Merge #894: ctime_test: move context randomization test to the end
7d3497cdc4c747bdd51db70f42fe218622c3169f ctime_test: move context randomization test to the end (Jonas Nick) Pull request description: ACKs for top commit: real-or-random: ACK 7d3497cdc4c747bdd51db70f42fe218622c3169f diff looks good Tree-SHA512: aef006c43df4cab254ee7de79cdd34c4e2f7a463f29d1da6d285006b32bb4e18d0b914a305f371b8b5f5a20594c37ee464eb1e59d1978db9b06bf6b642e651d8
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3a8b47bc6d
@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
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***********************************************************************/
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#include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "include/secp256k1.h"
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#include "assumptions.h"
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#include "util.h"
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@ -25,8 +27,42 @@
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#include "include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h"
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#endif
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void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key);
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int main(void) {
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secp256k1_context* ctx;
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unsigned char key[32];
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int ret, i;
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if (!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) {
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fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind.\n");
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fprintf(stderr, "Usage: libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./valgrind_ctime_test\n");
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return 1;
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}
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ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN
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| SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
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| SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY);
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/** In theory, testing with a single secret input should be sufficient:
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* If control flow depended on secrets the tool would generate an error.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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key[i] = i + 65;
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}
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run_tests(ctx, key);
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/* Test context randomisation. Do this last because it leaves the context
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* tainted. */
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, key);
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret);
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key) {
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
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secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
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size_t siglen = 74;
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@ -34,7 +70,6 @@ int main(void) {
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int i;
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int ret;
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unsigned char msg[32];
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unsigned char key[32];
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unsigned char sig[74];
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unsigned char spubkey[33];
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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@ -45,26 +80,10 @@ int main(void) {
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secp256k1_keypair keypair;
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#endif
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if (!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) {
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fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind.\n");
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fprintf(stderr, "Usage: libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./valgrind_ctime_test\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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/** In theory, testing with a single secret input should be sufficient:
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* If control flow depended on secrets the tool would generate an error.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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key[i] = i + 65;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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msg[i] = i + 1;
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}
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ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN
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| SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
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| SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY);
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/* Test keygen. */
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key);
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@ -122,12 +141,6 @@ int main(void) {
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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/* Test context randomisation. Do this last because it leaves the context tainted. */
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
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ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, key);
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret);
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/* Test keypair_create and keypair_xonly_tweak_add. */
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(key, 32);
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@ -157,7 +170,4 @@ int main(void) {
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VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&ret, sizeof(ret));
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CHECK(ret == 1);
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#endif
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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