14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jonas Nick
7a07f3d33f
Merge commits '3bab71cf 4258c54f 566faa17 9ce9984f 04bf3f67 5be353d6 2e035af2 5b0444a3 a6f4bcf6 5ec1333d f6bef03c 1f33bb2b 1c895367 6b7e5b71 596b336f 4b84f4bf 024a4094 222ecaf6 4b0f711d 3c818388 f30c7486 1cf15ebd 24c768ae 341cc197 c63ec88e 54d34b6c 073d98a0 9eb6934f ab5a9171 fb3a8063 006ddc1f 3353d3c7 b54a0672 7d4f86d2 e8295d07 3e3d125b acf5c55a ' into temp-merge-1312 2023-07-24 20:15:07 +00:00
Tim Ruffing
e444d24bca Fix include guards: No _ prefix/suffix but _H suffix (as in upstream) 2023-04-21 12:02:28 +02:00
Tim Ruffing
4eca406f4c Use relative #include paths in library (as in upstream) 2023-04-21 11:50:24 +02:00
Andrew Poelstra
87373f5145 MOVE ONLY: move Pedersen commitment stuff to generator module from rangeproof module
You can verify this commit with `git diff --color-moved=zebra`
2023-01-23 10:18:21 -08:00
Andrew Poelstra
5a40f3d99b replace memcmp with secp256k1_memcmp_var throughout the codebase
memcmp only appears in -zkp-specific modules. Fix those.
2022-08-10 22:14:31 +00:00
Andrew Poelstra
347f96d94a fix include paths in all the -zkp modules
This is causing out-of-tree build failures in Elements.
2022-08-05 14:56:10 +00:00
Jonas Nick
938725c1c9 Merge commits 'd7ec49a6 9a5a87e0 aa5d34a8 2a3a97c6 ' into temp-merge-976
Also remove remaining uses of ecmult context in secp-zkp and update API tests
accordingly.
2021-09-16 15:21:11 +00:00
Andrew Poelstra
6ad66de680 rangeproof: add an (unnecessary) variable initialization to shut up CI 2021-07-27 18:15:58 +00:00
Andrew Poelstra
c50b218698 rangeproof: check that points deserialize correctly when verifying rangeproof 2020-07-24 14:50:48 +02:00
Andrew Poelstra
94425d4a67 rangeproof: several API changes
* add summing function for blinded generators
* drop `excess` and `gen` from `verify_tally`
* add extra_commit to rangeproof sign and verify
2020-07-24 14:49:33 +02:00
Pieter Wuille
f6c84a02f3 Expose generator in pedersen/rangeproof API 2020-07-24 14:49:33 +02:00
Andrew Poelstra
e7a8a5f638 rangeproof: expose sidechannel message field in the signing API
Including a fix by Jonas Nick.
2020-07-24 14:49:33 +02:00
Andrew Poelstra
a88db4a744 [RANGEPROOF BREAK] Use quadratic residue for tie break and modularity cleanup
Switch to secp256k1_pedersen_commitment by Andrew Poelstra.
Switch to quadratic residue based disambiguation by Pieter Wuille.
2020-07-24 14:49:33 +02:00
Gregory Maxwell
16618fcd8d Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:

Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
 to a value.  Functionally they work like:
  commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
 except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
  C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
  C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
 The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
 In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
 utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
 to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
 If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
 have information theoretic privacy.

Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
 construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
 an AND of ORs, each of any size).  This construction requires
 32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
 overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
 A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
 satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".

ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
 a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
 value.  The construction here is based on the above borromean
 ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
 to maximize efficiency.  It also supports encoding proofs with a
 non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
 off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
 keeping data private that was already public due to external
 constraints).

A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
 this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
 who shares a secret random seed with the prover.

Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2020-07-24 14:49:33 +02:00