Avoid calling secp256k1_*_is_zero when secp256k1_*_set_b32 fails.

Most of the codebase correctly used short-cutting to avoid calling
 _is_zero on possibly incompletely initialized elements, but a few
 places were missed.
This commit is contained in:
Gregory Maxwell 2019-05-26 10:22:38 +00:00
parent 6c36de7a33
commit cd473e02c3
3 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const
do { do {
secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32);
retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32); retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32);
retry |= secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s); retry = retry || secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s);
} while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */ } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */
/* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */ /* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */
secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s); secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s);
@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const
secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32);
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry);
/* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */ /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */
retry |= secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b); retry = retry || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b);
} while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */ } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */
secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng); secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng);
memset(nonce32, 0, 32); memset(nonce32, 0, 32);

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@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_ecd
break; break;
} }
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow);
if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non) && !overflow) { if (!overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) {
if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, &recid)) { if (secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &r, &s, &sec, &msg, &non, &recid)) {
break; break;
} }

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@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *p
ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL); ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL);
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow); secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, &overflow);
ret = (!overflow) & (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)); ret = !overflow && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec);
if (ret) { if (ret) {
secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, &sec); secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pj, &sec);
secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&p, &pj); secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&p, &pj);