Avoid out-of-bound pointers and integer overflows in size comparisons

This changes pointer calculations in size comparions to a form that
ensures that no out-of-bound pointers are computed, because even their
computation yields undefined behavior.
Also, this changes size comparions to a form that ensures that neither
the left-hand side nor the right-hand side can overflow.
This commit is contained in:
Tim Ruffing committed 2019-05-23 15:22:29 +02:00
1 parent 01ee1b3b3c
commit ec8f20babd
3 files changed
+7 -10

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+2 -6
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@@ -157,12 +157,8 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_parse(secp256k1_scalar *rr, secp256k1_scalar *rs,
if (secp256k1_der_read_len(&rlen, &sig, sigend) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (sig + rlen > sigend) {
/* Tuple exceeds bounds */
return 0;
}
if (sig + rlen != sigend) {
/* Garbage after tuple. */
if (rlen != (size_t)(sigend - sig)) {
/* Tuple exceeds bounds or garage after tuple. */
return 0;
}
+2 -1
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@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ static void secp256k1_sha256_transform(uint32_t* s, const uint32_t* chunk) {
static void secp256k1_sha256_write(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t len) {
size_t bufsize = hash->bytes & 0x3F;
hash->bytes += len;
while (bufsize + len >= 64) {
VERIFY_CHECK(hash->bytes >= len);
while (len >= 64 - bufsize) {
/* Fill the buffer, and process it. */
size_t chunk_len = 64 - bufsize;
memcpy(((unsigned char*)hash->buf) + bufsize, data, chunk_len);