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Verify signatures after signing

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As per [BIP-340, footnote 14][fn]:
> Verifying the signature before leaving the signer prevents random or
> attacker provoked computation errors. This prevents publishing invalid
> signatures which may leak information about the secret key. It is
> recommended, but can be omitted if the computation cost is prohibitive.

[fn]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki#cite_note-14
This commit is contained in:
Scott Robinson 2022-08-15 15:07:14 +10:00
parent 9f9ffd0efd
commit 7b1ad1b629
No known key found for this signature in database
1 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions
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16
src/wallet/signer.rs
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@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ fn sign_psbt_ecdsa(
hash_ty: EcdsaSighashType,
secp: &SecpCtx,
) {
let sig = secp.sign_ecdsa(
&Message::from_slice(&hash.into_inner()[..]).unwrap(),
secret_key,
);
let msg = &Message::from_slice(&hash.into_inner()[..]).unwrap();
let sig = secp.sign_ecdsa(msg, secret_key);
secp.verify_ecdsa(msg, &sig, &pubkey.inner)
.expect("invalid or corrupted ecdsa signature");
let final_signature = ecdsa::EcdsaSig { sig, hash_ty };
psbt_input.partial_sigs.insert(pubkey, final_signature);
@ -504,10 +504,10 @@ fn sign_psbt_schnorr(
Some(_) => keypair, // no tweak for script spend
};
let sig = secp.sign_schnorr(
&Message::from_slice(&hash.into_inner()[..]).unwrap(),
&keypair,
);
let msg = &Message::from_slice(&hash.into_inner()[..]).unwrap();
let sig = secp.sign_schnorr(msg, &keypair);
secp.verify_schnorr(&sig, msg, &XOnlyPublicKey::from_keypair(&keypair))
.expect("invalid or corrupted schnorr signature");
let final_signature = schnorr::SchnorrSig { sig, hash_ty };