Address sipa's comments

bip-schnorr.mediawiki

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ encodings and operations.
 
 We choose the ''R''-option to support batch verification.
 
-'''Key prefixing''' When using the verification rule above directly, it is possible for a third party to convert a signature ''(R,s)'' for key ''P'' into a signature ''(R,s + ahash(R || m))'' for key ''P + aG'' and the same message, for any integer ''a''. This is not a concern for Bitcoin currently, as all signature hashes indirectly commit to the public keys. However, this may change with proposals such as SIGHASH_NOINPUT ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki BIP 118]), or when the signature scheme is used for other purposes&mdash;especially in combination with schemes like [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki BIP32]'s unhardened derivation. To combat this, we choose ''key prefixed''<ref>A limitation of committing to the public key (rather than to a short hash of it, or not at all) is that it removes the ability for public key recovery or verifying signatures against a short public key hash. These constructions are generally incompatible with batch verification.</ref> Schnorr signatures; changing the equation to ''sG = R + hash(R || P || m)P''.
+'''Key prefixing''' When using the verification rule above directly, it is possible for a third party to convert a signature ''(R,s)'' for key ''P'' into a signature ''(R,s + a⋅hash(R || m))'' for key ''P + aG'' and the same message, for any integer ''a''. This is not a concern for Bitcoin currently, as all signature hashes indirectly commit to the public keys. However, this may change with proposals such as SIGHASH_NOINPUT ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki BIP 118]), or when the signature scheme is used for other purposes&mdash;especially in combination with schemes like [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki BIP32]'s unhardened derivation. To combat this, we choose ''key prefixed''<ref>A limitation of committing to the public key (rather than to a short hash of it, or not at all) is that it removes the ability for public key recovery or verifying signatures against a short public key hash. These constructions are generally incompatible with batch verification.</ref> Schnorr signatures; changing the equation to ''sG = R + hash(R || P || m)P''.
 
 '''Encoding R and public key point P''' There exist several possibilities for encoding elliptic curve points:
 # Encoding the full X and Y coordinates of ''P'' and ''R'', resulting in a 64-byte public key and a 96-byte signature.