secp256k1-zkp/src/ctime_tests.c

/***********************************************************************
 * Copyright (c) 2020 Gregory Maxwell                                  *
 * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
 * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
 ***********************************************************************/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#include "../include/secp256k1.h"
#include "assumptions.h"
#include "checkmem.h"

#if !SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_ENABLED
#  error "This tool cannot be compiled without memory-checking interface (valgrind or msan)"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
# include "../include/secp256k1_ecdh.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
# include "../include/secp256k1_recovery.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
# include "../include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
#include "../include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
#include "../include/secp256k1_musig.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
#include "../include/secp256k1_ellswift.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_S2C
#include "../include/secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_ADAPTOR
#include "../include/secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor.h"
#endif

#if defined(__GNUC__)
# pragma GCC diagnostic push
# pragma GCC diagnostic warning "-Wunused-function"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_FROST
#include "../include/secp256k1_frost.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_CHILLDKG
#include "../include/secp256k1_chilldkg.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_PREFRACTAL
#include "../include/secp256k1_prefractal.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_FROST_ENROLLMENT
#include "../include/secp256k1_frost_enrollment.h"
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ICEBERG
#include "../include/secp256k1_iceberg.h"
#include "../include/secp256k1_iceberg_dealer.h"
#endif

static void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key);

int main(void) {
    secp256k1_context* ctx;
    unsigned char key[32];
    int ret, i;

    if (!SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_RUNNING()) {
        fprintf(stderr, "This test can only usefully be run inside valgrind because it was not compiled under msan.\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: valgrind ./ctime_tests (or with Autotools: libtool --mode=execute valgrind ./ctime_tests)\n");
        return EXIT_FAILURE;
    }
    ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY);
    /** In theory, testing with a single secret input should be sufficient:
     *  If control flow depended on secrets the tool would generate an error.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
        key[i] = i + 65;
    }

    run_tests(ctx, key);

    /* Test context randomisation. Do this last because it leaves the context
     * tainted. */
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, key);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret);

    secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

static void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key) {
    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
    secp256k1_pubkey pubkey;
    size_t siglen = 74;
    size_t outputlen = 33;
    int i;
    int ret;
    unsigned char msg[32];
    unsigned char sig[74];
    unsigned char spubkey[33];
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
    secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature recoverable_signature;
    int recid;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
    secp256k1_keypair keypair;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
    unsigned char ellswift[64];
    static const unsigned char prefix[64] = {'t', 'e', 's', 't'};
#endif

    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
        msg[i] = i + 1;
    }

    /* Test keygen. */
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, key);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey));
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret);
    CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, spubkey, &outputlen, &pubkey, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED) == 1);

    /* Test signing. */
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(ctx, &signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&signature, sizeof(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature));
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret);
    CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(ctx, sig, &siglen, &signature));

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
    /* Test ECDH. */
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, msg, &pubkey, key, NULL, NULL);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
    /* Test signing a recoverable signature. */
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &recoverable_signature, msg, key, NULL, NULL);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&recoverable_signature, sizeof(recoverable_signature));
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret);
    CHECK(secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(ctx, sig, &recid, &recoverable_signature));
    CHECK(recid >= 0 && recid <= 3);
#endif

    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, key);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(ctx, key);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(msg, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(ctx, key, msg);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(msg, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(ctx, key, msg);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    /* Test keypair_create and keypair_xonly_tweak_add. */
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    /* The tweak is not treated as a secret in keypair_tweak_add */
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(ctx, &keypair, msg);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&keypair, sizeof(keypair));
    ret = secp256k1_keypair_sec(ctx, key, &keypair);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);
    ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(ctx, sig, msg, &keypair, NULL);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
    {
        secp256k1_pubkey pk;
        const secp256k1_pubkey *pk_ptr[1];
        secp256k1_xonly_pubkey agg_pk;
        unsigned char session_secrand[32];
        uint64_t nonrepeating_cnt = 0;
        secp256k1_musig_secnonce secnonce;
        secp256k1_musig_pubnonce pubnonce;
        const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonce_ptr[1];
        secp256k1_musig_aggnonce aggnonce;
        secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache cache;
        secp256k1_musig_session session;
        secp256k1_musig_partial_sig partial_sig;
        const secp256k1_musig_partial_sig *partial_sig_ptr[1];
        unsigned char extra_input[32];
        unsigned char sec_adaptor[32];
        secp256k1_pubkey adaptor;
        unsigned char pre_sig[64];
        int nonce_parity;

        pk_ptr[0] = &pk;
        pubnonce_ptr[0] = &pubnonce;
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
        memcpy(session_secrand, key, sizeof(session_secrand));
        session_secrand[0] = session_secrand[0] + 1;
        memcpy(extra_input, key, sizeof(extra_input));
        extra_input[0] = extra_input[0] + 2;
        memcpy(sec_adaptor, key, sizeof(sec_adaptor));
        sec_adaptor[0] = extra_input[0] + 3;
        partial_sig_ptr[0] = &partial_sig;

        CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key));
        CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &pk, &keypair));
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(ctx, &agg_pk, &cache, pk_ptr, 1));
        CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &adaptor, sec_adaptor));

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand, sizeof(session_secrand));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(extra_input, sizeof(extra_input));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(sec_adaptor, sizeof(sec_adaptor));
        ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(ctx, &secnonce, &pubnonce, session_secrand, key, &pk, msg, &cache, extra_input);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter(ctx, &secnonce, &pubnonce, nonrepeating_cnt, &keypair, msg, &cache, extra_input);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(ctx, &aggnonce, pubnonce_ptr, 1));
        /* Make sure that previous tests don't undefine msg. It's not used as a secret here. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_process(ctx, &session, &aggnonce, msg, &cache, &adaptor) == 1);

        ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        ret = secp256k1_musig_partial_sign(ctx, &partial_sig, &secnonce, &keypair, &cache, &session);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&partial_sig, sizeof(partial_sig));
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_agg(ctx, pre_sig, &session, partial_sig_ptr, 1));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pre_sig, sizeof(pre_sig));

        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_parity(ctx, &nonce_parity, &session));
        ret = secp256k1_musig_adapt(ctx, sig, pre_sig, sec_adaptor, nonce_parity);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        ret = secp256k1_musig_extract_adaptor(ctx, sec_adaptor, sig, pre_sig, nonce_parity);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift, key, NULL);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
    ret = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift, key, ellswift);
    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
    CHECK(ret == 1);

    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ellswift, sizeof(ellswift));
        ret = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, msg, ellswift, ellswift, key, i, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ellswift, sizeof(ellswift));
        ret = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, msg, ellswift, ellswift, key, i, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_prefix, (void *)prefix);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_S2C
    {
        unsigned char s2c_data[32] = {0};
        unsigned char s2c_data_comm[32] = {0};
        secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c_opening s2c_opening;

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(s2c_data, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c_sign(ctx, &signature, &s2c_opening, msg, key, s2c_data);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(s2c_data, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_anti_exfil_host_commit(ctx, s2c_data_comm, s2c_data);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(s2c_data, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_anti_exfil_signer_commit(ctx, &s2c_opening, msg, key, s2c_data);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ECDSA_ADAPTOR
    {
        unsigned char adaptor_sig[162];
        unsigned char deckey[32];
        unsigned char expected_deckey[32];
        secp256k1_pubkey enckey;

        for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
            deckey[i] = i + 2;
        }

        ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &enckey, deckey);
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor_encrypt(ctx, adaptor_sig, key, &enckey, msg, NULL, NULL);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(adaptor_sig, sizeof(adaptor_sig));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(deckey, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor_decrypt(ctx, &signature, deckey, adaptor_sig);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&signature, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_adaptor_recover(ctx, expected_deckey, &signature, adaptor_sig, &enckey);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(expected_deckey, sizeof(expected_deckey));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(deckey, sizeof(deckey));
        ret = secp256k1_memcmp_var(deckey, expected_deckey, sizeof(expected_deckey));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 0);
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_FROST
    {
        unsigned char thresh_seckey[32];
        unsigned char secshares[2 * 32];
        secp256k1_pubkey thresh_pk;
        secp256k1_pubkey pubshares[2];
        uint32_t frost_ids[2] = { 0, 1 };
        secp256k1_frost_tweak_cache cache;
        secp256k1_frost_secnonce secnonce[2];
        secp256k1_frost_pubnonce pubnonce[2];
        const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pubnonce_ptrs[2];
        secp256k1_frost_aggnonce aggnonce;
        secp256k1_frost_session session;
        secp256k1_frost_partial_sig partial_sig[2];
        const secp256k1_frost_partial_sig *partial_sig_ptrs[2];
        unsigned char session_secrand[2][32];

        pubnonce_ptrs[0] = &pubnonce[0];
        pubnonce_ptrs[1] = &pubnonce[1];
        partial_sig_ptrs[0] = &partial_sig[0];
        partial_sig_ptrs[1] = &partial_sig[1];

        /* All public inputs are derived from defined memory. key is reused as
         * the base of the (secret) threshold key and session randomness. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
        memcpy(thresh_seckey, key, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
        thresh_seckey[0] = thresh_seckey[0] + 1;
        memcpy(session_secrand[0], key, 32);
        session_secrand[0][0] = session_secrand[0][0] + 2;
        memcpy(session_secrand[1], key, 32);
        session_secrand[1][0] = session_secrand[1][0] + 3;

        /* Test frost_trusted_dealer_keygen. The threshold secret key and the
         * resulting secret shares are secret; the threshold public key and
         * the public shares are public. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(thresh_seckey, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
        ret = secp256k1_frost_trusted_dealer_keygen(ctx, secshares, &thresh_pk, pubshares, 2, 2, thresh_seckey);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&thresh_pk, sizeof(thresh_pk));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares, sizeof(pubshares));

        /* The session setup uses only public inputs. */
        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_tweak_cache_init(ctx, &cache, &thresh_pk) == 1);
        /* Make sure that previous tests don't undefine msg. It's not used as a secret here. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));

        /* Test frost_nonce_gen. The session randomness and the secret share
         * are secret; the pubnonce is public. The secnonce stays secret. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand[i], 32);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(ctx, &secnonce[i], &pubnonce[i], session_secrand[i], &secshares[32 * i], &pubshares[i], NULL, msg, 32, NULL, 0);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&pubnonce[i], sizeof(pubnonce[i]));
        }

        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_nonce_agg(ctx, &aggnonce, NULL, pubnonce_ptrs, 2) == 1);
        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_session_init(ctx, &session, &aggnonce, frost_ids, pubshares, 2, 2, 2, &cache, msg, 32) == 1);

        /* Test frost_sign. The secret share is secret (the secnonce is
         * tainted through the tainted session randomness; its magic bytes
         * must remain defined for the validity check). The partial signature
         * is public. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_frost_sign(ctx, &partial_sig[i], &secnonce[i], &secshares[32 * i], &session, frost_ids, pubshares, 2, frost_ids[i]);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&partial_sig[i], sizeof(partial_sig[i]));
        }
        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_partial_sig_agg(ctx, sig, NULL, &session, partial_sig_ptrs, 2) == 1);

        /* Test frost_deterministic_sign. The secret share is secret; the
         * pubnonce and the partial signature are public. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            secp256k1_frost_pubnonce det_pubnonce;
            secp256k1_frost_partial_sig det_partial_sig;

            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_frost_deterministic_sign(ctx, &det_partial_sig, &det_pubnonce, &secshares[32 * i], frost_ids[i], &aggnonce, frost_ids, pubshares, 2, 2, 2, &cache, msg, 32, NULL);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&det_pubnonce, sizeof(det_pubnonce));
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&det_partial_sig, sizeof(det_partial_sig));
        }
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_CHILLDKG
    {
        /* Full ChillDKG session with n = 2, t = 2 (pmsg1: 227 bytes, cmsg1:
         * 357 bytes, cert: 128 bytes, recovery data: 394 bytes). */
        unsigned char hostseckeys[2][32];
        unsigned char hostpubkeys[2 * 33];
        unsigned char dkg_random[2][32];
        unsigned char aux_rands[2][32];
        secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_state1 state1[2];
        secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_state2 state2[2];
        secp256k1_chilldkg_coordinator_state cstate;
        unsigned char pmsgs1[2][227];
        const unsigned char *pmsgs1_ptrs[2];
        unsigned char cmsg1[357];
        unsigned char pmsgs2[2][64];
        const unsigned char *pmsgs2_ptrs[2];
        unsigned char cmsg2[128];
        unsigned char secshare32[32];
        unsigned char thresh_pk33[33];
        unsigned char pubshares33[2 * 33];
        unsigned char recovery[394];
        unsigned char rec_secshare32[32];
        unsigned char rec_thresh_pk33[33];
        unsigned char rec_pubshares33[33 * SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_MAX_PARTICIPANTS];
        unsigned char rec_hostpubkeys33[33 * SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_MAX_PARTICIPANTS];
        unsigned char ack_sig[64];
        size_t rec_n;
        uint32_t rec_t;
        uint32_t fault_index;
        secp256k1_chilldkg_fault fault;

        pmsgs1_ptrs[0] = pmsgs1[0];
        pmsgs1_ptrs[1] = pmsgs1[1];
        pmsgs2_ptrs[0] = pmsgs2[0];
        pmsgs2_ptrs[1] = pmsgs2[1];

        /* All public inputs are derived from defined memory. key is reused as
         * the base of the (secret) host keys, session randomness and
         * auxiliary randomness. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            memcpy(hostseckeys[i], key, 32);
            hostseckeys[i][0] = hostseckeys[i][0] + 4 + i;
            memcpy(dkg_random[i], key, 32);
            dkg_random[i][0] = dkg_random[i][0] + 6 + i;
            memcpy(aux_rands[i], key, 32);
            aux_rands[i][0] = aux_rands[i][0] + 8 + i;
        }

        /* Test chilldkg_hostpubkey_gen. The host secret keys are secret; the
         * host public keys are public. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_chilldkg_hostpubkey_gen(ctx, &hostpubkeys[33 * i], hostseckeys[i]);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&hostpubkeys[33 * i], 33);
        }

        /* Test chilldkg_participant_step1. The host secret key and the
         * session randomness are secret; pmsg1 and the state1 object (which
         * contains no secrets) are public. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[i], 32);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(dkg_random[i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_step1(ctx, &state1[i], pmsgs1[i], hostseckeys[i], hostpubkeys, 2, 2, dkg_random[i]);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pmsgs1[i], sizeof(pmsgs1[i]));
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&state1[i], sizeof(state1[i]));
        }

        /* The coordinator's steps use only public inputs. */
        fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_coordinator_step1(ctx, &cstate, cmsg1, &fault_index, pmsgs1_ptrs, hostpubkeys, 2, 2);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
        CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);

        /* Test chilldkg_participant_step2. The host secret key and the aux
         * randomness are secret; the CertEq signature is public. The state2
         * object contains the secret share and stays secret. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[i], 32);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(aux_rands[i], 32);
            fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_step2(ctx, &state2[i], pmsgs2[i], &fault_index, NULL, &state1[i], hostseckeys[i], cmsg1, aux_rands[i]);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
            CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pmsgs2[i], sizeof(pmsgs2[i]));
        }

        fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_coordinator_finalize(ctx, cmsg2, thresh_pk33, pubshares33, recovery, &fault_index, &cstate, pmsgs2_ptrs);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
        CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);

        /* Test chilldkg_participant_finalize. The state2 input and the
         * secshare output are secret; the threshold public key, the public
         * shares and the recovery data are public. */
        fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_finalize(ctx, secshare32, thresh_pk33, pubshares33, recovery, &fault_index, &state2[0], cmsg2);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
        CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(thresh_pk33, sizeof(thresh_pk33));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares33, sizeof(pubshares33));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(recovery, sizeof(recovery));

        /* Test chilldkg_participant_recover. The host secret key and the
         * recovered secret share are secret; the recovery data and the
         * remaining outputs are public. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[0], 32);
        fault = secp256k1_chilldkg_participant_recover(ctx, rec_secshare32, rec_thresh_pk33, rec_pubshares33, rec_hostpubkeys33, &rec_n, &rec_t, &fault_index, hostseckeys[0], recovery, sizeof(recovery));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&fault, sizeof(fault));
        CHECK(fault == SECP256K1_CHILLDKG_OK);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(rec_thresh_pk33, sizeof(rec_thresh_pk33));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(rec_pubshares33, 2 * 33);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(rec_hostpubkeys33, 2 * 33);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&rec_n, sizeof(rec_n));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&rec_t, sizeof(rec_t));
        CHECK(rec_n == 2 && rec_t == 2);

        /* Test chilldkg_recovery_ack_sign. The host secret key and the aux
         * randomness are secret; the acknowledgment signature is public. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(hostseckeys[0], 32);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(aux_rands[0], 32);
        ret = secp256k1_chilldkg_recovery_ack_sign(ctx, ack_sig, hostseckeys[0], hostpubkeys, 2, 2, recovery, sizeof(recovery), aux_rands[0]);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(ack_sig, sizeof(ack_sig));
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_PREFRACTAL
    {
        /* A 2-of-2 nested group with one stock musig cosigner, taken as far as
         * one signature share. Secret here is the threshold key, the secret
         * shares derived from it, and the session randomness the nonces come
         * from. Not secret: the identifiers, the public shares, the threshold
         * public key, both aggregate nonces, the outer keyagg cache, b_frost,
         * and the resulting partial signature. */
        unsigned char thresh_seckey[32];
        unsigned char secshares[2 * 32];
        unsigned char session_secrand[2][32];
        unsigned char cosigner_seckey[32];
        secp256k1_pubkey thresh_pk, pubshares[2], cosigner_pk;
        const secp256k1_pubkey *outer_pubkeys[2];
        uint32_t pf_ids[2] = { 0, 1 };
        secp256k1_frost_tweak_cache pf_cache;
        secp256k1_frost_secnonce pf_secnonce[2];
        secp256k1_frost_pubnonce pf_pubnonce[2];
        const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pf_pubnonce_ptrs[2];
        secp256k1_frost_aggnonce pf_aggnonce;
        secp256k1_frost_partial_sig pf_partial_sig;
        secp256k1_xonly_pubkey outer_xonly;
        secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache outer_cache;
        secp256k1_musig_pubnonce group_pubnonce, cosigner_pubnonce;
        const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *just_cosigner[1];
        secp256k1_musig_secnonce cosigner_secnonce;
        secp256k1_musig_aggnonce cosigner_aggnonce;
        unsigned char cosigner_secrand[32];

        pf_pubnonce_ptrs[0] = &pf_pubnonce[0];
        pf_pubnonce_ptrs[1] = &pf_pubnonce[1];

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
        memcpy(thresh_seckey, key, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
        thresh_seckey[0] = thresh_seckey[0] + 4;
        memcpy(cosigner_seckey, key, sizeof(cosigner_seckey));
        cosigner_seckey[0] = cosigner_seckey[0] + 5;
        memcpy(session_secrand[0], key, 32);
        session_secrand[0][0] = session_secrand[0][0] + 6;
        memcpy(session_secrand[1], key, 32);
        session_secrand[1][0] = session_secrand[1][0] + 7;
        memcpy(cosigner_secrand, key, 32);
        cosigner_secrand[0] = cosigner_secrand[0] + 8;
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(thresh_seckey, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
        ret = secp256k1_frost_trusted_dealer_keygen(ctx, secshares, &thresh_pk, pubshares, 2, 2, thresh_seckey);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&thresh_pk, sizeof(thresh_pk));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares, sizeof(pubshares));
        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_tweak_cache_init(ctx, &pf_cache, &thresh_pk) == 1);

        /* The outer aggregation and the cosigner's round one are entirely
         * public as far as this module is concerned. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(cosigner_seckey, sizeof(cosigner_seckey));
        ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &cosigner_pk, cosigner_seckey);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&cosigner_pk, sizeof(cosigner_pk));
        outer_pubkeys[0] = &thresh_pk;
        outer_pubkeys[1] = &cosigner_pk;
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(ctx, &outer_xonly, &outer_cache, outer_pubkeys, 2) == 1);

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(cosigner_secrand, sizeof(cosigner_secrand));
        ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(ctx, &cosigner_secnonce, &cosigner_pubnonce, cosigner_secrand, cosigner_seckey, &cosigner_pk, msg, &outer_cache, NULL);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&cosigner_pubnonce, sizeof(cosigner_pubnonce));
        just_cosigner[0] = &cosigner_pubnonce;
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(ctx, &cosigner_aggnonce, just_cosigner, 1) == 1);

        /* Group round one. msg is NULL: the wire nonce is published before the
         * message is known. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand[i], 32);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(ctx, &pf_secnonce[i], &pf_pubnonce[i], session_secrand[i], &secshares[32 * i], &pubshares[i], NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&pf_pubnonce[i], sizeof(pf_pubnonce[i]));
        }
        /* Aggregation is over published nonces only, so it is public. */
        CHECK(secp256k1_prefractal_nonce_agg(ctx, &group_pubnonce, &pf_aggnonce, pf_pubnonce_ptrs, pf_ids, 2, &thresh_pk) == 1);

        /* The share and the secnonce are secret; the partial signature is the
         * public output. */
        ret = secp256k1_prefractal_sign(ctx, &pf_partial_sig, &pf_secnonce[0], &secshares[0], pf_ids[0], pf_ids, pubshares, 2, &pf_aggnonce, &thresh_pk, &pf_cache, &outer_cache, &cosigner_aggnonce, msg);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&pf_partial_sig, sizeof(pf_partial_sig));
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_FROST_ENROLLMENT
    {
        /* A 2-of-3 group enrolling a fourth participant, taken through all
         * three rounds. Secret here is the threshold key, the secret shares
         * derived from it, the session randomness the split comes from, and
         * every delta and sigma value on the wire -- those are additive shares
         * of real secret shares. Not secret: the identifiers, the public
         * shares, the threshold public key, the parameters hashes, and the
         * public share derived for the new participant. */
        unsigned char thresh_seckey[32];
        unsigned char secshares[3 * 32];
        unsigned char session_secrand[2][32];
        unsigned char shares[2][2 * 32];
        unsigned char all_shares[2 * 32];
        unsigned char received_hashes[2 * 32];
        unsigned char params_hashes[2][32];
        unsigned char sigmas[2 * 32];
        unsigned char new_secshare[32];
        unsigned char direct_hash[32];
        secp256k1_pubkey thresh_pk, pubshares[3], new_pubshare;
        uint32_t fe_ids[2] = { 0, 1 };
        uint32_t mismatch_id;
        int j;

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
        memcpy(thresh_seckey, key, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
        thresh_seckey[0] = thresh_seckey[0] + 9;
        memcpy(session_secrand[0], key, 32);
        session_secrand[0][0] = session_secrand[0][0] + 10;
        memcpy(session_secrand[1], key, 32);
        session_secrand[1][0] = session_secrand[1][0] + 11;

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(thresh_seckey, sizeof(thresh_seckey));
        ret = secp256k1_frost_trusted_dealer_keygen(ctx, secshares, &thresh_pk, pubshares, 3, 2, thresh_seckey);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&thresh_pk, sizeof(thresh_pk));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares, sizeof(pubshares));

        /* The parameters hash and the public share at the target identifier
         * are functions of public data alone. */
        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_enrollment_params_hash(ctx, direct_hash, &thresh_pk, fe_ids, 2, 3, 3, 2) == 1);
        CHECK(secp256k1_frost_enrollment_pubshare_derive(ctx, &new_pubshare, pubshares, fe_ids, 2, 3, 3, 2) == 1);

        /* Round 1.1. The seed and the secret share are secret; the parameters
         * hash is public, the delta values are not. */
        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand[i], 32);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(&secshares[32 * i], 32);
            ret = secp256k1_frost_enrollment_shares_gen(ctx, shares[i], params_hashes[i], session_secrand[i], &secshares[32 * i], &thresh_pk, fe_ids, 2, fe_ids[i], 3, 3, 2);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(params_hashes[i], 32);
        }

        /* Round 1.2, for both helpers. The delta values stay secret through
         * the sum; only the return value is examined. */
        for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
            memset(received_hashes, 0, sizeof(received_hashes));
            for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
                memcpy(&all_shares[32 * i], &shares[i][32 * j], 32);
                if (i != j) {
                    memcpy(&received_hashes[32 * i], params_hashes[i], 32);
                }
            }
            ret = secp256k1_frost_enrollment_share_agg(ctx, &sigmas[32 * j], &mismatch_id, all_shares, received_hashes, &thresh_pk, fe_ids, 2, fe_ids[j], 3, 3, 2);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
        }

        /* Round 2, with both optional checks on. The resulting share is
         * secret; the verification against the expected public share is the
         * one place a secret-derived point is deliberately declassified. */
        ret = secp256k1_frost_enrollment_secshare_gen(ctx, new_secshare, sigmas, &thresh_pk, fe_ids, 2, 3, 3, 2, params_hashes[0], &new_pubshare);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
    }
#endif

#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ICEBERG
    {
        /* A 3-of-5 group, dealt from `key` and taken as far as one signature
         * share. Secret here is the dealer's root seed and everything the
         * module derives from it: the per-subset seeds, the key share, and the
         * two nonce shares. Not secret: participant indices, the group and
         * threshold, every Lagrange weight, the commitments, the session label,
         * and both nonce coefficients. */
        enum { ICEBERG_N = 5, ICEBERG_T = 3, ICEBERG_MU = 2 * ICEBERG_T - 1 };
        secp256k1_iceberg_share shares[ICEBERG_N];
        secp256k1_iceberg_share *share_ptr[ICEBERG_N];
        secp256k1_iceberg_share_cache share_cache;
        secp256k1_iceberg_pubshare pubshares[ICEBERG_N];
        const secp256k1_iceberg_pubshare *pubshare_ptr[ICEBERG_N];
        secp256k1_iceberg_pubnonce nonces[ICEBERG_N];
        const secp256k1_iceberg_pubnonce *nonce_ptr[ICEBERG_N];
        secp256k1_iceberg_aggnonce iceberg_aggnonce;
        secp256k1_iceberg_partial_sig iceberg_psig;
        secp256k1_musig_pubnonce group_pubnonce, cosigner_pubnonce;
        const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *cosigner_ptr[1];
        secp256k1_musig_secnonce cosigner_secnonce;
        secp256k1_musig_aggnonce cosigner_aggnonce;
        secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache iceberg_cache;
        secp256k1_pubkey group_pk, cosigner_pk;
        const secp256k1_pubkey *iceberg_pk_ptr[2];
        unsigned char share_bytes[SECP256K1_ICEBERG_SHARE_MAX_LEN];
        unsigned char sid[32], cosigner_secrand[32];
        size_t share_len;
        int party;

        for (party = 0; party < ICEBERG_N; party++) {
            share_ptr[party] = &shares[party];
            pubshare_ptr[party] = &pubshares[party];
            nonce_ptr[party] = &nonces[party];
        }
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
        /* The cosigner needs randomness distinct from the dealer's root seed;
         * any perturbation of `key` will do. */
        memcpy(cosigner_secrand, key, sizeof(cosigner_secrand));
        cosigner_secrand[0] = cosigner_secrand[0] + 3;
        CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key));
        CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &cosigner_pk, &keypair));

        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
        ret = secp256k1_iceberg_shares_gen(ctx, share_ptr, ICEBERG_N, ICEBERG_T, key);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        /* Storing and restoring a share moves seed material through a buffer,
         * which is where a length or an offset computed from it would show. */
        share_len = sizeof(share_bytes);
        ret = secp256k1_iceberg_share_serialize(ctx, share_bytes, &share_len, &shares[0]);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        ret = secp256k1_iceberg_share_parse(ctx, &shares[0], share_bytes, share_len);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);

        ret = secp256k1_iceberg_share_cache_create(ctx, &share_cache, &shares[0]);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        /* The header says the cache holds no secret, and this is the line that
         * makes that a result rather than a claim. Every byte of it must be
         * defined: the weights come from the group size, the threshold and the
         * participant index, all of which are public, and none of them from a
         * seed. Declassifying is not the same test: it would say the value may be
         * published, where this says nothing secret reached it. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_CHECK(&share_cache, sizeof(share_cache));

        for (party = 0; party < ICEBERG_N; party++) {
            ret = secp256k1_iceberg_pubshare_gen(ctx, &pubshares[party], &shares[party],
                                                 party == 0 ? &share_cache : NULL);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
        }

        /* A commitment is public, and so is everything built from one. */
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(pubshares, sizeof(pubshares));
        CHECK(secp256k1_iceberg_pubkey_agg(ctx, &group_pk, pubshare_ptr, ICEBERG_MU, ICEBERG_N, ICEBERG_T) == 1);

        iceberg_pk_ptr[0] = &group_pk;
        iceberg_pk_ptr[1] = &cosigner_pk;
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(ctx, NULL, &iceberg_cache, iceberg_pk_ptr, 2));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(cosigner_secrand, sizeof(cosigner_secrand));
        ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(ctx, &cosigner_secnonce, &cosigner_pubnonce,
                                        cosigner_secrand, NULL, &cosigner_pk, msg,
                                        &iceberg_cache, NULL);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&cosigner_pubnonce, sizeof(cosigner_pubnonce));
        cosigner_ptr[0] = &cosigner_pubnonce;
        CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(ctx, &cosigner_aggnonce, cosigner_ptr, 1));
        memset(sid, 0x7e, sizeof(sid));  /* public: the label is the caller's to choose */

        for (party = 0; party < ICEBERG_MU; party++) {
            ret = secp256k1_iceberg_nonce_gen(ctx, &nonces[party], &shares[party],
                                              party == 0 ? &share_cache : NULL, sid);
            SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
            CHECK(ret == 1);
        }
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(nonces, sizeof(nonces));
        CHECK(secp256k1_iceberg_nonce_agg(ctx, &group_pubnonce, &iceberg_aggnonce,
                                          nonce_ptr, ICEBERG_MU, ICEBERG_N, ICEBERG_T, &group_pk) == 1);

        ret = secp256k1_iceberg_partial_sign(ctx, &iceberg_psig, &shares[0], &share_cache,
                                             sid, nonce_ptr, ICEBERG_MU, &group_pk,
                                             &iceberg_cache, msg, &cosigner_aggnonce);
        SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
        CHECK(ret == 1);
    }
#endif
}

#if defined(__GNUC__)
# pragma GCC diagnostic pop
#endif