mirror of
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips.git
synced 2025-05-12 12:03:29 +00:00
[BIP-119] Whitspace Consistency
This commit is contained in:
parent
b305d56352
commit
6058f2f669
@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ for purposes of confirmation using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. Then, some time later, t
|
|||||||
be expanded out of that UTXO when the demand for blockspace is decreased. These payments can be
|
be expanded out of that UTXO when the demand for blockspace is decreased. These payments can be
|
||||||
structured in a tree-like fashion to reduce individual costs of redemption.
|
structured in a tree-like fashion to reduce individual costs of redemption.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The below chart showcases the structure of these transactions in comparison to
|
The below chart showcases the structure of these transactions in comparison to
|
||||||
normal transactions and batched transactions.
|
normal transactions and batched transactions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -71,6 +70,7 @@ is provided in this BIP's subdirectory.
|
|||||||
<img src="bip-0119/fifty.png" align="middle"></img>
|
<img src="bip-0119/fifty.png" align="middle"></img>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
===Payment Channels===
|
===Payment Channels===
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
There are numerous payment channel related uses.
|
There are numerous payment channel related uses.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====Channel Factories====
|
====Channel Factories====
|
||||||
@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ penultimate transaction node.
|
|||||||
Thus, coins sent using a congestion controlled transaction can still enjoy instant liquidity.
|
Thus, coins sent using a congestion controlled transaction can still enjoy instant liquidity.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====Non-Interactive Channels====
|
====Non-Interactive Channels====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
When opening a traditional payment channel, both parties to the channel must participate. This is
|
When opening a traditional payment channel, both parties to the channel must participate. This is
|
||||||
because the channel uses pre-signed multi-sig transactions to ensure that a channel can always be
|
because the channel uses pre-signed multi-sig transactions to ensure that a channel can always be
|
||||||
exited by either party, before entering.
|
exited by either party, before entering.
|
||||||
@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ for their private key to be online.
|
|||||||
<img src="bip-0119/nic.svg" align="middle"></img>
|
<img src="bip-0119/nic.svg" align="middle"></img>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====Increased Channel Routes====
|
====Increased Channel Routes====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
In the Lightning Network protocol, Hashed Time Locked Contracts (HTLCS) are used in the construction
|
In the Lightning Network protocol, Hashed Time Locked Contracts (HTLCS) are used in the construction
|
||||||
of channels. A new HTLC is required per route that the channel is serving in.
|
of channels. A new HTLC is required per route that the channel is serving in.
|
||||||
In BOLT #2, this maximum number of HTLCs in a channel is hard limited to 483 as the maximum safe
|
In BOLT #2, this maximum number of HTLCs in a channel is hard limited to 483 as the maximum safe
|
||||||
@ -107,7 +109,6 @@ HTLCS.
|
|||||||
Because each HTLC can have its own relative time lock in the tree, this also improves the latency
|
Because each HTLC can have its own relative time lock in the tree, this also improves the latency
|
||||||
sensitivity of the lightning protocol on contested channel close.
|
sensitivity of the lightning protocol on contested channel close.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
===Wallet Vaults===
|
===Wallet Vaults===
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
When greater security is required for cold storage solutions, there can be
|
When greater security is required for cold storage solutions, there can be
|
||||||
@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ before. Further Each participant doesn't need to know the totality of the outpu
|
|||||||
that output, they only have to verify their own sub-tree will pay them.
|
that output, they only have to verify their own sub-tree will pay them.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
==Detailed Specification==
|
==Detailed Specification==
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The below code is the main logic for verifying CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, and is the canonical
|
The below code is the main logic for verifying CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, and is the canonical
|
||||||
specification for the semantics of OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY.
|
specification for the semantics of OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -203,7 +205,6 @@ The hash is computed as follows:
|
|||||||
return h.GetSHA256();
|
return h.GetSHA256();
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
A PayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash output matches the following template:
|
A PayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash output matches the following template:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
bool CScript::IsPayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash() const
|
bool CScript::IsPayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash() const
|
||||||
@ -234,7 +235,6 @@ SCRIPT_VERIFY_DEFAULT_CHECK_TEMPLATE_VERIFY_HASH flag is set, the network should
|
|||||||
execute a NOP4 as SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS for policy and a NOP for
|
execute a NOP4 as SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS for policy and a NOP for
|
||||||
consensus.
|
consensus.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
In order to facilitate using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, the common case of a
|
In order to facilitate using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, the common case of a
|
||||||
PayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash
|
PayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash
|
||||||
with no scriptSig data shall be made standard to permit relaying. Future template types may be
|
with no scriptSig data shall be made standard to permit relaying. Future template types may be
|
||||||
@ -245,17 +245,13 @@ standardized later as policy changes.
|
|||||||
A reference implementation and tests are available here:
|
A reference implementation and tests are available here:
|
||||||
https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bitcoin/tree/checktemplateverify.
|
https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bitcoin/tree/checktemplateverify.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
==Rationale==
|
==Rationale==
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The goal of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY is to be minimal impact on the existing codebase -- in the
|
The goal of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY is to be minimal impact on the existing codebase -- in the
|
||||||
future, as we become aware of more complex but shown to be safe use cases new template types can be added.
|
future, as we become aware of more complex but shown to be safe use cases new template types can be added.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Below we'll discuss the rules one-by-one:
|
Below we'll discuss the rules one-by-one:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====The DefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash of the transaction at the current input index matches the top of the stack====
|
====The DefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash of the transaction at the current input index matches the top of the stack====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The set of data committed to is a superset of data which can impact the TXID of the transaction,
|
The set of data committed to is a superset of data which can impact the TXID of the transaction,
|
||||||
@ -263,8 +259,6 @@ other than the inputs. This ensures that for a given known input, the TXIDs can
|
|||||||
of time. Otherwise, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY would not be usable for Channel Factory type constructions
|
of time. Otherwise, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY would not be usable for Channel Factory type constructions
|
||||||
as the redemption TXID could be malleated and pre-signed transactions invalidated.
|
as the redemption TXID could be malleated and pre-signed transactions invalidated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
=====Committing to the version and locktime=====
|
=====Committing to the version and locktime=====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Were these values not committed, it would be possible to delay the spending of
|
Were these values not committed, it would be possible to delay the spending of
|
||||||
@ -296,7 +290,6 @@ precomputed for each transaction to optimize SIGHASH_ALL signatures.
|
|||||||
Committing to the hash additionally makes it simpler to construct DefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash safely and unambiguously from
|
Committing to the hash additionally makes it simpler to construct DefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash safely and unambiguously from
|
||||||
script.
|
script.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
=====Committing to the number of inputs=====
|
=====Committing to the number of inputs=====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If we allow more than one input to be spent in the transaction then it would be
|
If we allow more than one input to be spent in the transaction then it would be
|
||||||
@ -459,7 +452,6 @@ does not make sense for input index to be the last field. However, given the des
|
|||||||
able to express a "don't care" index easily (e.g., for decentralized kickstarter-type transactions),
|
able to express a "don't care" index easily (e.g., for decentralized kickstarter-type transactions),
|
||||||
this value is placed last.
|
this value is placed last.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
===Design Tradeoffs and Risks===
|
===Design Tradeoffs and Risks===
|
||||||
Covenants have historically been controversial given their potential for fungibility risks -- coins
|
Covenants have historically been controversial given their potential for fungibility risks -- coins
|
||||||
could be minted which have a permanent restriction on how they may or may not be spent or required
|
could be minted which have a permanent restriction on how they may or may not be spent or required
|
||||||
@ -474,10 +466,10 @@ transactions which create all the inputs directly in this regard.
|
|||||||
Furthermore, templates are restricted to be spendable as a known number of inputs only, preventing
|
Furthermore, templates are restricted to be spendable as a known number of inputs only, preventing
|
||||||
unintentional introduction of the 'half spend' problem.
|
unintentional introduction of the 'half spend' problem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Templates, as restricted as they are, bear some risks.
|
Templates, as restricted as they are, bear some risks.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====Permanently Unspendable Outputs====
|
====Permanently Unspendable Outputs====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The preimage argument passed to CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY may be unknown or otherwise unsatisfiable.
|
The preimage argument passed to CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY may be unknown or otherwise unsatisfiable.
|
||||||
However, requiring knowledge that an address is spendable from is incompatible with sender's ability
|
However, requiring knowledge that an address is spendable from is incompatible with sender's ability
|
||||||
to spend to any address (especially, OP_RETURN). If a sender needs to know the template can be spent
|
to spend to any address (especially, OP_RETURN). If a sender needs to know the template can be spent
|
||||||
@ -485,6 +477,7 @@ from before sending, they may request a signature of an provably non-transaction
|
|||||||
from the leafs of the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY tree.
|
from the leafs of the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY tree.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====Forwarding Addresses====
|
====Forwarding Addresses====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Key-reuse with CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY may be used as a form of "forwarding address contract".
|
Key-reuse with CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY may be used as a form of "forwarding address contract".
|
||||||
A forwarding address is an address which can automatically execute in a predefined way.
|
A forwarding address is an address which can automatically execute in a predefined way.
|
||||||
For example, a exchange's hot wallet might use an address which can automatically be moved to a cold
|
For example, a exchange's hot wallet might use an address which can automatically be moved to a cold
|
||||||
@ -510,7 +503,6 @@ reuse-unsafe.
|
|||||||
Because CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY commits to the input index currently being spent, reused-keys are
|
Because CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY commits to the input index currently being spent, reused-keys are
|
||||||
guaranteed to execute in separate transactions which reduces the risk of "half-spend" type issues.
|
guaranteed to execute in separate transactions which reduces the risk of "half-spend" type issues.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====NOP-Default and Standardness Rules====
|
====NOP-Default and Standardness Rules====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If the argument length is not exactly 32, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY treats it as a NOP.
|
If the argument length is not exactly 32, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY treats it as a NOP.
|
||||||
@ -523,8 +515,8 @@ stricter standardness rules to be enforced during consensus. Should that develop
|
|||||||
transaction directly to the network relying on standardness rejection, an standardness-invalid but
|
transaction directly to the network relying on standardness rejection, an standardness-invalid but
|
||||||
consensus-valid transaction may be caused, leading to a potential loss of funds.
|
consensus-valid transaction may be caused, leading to a potential loss of funds.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
====Feature Redundancy====
|
====Feature Redundancy====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY templates are substantially less risky than other covenant systems. If
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY templates are substantially less risky than other covenant systems. If
|
||||||
implemented, other covenant systems could make the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's functionality redundant.
|
implemented, other covenant systems could make the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's functionality redundant.
|
||||||
However, given CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's simple semantics and low on chain cost it's likely that it
|
However, given CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's simple semantics and low on chain cost it's likely that it
|
||||||
@ -538,7 +530,6 @@ unintended behavior.
|
|||||||
Alternatively, SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT based covenant designs can implement
|
Alternatively, SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT based covenant designs can implement
|
||||||
something similar to templates, via a scriptPubKey like:
|
something similar to templates, via a scriptPubKey like:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<sig of desired TX with PK and fixed nonce R || SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT <PK with public SK> OP_CHECKSIG
|
<sig of desired TX with PK and fixed nonce R || SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT <PK with public SK> OP_CHECKSIG
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT bears additional technical and implementation risks
|
SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT bears additional technical and implementation risks
|
||||||
@ -564,7 +555,6 @@ than CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, and encumbers additional verification overhead absent
|
|||||||
from CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. These types of covenants also bear similar potential
|
from CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. These types of covenants also bear similar potential
|
||||||
recursion issues to OP_COV which make it unlikely for inclusion in Bitcoin.
|
recursion issues to OP_COV which make it unlikely for inclusion in Bitcoin.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Given the simplicity of this approach to implement and analyze, and the benefits realizable by user
|
Given the simplicity of this approach to implement and analyze, and the benefits realizable by user
|
||||||
applications, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's template based approach is proposed in lieu of more complete
|
applications, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's template based approach is proposed in lieu of more complete
|
||||||
covenants system.
|
covenants system.
|
||||||
@ -575,6 +565,7 @@ This section describes updates to OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY that are possible in
|
|||||||
the future as well as synergies with other possible upgrades.
|
the future as well as synergies with other possible upgrades.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
=====CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY Versions=====
|
=====CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY Versions=====
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY currently only verifies properties of 32 byte arguments.
|
OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY currently only verifies properties of 32 byte arguments.
|
||||||
In the future, meaning could be ascribed to other length arguments. For
|
In the future, meaning could be ascribed to other length arguments. For
|
||||||
example, a 33-byte argument could just the last byte as a control program. In
|
example, a 33-byte argument could just the last byte as a control program. In
|
||||||
@ -623,6 +614,7 @@ concatenates it to the template and checks the template matches the transaction.
|
|||||||
OP_SIZE 4 OP_EQUALVERIF
|
OP_SIZE 4 OP_EQUALVERIF
|
||||||
<nVersion || nLockTime || input count || sequences hash || output count || outputs hash>
|
<nVersion || nLockTime || input count || sequences hash || output count || outputs hash>
|
||||||
OP_SWAP OP_CAT OP_SHA256 OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
|
OP_SWAP OP_CAT OP_SHA256 OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
== Backwards Compatibility ==
|
== Backwards Compatibility ==
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY replaces a OP_NOP4 with stricter verification semantics. Therefore, scripts
|
OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY replaces a OP_NOP4 with stricter verification semantics. Therefore, scripts
|
||||||
@ -638,13 +630,11 @@ Older wallet software will be able to accept spends from OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
|
|||||||
require an upgrade in order to treat PayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash chains with a confirmed ancestor as
|
require an upgrade in order to treat PayToBareDefaultCheckTemplateVerifyHash chains with a confirmed ancestor as
|
||||||
being "trusted" (i.e., eligible for spending before the transaction is confirmed).
|
being "trusted" (i.e., eligible for spending before the transaction is confirmed).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Backports of OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY can be trivially prepared (see the reference implementation)
|
Backports of OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY can be trivially prepared (see the reference implementation)
|
||||||
for older node versions that can be patched but not upgraded to a newer major release.
|
for older node versions that can be patched but not upgraded to a newer major release.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
== References ==
|
== References ==
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*[https://utxos.org utxos.org informational site]
|
*[https://utxos.org utxos.org informational site]
|
||||||
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxsjdIl0034&t=2451 Scaling Bitcoin Presentation]
|
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxsjdIl0034&t=2451 Scaling Bitcoin Presentation]
|
||||||
*[https://bitcoinops.org/en/newsletters/2019/05/29/ Optech Newsletter Covering OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY]
|
*[https://bitcoinops.org/en/newsletters/2019/05/29/ Optech Newsletter Covering OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY]
|
||||||
@ -656,6 +646,7 @@ for older node versions that can be patched but not upgraded to a newer major re
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
===Note on Similar Alternatives===
|
===Note on Similar Alternatives===
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
An earlier version of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY, is withdrawn
|
An earlier version of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY, is withdrawn
|
||||||
in favor of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY did not commit to the
|
in favor of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY did not commit to the
|
||||||
version or lock time and was thus insecure.
|
version or lock time and was thus insecure.
|
||||||
@ -668,4 +659,5 @@ CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY has also been previously referred to as OP_SECURETHEBAG, whi
|
|||||||
to aid in searching and referencing discussion on this BIP.
|
to aid in searching and referencing discussion on this BIP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
==Copyright==
|
==Copyright==
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This document is licensed under the 3-clause BSD license.
|
This document is licensed under the 3-clause BSD license.
|
||||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user