manual-core.html

> -max-stackframe= [default: 2000000]
> The maximum size of a stack frame. If the stack pointer moves by more than this amount then Valgrind will assume that the program is switching to a different stack.
You may need to use this option if your program has large stack-allocated arrays.

basic-config: undef ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE before (re-)defining it
2019-09-05 09:19:41 +02:00
Tim Ruffing
c4fd5dab45 Switch to a single malloc call 2019-05-25 14:01:09 +02:00
Tim Ruffing
ef020de16f Add size constants for preallocated memory 2019-05-25 13:58:09 +02:00
Dan Raviv
abe2d3e84b Fix header guards using reserved identifiers
Identifiers starting with an underscore and followed immediately by a capital letter are reserved by the C++ standard.

The only header guards not fixed are those in the headers auto-generated from java.
2017-08-26 18:44:21 +03:00
Pieter Wuille
dd891e0ed5 Get rid of _t as it is POSIX reserved 2015-09-21 21:03:37 +02:00
Pieter Wuille
995c548771 Introduce callback functions for dealing with errors. 2015-07-26 18:08:38 +02:00
Gregory Maxwell
d2275795ff Add scalar blinding and a secp256k1_context_randomize() call.
This computes (n-b)G + bG with random value b, in place of nG in
 ecmult_gen() for signing.

This is intended to reduce exposure to potential power/EMI sidechannels
 during signing and pubkey generation by blinding the secret value with
 another value which is hopefully unknown to the attacker.

It may not be very helpful if the attacker is able to observe the setup
 or if even the scalar addition has an unacceptable leak, but it has low
 overhead in any case and the security should be purely additive on top
 of the existing defenses against sidechannels.
2015-04-22 19:25:16 +00:00
Andrew Poelstra
d899b5b67c Expose ability to deep-copy a context 2015-04-11 22:16:03 -05:00
Pieter Wuille
a9b6595ef8 [API BREAK] Introduce explicit contexts 2015-04-11 01:01:10 -07:00
Gregory Maxwell
71712b27e5 Switch to C89 comments in prep for making the whole codebase C89 compatible.
This should be whitespace/comment only changes and should produce the same
object code.
2014-11-15 07:33:07 -08:00
Pieter Wuille
a9f5c8b875 Introduce secp256k1_scalar_t for future constant-time mod order operations 2014-10-28 04:33:23 -07:00
Pieter Wuille
949c1ebb5e Split up ecmult and ecmult_gen entirely 2014-10-26 03:42:24 -07:00