diff --git a/Comments:BIP-0340.md b/Comments:BIP-0340.md
index 03ab45c..e93aca5 100644
--- a/Comments:BIP-0340.md
+++ b/Comments:BIP-0340.md
@@ -94,4 +94,9 @@ Here is the link to said paper = https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3372297.3417268
 
 1. https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/5/draft
 
-2. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/023.pdf 
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+2. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/023.pdf
+
+
+----
+
+The comments above appear to be misinformed. Nearly all ECDSA implementations today, including all the ones used in Bitcoin software that I know about, already use derandomized RFC6979 nonce generation for secp256k1. BIP340 too specifies such a nonce generation algorithm - one that is inspired by Ed25519's in fact. It permits adding randomness as research has shown this improves resistance to certain fault & side-channel attacks, but the randomness is not critical for security (it is purely additive). Lastly, the entire nonce generation concern is an implementation aspect that's orthogonal for the signature scheme - it can be done well, or badly, either with ECDSA or Schnorr/BIP340. BIP340 chooses to specify it, in the hope that implementations adopt it as a best practice, but circumstances may call for alternative nonce generation algorithms too.
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