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surjectionproof: fix generation to fail when any input == the output

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Verification will fail in this case, so don't "succeed" in generating a bad proof.
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Poelstra
2022-07-26 17:14:49 +00:00
parent 4ff6e4274d
commit bf18ff5a8c
2 changed files with 10 additions and 8 deletions
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12
src/modules/surjection/main_impl.h
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@@ -307,10 +307,14 @@ int secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_s
if (overflow) {
return 0;
}
/* The only time the input may equal the output is if neither one was blinded in the first place,
* i.e. both blinding keys are zero. Otherwise this is a privacy leak. */
if (secp256k1_scalar_eq(&tmps, &blinding_key) && !secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&blinding_key)) {
return 0;
/* If any input tag is equal to an output tag, verification will fail, because our ring
* signature logic would receive a zero-key, which is illegal. This is unfortunate but
* it is deployed on Liquid and cannot be fixed without a hardfork. We should review
* this at the same time that we relax the max-256-inputs rule. */
for (i = 0; i < n_ephemeral_input_tags; i++) {
if (memcmp(ephemeral_input_tags[i].data, ephemeral_output_tag->data, sizeof(ephemeral_output_tag->data)) == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
secp256k1_scalar_negate(&tmps, &tmps);
secp256k1_scalar_add(&blinding_key, &blinding_key, &tmps);