bitcoin/bips
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/bitcoin/bips.git synced 2026-09-21 19:04:28 +00:00
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #2259 from ViniciusCestarii/pseudocode-bip-324

Browse Source 
bip324: fix handshake pseudocode errors
This commit is contained in:
Murch
2026-09-18 11:49:14 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 55083d36dd 9571907539
commit 658fe07449
1 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

8
bip-0324.mediawiki
View File

@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ def initialize_v2_transport(peer, ecdh_secret, initiating):
peer.recv_garbage_terminator = initiator_garbage_terminator peer.recv_garbage_terminator = initiator_garbage_terminator
# To achieve forward secrecy we must wipe the key material used to initialize the ciphers: # To achieve forward secrecy we must wipe the key material used to initialize the ciphers:
memory_cleanse(ecdh_secret, prk, initiator_L, initiator_P, responder_L, responder_K) memory_cleanse(ecdh_secret, prk, initiator_L, initiator_P, responder_L, responder_P)
</pre> </pre>
The session ID uniquely identifies the encrypted channel. v2 clients supporting this proposal may present the entire session ID (encoded as a hex string) to the node operator to allow for manual, out of band comparison with the peer node operator. Future transport versions may introduce optional authentication methods that compare the session ID as seen by the two endpoints in order to bind the encrypted channel to the authentication. The session ID uniquely identifies the encrypted channel. v2 clients supporting this proposal may present the entire session ID (encoded as a hex string) to the node operator to allow for manual, out of band comparison with the peer node operator. Future transport versions may introduce optional authentication methods that compare the session ID as seen by the two endpoints in order to bind the encrypted channel to the authentication.
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ def respond_v2_handshake(peer, garbage_len):
if peer.received_prefix[-1] != V1_PREFIX[len(peer.received_prefix) - 1]: if peer.received_prefix[-1] != V1_PREFIX[len(peer.received_prefix) - 1]:
peer.privkey_ours, peer.ellswift_ours = ellswift_create() peer.privkey_ours, peer.ellswift_ours = ellswift_create()
peer.sent_garbage = rand_bytes(garbage_len) peer.sent_garbage = rand_bytes(garbage_len)
send(peer, ellswift_Y + peer.sent_garbage) send(peer, peer.ellswift_ours + peer.sent_garbage)
return return
use_v1_protocol() use_v1_protocol()
</pre> </pre>
@@ -363,13 +363,13 @@ Upon receiving the encoded responder public key, the initiator derives the share
<pre> <pre>
def complete_handshake(peer, initiating, decoy_content_lengths=[]): def complete_handshake(peer, initiating, decoy_content_lengths=[]):
received_prefix = b'' if initiating else peer.received_prefix received_prefix = b'' if initiating else peer.received_prefix
ellswift_theirs = receive(peer, 64 - len(received_prefix)) ellswift_theirs = received_prefix + receive(peer, 64 - len(received_prefix))
if not initiating and ellswift_theirs[4:16] == V1_PREFIX[4:16]: if not initiating and ellswift_theirs[4:16] == V1_PREFIX[4:16]:
# Looks like a v1 peer from the wrong network. # Looks like a v1 peer from the wrong network.
disconnect(peer) disconnect(peer)
ecdh_secret = v2_ecdh(peer.privkey_ours, ellswift_theirs, peer.ellswift_ours, ecdh_secret = v2_ecdh(peer.privkey_ours, ellswift_theirs, peer.ellswift_ours,
initiating=initiating) initiating=initiating)
initialize_v2_transport(peer, ecdh_secret, initiating=True) initialize_v2_transport(peer, ecdh_secret, initiating=initiating)
# Send garbage terminator # Send garbage terminator
send(peer, peer.send_garbage_terminator) send(peer, peer.send_garbage_terminator)
# Optionally send decoy packets after garbage terminator. # Optionally send decoy packets after garbage terminator.