2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_PREREQ([2.60])
AC_INIT([libsecp256k1],[0.1])
2014-11-07 01:55:27 +13:00
AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([build-aux])
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([build-aux/m4])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_CANONICAL_HOST
AH_TOP([#ifndef LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H])
AH_TOP([#define LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H])
2015-01-25 17:32:08 +00:00
AH_BOTTOM([#endif /*LIBSECP256K1_CONFIG_H*/])
2014-12-11 20:18:54 -05:00
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([foreign subdir-objects])
2019-12-17 12:41:44 +00:00
2020-02-19 14:07:54 +00:00
# Set -g if CFLAGS are not already set, which matches the default autoconf
# behavior (see PROG_CC in the Autoconf manual) with the exception that we don't
# set -O2 here because we set it in any case (see further down).
2019-12-17 12:41:44 +00:00
: ${CFLAGS="-g"}
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
LT_INIT
2014-06-19 22:36:24 -04:00
dnl make the compilation flags quiet unless V=1 is used
m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
2014-07-24 17:19:59 -04:00
AC_PATH_TOOL(AR, ar)
AC_PATH_TOOL(RANLIB, ranlib)
AC_PATH_TOOL(STRIP, strip)
2015-05-19 17:32:35 -07:00
AX_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD
2014-07-24 17:19:59 -04:00
2015-07-19 16:07:46 +02:00
AM_PROG_CC_C_O
2015-01-25 17:32:08 +00:00
AC_PROG_CC_C89
if test x"$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" = x"no"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([c89 compiler support required])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
fi
2014-12-24 12:12:37 +01:00
AM_PROG_AS
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
2014-05-20 11:39:54 +07:00
case $host_os in
2014-11-24 11:13:16 -05:00
*darwin*)
if test x$cross_compiling != xyes; then
AC_PATH_PROG([BREW],brew,)
if test x$BREW != x; then
dnl These Homebrew packages may be keg-only, meaning that they won't be found
dnl in expected paths because they may conflict with system files. Ask
dnl Homebrew where each one is located, then adjust paths accordingly.
openssl_prefix=`$BREW --prefix openssl 2>/dev/null`
gmp_prefix=`$BREW --prefix gmp 2>/dev/null`
if test x$openssl_prefix != x; then
PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$openssl_prefix/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH"
export PKG_CONFIG_PATH
2020-04-09 15:55:11 +08:00
CRYPTO_CPPFLAGS="-I$openssl_prefix/include"
2014-11-24 11:13:16 -05:00
fi
if test x$gmp_prefix != x; then
GMP_CPPFLAGS="-I$gmp_prefix/include"
GMP_LIBS="-L$gmp_prefix/lib"
fi
else
AC_PATH_PROG([PORT],port,)
dnl if homebrew isn't installed and macports is, add the macports default paths
dnl as a last resort.
if test x$PORT != x; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -isystem /opt/local/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/opt/local/lib"
fi
fi
fi
;;
2014-05-20 11:39:54 +07:00
esac
2019-12-17 12:37:48 +00:00
CFLAGS="-W $CFLAGS"
2014-11-12 16:07:48 -08:00
2020-09-18 13:36:07 +02:00
warn_CFLAGS="-std=c89 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Wcast-align -Wnested-externs -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes -Wundef -Wno-unused-function -Wno-long-long -Wno-overlength-strings"
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saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
2019-12-17 12:37:48 +00:00
CFLAGS="$warn_CFLAGS $CFLAGS"
2014-11-12 16:07:48 -08:00
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports ${warn_CFLAGS}])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
])
2015-09-20 19:36:37 +00:00
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
2019-12-17 12:37:48 +00:00
CFLAGS="-fvisibility=hidden $CFLAGS"
2015-09-20 19:36:37 +00:00
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if ${CC} supports -fvisibility=hidden])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
])
2014-11-12 16:07:48 -08:00
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(benchmark,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-benchmark],[compile benchmark [default=yes]]),
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[use_benchmark=$enableval],
2017-09-27 15:13:38 -07:00
[use_benchmark=yes])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
2016-11-26 20:34:15 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(coverage,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-coverage],[enable compiler flags to support kcov coverage analysis [default=no]]),
2016-11-26 20:34:15 +00:00
[enable_coverage=$enableval],
[enable_coverage=no])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(tests,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-tests],[compile tests [default=yes]]),
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
[use_tests=$enableval],
[use_tests=yes])
2016-07-05 11:00:39 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(openssl_tests,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-openssl-tests],[enable OpenSSL tests [default=auto]]),
2016-07-05 11:00:39 +00:00
[enable_openssl_tests=$enableval],
[enable_openssl_tests=auto])
2015-11-26 00:06:41 +01:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(experimental,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-experimental],[allow experimental configure options [default=no]]),
2015-11-26 00:06:41 +01:00
[use_experimental=$enableval],
[use_experimental=no])
2015-09-17 18:54:52 -05:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(exhaustive_tests,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-exhaustive-tests],[compile exhaustive tests [default=yes]]),
2015-09-17 18:54:52 -05:00
[use_exhaustive_tests=$enableval],
[use_exhaustive_tests=yes])
2015-05-19 17:32:35 -07:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(ecmult_static_precomputation,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ecmult-static-precomputation],[enable precomputed ecmult table for signing [default=auto]]),
2015-05-19 17:32:35 -07:00
[use_ecmult_static_precomputation=$enableval],
2016-02-16 15:50:17 -05:00
[use_ecmult_static_precomputation=auto])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
2015-06-29 15:06:28 -05:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ecdh,
2020-09-07 17:35:09 +00:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-ecdh],[enable ECDH shared secret computation]),
2015-06-29 15:06:28 -05:00
[enable_module_ecdh=$enableval],
[enable_module_ecdh=no])
2020-10-14 15:03:26 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_musig,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-musig],[enable MuSig module (experimental)]),
[enable_module_musig=$enableval],
[enable_module_musig=no])
2018-12-22 22:12:35 +00:00
2015-08-27 03:42:57 +02:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery,
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-recovery],[enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module [default=no]]),
2015-08-27 03:42:57 +02:00
[enable_module_recovery=$enableval],
[enable_module_recovery=no])
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_generator,
2019-04-05 21:26:19 +02:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-generator],[enable NUMS generator module [default=no]]),
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
[enable_module_generator=$enableval],
[enable_module_generator=no])
Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:
Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
to a value. Functionally they work like:
commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
have information theoretic privacy.
Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
an AND of ORs, each of any size). This construction requires
32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".
ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
value. The construction here is based on the above borromean
ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
to maximize efficiency. It also supports encoding proofs with a
non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
keeping data private that was already public due to external
constraints).
A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
who shares a secret random seed with the prover.
Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2015-08-05 19:04:14 +02:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_rangeproof,
2019-04-05 21:26:19 +02:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-rangeproof],[enable Pedersen / zero-knowledge range proofs module [default=no]]),
Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:
Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
to a value. Functionally they work like:
commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
have information theoretic privacy.
Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
an AND of ORs, each of any size). This construction requires
32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".
ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
value. The construction here is based on the above borromean
ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
to maximize efficiency. It also supports encoding proofs with a
non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
keeping data private that was already public due to external
constraints).
A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
who shares a secret random seed with the prover.
Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2015-08-05 19:04:14 +02:00
[enable_module_rangeproof=$enableval],
[enable_module_rangeproof=no])
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_whitelist,
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AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-whitelist],[enable key whitelisting module [default=no]]),
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
[enable_module_whitelist=$enableval],
[enable_module_whitelist=no])
2020-05-12 13:58:47 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_extrakeys,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-extrakeys],[enable extrakeys module (experimental)]),
[enable_module_extrakeys=$enableval],
[enable_module_extrakeys=no])
2020-05-12 21:19:03 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_schnorrsig,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-schnorrsig],[enable schnorrsig module (experimental)]),
[enable_module_schnorrsig=$enableval],
[enable_module_schnorrsig=no])
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(external_default_callbacks,
2019-09-04 18:53:08 +02:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-external-default-callbacks],[enable external default callback functions [default=no]]),
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
[use_external_default_callbacks=$enableval],
[use_external_default_callbacks=no])
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_surjectionproof,
2019-04-05 21:26:19 +02:00
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-surjectionproof],[enable surjection proof module [default=no]]),
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
[enable_module_surjectionproof=$enableval],
[enable_module_surjectionproof=no])
2019-05-30 09:04:40 +03:00
AC_ARG_ENABLE(reduced_surjection_proof_size,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-reduced-surjection-proof-size],[use reduced surjection proof size (disabling parsing and verification) [default=no]]),
[use_reduced_surjection_proof_size=$enableval],
[use_reduced_surjection_proof_size=no])
2020-08-09 10:58:40 -07:00
dnl Test-only override of the (autodetected by the C code) "widemul" setting.
dnl Legal values are int64 (for [u]int64_t), int128 (for [unsigned] __int128), and auto (the default).
AC_ARG_WITH([test-override-wide-multiply], [] ,[set_widemul=$withval], [set_widemul=auto])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
2014-12-12 16:20:47 +01:00
AC_ARG_WITH([bignum], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bignum=gmp|no|auto],
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
[bignum implementation to use [default=auto]])],[req_bignum=$withval], [req_bignum=auto])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
2019-03-06 14:10:38 +01:00
AC_ARG_WITH([asm], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-asm=x86_64|arm|no|auto],
[assembly optimizations to use (experimental: arm) [default=auto]])],[req_asm=$withval], [req_asm=auto])
2014-12-12 16:20:47 +01:00
2019-03-06 13:12:33 +01:00
AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-window], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-window=SIZE|auto],
[window size for ecmult precomputation for verification, specified as integer in range [2..24].]
[Larger values result in possibly better performance at the cost of an exponentially larger precomputed table.]
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[The table will store 2^(SIZE-1) * 64 bytes of data but can be larger in memory due to platform-specific padding and alignment.]
2019-03-06 13:12:33 +01:00
["auto" is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 15). [default=auto]]
)],
[req_ecmult_window=$withval], [req_ecmult_window=auto])
2015-10-18 10:35:16 +02:00
AC_ARG_WITH([ecmult-gen-precision], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ecmult-gen-precision=2|4|8|auto],
[Precision bits to tune the precomputed table size for signing.]
[The size of the table is 32kB for 2 bits, 64kB for 4 bits, 512kB for 8 bits of precision.]
[A larger table size usually results in possible faster signing.]
["auto" is a reasonable setting for desktop machines (currently 4). [default=auto]]
)],
[req_ecmult_gen_precision=$withval], [req_ecmult_gen_precision=auto])
2020-09-12 19:15:56 +00:00
AC_ARG_WITH([valgrind], [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-valgrind=yes|no|auto],
[Build with extra checks for running inside Valgrind [default=auto]]
)],
[req_valgrind=$withval], [req_valgrind=auto])
if test x"$req_valgrind" = x"no"; then
enable_valgrind=no
else
AC_CHECK_HEADER([valgrind/memcheck.h], [enable_valgrind=yes], [
if test x"$req_valgrind" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Valgrind support explicitly requested but valgrind/memcheck.h header not available])
fi
enable_valgrind=no
], [])
fi
2020-01-11 13:31:50 +00:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([VALGRIND_ENABLED],[test "$enable_valgrind" = "yes"])
2016-11-26 20:34:15 +00:00
if test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(COVERAGE, 1, [Define this symbol to compile out all VERIFY code])
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CFLAGS="-O0 --coverage $CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="--coverage $LDFLAGS"
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else
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CFLAGS="-O2 $CFLAGS"
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fi
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_popcount])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() {__builtin_popcount(0);}]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_POPCOUNT,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_popcount is available]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
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if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" != x"no"; then
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# Temporarily switch to an environment for the native compiler
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save_cross_compiling=$cross_compiling
cross_compiling=no
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SAVE_CC="$CC"
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CC="$CC_FOR_BUILD"
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SAVE_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD"
SAVE_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS_FOR_BUILD"
SAVE_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS_FOR_BUILD"
warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD="-Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-function"
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
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CFLAGS="$warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD $CFLAGS"
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AC_MSG_CHECKING([if native ${CC_FOR_BUILD} supports ${warn_CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD}])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[char foo;]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working native compiler: ${CC_FOR_BUILD}])
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AC_RUN_IFELSE(
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[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [])],
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[working_native_cc=yes],
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[working_native_cc=no],[:])
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CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD="$CFLAGS"
# Restore the environment
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cross_compiling=$save_cross_compiling
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CC="$SAVE_CC"
CFLAGS="$SAVE_CFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$SAVE_CPPFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$SAVE_LDFLAGS"
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if test x"$working_native_cc" = x"no"; then
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AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
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set_precomp=no
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m4_define([please_set_for_build], [Please set CC_FOR_BUILD, CFLAGS_FOR_BUILD, CPPFLAGS_FOR_BUILD, and/or LDFLAGS_FOR_BUILD.])
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if test x"$use_ecmult_static_precomputation" = x"yes"; then
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AC_MSG_ERROR([native compiler ${CC_FOR_BUILD} does not produce working binaries. please_set_for_build])
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else
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AC_MSG_WARN([Disabling statically generated ecmult table because the native compiler ${CC_FOR_BUILD} does not produce working binaries. please_set_for_build])
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fi
else
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AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
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set_precomp=yes
fi
else
set_precomp=no
fi
2015-08-05 16:17:50 +02:00
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __builtin_clzll])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[void myfunc() { __builtin_clzll(1);}]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUILTIN_CLZLL,1,[Define this symbol if __builtin_clzll is available]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
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if test x"$req_asm" = x"auto"; then
2014-01-24 16:57:13 -05:00
SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK
if test x"$has_64bit_asm" = x"yes"; then
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set_asm=x86_64
fi
if test x"$set_asm" = x; then
set_asm=no
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fi
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else
set_asm=$req_asm
case $set_asm in
x86_64)
SECP_64BIT_ASM_CHECK
if test x"$has_64bit_asm" != x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([x86_64 assembly optimization requested but not available])
fi
;;
2014-12-24 12:12:37 +01:00
arm)
;;
2014-12-12 16:20:47 +01:00
no)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly optimization selection])
;;
esac
fi
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if test x"$req_bignum" = x"auto"; then
SECP_GMP_CHECK
if test x"$has_gmp" = x"yes"; then
set_bignum=gmp
fi
if test x"$set_bignum" = x; then
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set_bignum=no
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fi
else
set_bignum=$req_bignum
case $set_bignum in
gmp)
SECP_GMP_CHECK
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if test x"$has_gmp" != x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([gmp bignum explicitly requested but libgmp not available])
fi
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;;
2014-12-12 16:20:47 +01:00
no)
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;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid bignum implementation selection])
;;
esac
fi
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# select assembly optimization
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use_external_asm=no
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case $set_asm in
x86_64)
AC_DEFINE(USE_ASM_X86_64, 1, [Define this symbol to enable x86_64 assembly optimizations])
;;
2014-12-24 12:12:37 +01:00
arm)
use_external_asm=yes
;;
2014-12-12 16:20:47 +01:00
no)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid assembly optimizations])
;;
esac
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# select wide multiplication implementation
case $set_widemul in
int128)
AC_DEFINE(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT128, 1, [Define this symbol to force the use of the (unsigned) __int128 based wide multiplication implementation])
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;;
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int64)
AC_DEFINE(USE_FORCE_WIDEMUL_INT64, 1, [Define this symbol to force the use of the (u)int64_t based wide multiplication implementation])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
;;
2020-08-09 10:58:40 -07:00
auto)
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
;;
*)
2020-08-09 10:58:40 -07:00
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid wide multiplication implementation])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
;;
esac
# select bignum implementation
case $set_bignum in
gmp)
2014-11-28 01:23:55 +01:00
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBGMP, 1, [Define this symbol if libgmp is installed])
AC_DEFINE(USE_NUM_GMP, 1, [Define this symbol to use the gmp implementation for num])
2014-11-26 16:04:24 +01:00
AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_INV_NUM, 1, [Define this symbol to use the num-based field inverse implementation])
AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_INV_NUM, 1, [Define this symbol to use the num-based scalar inverse implementation])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
;;
2014-12-12 16:20:47 +01:00
no)
2014-11-28 01:23:55 +01:00
AC_DEFINE(USE_NUM_NONE, 1, [Define this symbol to use no num implementation])
AC_DEFINE(USE_FIELD_INV_BUILTIN, 1, [Define this symbol to use the native field inverse implementation])
AC_DEFINE(USE_SCALAR_INV_BUILTIN, 1, [Define this symbol to use the native scalar inverse implementation])
;;
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid bignum implementation])
;;
esac
2019-03-06 13:12:33 +01:00
#set ecmult window size
if test x"$req_ecmult_window" = x"auto"; then
set_ecmult_window=15
else
set_ecmult_window=$req_ecmult_window
fi
error_window_size=['window size for ecmult precomputation not an integer in range [2..24] or "auto"']
case $set_ecmult_window in
''|*[[!0-9]]*)
# no valid integer
AC_MSG_ERROR($error_window_size)
;;
*)
if test "$set_ecmult_window" -lt 2 -o "$set_ecmult_window" -gt 24 ; then
# not in range
AC_MSG_ERROR($error_window_size)
fi
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE, $set_ecmult_window, [Set window size for ecmult precomputation])
;;
esac
2015-10-18 10:35:16 +02:00
#set ecmult gen precision
if test x"$req_ecmult_gen_precision" = x"auto"; then
set_ecmult_gen_precision=4
else
set_ecmult_gen_precision=$req_ecmult_gen_precision
fi
case $set_ecmult_gen_precision in
2|4|8)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS, $set_ecmult_gen_precision, [Set ecmult gen precision bits])
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR(['ecmult gen precision not 2, 4, 8 or "auto"'])
;;
esac
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
if test x"$use_tests" = x"yes"; then
SECP_OPENSSL_CHECK
2020-10-27 13:09:15 +02:00
if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" != x"no" && test x"$has_openssl_ec" = x"yes"; then
enable_openssl_tests=yes
2016-07-05 11:00:39 +00:00
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_OPENSSL_TESTS, 1, [Define this symbol if OpenSSL EC functions are available])
2020-04-09 15:55:11 +08:00
SECP_TEST_INCLUDES="$SSL_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CFLAGS $CRYPTO_CPPFLAGS"
2016-07-05 11:00:39 +00:00
SECP_TEST_LIBS="$CRYPTO_LIBS"
case $host in
*mingw*)
SECP_TEST_LIBS="$SECP_TEST_LIBS -lgdi32"
;;
esac
else
if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but OpenSSL with EC support is not available])
fi
2020-10-27 13:09:15 +02:00
enable_openssl_tests=no
2016-07-05 11:00:39 +00:00
fi
else
if test x"$enable_openssl_tests" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL tests requested but tests are not enabled])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
fi
2020-10-27 13:09:15 +02:00
enable_openssl_tests=no
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
fi
2014-12-17 12:41:31 +01:00
if test x"$set_bignum" = x"gmp"; then
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
SECP_LIBS="$SECP_LIBS $GMP_LIBS"
2014-11-24 11:13:16 -05:00
SECP_INCLUDES="$SECP_INCLUDES $GMP_CPPFLAGS"
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
fi
2016-09-07 12:14:18 -04:00
if test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"; then
2015-05-19 17:32:35 -07:00
AC_DEFINE(USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION, 1, [Define this symbol to use a statically generated ecmult table])
fi
2015-06-29 15:06:28 -05:00
if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDH module])
fi
2020-10-14 15:03:26 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the MuSig module])
fi
2018-12-22 22:12:35 +00:00
2015-08-27 03:42:57 +02:00
if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDSA pubkey recovery module])
fi
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
if test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the NUMS generator module])
fi
Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:
Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
to a value. Functionally they work like:
commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
have information theoretic privacy.
Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
an AND of ORs, each of any size). This construction requires
32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".
ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
value. The construction here is based on the above borromean
ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
to maximize efficiency. It also supports encoding proofs with a
non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
keeping data private that was already public due to external
constraints).
A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
who shares a secret random seed with the prover.
Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2015-08-05 19:04:14 +02:00
if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the Pedersen / zero knowledge range proof module])
fi
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the key whitelisting module])
fi
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the surjection proof module])
fi
2020-05-12 21:19:03 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the schnorrsig module])
enable_module_extrakeys=yes
fi
# Test if extrakeys is set after the schnorrsig module to allow the schnorrsig
# module to set enable_module_extrakeys=yes
2020-05-12 13:58:47 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the extrakeys module])
fi
2014-12-24 12:12:37 +01:00
if test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_ASM, 1, [Define this symbol if an external (non-inline) assembly implementation is used])
fi
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
if test x"$use_external_default_callbacks" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS, 1, [Define this symbol if an external implementation of the default callbacks is used])
fi
2019-05-30 09:04:40 +03:00
if test x"$use_reduced_surjection_proof_size" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_REDUCED_SURJECTION_PROOF_SIZE, 1, [Define this symbol to reduce SECP256K1_SURJECTIONPROOF_MAX_N_INPUTS to 16, disabling parsing and verification])
fi
2015-11-26 00:06:41 +01:00
if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_NOTICE([******])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([WARNING: experimental build])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.])
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building NUMS generator module: $enable_module_generator])
Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:
Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
to a value. Functionally they work like:
commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
have information theoretic privacy.
Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
an AND of ORs, each of any size). This construction requires
32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".
ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
value. The construction here is based on the above borromean
ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
to maximize efficiency. It also supports encoding proofs with a
non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
keeping data private that was already public due to external
constraints).
A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
who shares a secret random seed with the prover.
Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2015-08-05 19:04:14 +02:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building range proof module: $enable_module_rangeproof])
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building key whitelisting module: $enable_module_whitelist])
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building surjection proof module: $enable_module_surjectionproof])
2020-10-14 15:03:26 +00:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building MuSig module: $enable_module_musig])
2020-05-12 13:58:47 +00:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building extrakeys module: $enable_module_extrakeys])
2020-05-12 21:19:03 +00:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building schnorrsig module: $enable_module_schnorrsig])
2015-11-26 00:06:41 +01:00
AC_MSG_NOTICE([******])
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
2018-12-22 22:12:35 +00:00
2020-10-14 15:03:26 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" != x"yes"; then
if test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([MuSig module requires the schnorrsig module. Use --enable-module-schnorrsig to allow.])
fi
fi
2018-12-22 22:12:35 +00:00
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
if test x"$enable_module_generator" != x"yes"; then
if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Rangeproof module requires the generator module. Use --enable-module-generator to allow.])
fi
fi
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" != x"yes"; then
if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
AC_MSG_ERROR([Whitelist module requires the rangeproof module. Use --enable-module-rangeproof to allow.])
fi
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Surjection proof module requires the rangeproof module. Use --enable-module-rangeproof to allow.])
fi
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
fi
2015-11-26 00:06:41 +01:00
else
2020-10-14 15:03:26 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([MuSig module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2020-05-12 13:58:47 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([extrakeys module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2020-05-12 21:19:03 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([schnorrsig module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2014-12-24 12:12:37 +01:00
if test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([ARM assembly optimization is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
if test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([NUMS generator module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:
Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
to a value. Functionally they work like:
commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
have information theoretic privacy.
Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
an AND of ORs, each of any size). This construction requires
32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".
ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
value. The construction here is based on the above borromean
ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
to maximize efficiency. It also supports encoding proofs with a
non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
keeping data private that was already public due to external
constraints).
A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
who shares a secret random seed with the prover.
Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2015-08-05 19:04:14 +02:00
if test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Range proof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Key whitelisting module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
if test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Surjection proof module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
2015-11-26 00:06:41 +01:00
fi
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([src/libsecp256k1-config.h])
2014-05-07 06:10:08 +00:00
AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile libsecp256k1.pc])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_SUBST(SECP_INCLUDES)
AC_SUBST(SECP_LIBS)
AC_SUBST(SECP_TEST_LIBS)
AC_SUBST(SECP_TEST_INCLUDES)
2016-11-26 20:34:15 +00:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_COVERAGE], [test x"$enable_coverage" = x"yes"])
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_TESTS], [test x"$use_tests" != x"no"])
2015-09-17 18:54:52 -05:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS], [test x"$use_exhaustive_tests" != x"no"])
2014-12-11 20:09:19 -05:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$use_benchmark" = x"yes"])
2016-09-07 12:14:18 -04:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION], [test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"])
2015-06-29 15:06:28 -05:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"])
2020-10-14 15:03:26 +00:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG], [test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"])
2015-08-27 03:42:57 +02:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"])
2016-07-07 00:47:41 +02:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR], [test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"])
Pedersen commitments, borromean ring signatures, and ZK range proofs.
This commit adds three new cryptosystems to libsecp256k1:
Pedersen commitments are a system for making blinded commitments
to a value. Functionally they work like:
commit_b,v = H(blind_b || value_v),
except they are additively homorphic, e.g.
C(b1, v1) - C(b2, v2) = C(b1 - b2, v1 - v2) and
C(b1, v1) - C(b1, v1) = 0, etc.
The commitments themselves are EC points, serialized as 33 bytes.
In addition to the commit function this implementation includes
utility functions for verifying that a set of commitments sums
to zero, and for picking blinding factors that sum to zero.
If the blinding factors are uniformly random, pedersen commitments
have information theoretic privacy.
Borromean ring signatures are a novel efficient ring signature
construction for AND/OR admissions policies (the code here implements
an AND of ORs, each of any size). This construction requires
32 bytes of signature per pubkey used plus 32 bytes of constant
overhead. With these you can construct signatures like "Given pubkeys
A B C D E F G, the signer knows the discrete logs
satisifying (A || B) & (C || D || E) & (F || G)".
ZK range proofs allow someone to prove a pedersen commitment is in
a particular range (e.g. [0..2^64)) without revealing the specific
value. The construction here is based on the above borromean
ring signature and uses a radix-4 encoding and other optimizations
to maximize efficiency. It also supports encoding proofs with a
non-private base-10 exponent and minimum-value to allow trading
off secrecy for size and speed (or just avoiding wasting space
keeping data private that was already public due to external
constraints).
A proof for a 32-bit mantissa takes 2564 bytes, but 2048 bytes of
this can be used to communicate a private message to a receiver
who shares a secret random seed with the prover.
Also: get rid of precomputed H tables (Pieter Wuille)
2015-08-05 19:04:14 +02:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"])
2016-04-21 22:22:39 +00:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_WHITELIST], [test x"$enable_module_whitelist" = x"yes"])
2020-05-12 21:19:03 +00:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS], [test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG], [test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"])
2014-12-24 12:12:37 +01:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ASM_ARM], [test x"$set_asm" = x"arm"])
2016-07-01 15:51:07 +00:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SURJECTIONPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_surjectionproof" = x"yes"])
2019-05-30 09:04:40 +03:00
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_REDUCED_SURJECTION_PROOF_SIZE], [test x"$use_reduced_surjection_proof_size" = x"yes"])
2014-11-24 11:13:16 -05:00
dnl make sure nothing new is exported so that we don't break the cache
PKGCONFIG_PATH_TEMP="$PKG_CONFIG_PATH"
unset PKG_CONFIG_PATH
PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$PKGCONFIG_PATH_TEMP"
2014-01-17 22:52:33 -05:00
AC_OUTPUT
2018-03-10 10:36:59 -08:00
echo
echo "Build Options:"
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
echo " with ecmult precomp = $set_precomp"
echo " with external callbacks = $use_external_default_callbacks"
echo " with benchmarks = $use_benchmark"
2020-10-27 13:09:15 +02:00
echo " with tests = $use_tests"
echo " with openssl tests = $enable_openssl_tests"
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
echo " with coverage = $enable_coverage"
echo " module ecdh = $enable_module_ecdh"
echo " module recovery = $enable_module_recovery"
2020-05-12 13:58:47 +00:00
echo " module extrakeys = $enable_module_extrakeys"
2020-05-12 21:19:03 +00:00
echo " module schnorrsig = $enable_module_schnorrsig"
2018-03-10 10:36:59 -08:00
echo
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
echo " asm = $set_asm"
echo " bignum = $set_bignum"
echo " ecmult window size = $set_ecmult_window"
2015-10-18 10:35:16 +02:00
echo " ecmult gen prec. bits = $set_ecmult_gen_precision"
2020-08-09 10:58:40 -07:00
dnl Hide test-only options unless they're used.
if test x"$set_widemul" != xauto; then
echo " wide multiplication = $set_widemul"
fi
2018-03-10 10:36:59 -08:00
echo
2020-01-08 11:56:15 +00:00
echo " valgrind = $enable_valgrind"
2019-03-04 15:36:35 +01:00
echo " CC = $CC"
echo " CFLAGS = $CFLAGS"
echo " CPPFLAGS = $CPPFLAGS"
echo " LDFLAGS = $LDFLAGS"
2018-03-10 10:36:59 -08:00
echo