secp256k1-zkp/include/secp256k1_frost.h

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#ifndef SECP256K1_FROST_H
#define SECP256K1_FROST_H
#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#include <stdint.h>
/** This code is currently a work in progress. It's not secure nor stable.
* IT IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND RECKLESS TO USE THIS MODULE IN PRODUCTION!
*
* This module implements a variant of Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr
* Threshold Signatures (FROST) by Chelsea Komlo and Ian Goldberg
* (https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/frost/).
*
* Following the convention used in the MuSig module, the API uses the singular
* term "nonce" to refer to the two "nonces" used by the FROST scheme.
*/
/** Opaque data structures
*
* The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
* guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. If you
* need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or
* comparison, use the corresponding serialization and parsing functions.
*/
/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's _secret_ share.
*
* Guaranteed to be 36 bytes in size. Serialized and parsed with
* `frost_share_serialize` and `frost_share_parse`.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[36];
} secp256k1_frost_share;
/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's _secret_ nonce.
*
* Guaranteed to be 68 bytes in size.
*
* WARNING: This structure MUST NOT be copied or read or written to directly.
* A signer who is online throughout the whole process and can keep this
* structure in memory can use the provided API functions for a safe standard
* workflow. See
* https://blockstream.com/2019/02/18/musig-a-new-multisignature-standard/ for
* more details about the risks associated with serializing or deserializing
* this structure.
*
* We repeat, copying this data structure can result in nonce reuse which will
* leak the secret signing key.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[68];
} secp256k1_frost_secnonce;
/** Opaque data structure that holds a signer's public nonce.
*
* Guaranteed to be 132 bytes in size. It can be safely copied/moved.
* Serialized and parsed with `frost_pubnonce_serialize` and
* `frost_pubnonce_parse`.
*/
typedef struct {
unsigned char data[132];
} secp256k1_frost_pubnonce;
/** Parse a signer's public nonce.
*
* Returns: 1 when the nonce could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: nonce: pointer to a nonce object
* In: in66: pointer to the 66-byte nonce to be parsed
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_parse(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *nonce,
const unsigned char *in66
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Serialize a signer's public nonce
*
* Returns: 1 when the nonce could be serialized, 0 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: out66: pointer to a 66-byte array to store the serialized nonce
* In: nonce: pointer to the nonce
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_pubnonce_serialize(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
unsigned char *out66,
const secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *nonce
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Serialize a FROST share
*
* Returns: 1 when the share could be serialized, 0 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: out32: pointer to a 32-byte array to store the serialized share
* In: share: pointer to the share
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_share_serialize(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
unsigned char *out32,
const secp256k1_frost_share *share
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Parse a FROST share.
*
* Returns: 1 when the share could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: share: pointer to a share object
* In: in32: pointer to the 32-byte share to be parsed
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_share_parse(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_share *share,
const unsigned char *in32
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
/** Creates key shares
*
* To generate a key, each participant generates a share for each other
* participant. For example, in the case of 2 particpants, Alice and Bob, they
* each generate 2 shares, distribute 1 share to each other using a secure
* channel, and keep 1 for themselves.
*
* Each participant must transmit shares over secure channels to each other
* participant.
*
* Each call to this function must have a UNIQUE and uniformly RANDOM seed32
* that must that must NOT BE REUSED in subsequent calls to this function and
* must be KEPT SECRET (even from other participants).
*
* Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: shares: pointer to the key shares
* vss_commitment: pointer to the VSS commitment
* pok64: pointer to the proof of knowledge
* In: seed32: 32-byte random seed as explained above. Must be
* unique to this call to secp256k1_frost_shares_gen
* and must be uniformly random.
* threshold: the minimum number of signers required to produce a
* signature
* n_participants: the total number of participants
* ids33: array of 33-byte participant IDs
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_shares_gen(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_share *shares,
secp256k1_pubkey *vss_commitment,
unsigned char *pok64,
const unsigned char *seed32,
size_t threshold,
size_t n_participants,
const unsigned char * const* ids33
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8);
/** Aggregates shares
*
* As part of the key generation protocol, each participant receives a share
* from each participant, including a share they "receive" from themselves.
* This function verifies those shares against their VSS commitments,
* aggregates the shares, and then aggregates the commitments to each
* participant's first polynomial coefficient to derive the aggregate public
* key.
*
* If this function returns an error, `secp256k1_frost_share_verify` can be
* called on each share to determine which participants submitted faulty
* shares.
*
* Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise (which does NOT mean
* the resulting signature verifies).
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* Out: agg_share: the aggregated share
* agg_pk: the aggregated x-only public key
* In: shares: all key generation shares for the partcipant's index
* vss_commitments: coefficient commitments of all participants ordered by
* the x-only pubkeys of the participants
* n_shares: the total number of shares
* threshold: the minimum number of shares required to produce a
* signature
* id33: the 33-byte ID of the participant whose shares are being
* aggregated
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_share_agg(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_share *agg_share,
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *agg_pk,
const secp256k1_frost_share * const *shares,
const secp256k1_pubkey * const *vss_commitments,
size_t n_shares,
size_t threshold,
const unsigned char *id33
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(8);
/** Verifies a share received during a key generation session
*
* The signature is verified against the VSS commitment received with the
* share. This is only useful for purposes of determining which share(s) are
* invalid if share_agg returns an error.
*
* Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the share does not verify, 1
* otherwise
* Args ctx: pointer to a context object
* In: threshold: the minimum number of signers required to produce a
* signature
* id33: the 33-byte participant ID of the share recipient
* share: pointer to a key generation share
* vss_commitment: the VSS commitment associated with the share
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_frost_share_verify(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
size_t threshold,
const unsigned char *id33,
const secp256k1_frost_share *share,
const secp256k1_pubkey * const *vss_commitment
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
/** Computes a public verification share used for verifying partial signatures
*
* Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid, 1 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
* In: pubshare: pointer to a struct to store the public verification
* share
* threshold: the minimum number of signers required to produce a
* signature
* id33: the 33-byte participant ID of the participant whose
* partial signature will be verified with the pubshare
* vss_commitments: coefficient commitments of all participants
* n_participants: the total number of participants
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_compute_pubshare(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_pubkey *pubshare,
size_t threshold,
const unsigned char *id33,
const secp256k1_pubkey * const *vss_commitments,
size_t n_participants
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
/** Starts a signing session by generating a nonce
*
* This function outputs a secret nonce that will be required for signing and a
* corresponding public nonce that is intended to be sent to other signers.
*
* FROST, like MuSig, differs from regular Schnorr signing in that
* implementers _must_ take special care to not reuse a nonce. This can be
* ensured by following these rules:
*
* 1. Each call to this function must have a UNIQUE session_id32 that must NOT BE
* REUSED in subsequent calls to this function.
* If you do not provide a seckey, session_id32 _must_ be UNIFORMLY RANDOM
* AND KEPT SECRET (even from other signers). If you do provide a seckey,
* session_id32 can instead be a counter (that must never repeat!). However,
* it is recommended to always choose session_id32 uniformly at random.
* 2. If you already know the seckey, message or aggregate public key, they
* can be optionally provided to derive the nonce and increase
* misuse-resistance. The extra_input32 argument can be used to provide
* additional data that does not repeat in normal scenarios, such as the
* current time.
* 3. Avoid copying (or serializing) the secnonce. This reduces the possibility
* that it is used more than once for signing.
*
* Remember that nonce reuse will leak the secret key!
* Note that using the same agg_share for multiple FROST sessions is fine.
*
* Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid and 1 otherwise
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static)
* Out: secnonce: pointer to a structure to store the secret nonce
* pubnonce: pointer to a structure to store the public nonce
* In: session_id32: a 32-byte session_id32 as explained above. Must be
* unique to this call to secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen and
* must be uniformly random unless you really know what you
* are doing.
* agg_share: the aggregated share that will later be used for
* signing, if already known (can be NULL)
* msg32: the 32-byte message that will later be signed, if
* already known (can be NULL)
* agg_pk: the FROST-aggregated public key (can be NULL)
* extra_input32: an optional 32-byte array that is input to the nonce
* derivation function (can be NULL)
*/
SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_frost_nonce_gen(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_frost_secnonce *secnonce,
secp256k1_frost_pubnonce *pubnonce,
const unsigned char *session_id32,
const secp256k1_frost_share *agg_share,
const unsigned char *msg32,
const secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *agg_pk,
const unsigned char *extra_input32
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif