This commit adds the ECDSA adaptor signature APIs:
- Encrypted Signing
Creates an adaptor signature, which includes a proof to verify the adaptor
signature.
- Encryption Verification
Verifies that the adaptor decryption key can be extracted from the adaptor
signature and the completed ECDSA signature.
- Signature Decryption
Derives an ECDSA signature from an adaptor signature and an adaptor decryption
key.
- Key Recovery
Extracts the adaptor decryption key from the complete signature and the adaptor
signature.
This commit adds a nonce function that will be used by default
for ECDSA adaptor signatures.
This nonce function is similar to secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened
except it uses the compressed 33-byte encoding for the pubkey argument.
We need 33 bytes instead of 32 because, unlike with BIP-340, an ECDSA
X-coordinate alone is not sufficient to disambiguate the Y-coordinate.
33cb3c2b1fc3f3fe46c6d0eab118248ea86c1f06 Add secret key extraction from keypair to constant time tests (Elichai Turkel)
36d9dc1e8e6e3b15d805f04c973a8784a78880f6 Add seckey extraction from keypair to the extrakeys tests (Elichai Turkel)
fc96aa73f5c7f62452847a31821890ff1f72a5a4 Add a function to extract the secretkey from a keypair (Elichai Turkel)
Pull request description:
With schnorrsig if you need to tweak the secret key (for BIP32) you must use the keypair API to get compatible secret/public keys which you do by calling `secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add()`, but after that there's no currently a way to extract the secret key back for storage.
so I added a `secp256k1_keypair_seckey` function to extract the key
ACKs for top commit:
jonasnick:
ACK 33cb3c2b1fc3f3fe46c6d0eab118248ea86c1f06
real-or-random:
ACK 33cb3c2b1fc3f3fe46c6d0eab118248ea86c1f06 code inspection, tests pass
Tree-SHA512: 11212db38c8b87a87e2dc35c4d6993716867b45215b94b20522b1b3164ca63d4c6bf5192a6bff0e9267b333779cc8164844c56669a94e9be72df9ef025ffcfd4
1. using xonly_pubkeys in MuSig for input public keys and the combined
pk. For that to work we need to store whether the MuSig aggregated point
has an even y in the session, may need to negate each signers secret
key and may need to negate each signers public key in
musig_partial_sig_verify.
2. using a tagged hash for the message hash.
3. use !fe_is_odd in place of fe_is_quad_var