small fixes
restoring wycheproof files restoring wycheproof files2
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@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void secure_erase(void *ptr, size_t len) {
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* As best as we can tell, this is sufficient to break any optimisations that
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* might try to eliminate "superfluous" memsets.
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* This method used in memzero_explicit() the Linux kernel, too. Its advantage is that it is
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* pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficently,
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* pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficiently,
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* just not remove it entirely. See "Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmful" by
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* Yang et al. (USENIX Security 2017) for more background.
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*/
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@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ellswift_create(
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/** Given a private key, and ElligatorSwift public keys sent in both directions,
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* compute a shared secret using x-only Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
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*
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* Returns: 1: shared secret was succesfully computed
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* Returns: 1: shared secret was successfully computed
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* 0: secret was invalid or hashfp returned 0
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* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object.
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* Out: output: pointer to an array to be filled by hashfp.
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@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ def normalize_factor(p):
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(8) * (-bx + ax)^3
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```
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"""
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# Assert p is not 0 and that its non-zero coeffients are coprime.
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# Assert p is not 0 and that its non-zero coefficients are coprime.
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# (We could just work with the primitive part p/p.content() but we want to be
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# aware if factor() does not return a primitive part in future sage versions.)
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assert p.content() == 1
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
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# pragma message DEBUG_CONFIG_DEF(ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE)
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#endif
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/* Noone will ever need more than a window size of 24. The code might
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/* No one will ever need more than a window size of 24. The code might
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* be correct for larger values of ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE but this is not
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* tested.
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*
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@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_const_xonly(secp256k1_fe* r, const secp256k1_fe *n,
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*
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* It is easy to verify that both (n*g, g^2, v) and its negation (n*g, -g^2, v) have affine X
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* coordinate n/d, and this holds even when the square root function doesn't have a
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* determinstic sign. We choose the (n*g, g^2, v) version.
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* deterministic sign. We choose the (n*g, g^2, v) version.
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*
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* Now switch to the effective affine curve using phi_v, where the input point has coordinates
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* (n*g, g^2). Compute (X, Y, Z) = q * (n*g, g^2) there.
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@ -192,14 +192,14 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b);
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/** Set a field element equal to a provided 32-byte big endian value, reducing it.
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*
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* On input, r does not need to be initalized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
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* On input, r does not need to be initialized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
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* On output, r = a (mod p). It will have magnitude 1, and not be normalized.
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*/
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static void secp256k1_fe_set_b32_mod(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a);
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/** Set a field element equal to a provided 32-byte big endian value, checking for overflow.
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*
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* On input, r does not need to be initalized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
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* On input, r does not need to be initialized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array.
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* On output, r = a if (a < p), it will be normalized with magnitude 1, and 1 is returned.
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* If a >= p, 0 is returned, and r will be made invalid (and must not be used without overwriting).
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*/
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